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Preface 
Producing a report on an election requires the collaboration of many people. 
The initial planning for these studies began in 1986 during meetings of the 
Department of Political and Administrative Studies at the University of Papua 
New Guinea (UPNG). The group involved rapidly grew beyond the 
department and included other social scientists at UPNG and several 
colleagues from other universities. Both before and after the elections, 
seminars were organized at which preliminary papers were presented by those 
who had indicated an interest in research on various aspects the election. 
Some participants were in the end unable to write the papers they had 
originally planned, but contributed nonetheless to the development of our 
ideas on what the election was all about. 
Funds for the preparation and publication of this collection of studies 
came in major part from the Research and Publications Committee of UPNG. 
In addition, a particularly valuable grant was provided by the International 
Development Research Centre of Canada, earmarked for the participation of 
students in the gathering of data and especially in the administering of the 
interview schedules used in Yaw Saffu's survey, reported in Chapter 2. We 
are grateful to both bodies for their support. 
Throughout the work on the election studies, innumerable demands were 
made on the Electoral Commission of Papua New Guinea We are grateful to 
Luke Lucas, the Commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo, the Deputy Commissioner, 
and to the staff of the Commission for their unfailing courtesy and 
helpfulness. 
The final editing, and the preparation of photo-ready copy for printing, 
took place both at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies at 
UPNG and at the Department of Political and Social Change, Research 
School of Pacific Studies (RSPacS) , the Australian National University 
(ANU), where the editor was a visiting fellow early in 1 989. Both 
departments were hospitable to our research and generously provided space 
and materials. Typing at UPNG was done by Dimas Belik, and the 
coordination of pre-election research was done by U me Suve. Lulu Turner in 
Canberra was responsible for typing, layout, editing, and preparing 
manuscripts for printing. Joan Oliver contributed many hours of editing. 
Adri Govers, head of UPNG' s publications office saw the book through the 
printing stages. Thanks are due to all of them for their patience and 
dedication. 
The maps and several of the tables used in the book were painstakingly 
produced by the Geography Department of UPNG and by the Cartography 
Unit of RSPacS at ANU, to whom we are grateful. 
After the death of Iambakey Okuk, the great Highlands leader, one of the 
outstanding artists in Papua New Guinea, Kauage, produced a series of 
pictures depicting Okuk's life and political career. I approached him in the 
hope of getting his permission to use one of these, which depicted election 
campaigning, as a cover for our book. Kauage's response was marvellous. 
He immediately set about adapting one of his pictures and provided all the 
lettering for the cover as well. We are delighted to think of him as a valued 
collaborator in producing this book. 
It is impossible to name each person who helped make this book possible, 
but I know I speak for all the contributors in thanking them very warmly. 
Michael Oliver Canberra, May 1989. 
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1 
Intro d u ct i o n  
MICHAEL OLIVER 
Introduction 1 
STUDYING ELECTIONS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
In 1987, Papua New Guinea held its sixth national election; its third since 
Independence in 1975. Each one of the previous elections was the subject of 
a book, to which many students of Papua New Guinea contributed (Bettison, 
Hughes and van der Veur 1965; Epstein, Parker and Reay 197 1 ;  Stone 1976; 
Hegarty 1977; King forthcoming). They constitute a remarkable record and 
make it possible to trace the evolution of PNG politics in greater detail than in 
many developed countries. This study of the 1987 election owes a great deal 
to those that went before it, but a deliberate decision was taken not to try to 
replicate them. Had one wanted to do so, it would have been difficult, for 
each of the previous studies differed from all the others. Nevertheless, some 
constants can be found. Every study included one or more chapter on the 
overall significance of the election. In addition, each one included 
constituency studies, where the local level, the competition amongst 
candidates, was the focus. The present volume follows its predecessors to 
that extent. 
This introduction will look at the interrelationships among parties, the 
election and government. There will follow a chapter that marks a 'first' in 
Papua New Guinea: an analysis of the results of a survey of attitudes and 
opinions based on a nation-wide sample, undertaken by Yaw Saffu and the 
students who worked with him. Bernard Wijeweera will then draw our 
attention to the rules of the election game and the logistical tasks which have 
to be performed if votes are to be successfully cast by scattered peoples, 
living in terrain which is extraordinarily difficult to penetrate. 
Papua New Guinea is a state with nineteen provinces, grouped together in 
areas called Papua, the Highlands, the Islands and Mamose. (The name 
Mamose is a composite of the first two letters of the four North-West 
provinces of the former New Guinea coast, Madang, Morobe, (East and 
West) Sepik. It was formerly spelled Momase) . Ray Anere looks at the 
regionalism which results and its effect on voting. Mark Turner shows us in 
his chapter that the education levels of candidates and members elected is still 
rising and that youth is no disadvantage in appealing for votes. 
Papua New Guinea's elections are not noted for their focus on national 
issues and Rosemary Preston shows how little the situation had changed in 
1987. Women had never played a large role in politics, and Eileen Wormald 
tries to discover why the 1987 national election failed to send even one 
woman to parliament. Finally, a special minority in PNG, the Chinese, is 
looked at in terms of its political attitudes and behaviour by Margaret Willson. 
The chapters on constituencies follow, with a fair distribution having 
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been achieved among the country's four main regions. Papua is represented 
by Kerema Open (Oliver) and Central Provincial (lamo ); the Highlands by 
Simbu (Brown) and Hagen Open (Burton); the Islands by Namatanai Open 
(MacQueen), Manus Open and Provincial (Wanek and Wormald) and North 
Solomons (Griffin with Kawona); and Mamose by Angoram Open (May). 
Throughout the book, the role of the political party is touched on in one 
way or another. An understanding of the place of political parties is a key to 
answering the question: what do Papua New Guinea's elections decide? Not 
all of the contributors will agree with the answers given to that question in the 
section that follows. The analysis and argument are those of the author, but 
discussions with all of the contributors and a careful reading of their work 
have been invaluable in arriving at the conclusions that have been reached. 
Aftermath of the 1987 election 
Before trying to understand the election, an account of results and their 
aftermath must be presented. Other information will be found in the 
Appendices. A record number of 1515 candidates contested the 109 seats in 
the National Parliament in 1987 (Turner and Hegarty 1987). Five hundred 
and fifty-six candidates were endorsed by one (or more) of the fifteen parties 
in the field and the remaining 959 were Independents. Of the sitting members 
who contested the election, only 53.8 per cent were returned (Electoral 
Commission 1987a). 
Citing returns by party is hazardous, for the process of switching from 
one party to another began before the results of three postponed elections 
came in. Between the end of polling and the time of voting for the Prime 
Minister on 5 August 1987, the picture changed radically due to Independents 
moving into one or another party's ranks, switches of party allegiance, the 
results of one of three postponed elections, and the death of an elected 
member (Electoral Commission 1987 a and 1987b; Turner and Hegarty 1987), 
as shown in Table 1 .  
The prime ministership went to the leader of  the People's Democratic 
Movement, Paias Wingti, who at the last moment put together a winning 
coalition of PDM, PPP, NP, PAP, PP, UP, and Independents. The 
opposition was led by Michael Somare, who was later replaced by a new 
leader of Pangu Pati and the present Prime Minister, Rabbie Namaliu. 
Table 1 
Affiliation 
Pangu Pati 
People's Democratic Movement (PDM) 
National Party (NP) 
Melanesian Alliance (MA) 
People's Action Party (PAP) 
People's Progress Party (PPP) 
Morobe Independents Group (MIG) 
League for National Advancement (LNA) 
Papua Party (PP) 
United Party (UP) 
Independents 
Poll's End 
26 
17 
12 
7 
6 
5 
4 
3 
3 
1 
22 
5 Aug 87 
27 
26 
10 
7 
14 
10 
4 
3 
3 
2 
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WHAT DO PAPUA NEW GUINEA 'S ELECTIONS DECIDE? 
After an election in Britain, or New Zealand or Canada or Australia or the 
United States, it makes sense to ask: Which party won the election? Who 
will be the Prime Minister? Did the people throw the old government out or 
return it to power? What policies did the voters seem to favour? 
After PNG elections are over, one is no closer to answering those 
questions than before the voting began. Yet they are the normal questions 
that people from outside ask. Indeed some observers, especially if they 
come from Australia or another Commonwealth country or the US, jump to 
the conclusion that there is something radically wrong with PNG politics if, 
after an election is over, these questions cannot be answered. For an 
observer from Italy, or someone who remembered the Third and Fourth 
republics of France, there would be nothing too strange about an inability to 
give answers, and indeed, such a person probably would have asked other 
questions. 
But most of the people who pay occasional attention to PNG politics do 
come from Australia, or Britain or New Zealand or North America, and 
indeed it is people who come from these countries who write the books and 
articles about politics which are most accessible in Papua New Guinea. So 
there is sometimes an apologetic note that creeps into Papua New Guineans' 
voices when they explain that PNG elections do not tell which party won, or 
who will form their government, or whether people liked or disliked the last 
government, or even whether some policies were or were not popular. 
Worse than that, the desire to fit PNG elections into a more familiar pattern 
from abroad, like the Australian one perhaps, leads commentators to pretend, 
even when we know better, that the PNG elections really do provide the 
answers to those questions. Indeed, one can be critical of the title of the book 
that will soon appear on the 1982 national election in PNG: Pangu Returns to 
Power. It can be questioned whether the editor or any of the contributors to 
the volume got enough information from the voting results to predict what 
party or parties would form the government. Certainly the 1987 election 
results gave no sure clues, for up until the last few days before Parliament 
met, most people would have bet that Mr. Somare would head a Pangu-based 
government. And, as we have seen, he did not. 
If the national elections of PNG do not give us answers to questions 
such as those posed thus far, what do they decide? The information we can 
pull from the election results is anything but simple and straightforward. 
Paradoxically, what the electors seem to be deciding and what the elections 
themselves decide are different. I� is important to identify that difference and 
try to decide what effect it has on the quality of democracy in PNG. 
Democracy 
The word democracy was just introduced, and attention must be paid to it 
before we go further, for elections have become an integral part of the 
representative brand of democracy. Almost every regime, no matter how 
repressive, has tried since World War II either to claim that it is a democracy 
or that it is setting the scene for democracy. The great legitimizing ritual of 
democracy has become the election, and particularly the election of members 
of the legislature, the law-making body. Even elections that seem spurious, 
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for they involve just saying 'yes' or 'no' to a single candidate, can be 
remarkably important as recent events in Chile, where people voted in a 
plebiscite to reject the single candidate General Pinochet, have shown. 
It will get too complicated, however, if we try to look at Papua New 
Guinea' s elections against the backdrop of every kind of election in every 
kind of state that claims it is a democracy. Instead, discussion will be limited 
to countries with government systems like that of PNG. These countries 
include those that follow what is often called the Westminster system and 
others that are most like them. One of the crucial things these governments 
have in common is that they are party governments. In each of them there are 
elections in which parties compete and which result in a party or parties 
winning control of government. Systems of government of this kind exist in 
almost all the countries of Western Europe except Switzerland (Katz 1987). 
They were the original basis of government in the ex-colonies of Britain and 
France, before military coups and the moves to single party systems took 
their toll, and they persist in some of them, including Papua New Guinea. 
Party Government 
Richard Katz (1987) , in a recent book entitled Party Governments, has 
provided an 'ideal type' description of party government and the myths that 
sustain it. 'Ideal type' definitions are not supposed to describe any existing 
entities. Rather, they lay out the characteristics towards which real entities are 
tending and which they would have if they were completely rational. Katz' 
description of party government sounds quite familiar, but it highlights some 
assumptions about this kind of democracy that are often made implicitly and 
are not examined at all carefully. 
Two of the main assumptions of party government were just introduced: 
(a) that there are free elections in which competing parties contend, and (b) 
that the party or parties that win the election control the government. Here are 
a few more, often corollaries of the two basic assumptions. Party government 
assumes that the public service, the bureaucracy, either is under direct party 
domination or, more usually, that it is made up of bureaucrats who are neutral 
and act according to the direction of whatever party is in power. It assumes 
that only political parties exercize politi�al power and therefore that all other 
organizations that want to advance their views and interests must seek to 
influence one or more parties. Finally, in party government, none of the 
competing claims to give legitimacy to the exercize of power count as much as 
electoral success. The bureaucrat's claim based on expertise, the aristocrat's 
claim based on birth and a tradition of public service, the priest's claim based 
on holiness, the soldier's claim based on knowing how to maintain law and 
order, the traditional chiefs claim based on custom, the businessman's claim 
based on success in amassing wealth and on hardheaded management skills -
all these are set aside and the party politician's claim, based on electoral 
success, is paramount. 
It must be emphasized again that no existing regime will have all the 
characteristics of 'ideal type' party government. In most, bureaucrats' and 
businessmen's competing claims for legitimate, independent power are given 
some recognition. Parties do not have everything their own way. But, this 
said, it is hard to put Papua New Guinea in the party government category 
because its political parties seem so weak and incoherent in comparison with 
the parties of other states who practice the same kind of democracy and have 
the same sort of elections. Yet there is no doubt that the national elections of 
PNG eventually produce party government. 
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Indeed, one of the effects of using Katz's concept of party government as 
the category in which to slot PNG, rather than, say, 'the Westminster 
system', is to highlight PNG's differences from many other states that 
occupy places in the category. But before we go too far in isolating PNG as 
peculiar, let us look more closely at some of the other countries which enjoy 
party government and have greater similarity to PNG. Katz stated that the 
result of election competition in party government was that a party or parties 
won control of government. Coalition governments, made up of two or more 
parties, are indeed more common than single party governments in the 'party 
government' family. They occur frequently if not invariably in West 
Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, the Scandinavian 
countries, Spain and Portugal, India, Sri Lanka - and the list can be extended. 
It is certainly not the fact that PNG has coalition governments that marks it off 
from other countries with 'party government'. 
In some of the countries listed, however, the composition of the coalition 
is known, roughly at least, in advance. Thus in West Germany, the dominant 
party in government will either be the Christian Democrats or the Social 
Democrats, even though neither may obtain sufficient seats to avoid a 
coalition. In France since the beginning of the 1980s, the groupings of parties 
on the right and parties on the left has become clear enough so that the voter 
knows in advance what effect his ballot is likely to have on the composition 
of government, even though he or she may vote for a minor party that on its 
own could not possibly constitute a government. In such countries, 
coalitions tend to be fairly stable. But more than that, they are countries where 
the electors' votes have a clear effect on, first, the composition of parliament 
and the relation of parties in terms of shares of power; secondly, the party 
composition of the coalition; and, thirdly, the individual who will be the head 
of government. This leads Katz to focus on whether a party system is 'bi­
polar' (with a party or cluster of parties around opposing positions) or 
'fragmented' (with parties occupying a variety of positions). This is, it can 
be argued, more useful than the old distinction between two-party and multi­
party systems. 
Italy is the leading example of the fragmented system of party 
government, and there coalitions are not easily predictable in advance and 
tend to be extremely unstable. Admittedly, the shuffles and reshuffles of 
ministers take place within a limited range - and exclude both the Communists 
on the far left and the neo-fascists on the far right. But, on the surface, 
Italy's version of party government seems to have real similarities to that of 
PNG. Certainly in Italy it is no easier to answer the four questions asked at 
the outset than it is in PNG. Italians who read election results know little 
more than Papua New Guineans which parties have won control of 
government, who will be the prime minister, whether the old government was 
approved of or rejected, or what set of policies have been favoured by the 
voters. And the Italian voter has even less knowledge than the Papua New 
Guinean about how long any government that does get formed will last in 
office. 
It is generally agreed that the most successful forms of party government 
are those that tend towards a bi-polar form (eg. Britain, West Germany, 
Sweden). But it is also true that effective government has persisted for long 
periods in countries that have a fragmented party pattern. And if the only 
criticism one could reasonably make of PNG elections was that they resulted 
in unpredictable, multi-party coalitions, then Papua New Guineans could sit 
back in good company with Italians, Dutch, Belgians and quite a few others. 
But to understand PNG's elections and the problems they give rise to one 
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has to go deeper. Papua New Guinea stands out, it is suggested, because of 
the discontinuity between what the elections themselves decide, which is not 
very different from what they decide in many other party government 
countries, and what the voters in the election are voting for and think they are 
deciding. In short, it is the thesis of this chapter that voters think they are 
choosing individuals who will bring them local development and the election 
in fact chooses which parties will have a chance to govern. The gap between 
these two, it may be suggested, is uncomfortable and potentially dangerous. 
Parties in Papua New Guinea 
The role of the political party is the most important element in the discrepancy 
between what the electors believe they are doing and what the election in fact 
decides. Elections in Papua New Guinea on the face of it seem to produce 
party government and voters seem to be voting for members of political 
parties. The results of the election, as the ballots are counted, are reported in 
terms of a party losing a seat here and gaining a seat there. Admittedly, 
independent candidates are more numerous and successful than we would 
find in most countries with party government, but still in 1987, party 
candidates on average took three of the five top ranking places in each 
electorate. Success in the election is more closely correlated with party 
membership than education, religion, age or several other factors that could 
explain why some candidates do well and others not so well. Independents 
may have won 22 seats in 1987, but party candidates won 87 seats. So what 
is the difficulty? Why is it being suggested that there is a discrepancy 
between what the voters do and what the election produces? 
The problem comes out when we look at two kinds of evidence. First, 
individual constituency studies and, secondly, the opinion survey data which 
Dr. Yaw Saffu (Chapter 2) is producing for the first time for Papua New 
Guinea. 
Case studies of individual electorates have been done ever since the 1964 
elections and they have filled a substantial part of the volumes of election 
studies that were put together for each subsequent election, in 1968, 1972, 
1977, 1982 and now 1987. Several factors are cited in these studies as the 
best explanations of why some candidates won and others lost. Clan loyalties 
and obligations, local popularity, the impact of cargo cults, the wealth of the 
candidates, the energy and skill they put into campaigning - all these and 
others have been put forward as the crucial determinants of voting behaviour 
in a given electorate. Party affiliation is almost never cited as primarily 
responsible for either success or failure. Here is a brief quotation from David 
Hegarty's introductory chapter to the book on the 1977 national elections 
(Hegarty 1983: 12): 
Most of the studies in this volume show that parties had very little 
impact at all on the voter. Goode ... , in his study of a "village view" 
of the election, shows that neither parties nor national issues were of 
concern to the voters. Goode suggests that villagers evaluate 
candidates in terms of the language group to which they belong; 
residential proximity; maturity; political and educational experience; 
kinship linkages; the place of origin of the candidate's wife or wives; 
and their perceived honesty or integrity ... .in general, elections remain 
very much local level contests. 
As the constituency studies written on the 1987 election came in, the same 
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kind of pattern emerged. Party membership either does not seem to count at 
all, or it is inextricably mixed in with personal and local factors. Norrie 
MacQueen's study of Namatanai Open (Chapter 14), where Sir Julius Chan 
won again, does not report that the reason for his success is that he represents 
PPP, but does take into account the probability that his leadership of that 
party, and the cabinet roles and the general power position that that leadership 
opened up for him, affected peoples' votes. Jim Griffin and Samuel Kawona 
write on the North Solomons where the Melanesian Alliance and John Momis 
maintained a strength which is hard to factor into personal and organizational 
components. But instances like these, where a prominent party leader was a 
candidate were the exception in 1987 as in previous elections, and in most of 
the electorates of the country, like Kerema Open, party affiliation was 
indiscernible as a factor influencing how the people voted. W ari Iamo, 
writing on Central province constituencies (Chapter 10) , gives party little 
weight; nor do Ron May on Angoram (Chapter 9) , Alexander Wanek and 
Eileen Wormald on Manus (Chapter 13) and Paula Brown on Simbu (Chapter 
16); 
Yaw Saffu's survey of people's attitudes to voting brings a new kind of 
evidence to bear on the question of the role of political parties. The study he 
has done is path-breaking. Working with students (mostly from UPNG) 
Dr. Saffu obtained interviews from 1127 electors in seventeen of the 19 
provinces and in the NCD. One of the crucial questions he asked was: 'What 
is it that you will look for in the candidate you will be voting for in 1987?' 
Only 3.4 percent gave party membership as their response, that is, thirty-two 
out of 941 respondents. 
The conclusion one is forced to, both from the case study evidence and 
the survey evidence, is that party counts for almost nothing in voters' minds. 
The question immediately arises: If that is the case, how do you explain the 
much greater success of party candidates than candidates who have no party 
connection (independents)? Why does party affiliation correlate quite well 
with an appearance in the top group of candidates, listed in order of the votes 
cast for them? 
The simple answer, which was first clearly stated by Peter King after the 
1982 election (King forthcoming), seems to be this: candidates do not win 
because they are endorsed by parties; rather, parties endorse candidates who 
are going to win. The process of selecting candidates is a crucial one for the 
success of a party and a great deal of time and effort goes into it. 
Furthermore, strong candidates seek party endorsement not because they 
think that endorsement itself is a vote-catcher, but because endorsement 
brings with it some other advantages. First, parties provide money, posters, 
buttons, T-shirts, transportation - the material base for an active campaign. 
Secondly, sophisticated candidates know that the selection of the Prime 
Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister and the other members of the National 
Executive Council ( the cabinet) is made as a consequence of party 
manouevring and bargaining. A strong independent member is not without 
resources in this manouevring, but normally the chance of a cabinet post, or 
real influence on those in power, improves considerably as a consequence of 
party membership. Put in another way, the candidates most likely to succeed 
know that Papua New Guinea has a system of party government. They are 
aware of the key characteristics of party government that we pointed out 
earlier: only parties exercise legitimate power; elections determine which party 
or parties control government. There may be exceptions, and the chances of 
an independent may be better in PNG than elsewhere, but still party matters, 
and matters a great deal, and politicians know it. 
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Where are we then? People vote in PNG elections believing that party 
doesn't matter. Politicians, especially the ablest ones, know party does 
matter. Herein lies the special problem of party government in this country. 
For in this discrepancy there may lie a major weakness of PNG democracy. 
To find out a little more about the implications of the perception gap, we must 
do several things. First, decide how important the discrepancy in perception 
is. Secondly, if it does seem important, try to understand why it occurs. 
Thirdly, ask whether remedies are needed, and if they are, (a) whether we 
should try to give greater coherence to the party system and thus to party 
government, or (b) whether there are alternatives to party government that we 
should be examining carefully. 
The Perception Gap 
Does it really matter that voters pay little attention to parties and politicians a 
good deal of attention? Perhaps the voters can get reasonable satisfaction 
from the way they cast their ballots even if, because they don't vote by party, 
they are not able consciously to influence the way government is formed and 
are not able to reward or punish governments by confirming them in office or 
throwing them out. One way of describing the process that actually goes on 
during and after an election is this: 
The voters in each locality, as Dr. Saffu's survey suggests, vote for the 
person whom they think has the best leadership qualities and is best able to 
bring development. The candidates who put themselves forward will often 
find it convenient to get a political party to bear part of their election costs and 
serve as a base for negotiations for a minister's portfolio. But most of them 
accept the voters' thinking as to why they were elected and set about filling 
voters expectations as best they can. They therefore only calculate the extent 
to which party loyalty is to their own, and their constituents, advantage and 
are prepared to shift and change when the situation demands it. They join in 
the moves to pass or block votes of lack of confidence that will change or 
reinforce the ministers who have the closest access to state power, always 
hoping to increase their own and their constituents' advantage. 
The logic of the election is that both voters and those elected accept that its 
purpose is to get access to the power and the resources that the state 
commands. In most developing countries, material advantage depends above 
all on success in obtaining access to the goods and services, the jobs and the 
benefits, the roads and the schools and the pensions, provided by the state. 
In more developed countries where the private sector is the chief source of 
people's incomes and the market is the chief provider of needed goods and 
services, politics can be less material, less local, less personal. Elections can 
be about foreign policy (though they rarely are) or trade policy or the extent of 
state regulation. But when jobs, subsidies, services and infrastrucure must 
be sought not in the market but through the state, politics becomes something 
close and personal or at least local, and matters like parties or 'who will form 
the next government' seem to be distractions that are not allowed to intrude. 
Now if this picture were the whole story, perhaps there would be little 
need to worry much about the future of democratic politics in PNG. But the 
trouble with it is that it puts an impossible burden on the individual MP. He 
(or too rarely she) gets chosen to bring development and gets rewarded or 
punished on the basis of whether development has been delivered. Yet the 
fundamental decisions about development are made by cabinet and by 
ministers who gain power through party coalitions. They are the ones that 
should be rewarded or punished in a democratic system that really makes 
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government accountable to the people. Yet when there is no party linkage, 
punishing an MP by not re-electing him does not punish the government in 
power. Thus the voter and the local MP, no matter how closely they may 
understand each other, are playing a largely irrelevant game. If the 
government closes down Ok Tedi mine, it makes little sense to punish Bob 
Bubec the local MP in North Fly Open. Only if punishing him were also a 
means of punishing the government of the day would voters be able to 
register their views effectively. 
There is nothing irrational about the way PNG voters behave at the polls. 
But because they are involved in a process that leads to party government and 
they are not taking party into account in their voting, their influence on what 
they are trying to control - the flow of development to their locality and group 
- is p artial and incomplete. This may not be too important if the country is 
growing and prospects for everyone getting a share of the growth seem 
reasonably good. The voter who lives in an area that is not yet prospering 
can argue that if he picks someone next election who has better leadership 
qualities and is more skilled at bringing development, he can remedy the 
situation, and the local share in the advantages of growth will be increased. 
But should the day come when the country as a whole seems to going 
down the wrong road or has come to a standstill, a serious form of frustration 
and disillusionment may set in. Voters may be convinced that the 
'government' should be doing something quite different; but realize too late 
that simply trying to choose a better local representative will have no effect on 
the situation. A system of elections that makes only local MPs responsible 
and does not let electors call governments to account must eventually lose its 
credibility. If the peoples' decisions in elections are to give legitimacy to 
government, they must be seen by the people to have a more direct effect on 
government than do the elections of Papua New Guinea. Up to the present, 
PNG has a voting public that still believes in the process.  Turnouts at 
elections are high and interest in politics is strong. Tolerance for the 
shenanigans of votes of confidence, and the incessant manouevring of 
members for advantage and power, seems high. Indeed, voters may take 
pride in the tactical skills of their representative as long as they think his 
search for greater personal advantage is also a search for more development 
for the electorate. But, tolerance can give way quickly to rejection, if things 
go wrong for the country as a whole and there is no way the citizen feels he 
can correct the situation through a voting system that is so narrowly focussed 
on the choice of local candidates. 
Why is the voter's perception of the electoral process so narrow? This 
question is vast one, but it must be raised, for if we are eventually going to 
want to change the electoral process, it is important to try to understand why 
it is the way it is today. A tentative proposition, which others have raised, 
can be suggested. The people of Papua New Guinea have never been 
mobilized on a nation-wide question. In many developing countries, the 
creation of a strong political party was the outcome of a struggle for liberation 
from colonial rule. Africa gives many examples - Kwame Nkrumah's 
Convention Peoples' Party in Ghana, Nyerere's T ANU in Tanzania and 
Kenyatta's KANU in Kenya come quickly to mind. In each case, the 
mobilization of a whole people around a liberation movement got transformed 
into an identification with a dominant party once independence had been 
achieved. In Papua New Guinea, the questions that attended the coming of 
independence were also the questions that brought political parties into 
existence in the country. But there was no prolonged struggle for liberation 
which demanded the mobilization of mass feelings and the creation of a mass 
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movement. Political parties were divided on the pace at which independence 
should come and the advantage that could be obtained in the process for 
various regions and groups. But they remained politicians' parties, not mass 
parties. In spite of Pangu Pati's attempt to go the mass party route, especially 
under the influence of Tony Voutas (Steven 1972) , the parties of PNG 
remained typical examples of 'cadre' parties, to use the term of Maurice 
Duverger, the French political scientist who inflenced thinking on parties so 
much in the 1950s (Duverger 1954). A cadre party was defined by Duverger 
in language which still rings remarkably true in PNG today, and might 
readily be applied to the founding of the Political Action Party under Ted 
Diro. 
The cadre party [is a] ... grouping of notabilities .. .Influential persons, 
in the first place, whose name, prestige, or connections can provide a 
backing for the candidate and secure him votes; experts, in the second 
place, who know how to handle the electors and how to organize a 
campaign; last of all financiers, who can bring the sinews of 
war . .. What the mass party secures by numbers, the cadre party 
achieves by selection. 
Although these parties of politicians and notables originally differentiated 
themselves at least in part on the basis of issues, they very soon became 
organizations for gaining access to governmental power pure and simple. 
Because they had not had to mobilize the electorate as a whole around a vital 
cause, like liberation, they were able to adapt themselves to the political 
culture of the village, rather than becoming an agency for the change in that 
political culture. A political party could be quite successful if it just picked as 
candidates the people who most closely met the image of the successful leader 
that village political culture produced. It did not have to appeal to a national 
mass audience. It didn't have to identify national issues which would evoke 
enthusiatic response over the entire country. All the party had to do was pick 
the right man in the right place and give him enough backing to let him win. 
The governmental system which PNG had adopted was party government 
and required the existence of political parties, but it soon was clear that an 
accumulation of support for local candidates was quite enough for party 
success and that a competitive nation-wide appeal either on issues or on the 
merits of rival teams of leaders was quite unnecessary. 
It should be stressed again how this differs from even the Italian kind of 
party government which involves unpredictable coalitions and a minimal 
direct control over government by the electorate. In Italy, parties are very 
important. People vote Communist, or Socialist or neo-fascist or Christian 
Democratic and not for the candidate and his personal qualities (Sartori 
1976:88) . It would of course be an exaggeration to say that in the other 
countries that enjoy party government voters always cast their ballots for a 
party rather than the individual, but it would be hard to find another example 
of party government where only 3.4 percent of the electors is likely to vote 
for the party. Papua New Guinea is remarkable, if not unique, in grafting 
village political perceptions onto a system of party government that seems 
inherently to demand a political culture that leads voters to choose on the basis 
of parties. To use Marxian language, PNG seems to be deep into a problem 
of articulating modes of production. A peasant mode creates a political 
consciousness, based on the understanding and values of subsistence­
agriculture villages, that fits very uneasily with a system of party government 
that requires the political consciousness of a quite different mode of 
production. 
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Two recent examples of new political formations in PNG bear out the 
case that party has significance only among politicians after elections and not 
with the voters during elections. Mr. Hugo Berghuser organized for the last 
election a 'Group of Independents' (Anere, Chapter 4). Each candidate 
presented himself to the voters as an independent, but because post-election 
manoeuvres for government formation and ministerial choice are better done 
from a group base, the temporary alliance was formed. At the right moment, 
Mr. Berghuser and others made their move and joined with Diro to form the 
Papuan Bloc. Utula Samana's Morobe Independents Group followed a 
similar strategy, although in this case Mr. Samana went the next step once 
cabinet manoeuvres were through and formed a political party with a potential 
nation-wide support base. In neither case did it seem necessary to present 
candidates to voters as party members. If the right candidates had been 
chosen, they would do just as well as independents, and post-election 
flexibility was maximized. 
A strange picture emerges. Papua New Guinea's political parties in many 
ways behave just as parties do in other states with party government systems. 
Before and during national elections, party conventions or conferences are 
held; party platforms are issued and distributed; press conferences are given 
by party leaders; campaign tours are organized with great fanfare. The 
leaders of the opposition parties in the old parliament denounce those who 
were in the government. Newspaper articles are written as if a party contest 
was underway. Is it all a sham and a facade? Perhaps not all, but the attempt 
to isolate a party influence in the actual choice made by voters produces little 
that we can get our teeth into. For example, in the North Solomons, the 
Melanesian Alliance seems to have great strength. But do voters cast their 
ballots for the party? or is Father John Momis' personal following the reason 
why voters support those he endorses? or does the Melanesian Alliance just 
have enough prestige and astuteness to pick the right candidates, the ones 
who will win? The answers are not entirely clear, but the case for party 
influence is certainly unproved. 
Promoting Party coherence 
Obviously a great many people share a concern about the weakness and 
incoherence of the political parties in Papua New Guinea and their lack of 
impact on the electorate. And where there are concerns, there will be attempts 
at remedy. One of these attempts was made by the Electoral Commissioner, 
Mr. Luke Lucas, for the 1987 election. The ballot paper included not only a 
picture of each candidate, but also a smaller photograph of the candidate's 
party leader. Voters simply couldn't ignore the fact that when voting for a 
candidate they were also voting for a party, unless of course they were 
supporting an Independent. No one, it seems, believes that the impact of this 
decision was significant; more than anything else, one suspects it raises the 
question of how far an Electoral Commissioner should go in attempting to 
influence the outcome of an election. 
More drastic measures have been proposed to cope with instability, for 
instability is often cited as the worst feature of the party system in Papua New 
Guinea. The constitution gives some protection already from the frivolous 
use of the vote of lack of confidence to destabilize government. It cannot be 
proposed during the first six months after a government takes office, and if it 
is moved successfully during the final year of the life of Parliament, it results 
in dissolution and a new general election rather than a change in government. 
12 MICHAEL OLNER 
The N amaliu government has indicated that it will bring in a constitutional 
amendment prolonging the initial period of grace enjoyed by a government, 
and just recently the premiers of the provinces have supported the idea of the 
first and the last twelve months of a government's life being free from threat 
of dismissal. Such a reform has a great deal to recommend it, but it shifts to 
the courts, the press, and the senior bureaucrats the onus of keeping the 
government within reasonable bounds in using its great powers. Stretching 
out the period of grace to twelve months seems safe enough. To prolong it 
much further raises the possibility of a government that is unable to get a 
majority in Parliament even to pass supply bills to provide the money to keep 
the government going, yet which cannot be forced out of office, short of 
Parliament dissolving itself and calling a new election under Section 105C of 
the constitution. 
Another proposal that looks as if it will gather strong support is the 
reduction of the time between the end of the election and the formation of a 
new government. In 1987, the lengthy period between the final count (15 
July) and the first meeting of Parliament (August 5) permitted a incredible 
display of seduction, bribing, and coercing of independents and small party 
groups as the two rival groups led by Mr. Somare and Mr. Wingti tried to 
assure themselves a majority of Parliamentary votes. Allowing less time for 
these manoeuvers is no major change, but it may at least decrease the 
indignity of the present procedure for government formation. 
In the Report of the Electoral Commissioner (Electoral Commission 
1987b) and in the papers presented at a seminar on elections held earlier this 
year a number of other possible changes were analyzed. They illustrate the 
difficulties of remedying deficiencies in a party system by changes in rules 
and procedures. One scheme, for example, sought to deter members from 
switching from one party to another by requiring them to face a by-election if 
they changed. Unfortunately, the likely consequence of such a rule would be 
to increase yet again the number of candidates who stood as independents in 
the next national election, thus making themselves immune from this penalty. 
In 1982, 60 percent of the candidates ran under party labels and they captured 
79 percent of the vote. In 1987, only 37 percent of the candidates were 
endorsed by a party and they received only 59 percent of votes cast (Turner 
and Hegarty 1987), (nevertheless, they made up 79 per cent of those elected). 
Any measure that caused a further reduction in party-affiliated candidates 
would make Papua New Guinea a doubtful candidate for the party 
government category. 
A deliberate move away from party government 
But perhaps that is the direction in which Papua New Guinea should go. 
Perhaps we should stop trying to find ways of changing the political culture 
of Papua New Guinean villages and of persuading the Papua New Guinean 
voter to pay attention to parties. Perhaps we should stop trying to show the 
mass of voters that only by voting along party lines can they exercize any 
direct influence on who is prime minister, who forms the government, and 
with what mandate. There are alternatives - and not just the dead ends of 
military rule, or a single party state, or the rule of 'experts' (technocrats/ 
bureaucrats). One of the most interesting aspects of the analysis of party 
government in Richard Katz' book ( 1987) is the suggestion that the 
presidential/congressional system of the United States really falls outside the 
definition of party government. 
Nowadays the Republican and the Democratic candidates for the 
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presidency are not really the nominees of their party organizations at all. Rival 
candidates for the right to represent the party organize their own primary 
election campaigns and by the time the party conventions come around, there 
is nothing left for the party delegates or the old party bosses in their smoke­
filed rooms to decide. They are committed to follow the primary results. In 
the words of a well known analyst of American politics, Austin Ranney, 
"both parties have become little more than passive arenas within which the 
real political actors - groups committed to particular candidates and particular 
issue positions - contend for the nominations. The prizes are the two parties' 
labels, but the parties no longer control who wears them." (cited in Katz 
1987) 
Once someone has been elected President, whether he bears a Democratic 
or Republican label, he neither needs nor can count on the support of elected 
members of the legislature, Congress. He is slightly more likely to have his 
wishes respected by those in Congress who have the same party label, but he 
can be sure that normally they will be more interested in the views of their 
constituents, or those of the powerful interests groups within their states or 
districts, than in his own views. At any rate, he is sure of being in power for 
four years unless something perfectly awful, like Watergate, occurs. 
In brief, parties remain the means of organizing American politics, but 
elections are much more a series of competitions among individual 
candidates, both at the presidential and the congressional levels, than between 
parties; parties show very little internal coherence; and it is not a political 
party that gains control of government after an election, but an individual 
president, along with a collection of highly individualistic congressmen and 
senators who pay little attention to party discipline. 
Let us now try to think about the consequences of bringing such a system 
into Papua New Guinea. People have worried about government instability 
and the frequency of votes of no confidence. Perhaps these concerns have 
been somewhat overstated - five successful votes of no confidence in thirteen 
years does not have to strike terror in one's heart. But it may be sensible to 
worry about how long the country can tolerate governments that cannot be 
made accountable to the electors and which can engage in irresponsible power 
manoeuvres without an electoral penalty being applied. 
In one stroke, a switch to the Presidential system would seem to solve 
these problems. Government would be stable for the full term of the directly 
elected president. And the Papua New Guinean elector's desire to choose as 
his representative to the legislature the person whose leadership qualities 
made him most likely to bring development to his electorate could be satisfied 
completely. Parties would still probably be formed to enable joint campaigns 
to be run - though they would not need to be any more rigid or durable than 
Mr. Berghuser's 'Group of Independents' - but they could be completely 
ignored by the voter who was assured of some influence directly on 
government by his vote for the presidential candidate of his choice. For that 
decision, the voter would soon learn that an effective vote required him to do 
more than favour a local favourite son and the notion of accountability, at 
least after every term of office, could take hold. Elections would still impart 
legitimacy, but to persons and not to parties. 
Before one goes overboard in favour of this option, thought should be 
giveQ to the experience of the Philippines and of some South American states 
who have tried this option, with results that chill any first enthusiasm. 
Nevertheless, it can be argued that a country that has not succeeded in taking 
parties seriously should be asking itself whether it should try to find ways of 
retaining democracy while making parties less important. The alternative of . 
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tinkering with rules and incentives may not be a very promising one. 
The Waiting Game? 
Is there another strategy? Perhaps the waiting game. PNG missed out on 
liberation as a mobilizing issue that would give people a sense of national 
consciousness. But there may be other dilemmas in the future that become 
the basis for organizing people around a single issue or cluster of issues. It 
might be the case for a high rate of resource development versus the 
preservation of environment and a PNG identity. Perhaps the development 
mania makes that a unlikely focus for bipolar politics, but a foreign threat, 
with options of ceding or resisting, might do the trick. 
In sum, one may doubt the virtues of a sudden leap away from the idea of 
party government, even though it is not easy to think of ways of rooting it 
firmly in the people's consciousness. Democracies that are not party 
governments, as in the case of the US or Switzerland, tend to be better at 
limiting the role of government than at giving the state a popular mandate to 
act positively. It is doubtful that third world countries can prosper without a 
large role being played by the state, so one may have grave doubts about a 
move to the presidential system even if its worked out well. 
Papua New Guinea has thus far shown a real capacity to find its own 
solutions to its problems. One can hope that this capacity to find a way will 
be used to relate parties, elections and governments more coherently. 
References 
Bettison, D.G., Hughes, C.A., van der Veur, P.W. (eds.), 1965. The Papua-New Guinea 
Elections 1964. Canberra: Australian National University. 
Electoral Commission, 1987a. 1987 National Election Voting Statistics. 
Electoral Commission, 1987b. Report by the Electoral Commissioner on the 1987 
National Elections to the 4th Parliament, 5th August 1987. 
Epstein, A.L., Parker, R.S. ,  Reay, M. (eds.), 1971 .  The Politics of Dependence: Papua 
New Guinea 1968. Canberra: Australian National University Press. 
Hegarty, D., 1983. Electoral Politics in Papua New Guinea: Studies in the 1977 National 
Elections. Port Moresby: University of Papua New Guinea Press. 
Katz, Richard S. (ed.), 1987. Party Governments: European and American Experiences. 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
King, Peter (ed.), forthcoming. Pangu Returns to Power: the 1982 Elections in Papua New 
Guinea. Port Moresby: University of Papua New Guinea. 
Sartori, G., 1976. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, Vol 1 .  
Stephen, David, 1972. A History of Political Parties in Papua New Guinea. Melbourne: 
Lansdowne Press. 
Stone, David (ed.), 1976. Prelude to Self Government: Electoral Politics in Papua New 
Guinea 1972.  Canberra: Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National 
University and Port Moresby: University of Papua New Guinea. 
Turner, M.M. and Hegarty, D.W., 1987. The 1987 National Election in Papua New 
Guinea. Canberra: The Australian Institute of International Affairs Occasional Paper 
No. 6, 1987. 
2 
Survey Evidence on Electoral 
Behaviour In Papua New Guinea 
YAW SAFFU 
So far, all Papua New Guinea (PNG) national elections have been studied. 
A substantial body of apparently empirical propositions on the determinants 
of electoral behaviour can be compiled from them. Among recurring themes 
are the overwhelming importance of local factors in candidate evaluation, 
the corresponding insignificance of party, and the virtual absence of issues 
in the decision calculus. Generalizations asserting or denying the 
meaningfulness of the voting act to the participants, and those insisting on 
or denying linkages between class and electoral choice, are also noticeable. 
To provide a systematic collection of empirical evidence on such 
propositions, the study of the 1987 election, undertaken by the Department 
of Political and Administrative Studies, UPNG, incorporated a survey of 
electors. With the help of mostly UPNG students, a total of 1127 electors 
were interviewed in the National Capital District (NCD) and in all but two 
of the nineteen provinces. This chapter is a report of the survey evidence 
regarding propositions which have been quarried from earlier studies on 
PNG elections. 
The Pattern of Localized Support 
The most widely observed feature of PNG elections is the phenomenon of 
localized support for candidates. Localized support is demonstrated by the 
ability of a candidate to attract virtually 100 per cent of the votes of a 
locality within the wider constituency, thereby denying his numerous 
competitors any electoral support within that particular locality. In terms of 
making a clean sweep of votes in an identifiable locality (or localities) while 
crashing ignominiously in other localities commandeered by one or the 
other of his/her rivals, the most successful candidate is often no different 
from the weakest. 
A contributor to the studies on the very first national election 
highlighted the phenomenon: 'Only in two of the forty-two open 
electorates, Gumine and Milne Bay, did a candidate have a runaway win 
spread over the whole electorate . . . ' (Hughes and van der Veur 1965: 423) . 
The 'Results ' section of the various contributions to the Hegarty book on 
the 1977 election is replete with illustrations of extremely localized support 
for candidates. One contributor even offers an index with which to measure 
the phenomenon (Jackson 1983). In a study of the 1982 election in the Sohe 
constituency of Oro Province, I argued that to understand electoral 
behaviour in Oro, this pattern of voting had to be explained (Saffo 1982). 
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The phenomenon of localized support has come in for all sorts of 
formulations, as observers and commentators have struggled to identify just 
what aspects of the political economy and culture appear to lead so 
inexorably to it. While some formulations are non-committal, most harbour 
implicit hypotheses on the causes of the phenomenon. There are 
formulations which suggest that kinship factors, or linguistic solidarity, or 
the church, or social involvement, or hope of material benefits for the 
community may be at the basis of localized support. There have even been 
suggestions that class analysis explains the phenomenon (Donaldson and 
Good 1983; S tewart 1984). 
A major aim of our survey was to try and explain the phenomenon of 
localized support. What attributes of a candidate account for it? What 
aspects of the candidate's  relationship with a locality are important? To 
what extent do aspects of the cultural environment, rather than the personal 
attributes of the candidate (assuming the two are separable and are separated 
by electors) explain his or her runaway success in the locality? For 
instance, might the prevalent mode of decision-making over significant 
issues be a major cause? Might traditional alliance-making be a significant 
contributory factor? 
Determinants of Voting Cho ice 
We asked two identical questions, one referring retrospectively to the 1 982 
election, the other prospectively to the forthcoming 1987 election. The 
retrospective question, asked of those who said they had voted in 1982, was: 
'What was it that you liked about the candidate you voted for in 1982?' The 
forward-looking question about voting intentions was: 'What is it that you 
will look for in the candidate you will be voting for in 1987? ' .  
A list of  nine alternative responses, and a tenth omnibus, 'other' , 
category, was offered, with accompanying directives to the interviewers, as 
follows: 
(ALLOW THE RESPONDENT TO ANSWER THE QUESTION IN HIS OR 
HER OWN WAY. CHECK THE FIRST ANSWER AGAINST THE LIST OF 
POSSIBLE RESPONSES BELOW. WRITE ' 1 '  IN THE MOST 
APPROPRIATE BOX THEN ASK THE RESPONDENT IF HE OR SHE HAD 
ANY ADDITIONAL REASONS FOR THE W A Y THEY VOTED. WRITE '2' 
IN THE BOX NEXT TO THE SECOND REASON GIVEN, '3' IN THE BOX 
NEXT TO THE THIRD REASON, AND SO ON UNTIL THE RESPONDENT 
RUNS OUT OF REASONS.) 
1 .  We belong to the same community, clan or language group. 
2. His/Her group are friends or allies of my group. 
3 .  We belong to the same church or were educated together. 
4. We have worked or done business together. 
5. He/she has good leadership qualities. 
Table 1: Determinants of the Vote in Papua New Guinea 
RESPONSE CA TE GO RIES 
No. % Rank No. % Rank No. % Rank No. % Rank No. % Rank No. % Rank 
1 .  Good leadership 212 30.7 1 89 16.8 2 56 14.5 3 351 37.3 1 122 16.0 2 59 10.4 4 
qualities 
2. Ability to 137 19.8 2 122 23. l  1 93 24.0 1 175 8.6 2 189 24.8 1 154 26.2 
bring development 
3. Primordial 83 12.0 3 16 3.0 7 14 3 .6 7 89 9.4 3 21 2.8 7 20 3.4 6 
4. Won't desert 5 1  7.4 4 85 16.1 3 75  19.4 2 8 1  8.6 4 1 19 1 5 .6 3 1 18 20. 1 2 
grassroots 
5. High education 35 5.1  5 56 10.6 4 47 12.2 4 8 1  8.6 4 1 1 3  1 4.8 4 88 1 5.0 3 
t'?'j -
6. Party 33 4.8 6 55 10.4 5 35 9.0 5 32 3.4 6 87 1 1 .4 5 57 9.7 5 � � 
c 
7. Allies 3 1  4.5 7 35 6.6 6 13 3.4 8 21 2.2 7 32 4.2 6 14 2.4 8 ""'C � -
8. Same schooV 19 2.7 8 16 3.0 7 7 4.4 6 13 1 .4 8 19 2.5 8 16 2.7 9 b:i � 
chmch � � 
� ..... 
9. Worlced 12 1 .7 9 1 1  2. 1 9 5 1 .3 9 1 1  1 .2 9 10 1 .3 9 7 1 .2 9 � � 
""'C ..... 
SUB TOTAL 613 88.7 485 9 1 .7 355 9 1 .8 854 90.7 712 93.5 533 90.7 ;:s 
10. Other 78 1 1 .3 43 8. 1 32 8.3 87 9.2 50 6.6 54 9.2 
--0 
� 
TITTAL 69 1 100 528 99.8 387 100. 1 94 1 99.9 762 100. 1 587 99.9 ........ 
...J 
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6. He/she is associated with some good leaders or party 
members. 
7 .  He/she is highly educated. 
8 .  He/she knows the way to bring business or  development 
here. 
9. He/she will not desert us, but will come around and help us. 
1 0. Other (specify) .  
As the list shows, the categories went from primordial, kinship and 
linguistic considerations, through traditional socio-political factors, to 
aspects of secondary association solidarity, and to more personal attributes 
of the candidate. Table 1 summarizes responses to the two questions. 
Table 2: Changing Weights of Determinants (Trends) 
Response Categories 1982 Totals 1987 Totals 
Endorsements Endorsements 
No. % No. % 
1 .  Personal leadership 1058 65.87 1650 72.05 
attributes 
(Ref: Table 1 Categories 
1 + 2 + 4 + 5) 
2. Secondary solidarity 203 12.64 256 1 1 . 18  
(6 + 8 + 9) 
3. Primordial 192 1 1 .95 197 8.60 
(3 + 7) 
4. Other 153 9.53 191 8.34 
TOTAL 1606 99.99 2290 100. 17 
Of 69 1 respondents who said they had voted in 1 982, and who also 
answered the question what they liked about their candidate, 212 (or 30.7 
per cent) gave ' good leadership qualities ' as their first answer. One hundred 
thirty seven respondents (or 19.8 per cent) gave business acumen or ability 
to bring development to the area as their first answer. The primordial 
category came only third, endorsed by 83 respondents (or 1 2.0 per cent) as 
their first answer. Party, other secondary associations, and traditional socio­
political alliances evidently did not count for very much in the voting 
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calculus. Not one of the three was endorsed by more than 5 per cent of the 
respondents as a first answer. 
The second and third answers, provided by fewer respondents, 528 and 
387 respectively, confirmed good leadership and business acumen or ability 
to bring development to the area as the two most important determinants of 
the vote. The primordial category was endorsed seventh on both the second 
and third responses. 
The responses with regard to voting intentions in 1987 were consistent 
with the 1982 ones. Of 941 respondents who said they would vote and who 
also indicated which factors would be most important for them, 35 1 (or 37.3 
per cent) gave good leadership as their first answer, 175 (or 1 8.6 per cent) 
mentioned business acumen and ability to bring development to the area 
while, as before, the primordial response came third, with 89 (or 9 .4 per 
cent) endorsing it. The endorsement for party, 32 (or 3.4 per cent), and for 
traditional socio-political concerns, 2 1  (or 2.2 per cent), were even lower 
than before. 
These findings manifestly do not offer much help in disposing of the 
first two questions posed above, namely, what attributes of the candidates 
and what aspects of their relationship with the locality explain localized 
support. What they allow us to do is confirm propositions concerning the 
relative unimportance of party. We can also say that primordial factors are 
not as decisive as conventional wisdom appears to suggest. But the factors 
which appear to be important, such as perceived good leadership qualities of 
a candidate, and his or her ability to bring development to the area, are not, 
in themselves, capable of explaining localized support. Why should 
virtually all members of a locality, and only they but not others, be able to 
recognize the special abilities of their preferred candidate? 
Might the answer to the puzzle perhaps lie in the way electoral 
decisions are made in PNG? Several writers have emphasized the 
importance voters attach to 'seeing the face' of the candidate. Paul Sillitoe, 
for instance, observed, in his study of the Nipa-Kutubu electorate of 
Southern Highlands: ' Seeing faces and forming opinions about character 
were important issues because there was little else on which people could 
base a rational choice in an electorate where all candidates stood on the 
same platform' (Sillitoe 1983:205) .  S illitoe put forward both a structural 
and cultural explanation for the electors ' evident insistence on judging 
candidates on the basis of personal knowledge: 
People asked themselves, in the best selfish democratic tradition, 
who would hylp them most, and having no other yardstick plumped 
for the nearest man. In this they followed to some extent their 
traditional acephalous way of doing things where they judge others 
on the basis of personal knowledge. [Sillitoe 1983:2 1 1 ] 
Townsend and Wamma' s  study of two constituencies in Morobe, at the 
opposite (eastern) end of the New Guinea 'mainland' ,  also suggested that 
the kinds of 'judgement' electors make on the suitability or otherwise of 
candidates require close personal knowledge. They reported that such 
comments as the following featured on the positive side of candidate 
evaluation in Finschhafen and Kabwum: 'He does not drink beer; he has 
come and sat down to talk with us; he has strong family connections; he can 
speak out strongly. ' (Townsend and Wamma 1983 :234). The authors 
concluded: 'Candidates who did well . . .  all had long periods of presence in 
the past in the province '(Townsend and Wamma 1983:240) .  On the basis of 
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their study, the authors dispensed free advice to future hopefuls: 'maintain 
a presence in the electorate . . .  ' .  
The final example of the importance which observers and commentators 
have attached to candidates 'just showing their face' is furnished by Winnett 
and May, in their study of the Yangoru-Sausia constituency in East Sepik 
Province. Invoking the testimony of the legendary Tony Voutas, on how he 
turned Moro be into Pangu territory, Winnett and May pointed to the 
'importance of getting around the electorate even if it is just to talk to 
people and listen to what they have to say' (Winnett and May 1983:270). 
But side by side with these findings is the equally widely observed, very 
marked, reluctance of candidates in PNG to campaign throughout their 
constituency. The overwhelming proportion of candidates choose, 
deliberately, to confine their campaign to a particular area of the 
constituency or to a few clusters of small areas therein. Usually they 
concentrate their efforts on where they come from, or where their wives 
come from, or where they believe they have advantage over other 
candidates because they are known there, having lived or worked there over 
a period. I was struck by these self-imposed restrictions during my study of 
the 1982 election in Oro Province. Other observers (Ballard 1983: 1 90; 
Westermark 1983 : 1 62) have pointed to this self-denying ordinance on the 
part of election candidates in PNG. 
The explanation for this tendency to concentrate attention and efforts on 
only a small section of the constituency was one of the objectives of a 
second survey (of candidates) which, unfortunately, had to be abandoned 
because of the reluctance of candidates to fill out the questionnaire and 
return. So, at this stage, a set of hypotheses is the best that can be offered. 
First, the depth and extensiveness of the principle of reciprocity in PNG 
cultures suggest that candidates believe it is a waste of time and, perhaps,  
culturally improper also, to try to intrude into the preserve of other 
candidates. Second, perhaps the lingering influence of the optional 
preference electoral system, used in the first three national elections, is also 
at work. Concentrating on one's own little corner and making deals with 
others for the second and subsequent preferences made sense. Third, parties 
have failed to implant themselves in the consciousness of electors, primarily 
because no source of social cleavage, such as class, ethnicity or religion, is 
deep and pervasive enough to serve as a base for effective party 
organization. The appearance (or perhaps reality) of a political vacuum 
created by this failure of parties encourages a triam lak mentality, a 
gambler' s  mind set, which is part of the explanation for the extremely large 
number of candidates. Finally, the difficulty of the terrain, the undeveloped 
nature of road networks, and the high cost of everything, including 
campaigning, are also part of the explanation. 
But interesting as speculating on the causes of the phenomenon of self­
imposed restrictive practices by candidates might be, the consequences 
interest us more. Perhaps the combination of spatial concentration of 
campaign activities by candidates and the legitimate desire of electors to 
know the candidate they vote for go far in explaining localized support for 
candidates? The response category that specifically.tried to capture the 
combined effects of these two phenomena was: 'He/She will not desert us 
but will come around to help us' .  In 1982, fifty-one people (or 7.4 per cent) 
gave this as their first response; eighty-five (or 1 6. 1  per cent) gave it as their 
second; while seventy-five (or 19.4 per cent) gave it as their third answer. 
With respect to voting intentions in 1987, eighty-seven people out of 941 
(or 9.2 per cent) gave this as their first response, while it was the second 
Electoral Behaviour in PNG 2 1  
response for 1 19 people out of 762 (or 15 . 1 per cent) . One hundred­
eighteen respondents out of 587 (or 20. 1 per cent) gave this as their third 
response. The position of this response category was thus fourth on the first 
response, third on the second response, and second on the third response. In 
1987, the respective positions were fourth, third and second, as Table 1 
shows. 
While such endorsements were not overwhelming, two observations are 
worth making. First, compared with the specifically primordial category, 
this response category was endorsed by far more people. Second, an even 
more important remark to make, I think, is that perceptions of good 
leadership, the single most important determinant of the vote in PNG, most 
probably incorporate this response category. A certain notion of social 
propinquity and non-desertion of grassroots almost certainly, on the 
evidence of another, unpublished survey, enters into the definition of a good 
leader in PNG. In many parts of the country, people with university degrees 
are still very rare. That a candidate' s  high level of education is not a 
stronger reason for voting for him or her is perhaps an indication of the 
importance that people attach to social propinquity and non-desertion of 
grassroots when evaluating leadership. 
Another cultural dimension investigated by the survey was the prevalent 
mode of decision-making by electors. Implicitly challenging commentators 
who have claimed that for masses of electors in PNG voting entails no 
conscious decision-making, (Hughes and van der Veur 1965 :40 1 ,  414-4; 
rather inconsistently, Sillitoe 1983) the following question was asked: 
'When people around here are trying to decide which candidate they will 
vote for in a national election, how do they go about it? ' We wanted to 
know what proportion of electors make up their own minds, and what 
proportion are told what to do by others. If people are told what to do, we 
wanted to know the source of the command, and whether it was primarily 
communal and authoritative or private and informal. 
Seven hundred five respondents gave both a meaningful and relevant 
response. Of them, 348 (or 49.7 per cent) indicated that the voting decision 
was an individual act while 276 respondents (or 39. 1 per cent) made it clear 
that voters are told whom to vote for. Two hundred twenty-one of these (or 
3 1 .3 per cent) identified the source of command as primarily 
communal/authoritative, in the shape of a formal community meeting ( 1 8 . 1  
per cent), the clan head (7 .5 per cent), the councillor ( 4.8 per cent) , and the 
church (0.8 per cent) . Identifying the source of command as 
private/informal were 55 respondents (or 7.8 per cent) who said the family 
head or educated wantoks tell people which candidate to vote for. 
These figures, indicating the relative amounts of individual and group 
decision-making in electoral behaviour, do not tell the whole story. Aspects 
of the voting process in PNG need to be touched on briefly to show how, in 
rural polling stations, even those individuals who make up their own minds 
might be constrained to go along with the decision of others who have 
formal or personal authority over them. In the Highlands (where I observed 
the 1987 elections) the voting act is invested with a traditional significance 
which can be compelling. Often voters arrived at polling stations in groups, 
dressed up in bilas, and they would sing and dance around the polling 
station for some time before voting. While a candidate was not allowed to 
operate within seven metres of a polling station (admittedly not a very 
severe restriction) traditional groups representing him or her were quite at 
liberty to do so. The explanation for an intriguing phenomenon, voters 
actually shouting the name of their candidate as they dropped the ballot 
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paper in the box, also reflected the enormous social pressures on rural 
voters. I was told, when I enquired, that voters wanted their fell ow 
villagers, or the scrutineer of the particular candidate to know they were 
voting correctly, that is, in accordance with an understood reciprocal 
obligation. 
Even greater pressures on the voter to take the wishes of influential 
persons in the village into serious account appeared to be built into the 
voting procedures. First, the so-called village identification tribunal, a panel 
of village influentials who help the presiding officer to decide whether a 
person who wants to vote is indeed who he or she claims to be, is given a 
sort of semi-official status at the polling station. Second, illiterate voters are 
allowed by the Organic Law on Elections to be accompanied by an 
educated person of their choice to ensure that the presiding officer marks the 
appropriate name whispered by them. But what was happening in several 
polling stations I visited was that an influential educated person from a 
village would perform this role of witnessing for all the voters from the 
village. Thus, the vote was not secret. The physical lay-out of the polling 
stations emphasized this fact. There were no walls or effectively partitioned 
booths to offer privacy. Everything was done in the open. The scrutineers, 
and any observer for that matter, by standing at the right place, could see or 
lip read the choices made by voters. Of course, there are solid advantages in 
this, from the point of view of avoiding vote rigging. On the other hand, 
however, the pressures on a voter from a small face-to-face community to 
conform could be overwhelming in the circumstances. 
FURTHER SUPPORTING EVIDENCE 
We have to look further at our data to see what other evidence we need to 
accommodate. A question was asked to elicit views on what constitute 
crucial political resources in PNG elections.  We asked respondents to 
account for their stated opinion on the re-election chances of the sitting MP. 
We asked: 'Do you think the sitting MP will win again or not? ' Irrespective 
of the answer, the follow up question was: 'Why do you say that?' We 
could have sorted the respondents into 'will win' (320); 'won 't  win ' (285) 
and 'don't  know ' (500), in order to find the reasons given by various 
categories in each group. We did not do so (although obviously that can 
still be done) because that would have proliferated subsets unduly. Instead, 
the reason cited as crucial, whether it was for winning, for losing, or for 
making it impossible for the respondent to predict, was coded the same. For 
instance, if money was given as the reason why the incumbent MP would 
win, or why his challenger would win, or why the respondent could not 
predict, the answer was coded as 'money' .  
Poor performance was the single largest specific response category. 
Two hundred and twenty-nine respondents out of 696 (or 33 per cent) cited 
it, naturally, as a reason why the sitting MP would lose. If we add those 
who mentioned projects initiated by the MP ninety-seven or 14 per cent) 
and experience gained in office (twenty or 2.9 per cent) as reasons why the 
sitting member would win again, we find that 50 per cent of the respondents 
in our specific categories cited leadership as the crucial resource for 
winning elections. Answers referring to primordial factors came to only 68 
(or 9.8 per cent) . But it must also be said that ethnicity was mentioned 
indirectly. The major reason why 212  respondents (or 30.4 per cent) could 
not say whether the incumbent MP would win again or not was because the 
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large number of candidates was said to be making ethnic arithmetic 
difficult. The insignificant role of parties, and by extension of policy issues, 
was once again clear. Only thirty-seven respondents (or 5 .3 per cent) 
mentioned the party or the support of party leaders in explaining their view. 
And if parties were insignificant for electors , it is a fair assumption that so 
were policy issues. 
What came as a surprise, given the open role of money in PNG politics -
the large sums of money that are reportedly spent by candidates, the obvious 
importance politicians attach to delivering government cheques personally 
to groups in their constituency, and the citing of bribery of electors in 
petitions to the Court of Disputed Returns - was the small number of 
respondents who mentioned money as a crucial resource. Only thirty (or 4.3 
per cent) did. Surprising also was the absence of evidence of sympathetic 
support for the underdog or the new challenger. Such a reaction might have 
been expected, first, as a possible explanation for the high turnover rate 
among MPs at elections and, secondly, from the literature that implicitly 
posited a theory of circulation of elites to explain the acephalous syndrome 
(but not perhaps the equally ubiquitous 'big-man' syndrome) in traditional 
PNG (Sahlins 1 963, Hogbin 1973, Berndt and Lawrence 197 1 ). 
Another question that was expected to elicit responses to throw further 
light on the determinants of electoral behaviour was the turnout question: 
the reasons non-voters give for their abstention. Of the 400 respondents 
who did not vote in 1 982, 237 (or 59.2 per cent) gave age ineligibility as 
their reason, while fifty-six (or 14 per cent) said they had only recently 
moved into the area and thus either did not feel sufficiently involved in 
things or did not even know the candidates. Another fifty respondents (or 
1 2.5 per cent) gave self-regarding reasons. The 1987 non-voters were even 
fewer: 1 19 respondents.  Self-regarding reasons were given by forty-seven 
respondents (39.5 per cent) while eighteen (or 1 5. 1 9  per cent) gave change 
in residency as their reason. Apart from the large underage category in 
1982, the noteworthy difference in the response patterns by non-voters in 
1 982 compared with 1 987 was the increase in cynicism in the latter year. 
Twenty-two respondents (or 1 8 .5  per cent) , compared with only nine (or 2.2 
per cent) in 1 982, gave reasons which suggested that they had lost faith in 
the system. Once more, the unimportance of parties in the decision calculus 
was made absolutely clear. Not a single person said they had abstained 
from voting in 1 982 because their own party was either not fielding a 
candidate or was fielding a poor candidate. In 1987 only two respondents 
gave this reason. 
How Meaningful Is The Vote? 
The significance of the act of voting derives from the wider system in which 
it occurs. In a liberal democracy, to ask about the meaning of elections is to 
ask, ultimately, about electors ' ability to link voting to other concepts and 
institutions in the system, particularly the legislature, the executive, 
accountability, and the rule of law. The level of understanding of how the 
system is supposed to work and, even more important, how it actually 
works, would thus be a good measure of the meaningfulness of elections.  A 
series of questions was intended to probe electors' level of understanding of 
the system and also to elicit some evaluation of the performance of 
representatives chosen through the electoral process. 
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The first question was: 'If you vote for someone and he/she wins this 
election and goes off to Moresby, what do you expect him/her to do when 
they get there? ' .  Only sixty-seven respondents (or 5.9 per cent) failed to 
answer that question or said they did not know what MPs are expected to 
do. Thus, over 94 per cent did have views on what MPs are expected to do. 
But of these, 833 (or 78 .6 per cent) said MPs were expected to fulfil their 
campaign promises and bring development to the area, while another 
seventy-six (or 7 .2 per cent) expected MPs to help them fix their personal 
problems. Only seventy-seven respondents (or 7.3  per cent) mentioned any 
of the following five items: attend parliament; participate in law-making; 
help to make and unmake governments; support party leaders; liaise with 
bureaucrats . Thus, there appears to be a very general understanding of the 
role of MPs as representatives who can bring development projects. But the 
indication is that not much is known about what MPs do specifically in 
order to bring these about. 
The second question was an invitation to evaluate MPs ' performance. 
Following the answer to the preceding question, we asked: 'Is this how 
other MPs generally behave?' That is, did respondents think that MPs live 
up to the expectations of their constituents? Only 355 respondents (or 3 1 .5 
per cent) thought so. The rest either did not think so ( 40. 1 per cent), did not 
know (22.7 per cent) or did not answer (4.9 per cent) . Thus, the high level 
of negative rating of MPs by electors, widely suspected because of the large 
turnover of MPs at elections, was confirmed. Those who said they did not 
think MPs live up to expectations were then asked to say what they think 
MPs actually do, instead of delivering on campaign promises. Of the 56 1 
eligible respondents, 325 (or 57 .9 per cent) said MPs look after themselves, 
153  (or 27 .3  per cent) were in the 'Other' category, while another forty-two 
respondents (or 7.5 per cent) admitted they did not know what MPs really 
do. Three specific response categories that would have indicated advanced 
understanding of the system - that MPs scheme to change governments, that 
they struggle to become ministers, and that they go on overseas travel sprees 
- were altogether endorsed by only fourteen respondents (or 2.5 per cent). 
The last question on the questionnaire was an attempt to sum up 
respondents' position on most of the areas of enquiry. The question was: 
'All candidates say that they will bring business or bring development to 
their areas if they are elected. How do you know who is telling the truth 
and who is lying?' We expected that answers could tell us something about 
the determinants of electoral choice, about which political resources are 
held to be crucial, about respondents' knowledge of the system, hence the 
meaningfulness or otherwise of elections, about electors ' level of cynicism, 
and so on. No responses and inappropriate responses came to seventy-two 
while another 179 responses were in the omnibus, 'Other' , category. Of the 
remaining 876 classified respondents, 2 1 5  (or 24.5 per cent) skeptically said 
it was impossible to know. At the other extreme, 1 04 (or 1 1 .9 per cent) 
cynically said all candidates were lying. In between the two extremes were 
282 respondents (or 32.2 per cent) who said they relied on their experience 
of human behaviour to detect who could be trusted, while another 245 (or 
28 per cent) said they used candidates' past achievements as a guide. Thus, 
once more, we encounter the necessity for personal knowledge of the 
candidate. 
Responses indicating that community or group sponsorship, party 
endorsement or religious affiliation of candidates would be adequate 
references all came to the small total of 30 (or 3.4 per cent). The relative 
irrelevance of party, church and even communal sponsorship, in the 
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evaluation of candidate reliability and integrity, was made clear. Direct, 
unmediated, personal assessment of the candidate, rather than cues offered 
by the company he or she keeps, is evidently what counts with electors. 
The Social Bases of Electoral Behaviour 
In this section, we want to examine the social bases of electoral behaviour. 
We want to see the extent of regional variation. We also want to know how 
seriously class must be taken in the explanation of electoral behaviour in 
PNG. Are there significant variations in electoral choice and political 
assessments based on socio-economic status indicators? Is there a gap 
between elite and mass behaviour in electoral politics? Is there a gender 
gap? Finally, how significant is the generation gap? The chi-square 
statistic was used to evaluate the significance of differences observed within 
the independent variables: sex, age, region, religion, residence and indices 
of class. Tables 3 to 8 below summarize the findings displayed by some 
1 1 0 chi-square contingency tables. 
The differences observed between male and female responses on the 1982 
and 1987 primordial categories, on what MPs really do instead of delivering 
'development' , and on how voting decisions are made, were not significant 
at either the 0.05 or 0.0 1  level. On two categories, secondary association 
solidarity in 1 987 voting intentions and what MPs are expected to do, the 
difference was significant at 0.05 level, but not at the more conservative 
0.0 1 level. On the remaining five items in the table, differences between 
male and female were significant. Thus, we might say that about half the 
time being male or female does make a difference. But there is no clear 
pattern regarding when, or over what issues, it does in electoral behaviour or 
opinion. 
Table 3: Gender and Politics: Sex By: 
Value Degree of Sig. at Sig.  at 
Category Freedom 0.05 0.01 
1982 LEADERSHIP 29.43 1 YES YES 
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY 1 1 .65 1 YES YES 
82 PRIMORDIAL 0.05 1 NO NO 
1987 LEADERSHIP 12.87 1 YES YES 
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY 4.35 1 YES NO 
87 PRIMORDIAL 0.52 1 NO NO 
RESOURCE 22.75 8 YES YES 
VOTING DECISION 14.64 9 NO NO 
MPS JOB 19.14 7 YES NO 
REAL JOB 5.68 7 NO NO 
SUM UP 18.78 7 YES YES 
26 YAW SAFFU 
Table 4: The Generation Gap: Age By: 
Value Degree of Sig. at Si�. at 
Category Freedom 0.05 0. 1 
1982 LEADERSHIP 206.18 4 YES YES 
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY 24.85 4 YES YES 
82 PRIMORDIAL 32.56 4 YES YES 
1987 LEADERSHIP 47.50 4 YES YES 
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY 4.97 4 NO NO 
87 PRIMORDIAL 5.41 4 NO NO 
RESOURCE 30.86 32 NO NO 
VOTE DECISION 39.99 32 NO NO 
MPS JOB 60.52 36 YES YES 
REAL JOB 27.56 28 NO NO 
SUM UP 40.02 28 NO NO 
According to Table 4, age matters on five counts, but not on six. The 
significant differences appear mostly in electoral behaviour but not so much 
in knowledge and evaluation of the system. 
Differences between urban and rural residents are even less significant 
for politics than sex or age differences. Only three differences, two on 1987 
voting intentions and one on overall evaluation of candidates, on leadership 
in the 1987 voting intentions, on opinions on political resources and 
decision-making in voting, were significant at both levels. A fourth 
difference, over what MPS are expected to do, was significant at 0.05 but 
not at 0.01. 
Table 5 :  Residence and Politics: UrbanNillage By:  
Value Degree of Sig.at Sig. at 
Category Freedom 0.05 0.01 
1982 LEADERSHIP 0.93 2 NO NO 
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY 0.42 2 NO NO 
82 PRIMORDIAL 4.31  2 NO NO 
1987 LEADERSHIP 9.90 2 YES YES 
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY 1 .23 2 NO NO 
87 PRIMORDIAL 13.3 1 2 YES YES 
RESOURCE 26. 17 16 NO NO 
VOTE DECISION 14.02 16 NO NO 
MPS JOB 33.85 18 YES NO 
REAL JOB 1 1.44 12 NO NO 
SUM UP 4 1 . 19 14 YES YES 
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Table 6:  Regional Variation: Resident Region By: 
Value Degree of Sig. at Sig. at 
Category Freedom 0.05 0.0 1 
1982 LEADERSHIP 1 5.57 5 YES YES 
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY 6.74 5 NO NO 
82 PRIMORDIAL 45.83 5 YES YES 
1987 LEADERSHIP 28.73 5 YES YES 
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY 10.14 5 NO NO 
87 PRIMORDIAL 4 1 .47 5 YES YES 
RESOURCE 139.9 1 40 YES YES 
VOTING DECISION 1 19. 15 40 YES YES 
MPS JOB 194.89 45 YES YES 
REAL JOB 50. 16 35 YES NO 
SUM UP 13 1. 13  35 YES YES 
Table 6A: Home Region By: 
Value Degree of Sig. at Sig. at 
Category Freedom 0.05 0.0 1 
1982 LEADERSHIP 10. 1 5  5 NO NO 
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY 3.85 5 NO NO 
82 PRIMORDIAL 52.56 5 YES YES 
1987 LEADERSHIP 6.08 5 NO NO 
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY 5.35 5 NO NO 
87 PRIMORDIAL 39.57 5 YES YES 
RESOURCE 99.33 40 YES YES 
VOTING DECISION 87.39 40 YES YES 
MPS JOB 187.08 45 YES YES 
REAL JOB 176.4 1 35 YES YES 
SUM UP 85.08 35 YES YES 
There were only two differences in the Resident Region Table which 
were not significant. Both had to do with the role of secondary association 
solidarity as a determinant of electoral choice. All the remaining nine 
differences were significant, although one of them, views on what MPs 
actually do, was significant only at the 0.05 level. The companion table on 
regional variation, Table 6A, was not as clear cut. Seven differences were 
significant, four were not. All four insignificant differences were in the area 
of electoral behaviour, while the significant differences were in the area of 
knowledge and evaluation of the system. 
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Table 7 :  Religion and Politics:  Church By: 
Value Degree of Sig. at Sig. at 
Category Freedom 0.05 0.01 
1982 LEADERSHIP 25. 19 6 YES YES 
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY 1 1 .89 6 NO NO 
82 PRIMORDIAL 1 1 .23 6 NO NO 
1987 LEADERSHIP 14 .27 6 YES NO 
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY 20.92 6 YES YES 
87 PRIMORDIAL 49.05 6 YES YES 
RESOURCE 79.54 48 YES YES 
VOTING DECISION 1 10.4 1 48 YES YES 
MPS JOB 69.04 54 NO NO 
REAL JOB 69.98 42 YES YES 
SUM UP 4 1 .73 42 NO NO 
Table 7 A: Religiousness 
Value Degree of Sig. at Sig.  at 
Category Freedom 0.05 0.01 
1982 LEADERSHIP 27.45 2 YES YES 
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY 2.06 2 NO NO 
82 PRIMORDIAL 3.37 2 NO NO 
1987 LEADERSHIP 10.24 2 YES YES 
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY 3.61 2 NO NO 
87 PRIMORDIAL 1 .59 2 NO NO 
RESOURCE 10.42 16 NO NO 
VOIB DECISION 20.67 16 NO NO 
MPS JOB 18.89 18 NO NO 
REAL JOB 17. 15 14 NO NO 
SUM UP 21 .65 14 NO NO 
Religiousness, measured by how often respondents went to church, 
turned out to be the least discriminating causal variable. There were two 
significant differences, both to do with leadership as a determinant of 
electoral choice, while nine differences were insignificant. Religious 
affiliation was more predictive, with five of the eleven differences being 
significant. 
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Table 8 :  Class and Politics: Education By: 
Value Degree of Sig. at Sig. at 
Category Freedom 0.05 0.01 
1982 LEADERSHIP 39.59 2 YES YES 
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY 0.02 2 NO NO 
82 PRIMORDIAL 26. 13 2 YES YES 
1987 LEADERSHIP 2.04 2 NO NO 
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY 7.65 2 YES YES 
87 PRIMORDIAL 1 5.34 2 YES YES 
RESOURCE 26.20 16 NO NO 
VOTE DECISION 42.87 10 YES YES 
MPS JOB 41 .69 18 YES YES 
REAL JOB 3 1 .90 14 YES YES 
SUM UP 9.34 14 NO NO 
Table 8A: Occupation By: 
Value Degree of Sig. at Sig. at 
Category Freedom 0.05 0.01 
1982 LEADERSHIP 54.25 8 YES YES 
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY 25.93 8 YES YES 
82 PRIMORDIAL 24.51  8 YES YES 
1987 LEADERSHIP 13.32 8 NO NO 
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY 14.30 8 NO NO 
87 PRIMORDIAL 14.67 8 NO NO 
RESOURCE 13.48 9 NO NO 
VOTE DECISION 9.95 6 NO NO 
MPS JOB 22.47 9 YES YES 
REAL JOB 12.31y 6 NO NO 
SUM UP 22.46 12 YES NO 
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Table 8B : Income By: 
Value Degree of Sig. at Sig. at 
Category Freedom 0.01 0.05 
1982 LEADERSHIP 16. 13  4 YES YES 
82 SEC.SOLIDARITY 22.09 4 YES YES 
82 PRIMORDIAL 13.96 4 YES YES 
1987 LEADERSHIP 2.25 4 NO NO 
87 SEC.SOLIDARITY 13.30 4 YES YES 
87 PRIMORDIAL 16.00 4 YES YES 
RESOURCE 41 .98 32 NO NO 
VOTE DECISION 3 1 .93 32 NO NO 
MPS JOB 59.55 36 YES YES 
REAL JOB 65.75 28 YES YES 
SUM UP 34.12 28 NO NO 
Finally, the socio-economic-status indicators show that class does not 
divide as clearly as class analysts of PNG electoral politics assume. 
Occupation makes the least difference, with only four differences out of 
eleven being significant. Both education and income differences are 
significant in seven out of eleven cases. Once more, it is difficult to see any 
pattern in the tables. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Some conclusions emerge from our findings. First, monocausal explanations 
of the vote in PNG are definitely wrong, and none more so than those that 
put forward kinship or linguistic factors. Second, personal attributes of 
candidates,  their perceived leadership qualities and ability to bring 
development to the area, both assessed personally at close quarters by 
electors, are the most significant explanatory variables. Third, as Table 2 
makes clear, the explanatory capacity of personal attribute variables appears 
to be increasing at the expense of both primordial factors and secondary 
association variables. 
If all the foregoing diverse bases of candidate evaluation result in 
patterns of localized support for candidates, then other factors must be at 
play. Political parties cannot account for it. They clearly do not count with 
electors. We have found some help in the prevalent mode of decision­
making by electors and also in the spatially confined nature of election 
campaigns. The sorts of pressures operating on rural voters to conform to 
communal choices, if and when these are made, also need to be taken into 
account. 
Finally, the social bases of PNG politics are presented in tables 3 to 8. 
Flux and fluidity are perhaps the only firm conclusions to emerge from the 
tables. 
Opinions and behaviour are not settled and no clear patterns in the 
influence of the independent variables emerge. There is no elite - mass 
distinction to speak of. Class does not show up clearly in political opinion or 
behaviour. The urban-village dichotomy, difficult to demarcate in 
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practice in any case, leads to no discernible differences in politics. Neither 
does sex, age, religion or religiousness. Even the region of origin does not 
correspond very much to observed differences in politics. Only the region 
of residence appears to lead to significant political differences. Analysis of 
the direction of differences, to determine the rank of regions on opinions 
and behaviour, and a repeat of the survey, say two elections hence, may be 
worth doing for whatever further illumination they might throw on the 
insignificance of social cleavages for politics in PNG. 
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APPENDIX A 
ELECTION STUDY 1987 
Survey of Electors 
Sampling Strategy 
Please follow the following steps to select your sample. 
A: In the Village 
1. Label all the houses in the village. 
A B C D etc., etc. 
2. Write the labels on pieces of paper, cut out and crumple so that you can 
select the number of houses you want by the lottery method. 
3. After shaking the pieces of paper in a suitable container (eg. a large 
envelope; a hat) pick out the number of houses you want in the village. 
The houses have been selected randomly. 
4. The next step will be determined by how much time you have. If time is 
on your side, go to each of the selected houses, explain your mission and 
obtain the names of all adults who live there. 
5. List all the adults on equal pieces of paper, crumple, shuffle, shake, as 
before, and draw out one name from the lot and then go back and 
interview the person selected. 
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6. If the person is not available after a couple of visits to interview him/her, 
or if he/she refuses to be interviewed, find out a few details about the 
person, eg. age, level of education, religion, and then try to find 
somebody else who seems to fit the description of the original sample 
member and then substitute this person for the original. 
7. After step 3, if time is not on your side, then take the following steps, 
instead of steps 4-6. 
In the first house drawn from the container, ask for the oldest male 
inhabitant; in the second, the oldest female inhabitant; in the third house, 
the youngest (but above 18) male; in the fourth house, the youngest 
female, and so on. 
8. As before, if you encounter non-response, substitute by drawing lots 
again, and follow the pattern. That is to say that if the non-response was 
encountered at house No.2, then in the substitute house, it is the oldest 
female inhabitant we will seek out. 
B. In Larger Towns 
1 .  First, draw a rough diagram of  the town and divide the diagram into any 
number of sections, say 10, 20, 25, etc., and name them. 
2. Cut up the diagram according to the number of sections you have, and 
crumple the pieces of paper so that once more you can select two or three 
sections from the container. 
3. Depending on the number of people you want from the town, you may 
decide to select two or three from each section. 
4.  Before you set out to the sections of town to select your sample, settle on 
a number 3, 5, 6, 9, whatever, and say that you will start from the third 
house, or fifth house, or sixth house that you encounter in the particular 
section and then every third or fifth or sixth house after that. 
5 .  To determine who to interview in each of the sampled houses,please 
follow the directions in step 7 above. 
6. If a section selected happens to be an office/commercial area, follow 4 
and 6, or 7, except that, instead of the oldest male, female etc, you will 
have to determine respondents by position. Thus, for example,in the first 
office, the third national in the office hierarchy, in the second, the most 
junior or the most recently hired national, provided he/she is above 18; in 
the third the top boss, etc. etc. Be consistent in following the pattern 
adopted. 
C. In General 
1 .  Please follow the instructions. If  you have to substitute, do so either 
through a further random sampling or by closely matching the original 
sample member who failed to cooperate. 
2. A void having more than 10 people sampled from one village or from one 
suburb of a town. 
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Variable 
1. Sex 
2. Age 
3. Province of 
Interview 
4. Home province 
5 Reside 
6. Education 
APPENDIX B 
Characteristics of the Sample 
Total: 1127 
Categories Frequency 
Male 753 
emale 363 
Under 20 1 1 1  
20-29 439 
30-39 3 13 
40-49 169 
Over 50 86 
Papua 227 
Highlands 265 
Island 164 
Mamose 234 
NCD 235 
Papua 376 
Highlands 314 
Island 179 
Mamose 246 
NCD 9 
Urban 499 
Rural 476 
Equally 46 
0-6 years ()()8 
7-10 380 
Over 1 1  120 
Per cent 
66.8 
32.2 
9.8 
38.9 
27.8 
27.8 
7.6 
20. 1  
23 .5 
14.5 
20.8 
20.8 
33.4 
27.9 
15.9 
21 .8 
0.8 
44.3 
42.2 
4.1 
53.9 
33.7 
10.6 
(continued next page) 
Variable 
7. Wage 
8. Occupation 
9. Income (per 
fortnight) 
10. Church 
Categories 
Yes 
No 
Sometimes 
Top professionaV 
managerial 
Cash farmer 
Supervisory 
Artisan/clerical 
Manual/casual 
Subsistence 
Never worked 
0-49 Kina 
50-99 
100- 199 
200-299 
Over 300 
United 
Catholic 
Lutheran 
SDA 
Anglican 
None 
Other 
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Frequency Per cent 
484 42.9 
572 50.8 
47 4.2 
50 4.4 
71  4 .5  
51  4.5 
303 26.9 
203 18.0 
220 19.5 
96 8.5 
482 42.8 
154 13.7 
283 25. 1  
60 5.3 
58 5 . 1  
298 26.4 
3 10 27.5 
172 15.3 
65 5.8 
1 10 9.8 
24 2.1  
140 12.4 
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ELECTION LAW OF PNG 
AND THE C ONDUCT OF THE 
ELE C TION 
B ERNARD WIJEWEERA 
Elections to the National Parliament were ordered by the Governor-General 
through the issue of a statutory writ dated 27 March 1 987, which fixed 1 5  
July 1 987 as the date for the return of the new members. Accordingly, 
nominations of candidates were entertained until 27 April 1 987. Polling took 
place between 1 3  June and 4 July; in some urban electorates polling lasted 
only a few days whilst in remote inaccessible ones longer periods of polling 
were permitted. Counting of votes of all electorates commenced 
simultaneously in the evening of 4 July and proceeded continuously to a 
finish, with appropriate stoppages for the resting of counting staff, in what is 
believed to be the most protracted counting operation in a general election in 
PNG. By 14 July 1 9 87, counting in all of the contested electorates had been 
completed. Finally, one hundred and six new members were returned to 
Parliament. In three open electorates (Mendi, Hagen and Kundiawa), polling 
had to be postponed and new dates fixed when a candidate in each of them 
died before the close of poll. 
This chapter examines, firstly, the relevant law relating to the conduct of 
general elections for the National Parliament and, secondly, the various 
operational stages in the conduct of the election. 
THE ELECTION LAW 
Constitutional Provision s 
The main constitutional provisions are those included in sections 1 2, 1 05, 125 
and 1 26 of the Constitution of Papua New Guinea (CPNG). These sections 
have to be read along with section 50 of the CPNG which enshrines the right 
of a citizen to vote and stand for election. Collectively, these sections of the 
CPNG provide for elections to be conducted by an Electoral Commission in 
accordance with an Organic Law, in electorates pre-demarcated by a 
Boundaries Commission. The composition, powers and functions of the two 
Commissions are to be prescribed by an Organic Law. In particular, an 
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Organic Law must regulate the electoral system and the procedures for the 
conduct of elections. 
The Organic Law on National Elections (OLNE) 
This Organic Law, passed by Parliament in accordance with section 12 of the 
CPNG, sets up the electoral system for the conduct of elections to the 
National Parliament. It provides for the establishment of the Electoral 
Commission, with the 'prime function' of organizing and conducting all 
elections for the Parliament, and a Boundaries Commission for purposes of 
demarcating electorate boundaries. Specifically, the OLNE deals with 
administration, electorates, polling places, electoral rolls, qualifications and 
disqualifications for enrolment, nominations, ballot papers, voting, postal 
voting, counting of votes and a miscellany of procedural matters incidental 
and consequential to the conduct of elections. 
Electoral Regulations 
Section 243 of the OLNE provides for the promulgation of Regulations by the 
Head of State, acting on the advice of the National Executive Council (Cabinet 
of Ministers),  on all matters that by law are required to be prescribed. 
Principally, these relate to the various statutory forms and notices that are to 
be used in the course of the elections. Three such regulations were operative 
at the time of the elections: Electoral Regulation 1977, Electoral (Marking of 
Voters) Regulation 1982 and Electoral (Amendment) Regulation 1986. 
THE PRELIMINARIES TO THE ELECTIONS 
The Preliminaries 
The demarcation of electoral boundaries and the compilation of the national 
roll of eligible voters constitute the important preliminaries that precede an 
election. 
The Electoral Boundaries 
Section 125 of the CPNG stipulates that the number of open electorates and of 
provincial electorates and their boundaries shall be determined by Parliament 
in accordance with recommendations from the Boundaries Commission and 
that such determination shall be at intervals of not more than ten years. The 
first such exercise was done in preparation for the General Elections of 1 977. 
Thereafter, in 198 1 ,  the Boundaries Commission did a delimitation exercise in 
preparation for the General Elections of 1 982. The Commission 's 
recommendations for delimitation were ultimately rejected by Parliament and, 
thus, the 1982 General Elections were based on the electoral boundaries 
demarcated in 1977. In so rejecting the Commission's recommendations,  
Parliament was acting in accordance with section 125(3) of the CPNG which 
conferred on Parliament the power either to accept or reject any 
recommendation of the Boundaries Commission; each such acceptance or 
rejection constituting a fresh determination by Parliament. 
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In ant1c1pation of the 1 987 General Elections,  the Boundaries 
Commission prepared a review programme for the latter part of 1 98 5 .  
However, it was handicapped in its effort by the absence of two members that 
should have been nominated to the Commission by Parliament. It is to be 
noted that in terms of section 25 of the OLNE, the Commission is formed of 
three ex-officio members (Electoral Commissioner who shall serve as 
Chairman, S urveyor-General, Government Statistician) and two other 
persons appointed by a resolution of Parliament. In spite of these vacancies, 
and since three members formed a quorum, the Commission proceeded with 
its review of electoral boundaries during the period September-December 
1985,  visiting provinces and consulting interested parties. The final 
recommendations were held in abeyance, awaitng the eventual appointment of 
Parliament's nominees. Parliament finally made its appointments in March 
1986 and, in early June 1986, the full Boundaries Commission met for the 
first time to take stock of what had transpired up to then. At this meeting the 
members decided to postpone all activities until after the 1 987 General 
Elections. Certainly, a charged pre-election atmosphere was not the most 
conducive to Parliamentary debate on a delimitation of electoral boundaries. 
The upshot of all this was that the 1987 General Elections too were based 
on the 1977 electoral boundaries. There were twenty provincial electorates 
mandated by section 33 of the OLNE and eighty nine open electorates 
determined by Parliament, bringing the total to one hundred and nine 
electorates. A list of these electorates is provided in Appendix 1 .  
The failure to revise the electoral boundaries, first demarcated i n  1977, 
raises some important issues in relation to the principle of equality of 
representation which is enshrined as a guiding principle in sections 125(2) of 
the CPNG. Section 35 of the OLNE further modifies this principle by 
permitting a plus or minus twenty per cent deviation from the norm of strict 
equality. However, without a proper delimitation exercise it is difficult to say, 
today, whether the electorates conform to the equality principle even after 
allowing for the permissible limits. Demographic evidence tends to present a 
different view of the matter. 
The electoral boundaries, demarcated in 1 977, were based on the figures 
enumerated in the population census of 197 1 . The next population census 
was in 1980. Though the populations in all provinces, as shown in Appendix 
2, increased in between the two censuses, the rate of increase was not 
uniform. The National Capital District and the provinces of North Solomons 
and West New Britain registered high increases (35 per cent or more) 
whereas provinces such as Western, Manus, Gulf and Simbu registered low 
increases ( 1 1 per cent or less). Thus,  it should be clear that a demarcation of 
electoral boundaries that is based on the 1 97 1  census is procedurally 
incorrect. Furthermore, this also means that provinces which have registered 
high rates of population increase since 1 97 1 are under-represented in 
Parliament in comparison to those that have registered low rates of population 
increase. 
One feature of the demarcation of electoral boundaries needs special 
comment. For political and administrative purposes the country is divided 
territorially into nineteen provinces and the district of the national capital. The 
CPNG (section 125) and section 33 of the OLNE prescribe that each such 
division as a whole shall constitute an electorate (called provincial electorate) 
for purposes of electing representatives to Parliament. In addition, each 
provincial electorate is to be carved up into smaller electorates (called open 
electorates) in such manner as may be reasonably practicable 'to ensure that all 
open electorates contain approximately the same population' [section 125(2) 
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of the CPNG] . Thus, as a mathematical proposition, it should be evident that 
this system of delimitation of electoral boundaries favours the less populous 
provinces, because irrespective of its population each province is entitled to 
one 'bonus' provincial seat. The distortion of the principle of equality of 
representation becomes marked when as shown below one compares the more 
populous provinces with those which are sparsely populated. 
Province Population No. of Voters No.of Seats Av.Pop Vote 
Census '80 1987 Roll Parliament /Seat /Seat 
Moro be 305,356 152,323 10 30,536 15 ,232 
Manus 25,859 14,039 02 12,930 7,020 
Gulf 63 ,843 29,923 03 2 1 ,28 1 9,974 
E.H'lands 274,608 1 82,18 1  09 30,5 12 20,242 
Sources: 1980 Census Report. National Statistical Office, 1983. National Elections 1987 
Electoral Commission, 1987. 
The delimitation system becomes most anomalous in Manus province. Unlike 
the other provinces, it is not divided up into smaller electorates because its 
population is very small. Thus, the Manus Provincial electorate boundaries 
and those of the Manus Open electorate coincide, making the two electorates 
one territorial unit. And, the same set of voters through one ballot paper elect 
a provincial member and through another ballot paper an open member. Two 
members represent the same electorate in Parliament though they are 
separately identified as Manus Provincial and Manus Open; a situation that is 
not found elsewhere in the country. 
Notwithstanding the distortion of the principle of equality of 
representation, it is worth considering whether the other provincial electorates 
(i.e. excluding Manus) serve a useful political purpose. It could be said that 
provincial electorates force candidates contesting them to transcend narrow, 
localized tribal and clan loyalties in reaching out for support in a larger 
territorial unit. It may be possible to win an Open electorate purely on the 
basis of clan support, but not so a Provincial electorate. In fact, a number of 
politicians who have gained national prominence have been elected in the past 
through provincial electorates. If this hypothesis is correct, then the provincial 
electorate may be a useful device for facilitating a national cohesion that rises 
above tribal and clan cleavages. 
Registration of Eligible Voters 
Section 50 of the CPNG recognizes, subj ect  to certain provisos, a 
fundamental right of every citizen who is of full capacity and has reached 
voting age to vote at elections. Section 56 on the OLNE imposes an obligation 
on every citizen so entitled to have his name placed on the Electoral Roll by 
making a claim in the prescribed manner. The qualification for such a claim is 
continuous residence for a period of not less than six months in an electorate 
(section 54 of the OLNE), with the right, and also an obligation, to seek a 
transfer of enrolment in the event of a change of residence. Failure to enrol in 
an electorate (or to seek a transfer of enrolment in the event of a change of 
residence) is an offence punishable, upon conviction, by a fine. Nobody, so 
far, has been taken to court on this ground. 
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The preparation of a reliable Electoral Roll is a matter that has eluded 
successive electoral officers working in the provinces; so much so that it has 
elicited an official admission that the roll used for the 1 982 elections 
'contained grossly inflated figures' (Report on the 1987 National Election, 
p. 10). A few examples given below should bear out this statement. 
Both the enrolment/population ratio and the actual votes cast at the 1982 
elections indicate that the enrolment figures were unrealistic. It would be a 
freakish demographic pattern that would have 90 per cent of its population 
over the age of eighteen (voting age specified in section 126 of CPNG). The 
classic case, however, was Simbu Province where the numbers enrolled at 
the 1982 elections exceeded the total population enumerated at the 1980 
Census . 
Provincial 
Electorate 
Moro be 
Gulf 
N.lreland 
Enrolment 
1982 
(1000s) 
27 1 
60 
60 
Population 
'80 Census 
( 1000s) 
305 
64 
66 
Enrolment/ 
Population 
Ratio 
89% 
94% 
9 1 %  
Votes Cast 
as % of 
Enrolment 
35% 
39% 
42% 
Sources: 1980 Population Census, National Statistical Office. 1982 National 
Elections Voting Statistics, Electoral Commission. 
A concerted attempt was made in 1987 to update the common roll as 
accurately as possible. Wide publicity was given and citizens were exhorted 
to 'enrol now and be ready to vote' . Provincial electoral officers were 
enjoined to enumerate eligible voters by organizing mobile teams to visit 
individual villages. The task was completed on schedule, a minor hitch being 
that a few provinces reported a reluctance on the part of some voters to enrol. 
The reasons for this refusal are not very clear, though in one place lack of 
development in the area and false promises by candidates were offered as the 
reasons (Minutes and Papers of Provincial Electoral Officers' Conference, 
September 1986: 97,99, 1 1 8 , 128). Nevertheless, the total enrolment figure of 
1 ,872,823 for the 1987 elections compares favourably with the inflated figure 
of 2,3 1 9  ,287 arrived at during the 1 982 elections. It also compares 
favourably with the estimated figure of 1 ,745,600, provided by the National 
Statistician as the citizen population over eighteen years of age in mid- 1987. 
There are, however, certain practical problems which make the enrolment 
exercise a difficult one. Though section 56 of the OLNE makes enrolment 
compulsory and non-compliance an offence punishable by a fine, it is simply 
impracticable to bring thousands of offenders before the courts. Also, 
although the Law puts the onus on the voter to enrol, in practice the accuracy 
of rolls depends on enumeration exercises conducted by electoral officials. In 
remote inaccessible areas it is difficult to conduct such exercises with a high 
degree of accuracy. Moreover, an erroneous view has gained currency that it 
not necessary to enrol because, in any event, an eligible voter can exercise his 
right to vote at the election under the special provisions of section 141 of the 
OLNE. The exact circumstances in which section 141  can be invoked will be 
discussed later, but for the present it must be emphasized that this view, 
though erroneous, has compounded the problem and together with the other 
difficulties has reduced compulsory enrolment to a provision without any 
teeth. 
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There would be a greater compulsion to register if only those enrolled 
were given the right to vote. In fact, in such an event,  the prospective 
candidates and political parties would be galvanized into mobilizing their 
supporters to get their names on the roll. However, this is a step that has to be 
taken with extreme caution, because then the right to vote becomes a matter of 
implicit faith in the accuracy of the electoral roll. And, experience has 
demonstrated that such faith may be misplaced. 
THE CONDUCT OF THE ELECTIONS 
The Nominations 
The elections proper began with the issue of a writ on 27 March 1 987 
under the hand of the Governor-General as provided for in section 105 of the 
CPNG and section 72 of the OLNE. The writ fixed the polling period and the 
date by which the new members were to be returned. At the same time, under 
section 7 4 of the OLNE, the date on which nominations were to close was 
also fixed. The relevant dates fixed for the 1987 elections were as follows: 
Close of Nominations 
Start of Polling 
End of Polling 
Return of Writs 
27 April 1987 
13 June 1 987 
04 July 1987 
15 July 1987 
According to sections 85 and 9 1  of the OLNE nominations may be made at 
any time after the issue of the writ and before 12  noon of the date of closing 
of nominations. There are stringent qualifications that apply to candidates. No 
candidate can be nominated for more than one electorate (section 83 of 
OLNE). A candidate should not be less than twenty-five years of age on the 
date of return of writs and must have been born in the electorate for which he 
intends to nominate or have resided in the electorate for a continuous period 
of two years immediately preceding the nomination or for a period of five 
years at any time before the nomination (section 103 of CPNG). A candidate 
has to deposit the prescribed fee and furnish a statutory declaration in terms of 
section 86 of the OLNE to the effect that he is qualified to be elected as a 
Member of Parliament. No obligation is cast on the Returning Officer to 
inquire into the veracity of the declaration so furnished. That is a matter for 
courts to adjudicate upon an application. 
A total of 1 5 15 candidates nominated for the one hundred and nine 
electorates. This follows an increasing pattern that has been observed since 
elections to Parliament began in 1977. 
Election Year 
1977 
1982 
1987 
Source:Electoral Commission. 
No. of Electorates No. of Candidates 
109 879 
109 1 12 
109 1 5 1 5  
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Of greater interest were the numbers of candidates (shown below) contesting 
the various seats. 
No. of Candidates 
0 1 - 05 
06 - 10 
1 1  - 20 
2 1  - 30 
3 1 - 40 
4 1 - 50 
Total 
No. of Electorates 
08 
30 
56 
12  
02 
01  
109 
Sources: 1987 National Elections Voting Statistics, Electoral Commission. 
About 50 per cent of the seats had candidate numbers ranging from eleven to 
twenty and 65 per cent of the seats were contested by more than ten 
candidates. 
The political party line-up of the candidates was as follows:  
Party 
National Settlement Party 
Leiba Party 
Country Party 
Morobe Independent Group 
Papua Besena 
Papua Party 
Wantok Party 
United Party 
People's Action Party 
Melanesian Alliance 
League for National Advancement 
National Party 
People's Democratic Movement 
People's Progress Party 
Pangu Party 
Independents 
Total 
No. of Candidates 
01 
02 
10 
10 
10 
17 
21  
24 
34 
43 
52 
55 
73 
88 
101  
974 
1 5 15 
Source: 1987 National Elections Voting Statistics, Electoral Commission. 
It will be observed that about two-thirds of the candidates were independents 
unaligned to any political party. 
The Ballot Papers 
With such large numbers standing for elections, divising a suitable ballot 
paper was a matter that presented some difficulty. Hitherto, in general 
elections to Parliament, ballot papers prescribed in Form 1 8  of Electoral 
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Regulation, 1977 had been used. This provided for the name of the candidate 
and a box opposite each name for marking the vote. Obviously, this called for 
a high rate of literacy in the electorate and experience had shown that many 
voters needed assistance to mark their vote. 
Another feature of Form 1 8  of Electoral Regulation, 1977 was the lack of 
party identification of candidates. All candidates, whether sponsored by 
political parties or standing as independents, were presented by name and a 
voter was hard put to ascertain the party affiliation of candidates. Naturally, 
political parties would have pref erred a system in which the party attachments 
were made clear to the voter. 
For these reasons, the format of the ballot paper was changed prior to the 
elections,  by means of Electoral (Amendment) Regulation, 1986. This 
Regulation vested in the Electoral Commissioner the discretionary power to 
use photographs on ballot papers and, when so used, provided for the 
photographs of the candidate and the parliamentary leader of his/her political 
party to be shown on the ballot paper. In the case of independent candidates 
and those whose party affiliations were not clear, the cage provided for the 
party leader was to be left blank. 
These changes to the ballot paper received the general support of the 
major political parties and wide publicity was given to them through the 
media. In the publicity campaign one item of controversy flared up. It centred 
around a short documentary video, prepared by a private advertising firm on 
behalf of the Electoral Commission, which explained the new format of the 
ballot paper and how to cast one's vote correctly. The documentary began 
with a short introduction by the incumbent Prime Minister and, as might have 
been expected, the opposition political parties took exception to this (and the 
background visual images of this introduction) as an act of political 
partisanship. Notwithstanding this objection, teams arranged by the Electoral 
Commission, with TV equipment and generators, toured the country showing 
the video in as many villages and towns as possible, all at state expense. 
Apart from this sour note, the publicity campaign was well managed and did 
serve the purpose of explaining an important innovation to the manner of 
voting. 
One side effect of the new ballot paper needs some comment. The use of 
photographs on ballot papers was not a matter that was entirely new to 
elections in this country, though this was the first time this procedure was 
used in a general election to Parliament. Provision was there under Electoral 
Regulation, 1977 to have photographs of candidates only, and this provision 
had been used in some by-elections; but the provision was to be used only on 
occasions where the number of candidates did not exceed fifteen. Obviously, 
the size of the ballot paper was a major consideration in placing an upper limit 
on the number of candidates. With this restriction removed by Electoral 
(Amendment) Regulation, 1986 and the number of candidates in electorates 
being what it was, the ballot paper assumed immense proportions. Electorates 
that had a large number of candidates required a ballot paper that was about 
seventeen inches long each way and, in most electorates, both sides (front 
and reverse) of the ballot paper had to be used to save space. One of the 
original objectives in revising the format of the ballot paper, namely that of 
presenting an illiterate voter with a clear and simple choice, was lost in the 
resulting clumsiness of the ballot paper. The impact that the size of the ballot 
paper had on the process of counting of votes will be commented on later. 
For the moment, suffice it to say that a simple, uncomplicated and functional 
ballot paper is a matter of serious consideration for reform. The above 
comment should not detract from the efficient and thorough manner in which 
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the ballot papers were prepared, well in time. Only about six weeks were 
available for the preparation, collection of photographs of about one thousand 
five hundred candidates, printing and distribution of ballot papers to the 
respective Returning Officers. About five million ballot papers had to be made 
ready before polling commenced. It was a difficult feat which, duly 
accomplished, brought credit to the administra tive capacity of the public 
service. 
Polling and Voter Turnout 
By far, the most difficult operation in the election process is the provision of 
necessary facilities for polling. Such are the terrain and the difficulties of 
access to remote villages that providing the opportunity to every voter for 
exercising his right to vote is an extremely difficult task. To overcome some 
of these difficulties, the election procedure provides for extended days of 
voting and for mobile polling teams to visit selected loca tions on announced 
dates. Small villages were covered in one day whereas bigger villages were 
afforded more time. In urban centres, the polling teams were stationary and 
the voters were given sufficient time to come and cast their votes. In all, over 
eight thousand officials were engaged on polling duty, most of them public 
servants though a number had to be recruited for such purpose from outside 
the public service. All this required training, instruction and detailed 
preparation. Not the least in importance was the maintenance of adequate 
security, law and order. It has already been noted that about 1 . 8  million 
voters had been enrolled. Assuming that each voter will cast two votes, one 
for the provincial seat and another for an open seat, the total of votes cast for 
the provincial seats should indicate the voter turnout. The number of formal 
votes cast for the twenty provincial seats was 1 ,367, 152 pointing to a voter 
turnout of about 73 per cent. This figure has to be qualified by the number of 
voters who cast ballot papers that were rejected (called informal ballot papers) 
and also by the number of voters who cast their vote without being enrolled. 
A comparison with the voting figures of previous years demonstrates 
that, over the years, increasing numbers have been able to register their votes 
effectively. 
Year Estimated Pop. No. of Formal Votes in Percentage 
Over 1 8  Years Provincial Electorates 
1977 1 ,400,900 980, 1 3 1  70.0 
1982 1 ,563,700 1 , 1 89,8 1 5  76. 1 
1987 1 ,745,600 1 ,367 , 1 52 78 .3  
Sources: National Statistical Office, National Elections Voting Statistics; 
1977; 1982; 1987, Electoral Commission. 
A negative feature was the increased number of informal votes cast at this 
election. An informal ballot paper is one that is rejected by the counting 
officer though the voter has used it to cast his/her vote. The grounds of 
rejection are precise and are laid down in section 1 54 of the OLNE. The three 
grounds are, ( 1 )  non-authentication by the Presiding Officer who issues the 
ballot paper to the voter, (2) no vote is indicated or the voter's intention in 
voting is devoid of certainty and (3) the voter has made a mark by which he 
could be identified. On these grounds alone can a ballot paper be rejected. It 
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could be said that in most instances ballot papers are rendered infonnal due to 
the inability of illiterate voters to understand how a vote should be marked. In 
the 1982 elections there were 43, 1 65 informal ballot papers, whereas in the 
1 987 elections this number was 56,07 1 ,  i.e. without counting those in 
thirteen electorates in which the records were destroyed by fire or vandalism. 
As percentages they reflect 1 .8 per cent and 2.0 per cent of the total votes cast 
in the respective year. Though the situation in respect of informal votes has 
not deteriorated so sharply as to cause alarm, its significance lies in relation to 
a claim that was made on behalf of the amended ballot paper (i .e. with 
photographs on it) when it was first introduced to the public. At a 'briefing 
session' held on 8 October 1986 at the Islander Hotel to which representatives 
of political parties were invited, a pamphlet that was distributed by the 
Electoral Commission claimed, inter alia, that 'the new ballot papers are also 
so designed that informal voting is kept at a minimum'. It is now clear that the 
new ballot paper did not lead to a reduction in the incidence of informal votes. 
The Voting 
No comment on voting patterns would be complete without a preliminary 
reference to what, in common parlance, is termed in PNG as 'sectional 
voting' . Sectional voting is of three types, though only two of them prove to 
be contentious. The OLNE, in section 141 ,  affords an opportunity to those 
whose names do not appear on the Roll for a particular electorate to vote on 
application and, in section 142, similarly affords an opportunity to a voter, 
whose vote has already been cast, to vote on application. 
Section 141  of the OLNE recognizes three reasons why a voter's name 
may not be on the roll :  incorrect omission, incorrect striking-off and name 
cannot be traced on the list of voters. In all such cases the benefit of the doubt 
is given to the voter, upon his subscribing to a declaration (Form 21  of 
Electoral Regulation, 1977) to the effect that he is entitled to be enrolled for 
that electorate. 
Section 142 of the OLNE deals with those situations where a person's 
vote has already been cast, presumably fraudulently. In such an event, the 
voter has to furnish a declaration (Form 22 of Electoral Regulation, 1977) to 
the effect that he is the person whose name appears in the list of voters and 
that he has not already voted at the election. 
Undoubtedly, these two provisions safeguard the interests of the genuine 
voter and his constitutional right to vote. Further more, they may have been 
prompted, at the time the election law was framed, by the lack of 
sophistication of the average citizen in ensuring that his name was duly placed 
on the electoral roll. Whatever may have been the reasons, the situation today 
is that these provisions tend to give a certain laxity to the voting procedure. 
Especially, the view appears to be prevalent among voters that it is not 
necessary to enrol because on polling day they will be able to make a 
declaration in terms of section 1 4 1  of the OLNE and still vote. Judicial 
interpretation has made it clear that this is an erroneous view and that unless 
there is an incorrect omission made by enumeration officials or special 
personal circumstances apply, voters cannot rely on section 141  to enrol 
themselves (Minutes and Papers of Provincial Electoral Officers' Conference, 
September 1986: 15) .  The difficulty is that polling officials have no way of 
ascertaining which is an official lapse and which is an act of negligence on the 
part of the voter. They have to give a decision quickly on the material placed 
before them through a declaration. It would be only prudent to err on the side 
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of caution and allow the applicant to vote. The ill effects of these provisions 
have been mitigated somewhat by the use of indelible ink. The voter's finger 
is stained with indelible ink when he is issued his ballot paper. Though there 
are rumours of ingenious ways (unconfirmed) of removing such stains, this 
method certainly inhibits a voter from voting more than once. 
Sectional voting could, of course, give rise to some degree of 
malpractice. In the case of votes cast under section 142 the malpractice is 
obvious, because more than one vote has been cast in the name of one voter. 
Even in the case of votes cast under section 141 ,  it may well be that the claims 
are not genuine. For this reason, it is a provision whose implications should 
be examined very carefully. It should be noted that a voter has been conferred 
the privilege of exercising his vote at any polling place within the electorate 
(section 132 of OLNE). This means, in practice, that polling officials have to 
search for a given name in an electoral list which may even contain about 
twenty thousand names. On occasions, this could present some difficulty 
even though every attempt is made to prepare the voter lists according to 
villages, wards, census divisions, etc. When in difficulty, the polling official 
has now the discretion of issuing a ballot paper under the sectional voting 
provisions. Also, if the use of indelible ink proves to be an adequate 
safeguard, then, the opportunity for abuse of sectional voting is very much 
minimized. 
Voting Patterns 
Voting patterns in general elections have been characterized by the 
scattering of votes among a large number of candidates. Up to the 1 987 
general election the record for the number of candidates in a given electorate 
was twenty nine, in the Kundiawa Open electorate during the 1982 elections. 
This record was broken in 1987 in as many as five electorates, the record this 
time being forty-five candidates for the Kerowagi Open seat. 
The increasing number of candidates vying for electoral support coupled 
with the plurality (first-past-the post) system of choosing the winner has 
contributed to give the winners only the support of a small section of the 
voters in a given electorate; a tendency that will increase the appeal to clan and 
kinship loyalties. Only a few winners receive the backing of a majority of the 
voters in an electorate. The following table is very revealing in regard to this 
trend. 
Percentage of Votes No. of Electorates 
Received bl Winner 1977 1982 1987 
0 - < 10% 04 0 1  
10 - <20% 1 1  20 39 
20 - <30% 37 33 42 
30 - <40% 26 20 12  
40 - <50% 1 6  14 05 
>50% 19 18  07 
Total 109 109 1 06 
Source: 1987 National Elections, Electoral Commission. National Elections 
Voting Statistics ; 1977; 1982; 1987, Electoral Commission. 
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An examination of the above figures will demonstrate that about 80 per cent 
of the representatives sitting in the present Parliament command less than 30 
per cent of the support of the voters in their respective electorates. If 
Parliament is taken as a collective body, then, its members received 778,620 
votes of the total of 2, 732,387 formal votes cast at the 1987 general election. 
In other words, Parliament has been elected on the basis of 28 per cent of the 
votes cast at the last election. A further deterioration, in line with the trend 
discussed above, cannot but devalue the representative nature of Parliament. 
The new ballot paper and the use of photographs of party leaders on them 
was an obvious move to strengthen voting on party lines. However, as the 
voting figures given below indicate it cannot be said that the use of the new 
ballot paper strengthened the position of the party-backed candidate vis-a-vis 
the independent. 
Twenty-two independent candidates were elected, forming the second 
largest group (if a group they can be called) in Parliament: Pangu Party with 
twenty-six candidates had the largest number. The independent candidates 
together polled the largest number of votes, exceeding the vote for the largest 
party (Pangu) by over two and a half times. Thus, the independent candidate 
is still a force to reckon with in PNG elections and political parties need 
further time to consolidate themselves. 
Party 
Pangu Party 
People's Democratic Movement 
People's Progress Party 
Melanesian Alliance 
National Party 
League for National Advancement 
People's Action Party 
United Party 
Morobe Independent Group 
Papua Party 
Papua Besena 
W antok Party 
Country Party 
Leiba Party 
National Settlement Party 
Sub-total 
Independents 
Total 
Total Formal Votes Cast 
408,082 
298,7 1 2  
1 68,280 
153,61 1 
1 35,76 1 
1 32,001 
87,836 
87 ,243 
60,922 
34,636 
17 , 1 22 
17 ,028 
1 0,743 . 
2,6 1 1 
164 
1 ,6 1 4,752 
1 , 1 17 ,635 
2,732,387 
Source: 1987 National Election Voting Statistics, Electoral Commission. 
Counting of Votes 
Elaborate arrangements preceded the counting of votes. Polling commenced 
on 13  June 1987 and went on, in some electorates, till 4 July 1987. In the 
meantime, preparations were set afoot to start counting in the evening of 4 
July. A counting centre was arranged for each of the electorates, generally 
located within the electorate itself. Counting for the provincial electorates was 
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arranged in the respective provincial capitals. The exception was the 
Highlands Region where, for greater security, all counting had to be 
transferred to the respective provincial capitals. 
The security of ballot boxes was one of the major goals of the counting 
arrangements. Ballot boxes were being transported from place to place, over a 
number of days. In view of this, once a ballot box was full, arrangements 
were made to deposit it in special security containers in police stations. 
Periodic reports from the various counting centres on the progress of 
counting were collated at the National Tally Room which was specially 
constructed for the elections at the Sir Hubert Murray Stadium grounds in 
Port Moresby. The officials worked in shifts, round the clock, putting 
together for public view the information received from the various centres. 
Special accomodation was provided at the Tally Room for political party 
leaders and many of them and their supporters kept a constant vigil 
throughout the proceedings. 
Counting commenced in all centres around 6 p.m. on 4 July and the first 
progress reports started coming into the Tally Room around 8 p.m. that night. 
There were high expectations of a quick completion when the first result was 
declared around 9 p.m. However, these hopes were premature and the 
counting process dragged on for days, the last result, that of the National 
Capital District Provincial electorate, being announced on 14 July 1987. The 
suspense of waiting for ten days to know the final results was a black mark 
on an otherwise well-conducted general election. The size and the format of 
the ballot paper also contributed to slowing down the counting procedure: it 
took some time to identify a vote which might be on either side of the ballot 
paper. Speeding up the counting process is a matter for urgent reform and 
will no doubt find sympathy among politicians, counting officials and the 
general public alike. A case in point is the recount in respect of Moresby 
South Open seat which was ordered, upon a petition, by the National Court. 
On the second occasion the count was completed in two working days, 
whereas the original count took five days of continuous counting. It is often 
pointed out that counting is delayed because candidates insist on repetitive 
recounts. Whatever the cause or causes, a speedier counting operation is a 
matter for serious attention. 
The Return of Writs 
On 1 5  July 1987 one hundred and six members were returned to 
Parliament. As explained earlier, elections for three seats had to be postponed 
due to the demise. of candidates during the polling period. In terms of section 
124 of the CPNG the new members were summoned to meet on 5 August 
1987,  for the first time, to elect a Prime Minister. These summons set in 
motion a different political process on which much comment will be found in 
the other chapters. 

4 
Regionalism in the 1987 Election 
RAY ANERE 
INTRODUCTION 
At the outset it will be useful to ask several key questions that may help to 
give perspective to the analysis of regionalism in the 1987 election. They 
are: What is regionalism? Is it evident in elections in Papua New Guinea? 
How does regionalism affect the behaviour of political parties, candidates 
and supporters of parties and candidates? Finally, how does regionalism 
affect politics at the national level? 
What ls Regionalism? 
Some geographers define regions as natural systems created by 
topographical features; others see them in terms of social relationships and 
organizational principles. The possibility of extending regional analysis so 
that it could deal directly with social and cultural phenomena was not 
widely appreciated until Skinner used locational principles, developed by 
both Christoller and Losch to analyze, among other things, marketing 
systems and social relationships in China. Regional analysis was later 
extended to new questions of kinship, religion, ethnicity, politics and class, 
by examining questions of history and evolution, and by creating certain 
new principles of analysis (Kuper 1985: 693). 
A region is a homogeneous area with physical and cultural 
characteristics distinct from those of neighbouring areas. As part of 
a national domain, a region may be sufficiently unified to have a 
consciousness of its customs and ideals and thus possess a sense of 
identity distinct from the rest of the country.. . .  The term 
'regionalism' properly represents the regional idea in action as an 
ideology, as a social movement, or as the theoretical basis for 
regional planning: it is also applied to the scientific task of 
delimiting and analyzing regions as entities lacking formal 
boundaries (Vance 1 968 : 377-78). 
Two points in the preceding paragraphs seem especially relevant to our 
analysis. The first is that regionalism involves an idea in action; for 
instance, it may be a social movement or a theoretical basis for regional 
analysis. It may even be a basis for regional social and political 
consciousness. In this respect, the region is both a constituent part of a 
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wider social and political consciousness and may itself be made up of a 
complex of what Clifford Geertz calls 'primordial sentiments' , based on 
traditional clan and village loyalties (Geertz 1963) . 
For the purpose of this study, I am interested in regionalism as an idea 
embedded in a course of action. The second point which seems to me to be 
relevant to the study of the 1987 general election is that regionalism as a 
concept can facilitate analysis in provinces and groups of provinces. In 
sum, regionalism can be seen as an idea transformed into a course of action, 
the basis of which is social and political consciousness which in tum 
permits analysis at the regional level. 
Regionalism and Elections 
Is regionalism evident in elections in Papua New Guinea and does it affect 
the behaviour of candidates, political parties, and supporters of candidates 
and parties? It will be suggested that it is evident, and that it does affect 
behaviour at many levels. More specifically, this chapter will attempt to 
show that regionalism is a significant factor: 
(a) at the constituency level; 
(i) through the action of the individual candidate who appeals to 
voters in a constituency on the basis of ethnic, linguistic, 
geographic and economic factors; 
(ii) through the regional claims made on candidates and parties by 
voters in the constituency; 
(b) at the party level when the party is organized or campaigns on the 
basis of regionalism; 
( c) at the parliamentary and cabinet level. 
These three levels will be discussed first by citing evidence from previ­
ous elections and then with evidence taken from the 1987 general election. 
REGIONALISM IN PAST ELECTIONS 
Universal adult suffrage was introduced into Papua New Guinea in 1964. 
Since then studies of each of the general elections have been undertaken by 
scholars to see how political structures imposed by Australia were adapted 
to suit conditions in PNG. Premdas and Steeves (1978:i) pointed out that 
'free elections are critical periods in a country's  life history; they tend to 
bring to highlight the operational features of the political system as well as 
expose the underlying forces affirming or challenging their validity' .  
Elections have been conducted i n  1964, 1968, 1972, 1977 and 1982. 
Every election offers new insights into changes that are taking place in the 
country. For example, change in the educational levels of candidates is 
occurring as well as in the nature and level of their background experience. 
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Political parties did not exist in the 1964 election and even if they existed 
embryonically in 1968, they did not constitute a fully-fledged party system 
until the 1972 election. 
The 1977 general election was particularly critical in that it involved 
discussions of both local and national issues: Papuans confronted New 
Guineans; old leaders were challenged by young and educated candidates; 
alternative programmes for social and political change were offered; party 
competition and electoral participation by citizens were intense; and the 
government' s performance in promoting economic development was 
discussed. 
Regionalism at the Constituency Level 
At the constituency level, regionalism was perhaps most important in the 
contest won by Josephine Abaijah in Port Moresby Regional electorate. 
Josephine Abaijah was the leader of the secessionist Papua Besena Party 
and she succeeded in defeating a key figure in Pangu Pati, Sir Albert Maori 
Kiki, by a decisive margin. Her vote was 57.8 per cent, an uncommonly 
strong showing in an election where most seats were won by less than 40 
per cent (Premdas and Steeves 1978 : 130). To some extent Abaijah's vote 
was a personal one rather than simply an expression of regionalist 
sentiment. She successfully developed an image as a populist, regularly 
leading demonstrations to government buildings of those facing housing 
problems and unemployment. She kept in touch with the have-nots in Port 
Moresby and successfully criticized and challenged the government which 
many people had come to believe had lost touch with the people. Premdas 
and Steeves stated that Abaijah had mobilized most of the Papuan votes 
both in the planned settlements and in the squatters' housing settlements, 
leaving Kiki with nearly all the New Guineans (Premdas and Steeves 1978: 
1 32). Her message was welfare, but Papuan welfare. She expected the votes 
of Papuans both for primordial reasons and for reasons of interest. She did 
not seek nor did she expect the votes of New Guineans. At that time, both 
the traditional villages of the National Capital District and its urban 
settlements were Papuan by a large majority. 
Regionalist sentiment was employed by Abaijah' s opponents as well, 
but the regional loyalties they hoped to command affected only a tiny 
fraction of the electorate. Thus, John Banomo, a Bougainvillean, could 
appeal to North Solomons residents and Tom Kimala, an Engan, to 
Highlands constituents, but neither stood a chance in an overwhelmingly 
Papuan city. 
Regionalism was also evident at the constituency level in the 1982 
election. Sir Iambakey Okuk appealed to his Chimbu electorate on the basis 
of greater development for the Highlands region. In his campaign he 
warned voters in the Highlands to be wary of coastal politicians and 
candidates, urging them to place trust and confidence in their fellow High­
landers. Josephine Abaijah,  running again, repeated her message of Papuan 
regionalism and, in the New Ireland provincial seat contest, Noel Levi made 
it clear that in fighting for a fish cannery for Kavieng he was seeking to 
contribute to the economic development of the region as a whole. The 
candidate perceived himself as an agent of regional interests at the same 
time as he responded to pressing needs of one part of his constituency. 
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Regionalism at the Party Level 
In both 1977 and 1982, the party that stood most openly and unequivocally 
for regionalism was Papua Besena. It called for the secession of the Papuan 
region and its leader, Josephine Abaijah, never wavered in her mission to 
obtain a better deal for Papua. In an only slightly less overt fashion, the 
National Party was regarded as, and probably regarded itself as, primarily a 
Highlands party. In July 1982, when the leader of the National Party, Sir 
Iambakey Okuk, failed to be re-elected he gave his party leadership to Ted 
Diro, a Papuan coastal. Immediately there was an outcry from another 
Highland politician. John Nilkare said that the selling of National Party 
leadership to the coastals was a disgrace to the Highlanders. A man highly 
respected by Highlanders has now publicly traded us' (Post-Courier, 2 July 
1982). In the same issue of the Post-Courier, Sir Pita Lus criticized Sir 
Iambakey's handling of the party leadership. It must be noted that both 
these public complaints came from Pangu Pati men, not from National Party 
supporters. The image of the National Party as a regional, Highlands party, 
seeking the promotion of Highland welfare, was nonetheless a familiar one. 
Regionalism at the Parliamentary and Cabinet Level 
The direct consequence and indeed part of the purpose of an election is the 
formation of a government, involving the selection of a prime minister and 
the choice by him of the rest of the members of the National Executive 
Council (NEC) or cabinet. In 1982, Michael Somare was re-installed as 
prime minister as soon as parliament met, and in early August, he was faced 
with the task of deciding how to put together a governing team. He faced 
problems. According to the press, his own Pangu Pati members from the 
Highlands were pushing for as many as thirteen portfolios. Within the 
parliament as a whole there were twenty-four Highlanders, including 
members of the United and National parties, as well as Pangu, and indepen­
dents. They were said to be demanding the portfolios of Transport and Civil 
Aviation, Works and Supply, and National Planning (Post-Courier, 5 
August 1982). In addition, claims for cabinet posts were being made by 
members from Mamose, the Islands and Papua, and tradition demanded that 
each of these regions be represented. Some of the provinces might not get a 
cabinet portfolio for one of their representatives, but the regions could not 
be ignored. With cabinet size restricted by the constitution to twenty-seven, 
the problems Somare faced were real. Somare' s approach to these problems 
represents an attempt at the same time to recognize and to limit the force of 
regionalism. He met with the Moro be branch of Pangu Pati over Morobe' s 
demand for another portfolio. They wanted Labour and Employment for 
veteran Lae MP Tony Ila, who was at that time the president of the PNG 
Trades Union Congress. At the meeting, Somare said, 'I explained that other 
Pangu provinces like Western, New Ireland and Manus, were given a 
ministry each. This is to build up party strength in the province. The fact 
that Morobe had three ministers - Mr Bendumb (Transport and Civil 
Aviation),  Mr Sali (Media) [sic] , and Mr Awasa (Religion, Youth and 
Recreation) - gave the province a solid voice in cabinet to demand 
development for the province. '  He went on to say that Morobe had a fair 
share and he urged leaders to work together for party solidarity (Post­
Courier, 17  August 1982). This incident is particularly revealing for it 
shows what can be done for a region if the party' s  organization is solid. 
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Morobe at this time was a Pangu Pati stronghold and had an organization 
comparable only to that of East New Britain. 
REGIONALISM IN THE 1987 ELECTION 
There can be little doubt that regionalism was at least as strong a .factor in 
the 1987 election as in those of the past, and perhaps it was stronger. 
Certainly, regional feelings manifested themselves at all the levels and in all 
the forms that we have briefly observed for previous elections. 
Regionalism at the Constituency Level 
Most expressions of regionalism at the constituency level have to do with 
demands for more development for the region of which the constituency is a 
part. When the region and the constituency coincide, as in the case of the 
provincial electorate for North Solomons, the likelihood of regional 
economic and social development questions being in the forefront is strong. 
In 1987, Father John Momis' campaign for re-election in the Bougainville 
Provincial seat focussed on the problems of foreign investment in the 
province and the returns which the people of the North Solomons were 
receiving for the exploitation of the copper deposits which had attracted 
large amounts of foreign capital. In May 1987, Momis petitioned 
Bougainville Copper Limited (BCL) to give 3 per cent of its yearly earnings 
to the provincial government to further compensate the people for the 
physical and social destruction which the mining operations entailed. This 
proposal became known as the Bougainville Initiative and Momis claimed 
that the people of the North Solomons were entirely behind it. The 
Melanesian Alliance Party which Momis led at the national level also 
dominated the provincial government of North Solomons, and it was not 
surprising that the acting premier of the province, Martin Bonai, threw his 
government's weight behind the initiative. He accused BCL of being a 
'pig' . No similar pig would be permitted to dig in the soil of North 
Solomons in the future unless it made a greater, direct contribution to the 
provincial government and to the people (Post-Courier, 8 May 1987). 
In another electorate, we find regional feeling expressed by the electors 
themselves, even though the leading candidate did not make explicit use of 
a regional argument. The electorate I am referring to is East Sepik 
constituency where Michael Somare was a candidate. There can be no 
doubt about Somare' s personal popularity amongst the voters, but the 
magnitude of his victory ( 49 ,226 votes ahead of his nearest rival, Robert 
Passu) suggests that other factors may have been at work. East Sepik voters 
were hoping that Somare would not only be a regional leader but also the 
leader of a major party in parliament and, it was hoped, the prime minister. 
As it later turned out, Somare did not have the required number of MPs on 
his side to be elected prime minister. His strong individual showing in the 
election was, nevertheless, an index of the interest that the East Sepik 
people had in having one of their own as a leading contender for the top 
position in the national government. 
In yet another electorate, regional claims were made with the same goal 
of assuring that party leadership would go to the region. During the election 
campaigns, Somare visited the Kokopo Open electorate to support the 
candidacy of Rabbie Namaliu. While there, he promised that if Namaliu 
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was re-elected he would become the next leader of Pangu Pati. A number 
of voters in Kokopo expressed the view that the party needed younger and 
more vigourous leadership and that Namaliu was the best candidate to take 
over the helm. By the late fall, the pressure from East New Britain to have 
one its own regional members take over the leadership of Pangu Pati 
became strong indeed. The East New Britain branch of Pangu took up the 
refrain initiated by the Kokopo electorate. Led by its president, Leo 
Tokaukau, the ENB branch resolved that Namaliu must resign altogether 
from Pangu since he still had not been made leader (Post-Courier, 12  
November 1987). Namaliu himself admitted a day later that 'he would lose 
support if he remained in Pangu' (Post-Courier, 13 November 1987). 
Indeed, during the November session of parliament, Namaliu vacated his 
usual seat directly behind the chief in the opposition frontbenches and was 
sitting among opposition back benchers in one of the middle rows' (Post­
Courier, 1 8  November 1987). This assertion of regionalism was resolved 
when Somare promised in mid-December 1987 to vacate the Pangu 
leadership in 1988, with Rabbie Namaliu as his automatic successor. The 
promise was kept in July 1988, when Namaliu became prime minister as 
well as leader of Pangu Pati. This incident is an example of regionalism 
expressed by the voters of an electorate largely after the election, but it had 
its origins in the electoral campaign. 
Regionalism at the Party Level 
The chief party to embody regionalism in the 1977 and 1982 elections was 
Papua Besena. In 1987, Papua Besena still fought on, but it had to make 
room for another Papuan regional party, the Papua Party. Furthermore, a 
new quasi-party, the Morobe Independent Group (MIG), was founded under 
the leadership of Utula Samana, the former premier of Morobe province. 
The identification of other parties with regions was also strong. The 
People's  Democratic Movement of the prime minister, Mr Paias Wingti, 
was perceived as having its stronghold in the Highlands, and it had to share 
this regional strength with the National Party, which continued to have a 
Highlands identity. 
The split of the Papua Party from Papua Besena occurred finally in 
1985, although tensions between Abaijah and other Papuan regionalists had 
been evident for some time. The Papua Party was led by Galeva K warara 
and it entered the 1987 election with high hopes of capitalizing on Papuan 
grievances and of support in voicing a demand for a greater Papuan voice in 
the affairs of the state. The party had no record of secessionism and 
although most of its members were former Papua Besena supporters, they 
had discarded independence as a political goal. Neither Papua Besena nor 
the Papua Party fielded candidates outside Papua but they named candidates 
in Fly River, Gulf, Central, Milne Bay and Oro. 
The Morobe Independent Group ran candidates only in Morobe and 
concentrated on the regional problems of this most populous province in 
PNG. It was created only just before the 1987 election and was clearly 
based on the assumption that Utula Samana and those who stood with him 
would have the best chance of winning seats if they capitalized on their 
regional identity. The temporary, electoral character of the Morobe 
Independent Group was revealed when it changed its name in 1988 to the 
Melanesian United Front (MUF). 
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Regionalism at the Parliamentary and Cabinet Level 
Once the election was over, the question of who would form the 
government dominated the news. For a long period, it seemed that Mr 
Somare would lead a coalition, and the struggle began for regional 
representation in the cabinet he would form. The coalition was to be based 
on Pangu, the National Party, the Melanesian Alliance, the Morobe 
Independent Group and the League for National Advancement. One of the 
difficulties with this combination was that it allowed little room for 
representation of the Papua region. Pangu had strength in Mamose and the 
Highlands, the National Party in the Highlands, the MIG in Mamose, the 
MA in the islands. The problem of finding strong prospective Papuan 
ministers from within this grouping was acute and it was not solved in time 
to prevent Somare losing out to Wingti and a PDM-led coalition when the 
vote in parliament came in August. Wingti faced regional problems of a 
comparable nature when he tried to put together his coalition and the cabinet 
which would be its expression. He was faced with the fact that the newly 
elected members of parliament had grouped themselves regionally in two 
powerful combinations. One of these was the Papuan Bloc. The other was, 
more predictably, the MIG. 
The Papuan Bloc was made up of four main elements: the Papua Party, 
led by Galeva K warara who became the chairman of the bloc; a group of 
independents led by Hugo Berghuser; a Southern Highlands contingent led 
by Aruru Matiabe, and, most important of all, the People's  Action Party 
(PAP), led by Ted Diro who immediately became the bloc leader as well. 
The PAP had not been created as a regional party and it fielded candidates 
in all regions. Its only successful candidates came from Papuan electorates, 
however, and it required little strain to tum the party into the lead element 
of a Papuan regional bloc. At the time of the formation of the Wingti 
cabinet, the Papuan Bloc counted twenty members and its bargaining power 
was such that it was assigned eleven ministries: five PAP members, five 
Independents and one Papua Party member. Wingti was spared the dilemma 
of deciding between Ted Diro and Sir Julius Chan for deputy prime minister 
by the interim report of the Commission of Enquiry into Forest Matters 
which was released after the election but before the formation of the new 
government. The interim report implicated Diro in possibly illegal 
activities. As a consequence, Wingti made him only a minister without 
portfolio, until he could be cleared (or convicted) of charges. Nevertheless, 
the key portfolio of Finance and Planning went to the bloc with Kwarara 
named to it. 
The formation of the bloc and the cohesion which it attained so rapidly 
is testimony to the strength of Papuan regional feeling. There was a hope 
that one of their own could become deputy prime minister; there was a clear 
opportunity to bring major ministerial powers within the grasp of the region. 
An official statement of the bloc showed the value it put on regional unity: 
Papuans have long sought solidarity and a Papuan image that 
enhances the dignity, self-reliance and strength of the Papuan 
people. We are a strength in our own right, one earned from a 
discerning electorate and to lose our dignity in a loose coalition of 
disparate views and policies would be a deception played on the 
people who elected us (Post-Courier, 20 July 1987). 
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Unfortunately, the bloc was dogged by bad luck and in addition to 
Diro' s dissapointing assignment, it had to put up with the dismissal of Aruru 
Matiabe, a Southern Highlands member, from his cabinet post as minister of 
Education while he faced charges of rape and carnal knowledge. 
The Morobe Independent Group saw its fortunes rise when, in a cabinet 
reshuffle in December 1987, its leader, Utula Samana, became Public 
Service minister, a post left vacant by Dennis Young when he became 
speaker of the house. (Post-Courier, 4 December 1987). The MIG counts 
three other members of parliament all, of course, from Morobe 
constituencies: Steven Mambon (Markham Open), Ainde Wainzo 
(Menyama Open) and Ben Garry (Huon Gulf). At first it seemed that the 
MIG would retain its identity as a regional bloc, concerning itself primarily 
with the interests of the Morobe region. It is now clear that Samana has 
nation-wide ambitions and the creation of the MUF will enable him and his 
followers to transcend regional considerations. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The study of the 1987 general election has shown that regionalism persists 
at three levels. It can be found at the constituency level where candidates 
make their appeals on the basis of regional solidarity and where voters exert 
pressure on candidates and on parties to pursue regional objectives. 
Regionalism is also evident in the ways that political parties organize their 
forces and plan their campaigns. Finally, it shows itself in the way groups 
form in the parliament and in the selection of ministers that is made by the 
prime minister when constructing the cabinet. 
The evidence does not support a contention that regionalism is the 
dominant consideration in PNG elections, but it continues to play an 
important part in election campaigns and their aftermath. 
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Gender, Age and Education of 
Candidates and Members 
MARK TURNER* 
CANDIDATES 
Gender 
Each parliamentary election in Papua New Guinea has involved increasing 
numbers of candidates contesting the 109 electorates. In 1987 there were a 
record 1 5 1 5  candidates, an increase of 35 per cent from 1982. Despite the 
massive numbers seeking parliamentary office there were very few female 
candidates. There were only nineteen females, 1 .3 per cent · of candidates, 
contesting seventeen electorates. Seven of these candidates gained party 
endorsement. This was not unusual and conformed to the experience of 
previous elections (see Table 1 ). 
Table 1 :  Female candidates in national elections and female MPs 1977-87 
Year Total Female Female Female 
Candidates Candidates Candidates MPs 
(Number) % 
1977 880 10 1 . 1  3 
1982 1 124 17 1 .5 1 
1987 15 15  19 1 .3 0 
In 1977, ten candidates were females ( 1 . 1  per cent of total candidates) 
while 1982 saw seventeen ( 1 .5 per cent) female candidates. Successive 
elections have witnessed negligible change in the meagre numbers and 
percentage of female candidates fighting for national elected office. Males 
* I am most grateful for the considerable assistance and co-operation of Luke Lucas, the 
Electoral Commissioner, Reuben Kaiulo, the Deputy Electoral Commissioner, and 
Andrew Trawen, the Senior Electoral Officer. 
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have maintained their dominance in national electoral politics despite an 
official commitment to greater social, economic and political participation 
by women. One of the Eight Aims which guide national development calls 
for an improvement in the position of women. Despite this call being in 
place for over a decade, it certainly has not been heeded in national electoral 
politics. 
Age 
The majority of candidates fell into the 30-39 years category (see Table 2). 
In 1987 fifty-four per cent of candidates for whom the age was known were 
in this group. The 40-49 years category accounted for 24.9 per cent of 
candidates with the 209 candidates under 30 years ( 14.7 per cent) and the 92 
over 50 years ( 6.5 per cent) making up the rest. These figures for 
candidates ' ages were very similar to 1982 (see Table 2) and reconfirmed 
Table 2: Age of candidates 1977-87 
Year Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 Over 60 Unknown 
(Total years years years years years 
Cands.) 
1977 200 39 1 196 62 7 24 
( 880) 32.4% 45.7% 22.9% 7.2% 0.8% 2.7% 
1982 193 595 243 52 1 1  30 
(1 124) 17.6% 54.4% 22.2% 4.8% 1 .0% 2.7% 
1987 209 770 354 79 13  90 
(15 15) 14.7% 54.0% 24.9% 5.6% 0.9% 5.9% 
Note: All columns except 'Unknown' show percentages of total number of candidates for 
whom age is known. The 'Unknown' column shows percentages of all candidates. 
the changes between 1977 and 1982 in the age profile for candidates. There 
is a sharp reduction (23.4 per cent to 14.7 per cent in the percentage of 
candidates in the youngest category (under 30 years). The percentage of 
those over 50 years has also shrunk slightly (8.0 per cent to 6.5 per cent) 
since 1977. Thus there has been a consolidation of candidates in the age 
range of 30-49 years, especially in the 30-39 years group.  Over three­
quarters of candidates are now found in the twenty-year age band between 
30 and 49 years. 
There was some variation in candidates' ages among regions (see Table 
3). The Highlands had larger numbers of candidates in the 30-39 years and 
under 30 age groups and much fewer than other regions in the over 40 years 
groups. By contrast the Islands had older candidates than the other regions. 
Only two candidates were under 30 years and the numerically largest 
category was the 40-49 years group with sixty-one ( 43.0 per cent) 
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candidates. Even the over 5 0  years groups were well represented with 14.8 
per cent of candidates. 
The age distribution of candidates was unlike that of the Papua New 
Guinea population at large. While 54.0 per cent of the candidates come 
from the 30-39 years age group only 3 1  per cent of the adult population 
(over the age of 25 years) 
Table 3 :  Age of candidates by region, 1987 
Region Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 Over 60 Unknown 
years years years years years 
South 29 161 1 15 3 1  2 27 
Coast 8.6% 47.6% 34.0% 9.2% 0.6% 7.4% 
Islands 2 58 61 17 4 2 
1 .4% 40.8% 43.0% 12.0% 2.8% 1 .4% 
North 
Coast 38 172 84 22 3 6 
1 1 .9% 53.9% 26.3% 6.9% 0.9% 1 .8% 
Highlands 140 379 94 9 4 55 
20.6% 55.7% 13.8% 1 .3% 0.6% 8 .1% 
TOTAL 2()<) 770 354 79 1 3  90 
14.7% 54.0% 24.9% 5.6% 0.9% 5.9% 
Note: All columns except 'Unknown' show percentages of total number of candidates for 
whom age is known. The 'Unkown' column shows percentage of all candidates. 
belonged to that group according to the 1980 national census. Those over 
50 years comprised 27 per cent of the adult population but supplied only 6.5 
per cent of the candidates. While wisdom may well be associated with age, 
it does not correlate with running for national office. That contest is left to 
younger men (but not too young) whose age, vigour, formal education and 
experience of the institutions of the urban world are seen as appropriate 
qualifications for entry into the realm of national politics. Rising life 
expectancy in Papua New Guinea has had no effect on this general pattern. 
Only in the Islands is there some deviation from it. 
Education 
The formal educational levels of candidates have been rising with each 
parliamentary election. The 1987 election was no exception (see Table 4) . 
At the lower end, those with no formal education shrank to a mere 2.6 per 
cent of candidates, thirty-seven of the 1515  standing. In 1977, 14  per cent 
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were without any education. Also contrasting were the percentages of 
candidates with primary education (grade 1-6) and with lower secondary 
education (grade 7-8) only. These two categories accounted for 42.2 per 
cent of candidates in 1977 but included only 24.8 per cent of candidates in 
1987. By contrast the grade 9- 10 group leapt from 29.8% of candidates to 
40.7 per cent of candidates ten years later. But the most dramatic change 
has come in the grade 1 1 - 1 2  category which claimed only 1 3.9 per cent of 
candidates in 1977 but in 1987 boasted 3 1 .9 per cent. Furthermore, almost 
10 per cent of candidates in 1987 had university degrees. 
Table 4: Educational level of candidates by highest grade achieved, 1977-
87 
Year/ Nil formal Grade Grade Grade Grade Unknown 
Total education 1 -6 7-8 9- 10 1 1 - 12 
No.of 
Can d. 
1977 1 18 245 1 10 25 1 1 17 39 
(880) 14.0% 29. 1% 13 . 1% 29.8% 13 .9% 4.4% 
1982 56 224 1 19 455 229 4 1  
(1 124) 5.2% 20.7% 1 1 .0% 42.0% 2 1 . 1 %  3.6% 
1987 37 234 120 580 455 89 
(15 15) 2.6% 16.4% 8.4% 40.7% 3 1 .9% 9.9% 
Note: All columns except 'Unknown' show percentages of total number of candidates for 
whom educational level is known. The 'Unknown' column shows percentages of all 
candidates. 
There was some regional variation (see Table 5). The Highlands and 
North Coast regions had larger percentages of candidates in the lower two 
categories. Twenty-nine of the thirty-seven without formal education stood 
in Highlands electorates while 2 1 .3 per cent of North Coast candidates had 
only received some degree of primary education. The South Coast and 
Islands regions possessed very high percentages of candidates with grade 
1 1 - 1 2  levels of attainment - 38.5 per cent and 45.4 per cent respectively. 
Almost 80 per cent of candidates in both these regions had achieved at least 
grade 9. Overall, the message given by these figures is clear. Education is 
an important resource for individuals to utilize in competing for national 
political office. Achievement in formal education has become an unofficial 
but necessary qualification for those running for parliament. It is 
increasingly expected that candidates should have been educated to at least 
secondary school level. Candidates realize and even encourage this by 
proclaiming their educational prowess as a reason others should vote for 
them. And with each election the educational levels of the candidates have 
risen. 
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The educational levels of the candidates stand in sharp contrast to those 
of the adult population at large. The latter are characterized by low levels of 
literacy and incomplete primary education. An estimated two thirds of adult 
Papua New Guineans are illiterate. Twenty-eight per cent of children still 
do not even commence primary school and of those that do, 54 percent do 
not finish. Eighty-four per cent of children do not attend provincial high 
school. Thus, candidates for the national elections are part of what is 
popularly referred to in Papua New Guinea as an 'educated elite' , a group 
distinguished by relatively high levels of formal educational attainment. 
The lack of this unofficial qualification for being a candidate effectively 
prevents, or at very least, strongly discourages the vast majority of the adult 
population from ever contemplating standing for parliament. The large 
numbers of candidates contesting each national election tends to obscure 
this fact. 
Table 5 :  Educational level of candidates by region and highest grade 
achieved, 1987 
Region Nil Grade Grade Grade Grade Degree Unknown 
formal 1-6 7-8 9-10 1 1 -12 
education 
South 1 39 30 144 1 34 29 17 
Coast 0.3% 1 1 .2% 8.6% 41 .4% 38.5% 8.3% 4.7 
% 
Islands 3 12 15 47 64 24 3 
2. 1 %  8.5% 10.6% 33.3% 45.4% 17.0% 2.1 
% 
North 4 68 30 133 84 28 6 
Coast 1.3% 21 .3% 9.4% 4 1 .7% 26.3% 8.8% 1.8 
% 
Highlands 29 1 1 5 45 256 173 56 63 
4.7% 18.6% 7.3% 4 1 .4% 28.0% 9. 1 %  9 .9 
% 
TOTAL 37 234 120 580 455 137 8 
2.6% 16.4% 8.4% 40.7% 31 .9 %  9.6% 9.9 
% 
Note: All columns except'Unknown' shows percentages of total number of 
candidates for whom educational level is known. The 'Unknown' column 
show percentages of all candidates. Figures in the 'Degree' column are also 
incorporated into the 'Grade 1 1 - 12' column. 
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MEMBERS 
Gender 
For the first time in a national parliamentary election, no female member 
was returned (see Table 1 ). In 1977 there were three female MPs. In 1982 
only one female was elected, and then only by one vote. Despite equality 
for women being one of the country' s  major developmental goals since 
independence, women have performed progressively worse in national 
elections since that time. In 1987 only one female candidate secured a 
second place in the polls and even then was a long way behind the winner. 
Fourteen of the nineteen female candidates finished below fifth position in 
the polls, gaining only very small percentages of the votes cast. Party 
endorsement seemed to provide little, if any, advantage. There was no 
regional or rural-urban variation in the female voting figures. Males were 
dominant everywhere resulting in a parliament where all 109 seats are 
occupied by males. 
Age 
The average age of members as 38.6 years, a slight increase over 1977 (35.6 
years) and 1982 (37.9 years). While Papua New Guinea's  national 
politicians are getting slightly older with each election, they are still on 
average fairly young. There is some regional variation with the Islands 
returning older members (average age 43.8  years) while the Highlands 
members are younger than average (35.8  years). 
In common with previous years (see Table 6) the 30-39 years age group 
accounts for over half of the seats (57 .0 per cent). The 40-49 year group has 
a further 29.9 per cent. Thus, the twenty-year band, 30-49, contains 86.9 
per cent of members and leaves little room for the very young and the old. 
Table 6: Members by age group 1977- 1987 
Year Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 Over 60 Unknown 
years years years years years 
1977 19 60 24 2 2 2 
17.8% 56. 1% 22.4% 1 .9% 1 .9% 
1982 12 58 35 3 1 
1 1 .0% 53.2% 32. 1 %  2.8% 0.9% 
1987 6 61  32 7 1 2 
5.6% 57.0% 29.9% 6.5% 0.9% 
Note: Percentages are of total number of members for whom age is known. 
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The under 30s have only six members, a considerably reduced presence 
from the nineteen and twelve representatives in the previous two 
parliaments. Although the 50-59 years group more than doubled its 
numbers from previous years, it still claims only seven members. The over 
60s made no headway and the only elected member from this group died 
shortly after he was declared. In general, the profile of the members' ages 
follows that for the candidates although members are even more heavily 
concentrated in the 30-49 years age group. But neither the young nor the 
old fare well in Papua New Guinea's parliamentary elections. They provide 
a minority of candidates, just over 20 per cent, and even less members, 13  
per cent. Although politics i s  regarded as a young man's  game i t  now 
appears that one can be too young to have a reasonable chance of success. 
There was some regional variation (see Table 7). In the Highlands, a 
massive 79.5 per cent of members are in the 30-39 years group. Only one 
Highlands member lies outside the 30-49 years band. The Islands electors 
chose no member under thirty but focussed their favours on the 40-49 years 
group taking 58.8 per cent of their members from there. Even the over 50s 
fared well in the Islands, providing 17.  7 per cent of the region's members. 
Region 
South 
Coast 
Islands 
North 
Coast 
Highlands 
TOTAL 
Table 7 :  Age groups of members by region, 1987 
Under 30-39 
30 years years 
2 12 
9.1% 54.5% 
4 
23.5% 
3 14 
10.3% 48.3% 
1 3 1  
2.6% 79.5% 
6 61 
5.6% 57.0% 
40-49 
years 
6 
27.3% 
10 
58.8% 
9 
3 1 .0% 
7 
17.9% 
32 
29.9% 
50-59 
years 
2 
9. 1 %  
2 
1 1 .8% 
3 
10.3% 
7 
6.5% 
Over 
60 years 
1 
5.9% 
1 
0.9% 
Unknown 
2 
2 
Note: All columns show percentages of total number of members for whom age is known. 
The electorate have a tendency to dispense with older sitting members (see 
Table 8). Over 7 5 per cent of the sitting members who lost their seats were 
over the age of 40 years. Those retaining their seats had a younger profile, 
over half being under the age of 40 years. Even younger were the new 
members, three-quarters of whom were under the age of 40 years. While 
the electorate favour younger men, they prefer their members to be over 30 
years. Thus, in every region the new members' ages were above 35 years. 
The high turnover of members, with the young replacing the old, militates 
against the establishment of a substantial body of highly experienced 
parliamentarians. Continuity in policy-making suffers while many members 
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have limited knowledge of parliamentary procedures and of parliamentary 
government in general. 
Education 
As has been already noted, with successive elections the educational levels 
of candidates have increased. The process of improvement in educational 
achievement has similarly affected the elected members. They too have 
become more educated with each parliament. Furthermore, they have 
always maintained educational levels above those of the candidates in 
general. The results of the 1987 national elections have confirmed both of 
these trends (see Table 9). For the first time, more than half (54. 1 per cent) 
of the members have attained at least grade 1 1 . This is considerable and 
rapid progress from 1977 and 1982 when the figures were 26 per cent and 
38 per cent respectively. It is also far superior to the candidates in 1987 
Table 8:  Returned, losing and new members by age groups, 1987 
Type of Under 30 30-39 40-49 50-59 Over 60 Unknown 
Member years years years years years 
Sitting 
Members 29 19 6 
Returned 
(56) 1 .8% 51 .8% 33.9% 10.7% 1 .8% 
Sitting 
Members 12 29 6 1 
Losing 
(48) 25.0% 60.0% 12.5% 2.8% 
New Members 5 33 12 
2 
(53) 9.8% 64.7% 23.5% 1 .9% 
Note: Percentages are of total number of members for whom age is known. 
of whom only 3 1 .9 per cent fell into the grade 1 1- 12  category (see Table 4). 
A massive 86.2 per cent now have at least grade 9 qualifications. Almost 
twenty years ago in the House of Assembly only 2 1 .9 per cent of Papua 
New Guinean members had attained that level. As members' educational 
levels have improved, the lesser-educated members have obviously become 
a rarer species. In the last two parliaments there have been no members 
without formal education while only ten members elected in 1987 fit into 
the grade 1 -6 category. Tertiary qualifications are now more prominent. 
According to the Electoral Commission bio-data, well over half of the 
members have attended tertiary level courses. In the last parliament fifteen 
members possessed university degrees. After the 1987 election there are 
twenty-six degree-holders in parliament. Eleven of them have new degrees. 
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At least six others, including the former Prime Minister Wingti, have 
attended but not graduated from university. Thus, with 29 per cent of 
members having experience of universities, the role of these institutions, 
especially the University of Papua New Guinea, in socializing the national 
political elite is becoming increasingly important. It also emphasizes the 
point that the electorate consistently selects members who in general are 
more highly educated than the candidates at large. 
There is some slight regional variation (see Table 10). In the South 
Coast and Highlands regions, over 90 percent of members have at least 
grade 9. This is quite remarkable for the Highlands, which, in 1968, elected 
only one person with that level of education; at that time eighteen of the 
twenty-five Papua New Guinean Highlands members had no formal 
Table 9: Educational levels of members by highest grade achieved 1977-
1978 
Year Nil formal Grade Grade Grade Grade 
education 1 -6 7-8 9-10 1 1 -12 
1977 10 26 10 35 28 
9.2% 23.9% 9.2% 32. 1% 25.7% 
1982 19 7 42 4 1  
17.4% 6.4% 38.5% 37.6% 
1987 10 5 35 59 
9.2% 4.6% 32. 1% 54.1 %  
Note: Members holding qualifications above Grade 1 2  are incorporated into the Grade 1 1-
12 column. 
education. Now, half of the degree-holders in parliament come from the 
Highlands. The Islands and especially the North Coast regions have higher 
representation in the lower categories. Most, but not all, of these men are 
long-serving politicians who have somehow succeeded in maintaining their 
popular support. One of them, Sir Pita Lus, was first elected in 1968. 
It should not be thought that the possession of high educational 
qualifications will automatically secure election. For example, there were 
1 1 1  disappointed degree-holders out of the 137 who stood for parliament in 
1987. Also, 68.7 per cent of sitting members who lost their seats had at 
least grade 9 level education (see Table 1 1). Five of them had university 
degrees. Education is only one resource which candidates bring to the 
political arena. Voters take into account other factors such as performance, 
clan, residence, status and age when deciding whom to support. 
Nevertheless, losing members as a group do have a lower educational 
profile than the new members. Twenty-five per cent of losers had only 
primary education compared with 7 .5 per cent of new members. Over half 
(28) of the latter were educated to grade 1 1 -12 standard and sixteen of these 
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had degrees. Approximately one third of the ousted members had grade 1 1-
12  qualifications. Finally, although the educational levels of the returned 
sitting members range from grade 3 to university degree, the educational 
profile of this group is higher than that of the losing members. While 68. 7 
per cent of the latter had at least grade 9, some 82.2 per cent of the returned 
sitting members had those qualifications. This pattern may well disappear 
or at least become less pronounced in the next elections. Approximately 
half of the members are ousted in each election. As most now have high 
educational qualifications, this means that the majority of losers may hold 
such qualifications. 
Table 10: Educational levels of members by region and highest grade 
achieved, 1987. 
Region Nil formal Grade Grade Grade Grade Degree 
education 1-6 7-8 9- 10 1 1-12 
South 1 8 14 4 
Coast 4.2% 33.3% 62.5% 
Islands 2 2 4 9 3 
1 1 .8% 1 1 .8% 23.5% 52.9% 
North 5 2 8 14 6 
Coast 17.7% 6.9% 27.6% 48.3% 
Highlands 3 15  21 13 
7.7% 38.5% 53.8% 
Note: Members appearing the 'Degree' column are also incorporated into the numbers 
appearing in the Grade 1 1 -12 column. 
Table 1 1 :  Returning, losing and new members by highest grade achieved, 
1987 
Type of Member Grade Grade Grade Grade Degree 
1-6 7-8 9- 10 1 1-12 
Sitting members 6 4 15  3 1  10  
returned (56) 10.7% 7. 1% 26.8% 55.4% 17.9% 
Sitting members 12 3 16 17 5 
losing (48) 25.0% 6.3% 33.3% 35.4% 10.4% 
New Members 4 I 20 28 16 
(53) 7.5% 1 .7% 37.7% 52.8% 30.2% 
Note: Numbers of members appearing in the 'Degree' column are also incorporated in the 
'Grade 1 1- 12' column. The percentages appearing in the 'Grade 1 1- 12 '  column 
incorporate those in the 'Degree' column. 
6 
Hidden and Open Agendas : 
Social Policy Issues in the 1987 
Election 
ROSEMARY PRESTON 
SUMMARY 
Party and candidate commitment to the development of national social 
policy as a vote-catching device was insignificant in the 1987 general 
election in Papua New Guinea. This conforms with patterns observed in 
other newly independent states and with electioneering since independence 
in PNG. In PNG, candidate status, political experience and motivation, the 
large numbers of candidates and the inevitability that a coalition 
government will be formed seem likely to have discouraged social policy 
statements in manifestos. The trend to cut social provisions in more 
developed countries as they seek to off set the effects of the recession and 
enforce monetarism is scarcely an incentive for less advantaged countres, 
equally squeezed for cash, to do the opposite. The implications of these 
trends in PNG for the fall of the multi-party state are not apparent, although 
some passing interest has been shown by the army in creating a military 
government. 
Sources of Information 
The information on which this paper is based draws principally from issues 
of three national newspapers: Post-Courier, Niugini Nius, and the Times of 
Papua New Guinea, published over the three-month period prior to the 
election in June. It refers in addition to seminars presented at UPNG on 
themes relating to the election and to occasional national radio programmes. 
At best, the comments made should be treated as speculative, perhaps as the 
basis for more substantive research. 
The nature of social policy 
There are many definitions of the term ' social ' .  This paper understands 
social policy to be policy oriented towards the promotion of well-being in 
society as a whole, or of communities within it. It is not concerned with 
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individual welfare, except insofar as society is the organized aggregate of all 
individuals in a given population. 
Unfortunately, at such a level of generalization, it will be observed that 
all government policy is promoted on the grounds that it will serve the 
ultimate good of the society at which it is directed. While this would 
include policy concerning the development of law, government, science and 
technology, land, production and marketing, and education and health, it is 
only the last two of these that are conventionally described as areas of social 
policy. This is because a system of policy classification has evolved to 
identify different fields of government and policy development (political, 
social, scientific and legal, for example) for administrative and budgetary 
purposes. 
One problem with such classificatory systems, however, is that the 
interdependence of the different areas and the primacy of economic policy 
may be overlooked. Initiatives to reduce the incidence of infringements of 
law and order are likely to include change in social or economic policy 
directed at providing greater opportunities for young people. They are less 
likely to affect legal policy. Changes in economic policy have immediate or 
long-term effects on social conditions which, in turn, require policy 
revisions. At the same time, social conditions are critical to the fulfilment 
of economic development policy, so that to ignore them can jeopardize its 
effectiveness. 
It becomes, therefore, artificially restrictive to attempt a discussion on 
social policy in the general election in PNG, without acknowledging that the 
need for such policy and the form that it takes can only be understood in 
relation to the existing social and economic situation and to proposed 
changes in other fields of government. Thus, while this paper identifies 
social policy as that which concerned with the distribution of social rights, 
of access to food, housing, law, government and education (Conyers 1986), 
it is mindful of the need to consider these in wider contexts, and in 
particular, in relation to expenditure in designated sectors. 
Elections and social change 
Finally, it has to be recognized that elections are mechanisms for popular 
legitimation of government and the policies that it introduces. In this they 
contribute to the process of social integration in national consolidation. In 
contrast, simultaneously, they legitimate the emergence of political elites in 
contexts, such as that of PNG, in which economic transition is accentuating 
social differentiation through the restructuring of the division of labour that 
is a prerequisite of an effective market economy. 
POUT/CS AND POUCY IN PNG AND OTHER DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
PNG's Democratic Policy in Principle 
Since independence, PNG has been struggling to strengthen its internal 
organization so as to optimize its internal well-being and its position and at 
the periphery of global systems on which it is economically and culturally 
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dependent. To achieve this, the state has adopted the political, b':1reaucratic 
and military systems modelled on those of the former metropolitan power 
which demonstrably promoted that nation's  economic prosperity and social 
integration. The political model adopted was the present electoral and party 
system derived from that of Westminster, England. In this, parties prepare 
manifestos for the policy that they would introduce in government and the 
electorate casts votes for the candidates representing parties which have the 
most appealing policy intentions. In theory, the right to formulate 
government policy is mandated to the party with the greatest number of 
elected candidates. 
Political Practice Elsewhere 
When constitutions were being written for states achieving independence 
from colonialism, the extent to which their internal social organization and 
external relationships would impede the replication of classical democratic 
systems was not anticipated. In practice, in many new states, where the 
point of social reference is strongly local, rather than national, candidates 
are moved more by the prospect of personal gain than by the opportunity to 
enhance the well-being of the state and society as a whole (Cammack 1988). 
As a result, political party systems and, with them, party policy statements 
for national development are imperfectly established. 
In many new nations, multi-party electoral systems emerge. 
Weaknesses in them become apparent when, after the count of votes in an 
election, no party has an absolute majority of members in the new 
parliament and fragile coalition governments are formed. Over time, the 
nascent party system may appear to atrophy, in what may be the first stage 
in a progression that leads to a single party state or dictatorship and later to 
military control (Premdas and Steeves 1983). These processes all serve to 
undermine the principal functions of political parties in elite-controlled, 
export-led states, elsewhere in the less developed world: integration, 
legitimation and policy formation and execution (Cammack 1988). 
Referring to comparative analysis of studies from Africa, Latin America 
and the Middle East, the indications are that such party weaknesses can be 
explained by the extent of state control above that of ruling parties, in 
particular the personal power of the state president and the power of the 
bureaucracy; the limited political and administrative expertise of party 
personnel; the increasing sophistication of technology, in economic 
production. In some countries, lack of certainty about the locus of control 
or about political stability have been said to inhibit party development and 
involvement in policy formulation and implementation. It is claimed that 
. . .  .it is inevitable that state resources will be used to shore up a 
regime and that the party will become a channel for patronage and 
the purchase of political support. Parties in the Third World tend to 
be agencies of the state rather than vehicles for the autonomous 
political mobilization of the citizenry behind clearly political 
programmes with strong ideological underpinning (Cammack 
1988). 
It can be argued that the intimate relationship between the state and the 
successful party explains above all else the paucity of party policy 
initiatives. 
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Caution should be used before assuming that elements of recent 
colonialism produce these imperfections in parliamentary systems. Most 
Latin American states achieved independence more than 150 years ago, but 
display similar symptoms. Many European states have, in the last forty 
years, formed coalition governments, after the failure of any one party to 
obtain a majority in parliament. The recent collapse of the centre and left of 
the political spectrum in Britain suggests weakness in the system that is 
likely to have sprung from recent economic change. 
Similarly, questions about the locus of power in democratic states have 
preoccupied political theorists for centuries. Debates in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries sought to establish the relative importance to 
government of the legislature, executive and crown (Hegel 1967). They 
continue as political scientists today argue over the roles of state, 
bureaucracy and party in national policy development (Middlemas 1983). 
Observations on political and policy-making developments in PNG, 
during and since the post-independence general elections of 1977 and 1982 
(Hegarty 1983, Pokawin 1982) suggest close conformity to the initial 
patterns set by African states after their independence in the 1950s and 
1960s. 
Echoing observations elsewhere and referred to above, the local rather 
than national orientation of candidates are seen to have dominated electoral 
campaigns :  
The population, including the political leaders , have yet to identify 
with the political structures and institutions.  They do not consider 
the institutions, laws and predominant values of the modern state as 
theirs (Pokawin 1982). 
This implies that, as the new economic elites become, if they were not 
already, prominent politicians and vice versa, their management of 
government policy will be such as to enable them to further their own 
interests and those of the clans and ethnic groups on whom they depend for 
primary support. This may be to the extent that, in many instances, self­
interest has been claimed to be more important than electoral obligations. 
Pre-independence party formation in PNG aimed to prepare people for 
democratic government after independence from Australia. In elections 
since then, no majority government has been returned to parliament. The 
multiplicity of parties and the large numbers of candidates, party and non­
party, contesting each seat has meant that post-independence governments 
have been formed from coalitions of elected parliamentarians, many of 
whom were not party members. They have constantly been subject to 
threats of votes of no-confidence which, in tum, have weakened government 
stability and courses of action. 
The fragility of the coalition governments and their ability to influence 
policy is compounded by the high levels of turnover of members of 
parliament between one election and the next: 38 per cent of members 
resumed seats after the elections in 1977; 53.8 per cent in 1982. Not only is 
the proportion of members with expertise in government small (Hegarty 
1988), their level of educational and professional experience is, in general, 
inferior to that of senior public servants. At independence, the locus of 
power was firmly within the established bureaucracy, rather than within the 
newly formed national parliament and cabinet. Since then, the greater 
stability, experience and professionalism of public servants have continued 
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to ensure that: ' . . .  by ministerial default bureaucrats are the real initiators and 
selectors of policy' (S affu 1 986). 
This in turn explains the tendency for policy to: 
. . .  effect marginal changes to existing frameworks, monitoring the 
progress of implementation and triggering corrective measures 
maintaining fiscal stability . . . .  bureaucrats are not equipped by 
training or temperament to discover large social principles and 
embrace them as bases for operation . . .  (Saffu 1 986). 
The continued need to employ expatriate expertise in government and 
business attests to the deficiency in human resources across the country and 
further enhances public service superiority in relation to governing parties. 
The growing use of information technology is undeniable. The extent to 
which this further weakens government power in PNG is as yet unclear. It 
is, however, likely to increase long-term dependency on imported 
commodities, which are used to control access to sensitive information of 
state, and on expatriate expertise for their operation. 
Finally, contrary to frequent claims that political parties in PNG lack 
ideologies (Pokawin 1982, Oliver 1987), it seems to be without doubt that 
post-independence government and party policy in PNG has been a product 
of development ideology inspired by market capitalism which, as yet, no 
party manifesto has sought to challenge. On achieving independence, 
parties endorsed the Eight Point Improvement Plan ( 1 972) and the National 
Goals and Directive Principles ( 1 97 5) as the aims of government (King 
1 986). These policies give much importance to social development, but, if 
read carefully, it is always in the context of economic change leading to 
increased participation in a differntiated global economy. However, until 
the mid- 1980s, the need to encourage the accumulation of wealth and status 
did not deter the adoption of policy to extend and diversify the provision of 
social services, from which there would be seemingly few direct returns to 
investment. Arguably, this unidirectional similarity between parties may be 
critical in explaining weakness in the party system. 
In each of the above respects the emerging political system of PNG 
appears to be similar to the first stages of the model proposed by Cammack 
for understanding weaknesses in the democratic systems in less developed 
countries. S uch weaknesses can only inhibit effective policy development. 
Social Policy in the 1987 General Election 
Descriptions of the conduct of the 1977 and 1 982 elections appear to apply 
equally well to the 1 987 campaign. However, the number of parties and the 
number of candidates had increased: in 1987 there were fourteen candidates 
aspiring to each seat in parliament and, of those returned, 53.8 per cent were 
new members. The educational and professional status of candidates had 
overall increased (Griffin 1 988),  but remain, on average, far below the 
levels of senior public servants. As before, in most cases, policy statements 
intended to muster votes emphasized local commitments, while those parties 
with manifestos stressed economic more than social policy development. 
After weeks of negotiation, a coalition was formed under the auspices of 
PDM, although it commanded no more than 1 7  per cent of the votes cast, a 
weak basis from which to assume authority to govern. 
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The treatment of social policy issues in the 1987 general election in 
PNG seems also to have changed little since 1977 and 1982. It has the same 
dominant characteristics: low salience, common underlying philosophies 
among candidates, a lack of planning specifications and the omission of a 
wide range of issues. 
Along with a plethora of other modern institutions in the country, 
political parties should serve to integrate the population behind clearly 
defined policy objectives. In the 1987 election, only the national Party, and 
to a much lesser extent, the Melanesian Alliance, made this the core of their 
manifestos, through their condemnation of foreign ties and influence in the 
state. In the other parties, this integrative function of political campaigns 
seemed not to be in question and such social policy as they endorsed was to 
be through the expansion of the social welfare activities of government and 
non-government organizations. 
Nevertheless, carefully planned campaign statements of policy to 
improve well-being across the country were not conspicuous. The most 
comprehensive were found in the manifestos of the principal parties, 
PANG U and PPP. Common themes were increased access to primary 
schooling, more extensive health services, strategies to reduce threats to 
civilian safety from street gangs and other criminal groups. Other issues 
included urban housing for public servants and the promotion of youth 
activities. ON the whole, proposed policy was in the form of reactive 
responses to existing situations, rather than proactive policy initiatives. 
Random statements of intent for social policy could also be found in the 
speeches of party leaders: these tended not to be well-prepared policy 
statements, but combative modes of upstaging oppositional contenders or 
promises of assistance to specific groups, made in exchange for election 
support from interested parties. Examples would include: 
1 )  Somare' s plan to increase and improve teacher training as  essential to 
maintaining the quality of education in all subjects and at all levels 
(Post-Courier, 8 May 1987) came as a direct challenge to the cuts 
imposed by Wingti to all sectors of the educational system, but above 
all to tertiary education, during 1986 and 1987. 
2) Momis's intentions to increase the training capacity of the dental school 
at UPNG (Niugini Nius, 1 8  June 1987) seemed a blatant and 
unimplementable sop to supporters, as well as a challenge to Wingti, 
since the end-of-year closure of the dental school, on the ground of poor 
cost-effectiveness, was almost certain. 
The low salience of statements of social policy in the campaign 
contrasts with the greater prominence given to proposed national economic 
development strategy. The latter, in both publications and speeches, 
appeared to be much more comprehensive. Wingti used it as justification 
for the low profile of social policy in the PDM policy programmed: 
. . . our policy is not to have policy to improve social 
conditions . . . .  health, educations . . . without sorting out the economic 
base first from which to do it. . . .  (Wingti, May 1987). 
In this he reveals an assumption that social development in PNG is 
irrelevant to the achievement of economic success. Seemingly, others 
shared his view. 
Party identity 
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The limited importance of social policy in the election campaign should be 
attributed only in part to the priority of economic growth. It is also related 
to the much-mentioned similarity of national policy proposals between 
contenders (Senge 1987, Oliver 1987a).  There is little difference between 
party lines for national social policy and independent candidates did not 
emerge with either clear or innovative proposals. At times, party leaders 
themselves lost sight of the supposed differences between their policies. At 
a meeting held at UPNG in May 1987, less than one month before the 
election, leaders of PANGU, PPP and MA (the leader of the PDM had 
declined the invitation to participate) , presented manifestos for national 
development. Their focus was economic policy, but in the course of debate, 
Somare, Chan and Momis were to foster the growth of gross domestic 
product (GDP) through technological change and the commercialization of 
production. Somare and Chan proposed doing this through capital 
investment and export-oriented production in primary industry. Momis 
stressed the importance of autochthonous enterprise that was not dependent 
on imported manufactures as the means of increasing output and growth. 
At several points in the discussion that followed the presentations, all 
semblance of separate identities between the speakers evaporated. With the 
acquiescence of Chan and Momis, Somare orchestrated responses to 
questions from the floor, deciding which of the three speakers was best 
prepared to field specific topics. In making their responses, all three 
referred to their often shared experiences of government since independence 
and on their agreed need to stimulate economic growth. At times, they 
discussed an issue so as to put forward a consensual platform opinion. The 
idea that they were competing to promote the position of their own parties 
in the eyes of the electorate was lost as they conspired to create an image of 
themselves as a trinity of elder statesmen. 
If it is remembered that national development aims are already 
enshrined in the Eight Point Plan and National Goals, such a display of 
common identity by the leaders of three of the more prominent parties may 
not be surprising. It is hardly calculated to stimulate differences in party 
policy recommendations. .On the contrary, such blueprints for development 
endorse the impression of state supremacy in the formulation and execution 
of policy. 
Sub-national commitments 
There is a fundamental inconsistency in democratic political systems which 
require the popular election of local area representatives to serve in national 
governments. Candidates for election have to convince local electorates 
that they will be more worthy than other candidates in diverting national 
resources to meet local needs. Many, to catch votes, portray this worthiness 
entirely in local and not in national terms, but know that, if elected, they 
will be obliged to act more in accordance with national than local policy. 
Under such conditions, it would be unfair to infer that candidates' lack 
of vision for policy development at national levels implies a lack of interest 
in social welfare across the country. What it does suggest is that candidates, 
whether party members or independent, have to promote sub-national policy 
if they are to attract votes. In 1987 in PNG, some candidates were able to 
do this, indicating regional or provincial development strategy that they 
would pursue if elected. Others, lacking status or experience, or both, were 
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unable to project their contribution to change beyond their district or 
community. 
While some political commentators maintain that trends towards 
regionalism in PNG are pointing the way to anarchy (Senge 1 987), it is a 
prominent issue on any alternative political agenda. The emergence of 
parties with strong regional links may well be a further factor reducing the 
commitment to social policy at a national level. 
Provincial orientations 
Experienced politicos were able to imply links between their achievements 
as provincial leaders and what they would do if elected to parliament 
(Oliver 1987a) .  Utula Samana capitalized on his achievements as premier 
of Morobe to win support, as did Alexis Sarei in North Solomons. Sitting 
members too endeavoured to manipulate their provincial electorates.  Karl 
Stack, the sitting member, made considerable disbursements to provincial 
welfare in the immediate pre-election period as a means of increasing the 
number of votes in his favour in the West Sepik Provincial constituency; the 
member for Unggai-Bena used similar tactics (Post-Courier, 2 June). 
Rooney was able to exploit to the full her parliamentary achievements in 
Manus. Her campaign document is a report of what had been accomplished 
at provincial levels in Manus, over the past ten years, with some references 
to those of her national achievements that had contributed. It made few 
promises for the future (Rooney 1987) . It is interesting to speculate on the 
extent to which a more nationally oriented position would have improved 
her performance in the polls, although it seems likely that her failure to win 
the seat had little to do with her manifesto and a great deal to do with 
internal politics in Manus. 
Local development policy manifestos 
It would be misleading to suggest that candidates promoting policy for 
development in specific local communities were contending in 
predominantly rural constituencies. Harry Hoerler, an independent National 
Capital District (NCD) candidate, had a detailed set of policies for which he 
was seeking mandate, all of which would properly be within the domain of 
the NCD council, rather than of the national government. Social policy in 
his manifesto included the creation of mobile health clinics to be based at a 
general hospital in Gordon, the provision of all utilities and services to 
settlement populations, improved sporting facilities in the city and reduction 
of the incidence of breaches of law and order. 
Idealistic visionaries 
Many candidates, perhaps the majority of outsiders, had no recognizable 
policy intentions to use as platforms in their campaigns. Examples would 
include both independents and party followers : Port Moresby independent 
candidates, Janet Regione and Ruth Iangalio, PAP's Alan S ako (Bulolo 
Open), National Party member Paiama Guambo (Kundiawa/Gembogl 
Open), LNA's  Habia Baba (Tari Open) and PANGU' s  Dorothy Tekwie 
(West Sepik Provincial). All proclaimed their personal rectitude and 
commitment to ideals such as justice, equality and progress. None had 
specific policy strategies that they would introduce if elected. All were 
confronted with formidable opposition and, to some extent, the purpose of 
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their standing was to weaken the poll for favourites rather than to enter 
parliament. 
What these candidates offered may, however, be a simplicity of 
discourse intended to be at the level of the average voter with limited 
understanding of modem politics, in a style that is closer to customary 
modes of status ascription than modem electioneering and razzmatazz. 
Unfortunately, given their generally low return rate, it would seem that such 
naYve campaigning was subverted at the outset by the prospect of material 
gain from more cannily manoeuvring competitors and an electorate with a 
slightly higher political acumen than might have been supposed. 
Campaigning lacunae 
Along with the low commitment to social policy in the election campaign 
was a failure to consider the implications for planning the implementation 
of such policy as was being promoted, either in terms of new administrative 
systems that would be required or in terms of changing the orientation of the 
existing ones. 
More significant were the social policy issues that were overlooked in 
the campaign. Few candidates, including women candidates, endorsed 
policy to promote women's  rights and this has been interpreted as paying no 
more than lip-service to the cause of improving the situation of women in 
the country (W ormald 1 988).  In particular, commitment to reducing the 
incidence of violence against women and to facilitating women' s  access to 
law, was singularly lacking in spite of the recent campaign by the Law 
Reform Commission (Toft 1 985). Statements about the future of West Irian 
refugees in West Sepik and Western provinces were not made. Positions on 
the future of expatriate contract officers and the dual salary structure were 
not convincing, any more than they were in respect of contractual social 
obligations to be imposed on mining companies or timber merchants. 
Other Explanations of the Lack of Social Policy 
There is no doubt that the salience of policy statements in the campaign is 
affected by a candidate' s  performance in national, provincial and local 
arenas. Long-term politicians of principal parties have no problems talking 
about policy at national levels. First time aspirants, of whom there were 
hundreds in 1 987, do not have the frames of reference which allow them to 
do this. To a lesser extent, policy positions are also affected by the party, if 
any, that the candidates endorse. In addition, there is a range of other 
factors which inhibit candidates from adopting rigid manifesto positions. 
Candidate numbers 
The large number of candidates affects voting behaviour and reduces the 
number of votes required for any candidate to be elected. In constituencies 
with as many as forty candidates competing for a single seat, the support 
base of nearly all will be parochial or clannish. Indeed, many such 
candidates will have been unable to refuse nomination by clans, whose 
leaders, looking to material gain and status for themselves and for the clan, 
may have little understanding of the way in which wider issues have to be 
addressed. 
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Coalition formation 
A second factor inhibiting policy commitment during the campaign is also 
related to the large number of candidates. In 1987, as in previous elections, 
is was certain that, with so many candidates, most of whom (63 per cent) 
were running as independents, the incoming government would not be 
composed of members of parliament from a single party. It would be 
formed by a coalition of members from different parties and non-aligned 
members who would agree to conditions, which could not be specified in 
advance, for co-operation in government. 
The power base of members of a governing party or coalition is superior 
to that of parties and independent members in opposition. This leads to 
post-count negotiations to form a coalition with majority support being 
characterized by political agility, as members susceptible to persuasion shift 
their allegiance from one side to another, according to which appears likely 
to emerge to govern the country. Candidates who took rigid campaign 
policy positions might find themselves excluded from certain coalitions of 
which they might otherwise have been members. Strong commitment to 
manifesto policies may also prevent members from switching sides, if so 
doing appears to enhance their status in parliament. 
The race to obtain majority parliamentary support, led by PANGU and 
PDM leaders after the June election, was overtly to elicit support from other 
members for their respective party policy proposals. The agreements made 
appeared to have little to do with policy and a lot to do with patronage, to 
the extent that members with well-known policy and party affiliations were 
prepared to foresake them for a seat in the ruling coalition. Of these the 
mose blatant was the member for Pomio who crossed the floor of the house 
on the morning parliament reconvened to ensure a majority for the Wingti 
coalition. His National party colleagues had aligned themselves with 
S_omare. Rumour suggested that the prize for his defection would have a 
significant effect on the development of his constituency and probably on 
his position within it. 
So far, then, in the 1987 election as in those before it, the limited 
reference to social policy derives from the dominance of personal and local 
interest, limited political experience of candidates and the inevitability of 
coalition formation. The first two positions of Cammack's  model are thus 
confronted. In addition, the power of the bureaucracy over parliament and 
its ability to direct policy have to be recognized, if nowhere else, in the 
stability of the nation during the long pre-election closure of parliament. 
This too suggests the limited need for strong statements of social policy 
during the campaign. 
Issues of Doubt and the Need for Social Policy in the Campaign 
There is one element in the organization of the 1987 and earlier campaigns 
that, at first sight, makes the low salience of policy positions surprising. 
Behind the leaders of each of the principal parties, PANGU, PDM, PPP and 
MA, was a campaign manager and adviser. These advisers were all 
expatriate journalists contracted from overseas in the immediate pre­
election period. Their brief was to prepare speeches and media 
presentations and to inform their principals on campaign activities each day. 
These gurus were unable to get their candidates to give priority to 
statements of policy intent, or saw no need for them to do so. This may 
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have mirrored the direction of social policy in recent elections in their own 
countries, where national contributions to social services are being reduced. 
Under these conditions, it is tempting to conclude that social policy 
statements are not a functional requirement for PNG elections. 
Indeed, polling in PNG seems to be more about drama, an opportunity 
to ensure excitement in the one formal act of citizen participation in 
government. Popular acknowledgment of the solemnity of the act is shown 
in the wearing of bilas and body paint. It endows voting with an aura of 
ritual, reinforced by the indelible finger marking of those who had exercised 
their right of franchise. Bribery to vote in a particular way involves 
conspiracy, while the destruction of property during the campaign creates 
the illusion of combat against an enemy. Loser frustration vented against 
government and personal property becomes customarily legitimate, a 
symbolic retaliation after tribal defeat. 
To some, elections are perceived to be no more than systems for 
choosing bigmen (and media hypes of election candidates in older 
democracies suggest that the same is increasingly true there) : they 
encompass little space for policy or planning. Advice from bishops to 
voters (Post-Courier, 2 May) encouraged them to vote carefully, to find out 
about candidates, to avoid big spenders and beer men and party 
representatives who otherwise had poor reputations. This advice did not 
stress the need to assess policy promises and other manifesto items as the 
principle of vote-casting. This again implies the limited importance of such 
issues in the election process. 
The point at which campaign policy matters 
The point at which a government is formed is the point at which the 
campaign policy statements of the members of the coalition are adopted as 
policy for the cabinet. There may be some doubt about the extent to which 
such policy is legitimate, given that it will have been mandated by only a 
minority of the electorate. Since there has been no overt popular dissent to 
a given policy, acquiescence by default should be assumed. PDM 
commitment to economic development implies not a limited expansion of 
social welfare provision, but an absolute reduction in the services mode. 
It is questionable how far such policy is economically imperative or 
how far it is aping strategy developed elsewhere in countries that are now 
dismantling once-famous social welfare systems through policies that 
unashamedly are bringing back the poverty, disease and homelessness of 
times gone by. 
Some Implications 
How far these observations point to the lack of future for the multi-party 
system of government in PNG, it is not possible to say. With the increasing 
numbers of candidates, the proportion campaigning under party umbrellas 
has declined, although the nuber of parties has increased. It would seem 
that the military had little scope for staging an an insurrection against the 
government, until it was seized with flights of fancy following the transition 
of power in Fiji, early in the election year. What seems more likely is the 
continued government of PNG by successive coalitions, under the aegis of a 
benign bureaucracy which, in comparison with other Third World countries, 
is reasonably efficient. This does not question the relevance of Cammack' s  
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hypothesis to the situation in PNG. It assumes that insufficient time has 
passed since independence for the hypothesis to be fully tested. 
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Women Candidates in the Election 
EILEEN W ORMALD 
Since Papua New Guinea's  independence, there have been three elections 
and three women members of parliament. Previously there had been one 
woman, Alice Wedega, appointed by the colonial government to the 
Legisl�tive Council in 196 1 ,  but in the first two elections to the House of 
Assembly in 1964 and 1968, no woman contested. In 1972 four women 
stood and one of them, Josephine Abaijah, was elected. In 1977 she was 
one of the ten women candidates in the first post-independence election of 
whom two beside herself, Waliyato Clowes and Nahau Rooney, won seats. 
All three stood again in 1982 with another fourteen women but only Rooney 
was elected and that after an appeal to the Court of Disputed Returns. 
Rooney had been a government minister, a position she eventually regained 
and held until she lost her seat in 1987 when along with Abaijah she and all 
of the eighteen women candidates were defeated. 
Altogether forty-one women have fought in the national elections held 
in Papua New Guinea. In doing so they were making a remarkable break 
with their traditional role. Clearly in such a diverse country, it is not 
possible to speak of one traditional culture but in terms of decision making, 
though not in some cases of lineage or economic status, the clans were and 
are male dominated with women excluded from power positions and from 
religious rituals (Strathern 1972). Nagari ( 1985) writes: 'In big village 
meetings [women] are often not allowed to speak. In the past male 
solidarity was emphasized by the men's  house which women were 
forbidden to enter. ' The subordinate position of women was reinforced 
during the period of colonization and Christianization by the 
superimposition of Western ideas of gender roles (Samana 1985), which are 
a powerful force in women' s  own self-perception. 
It may therefore be surprising not that so few but that so many women 
have attempted to breach the male fortress of politics. Their right and 
indeed their duty to do so results from the 197 5 constitution in which the 
equality of the sexes is firmly embedded: 'all citizens have the same rights, 
privileges, obligations and duties, irrespective of race, tribe, place of origin, 
political opinion, colour, creed, religion or sex. '  (Constitution, 55 [ 1 ]). 
The constitution is frequently appealed to as the ideology of the new 
nation in which a fresh start can be made by all citizens, unhampered by 
time-honoured structural constraints which in older nations have impeded 
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women's access to economic and political structures. The reality has been a 
replication of the experience of women in other cultures, with the 
interaction of gender, culture and the ideology of a developing capitalist 
economy, together with Christian beliefs, reproducing the subordination of 
women in this transitional society. The gendered role of women is one of 
the most basic tenets of PNG's  belief system despite the enlightened 
constitution. Women who wish to claim their promised equality have to do 
so in the face of considerable resistance, both by adopting male values and 
at the same time demonstrating their capacity as wives, and mothers, and 
homemakers. 
POUT/CAL WOMEN 
When one woman was elected in 1972 and three in 1977, it must have 
seemed as if progress was being made; but the defeat of Abaijah and 
Clowes in 1 982 and Rooney in 1987 was a bitter blow to all who hoped for 
an increase, however gradual, in the political representation of women. Did 
these three women themselves contribute to their own defeat and the failure 
of others successfully to follow them? 
Abaijah was the first elected member, a striking woman with a very 
clear platform based on the separation of Papua from New Guinea and 
embodied in the group she founded, 'Papua Besena' .  Her bid for Papuan 
independence failed and she had never adopted a position as spokesperson 
for women in the House. She was reported as saying, ' I  was elected by men 
as well as women. The men in the House don't just work for men. I'm not 
going to separate the sexes' (Woolford 1978). She has not changed this 
view. In an interview before the 1987 election when she had just declared 
her candidature for Central Province she said that of course she stood as a 
woman, 'you can't hide the fact, but when you are in a position where you 
don't just represent women . . .  you've got to make sure you play your role as 
a politician' .  Women, she felt, find it difficult to decide on their political 
role and they need help in finding it which will give them strength to stand 
up against the network of men. The latter is a subject about which she 
knows a lot, since when she was first in politics she was laughed at and had 
to suffer sexist remarks from her male colleagues. It may be due to this that 
her performance in parliament was described as 'lacklustre' (Post-Courier, 
July 1 982:2). 
Clowes was a twenty-six year old school teacher when she won the 
Middle Fly seat against four male candidates in 1977. She stood as an 
Independent and won with 3,360 votes out of a poll of 10,638, with her 
nearest rival gaining 2,392 votes. She was married to an expatriate and said 
that her decision to stand depended on his agreement and that he encouraged 
her. Abaijah was her role model and she declared that it was seeing her at 
work that made her own people, the Gogodalas, ask her (Clowes) to contest 
the election. 'They have seen Josephine Abaijah at work, and they didn't 
see why I could not do the same for my people at home' (Post-Courier, 29 
July 1977:22). She had a general platform based on helping local business 
and, in particular, improving shipping from her area to urban centres so that 
crops could be shipped for early sale. Unlike Abaijah, however, she stated: 
'The other thing is that I am a great believer in women's rights. I cannot 
promise anything but I will do all I can to help the women of the country. A 
lot of men think we are rubbish and take no notice of us' . In parliament she 
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was a persistent questioner and she started a political party (Panal) to co­
ordinate 'independent' Papuan members. It did not gather support and she 
was defeated in 1982 and disappeared from the political scene. 
Rooney, the first woman to serve in the cabinet, was appointed minister 
for Correctional Services and Liquor Licensing in 1977. In 1978 she 
became minister for Justice and the conflict over the relationship of the 
executive and judiciary (Rooney 1985) led to the downfall of the Somare 
government. From Justice she moved to the ministry of Decentralization 
but was soon in opposition when the Somare government was defeated and 
Chan took over the leadership. She herself feels that her high profile as a 
minister made the right for a woman to lead an issue in the 1982 election. 
Though she insisted that there is no women' s  vote for women, and that there 
is no special role for women in the political field, the thrust of much of her 
argument is that women can play a unique part in decision making. Though 
it may be regarded as special pleading there is some element of truth in her 
contention that the decline in expenditure on women's  projects out of the 
total National Public Expenditure Plan allocation from 1 1 .5 per cent to 0.2 
per cent between 1979 and 1982 (N akikus 1985) was due to the lack of a 
women's voice and that this lack at the ultimate decision-making level 
could not be compensated for by efficient work by women bureaucrats. She 
saw herself as 'automatically the minister determined to do battle on behalf 
of women' because male counterparts were failing in areas of development 
such as social justice and social welfare (Rooney 1985). 
Pokawin, himself a successful politician as premier of Manus and 
previously a member of the Political Studies department at UPNG, judged 
that in the 1982 election many of the Manus electorate wished to replace 
Rooney partly 'because of her success in the power game and even more, 
because she is a woman' (Pokawin 1987). 
It is in fact remarkable that these three women overcame the prejudice 
against their sex as political leaders. This bias was succinctly described by 
a Grade 1 2  national high school student: 'PNG still has a tough tradition of 
men having higher status and able to convert and lead others ' (Hayball 
1987). Each, however, had the encouragement of an expatriate man who 
may have had a different conception of women's role from PNG men. 
Clowes and Rooney were married to men of Australian birth and Abaijah 
was the protegee of another (Woolford 1976). 
This role of mentor for successful women politicians is not unique to 
Papua New Guinea (Wormald 1982) and in view of the recent entry of 
women into PNG politics, it is not surprising that their support should come 
from outside the culture. A number of women candidates in the current 
election commented on the difficulty of campaigning without spouse back­
up whether this situation occurred because of his lack of interest or because 
they currently had no spouse. Divorcee Pilacapio's statement that politics 
was her husband for life (Post-Courier, 10  May 1987:36) might be true of 
any woman candidate who succeeds but not for one who is spending money 
at the same time as caring for home and family in an unsuccessful fight. 
The wish of successful women politicians to discount their gender and 
to play the political game as men may be based on role models of successful 
women politicians outside Papua New Guinea but is probably particularly 
inappropriate in this culture. Women are constitutionally guaranteed 
equality with men - but as women, not as substitute men - and it would seem 
that politicized women may slowly be learning this important fact. 
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Candidates as Women's Representatives 
A sign of this transition appeared in Abaijah' s views expressed in an 
interview before the 1987 election. She felt women in politics must work 
together and bury their 'petty jealousies, otherwise men will take advantage 
to say we don't really know what we are doing' .  Asked if she felt women 
had a different political image from men she thought 'very much so - I work 
with village people, help with their projects, write their letters, look after 
them, and when I go to the village they look after me all the time not just at 
elections. If people vote for me it' s  because they know I will work for 
them' . 
Rooney, hampered in her election campaigning by the necessity to 
continue her ministerial activities, nevertheless also cultivated the women 
and the village people. A newspaper report (Post-Courier, 19 May 1987:5) 
said: 
The men are seated in Manus Open Member, Nahau Rooney's, 
village house, sipping their third cup of coffee in an equal number 
of hours. They are discussing the country's  hottest topic - politics. 
Mrs. Rooney is sitting cross-legged on the verandah discussing the 
same issue with women and another group of men. 
Other women candidates in 1987 pursued women's  issues. Fide Bale, a 
seasoned campaigner, had always insisted that she 'wanted to get a 
woman's point of view represented in parliament' (Hegarty 1983). In this 
election her platform included the promise that she would 'represent 
Mothers, Wives, The Family, Yourself and the Grass Roots ' .  
Matilda Pilacapio, who had also stood for election twice before and who 
had been a provincial government member, felt confident of winning half 
the women's  vote because women's  views needed to be represented in 
parliament. 'Debates on women's issues have been shallow .. . women's 
votes are being wasted if these men take the issues (of wife beating) as 
jokes ' .  (Post-Courier, 10 April 1987 :36) 
Whether or not this turning of women towards women was for these 
candidates a result of experience, other 'new' candidates campaigned on 
similar lines. Tamo Diro, former Women's  Affairs Advisor to Mr Somare 
and Executive Officer to the National Council of Women, stood because she 
felt there should be more women in. She stood as an independent with the 
support of the Women in Politics group. Of all the women candidates, she 
perhaps came nearest to the idea of women having a special political 
agenda, saying that decisions made at the national level affecting the lives 
of women should have input from women. 
Jogo included the need for equality of women with men in decision 
making in her campaign and Pai said that she was aiming at equal women's 
participation in all sectors of work. 
Dorothy Tekwie, founding member of Women in Politics was, at the 
time of the election, warden of women students at UPNG where she had 
obtained a degree in Social Work. Soon after Women in Politics was 
founded, she said its purpose was to 'whip ' men out of politics and almost 
immediately launched herself into the battle. She applied for and won 
nomination by Pangu Pati for West Sepik Provincial, a seat held by Karl 
Stack, resigned her post at UPNG and went to West Sepik to nurse the 
constituency. She travelled widely through the region and drew 
considerable interest and apparent support; she was, however, competing 
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against seven other candidates and a sitting member whose work for the 
region was widely acclaimed. This led to the latter's  resounding victory 
when he won with 20,8 1 3  votes and a margin of 13,350 over his nearest 
rival. Tekwie came second from the bottom with 2,803 votes but did 
manage to save her deposit. 
One interesting absentee from the list of women candidates was Lady 
Karina Okuk. There are many precedents in world politics for what has 
been called the 'Tiger principle' (Tiger 1970); women like Indira Gandhi, 
Cory Aquino, Isabel Peron, who came to power as daughters or widows of 
deceased politicians. It appeared at one point as if there would be a similar 
example in PNG, but this did not materialize. Lady Karina had first 
indicated that she might contest the seat of her late husband Sir Iambakey 
Okuk but when Ben Sabumei was nominated by Okuk's National Party for 
the by-election held in March 1987, she said that she would not stand at the 
general election if he won. When he did she honoured her word and he was 
again nominated and returned for Unggai-Bena in July of the same year. 
However, her interest in politics has not wavered and it seems likely that she 
will attempt to enter no later than 1992. 
Religion and Politics 
Analyzing the 1 968 elections to the House of Assembly, Wolfers wrote: 
An examination of the members' backgrounds reveals a further trait 
that separated most candidates from their constituents. All but two 
of the indigenous members of the second house claim to be 
adherents of one of the territory's  many Christian missions, a claim 
at which many missionaries would be astonished in individual 
cases. Could it be that Christianity is now one of the pre-requisites 
of political respectability in Papua New Guinea as in Australia, or 
do 'modernisers' simply tend to accept the white man's  religion 
along with his schools, economic and political systems, as part of 
the process of 'development' ?  (Wolfers 1969) 
Although much has changed in the two decades since that was written, 
the importance of Christian allegiance for many women candidates is still 
vital. It has already been suggested that Christianity has had an important 
influence on the position of women in PNG and its role in their politics may 
be equally important. The group founded in 1986 to encourage participation 
in politics - Women in Politics - is firmly based in religion and according to 
its constitution, all meetings have to start with a prescribed prayer. Of the 
eighteen women candidates in 1987, six made direct reference to religious 
allegiance or associated activities in their biodata (saee Table 1 ). For others, 
it was an important strength or impetus to action; for example, Fide Bale, in 
her election literature, said she stood for strong, honest and Christian 
leadership (God-fearing). As Abaijah stated at an interview: 'It would not 
be possible [to be in politics] without a belief in certain things - God has 
given me everything. This is the strength which helps you' .  Regione, a 
practising Catholic who goes regularly into retreat, said," ' It deepens my 
sense of purpose, gives a sense of direction, a sense of calm in a world of 
many trials and tribulations'  and she wished to 'restore values and dignity in 
high places ' (Times of Papua New Guinea, 1 1 - 17 June 1987 : 14).  Debessa 
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relied on church youth to help her in her campaign. The problem posed, 
however, is that where a particular church allegiance is strong and either 
stated or known, this may alienate those of a different church, both women 
and men. The church allegiance where it involves work with a woman' s  
fellowship seems to be a way of appealing to a particular group, not to men 
(nor to women outside the church), and is unlikely, therefore, to achieve a 
majority vote. 
Table 1 :  Women with Declared Religious Allegiance 
Diane Debessa 
Somere Jogo 
Immaculata Kereku 
Jacinta Kodana 
Association. 
Martha Pai 
Hun Tagazu 
describes herself as 'Christian Worker' .  
had worked overseas for 9 years with Moral 
Rearmament. 
President of Catholic Womens' Federation. 
Church Worker for Catholic Church. 
President of Catholic Women's 
Women's Fellowship Group Leader. 
Worked with Women's Fellowship. 
THE ELECTION 
In the event neither their faith nor their policies won any of the women 
sufficient support to be elected. Even Rooney was pushed into third place 
and although Abaijah came second, she was still nearly 5000 votes behind 
the winning candidate Ted Diro, whereas Rooney in third place was a bare 
hundred behind Pokasui who won. Tamo Diro, who was also third, was 
some 3,500 short of winning. 
Candidatures and Votes 
There were eighteen women out of a total of 1 ,464 candidates, or 1 .2 per 
cent (1987 National Election Voting Statistics). They received together 
39, 1 1 1  votes out of a total counted of 2,732,387 which is 1 .4 per cent, not 
an unreasonable result in purely numerical terms. 
Although only the three noted above came within striking distance of 
winning, a number of the other women polled a respectable number of 
votes. However, six - Debessa, Iangalio, Kodana, Pai, Lembo and Tagazu -
failed to obtain 10  per cent of the winning candidate' s  votes and thereby lost 
their deposits. 
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Table 2: Women Candidates in 1987 
Candidate Electorate Votes Winner's Position % of 
Votes in Poll Total Votes 
Abaijah Central. 10126 14970 2nd out of 
Province of 1 1  18.78 
Bale Moresby 997 2495 7th out 
Northeast of 19 6.78 
Debessa Moresby 377 5395 15th out 
Northwest of 24 1 .77 
Diro N.C.D 5458 89 19 3rd out 
of 20 5.31 
Iangalio Moresby 232 5359 19th out 
Northwest of 24 1 .08 
Jogo Western 2992 8245 6th out 
Province of 13 7.79 
Kereku Rabaul 796 2884 4th out 
Open of 8 8.46 
Kodana Goilala 64 2430 13th out 
Open of 13 0.68 
Lembo Tari 134 3324 13th out 
Open of 15  0.84 
Pai Tari 248 3324 12th out 
Open of 15  1 .57 
Pilacapio Milne Bay 4070 13980 6th out 
Province of 9 8.28 
Pokana Moro be 6883 43655 4th out 
Province of 7 6.05 
Regione Moresby 850 1905 5th out 
Southeast of 28 5.33 
Rooney Manus 2208 2335 3rd out 
Open of 14 18.03 
Tagazu Nipa-Kutubu 26 3921 l lth out 
Open of 1 1  0. 13 
Tekwie West Sepik 2803 208 13 7th out 
Province of 8 5.57 
Tutumang Finschaffen 434 3504 6th out 
Open of 10 3.32 
Wild Unggai-Bena 413  3960 8th out 
of 21 2.86 
88 EILEEN WORMALD 
Party Allegiance 
Eleven of the eighteen candidates stood as Independents while the other 
seven were spread among the six parties. 
IND 
Bale 
Debessa 
Diro 
Iangalio 
Kodana 
Lembo 
Pilacapio 
Pokana 
Regione 
Tagazu 
Wild 
Table 3: Party Allegiance 
PDM NP 
Rooney Kereku 
Tutumang 
PB Papua P Pangu P PAP 
Abaijah Jogo Tekwie Pai 
There is some evidence that party support was beneficial as a vote 
catcher. In terms of winning the highest percentage of total votes cast, four 
of the top five candidates were supported by parties: 
Table 4: Votes and Parties 
Name % Party 
Abaijah 18.18 PB 
Rooney 18.03 PDM 
Kereku 8.46 NP 
Pilacapio 8.28 Ind. 
Jogo 7.79 pp 
Only one party-supported candidate, Pai (PAP), lost her deposit and she 
was competing against another woman as well as thirteen men; the other 
five were all Independent. 
Two of the candidates had previously been party supported (Bale by 
PPP, Pilacapio by United) but did not this time obtain party support. Bale 
was in the Moro be Independent Group which might be considered a party. 
The choice of constituency to fight was dictated by residence or place of 
origin but it may be thought foolhardy, despite the general insecurity of 
sitting members' seats, for Tekwie and Pilacapio to fight such well­
entrenched figures as Stack and Young, and for Wild to contest a seat 
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against the man who had won it only four months earlier in the by-election 
caused by Sir Iambakey Okuk' s death. However, Tekwie and others saw 
themselves as fighting to make women and men aware of women's right to 
be politically active rather than with any real hope of winning. 
Perhaps the most surprising candidature was not related to place but to 
the decision to stand at all. Kodana in Goilala had been reported in August 
1986 (Niugini Nius, 5 August 1986:2) as being worried by the formation of 
the Women in Politics Group saying that the women in Goilala 'felt 
threatened to follow the group' and had lost interest in obligations to their 
Church. It may be that she stood specifically as a church candidate to draw 
women away from WIP which she claimed consisted of businesswomen 
who talked politics to church women and caused confusion and conflicts. 
Age, Marital Status and Education 
The ages of women candidates range from 26 to 46 with an average of 36, 
only one year lower than in 1982 when 37 was the average age of the fifteen 
out of seventeen candidates who declared. Only three gave their marital 
status: Pokana married with nine children, Regione divorced with three 
children and Wild, married. 
Table 5 :  Age and Education 
Name Education Age 
Abaijah Matriculation 37 
Bale Teachers College 45 
Debessa Grade 9 36 
Diro Grade 10, Queensland 45 
Iangalio Secretarial School 34 
Jogo Teachers Certificate 34 
Kereku Grade 9 32 
Kodana Standard 6 46 
Lembo Teachers Certificate 26 
Pai Grade 8 26 
Pilacapio Primary A 42 
Pokana Grade 7 43 
Regione BA, UPNG 37 
Rooney BA, UPNG 42 
Tagazu Grade 1 27 
Tekwie BA, UPNG 29 
Tutumang Teachers Certificate No 
information 
Wild Standard 5 37 
Though there are none without formal education, four (22 per cent) 
have attended only community school, five (28 per cent) have some 
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secondary schooling, two ( 1 1 per cent) completed secondary school (and 
one of those went on to further training but does not include this under 
education) , four (22 per cent) have a teachers ' certificate and three ( 17  per 
cent) have university degrees. This should be compared with the 
educational profile of all candidates. There is no clear relationship between 
age and education, older candidates (i.e. those over 40) being as likely to 
have reached secondary or tertiary education levels as younger. 
There is a slight increase in the educational level of these candidates 
over those in the 1982 when three ( 1 8  per cent) had no formal education, 
three ( 1 8  per cent) had completed community school, seven (4 1 per cent) 
had some secondary schooling, two ( 1 2  per cent) had post-school training 
and one (6 per cent) was a graduate of UPNG (one not given) .  
Occupation 
The candidates '  occupational claims are of some interest. Three (Pokana, 
Tagazu and Tutumang) describe their job as 'housewife' or 'home duties' 
but at least for Tutumang this seems to be an election necessity as her 'brief 
history ' shows a career in teaching and more recently, for seven years, in 
computing. Six classify themselves as self-employed or business woman 
(Bale, Diro, Kereku, Pai, Pilacapio, Regione) but Abaijah who is often cited 
as a successful PNG businesswoman, gives her occupation now and for the 
past years as 'farmer' .  A number of the candidates had been involved in 
community work. Debessa, for example, describing herself as 'Christian 
worker' had been involved with women' s  fellowship, prison fellowship and 
youth groups, while Jogo, saying she is a ' subsistence farmer' and 'active in 
community affairs' ,  had worked overseas for nine years with Moral 
Rearmament and later had worked with the National Regional Provincial 
Women' s  Council as provincial women' s  co-ordinator. Kereku ( ' self­
employed') had been a nurse for fifteen years (presumably all her working 
life until the election) but was also a village court magistrate and she had 
been president of the Catholic Women' s  Federation, an office presently held 
by Kodana ( ' subsistence farmer') .  Pokana actually described herself as 
'community leader' after early years as a community welfare officer and 
librarian while Tagazu ( 'housewife')  had worked with the Women' s  
Fellowship at Nipa. 
Although a number had been trained as teachers, it appeared that only 
one (Lembo) was still in the profession although Pai ( 'business woman' )  
had previously been a 'home economics trainer' after five years teaching i n  
community schools. O f  the three trained social workers (Regione, Rooney, 
Tekwie ), only the latter was still pursuing that occupation as a student 
counsellor/warden at UPNG before she left to 'nurse' West Sepik on behalf 
of Pangu. There was also Iangalio, not trained as a social worker, but who 
had been executive director of the PNG Family Planning Association for ten 
years. 
Experience in the Public Arena 
Although Abaijah and Rooney were the only two with experience as elected 
members in the national parliament, Diro and Regione, like Rooney at an 
earlier date, had acted as advisers to Somare when he was prime minister 
and Pilacapio and Pokana had served on provincial assemblies. 
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I f  we take into account the experience of the community leaders and the 
businesswomen described above, it is clear that in general these were 
women who would be sensitive to the position of women in PNG but also 
capable of participating actively in the decision-making process. If they had 
been able to sell themselves to the electorate, they could have made a 
powerful team in knowing how to use the appropriate channels for the 
benefit of women. 
Post-election 
Though distressed by the results, the women accepted defeat gracefully. 
They felt they had fought honest campaigns; one said: 'I wouldn 't buy 
votes though they were offered - if people voted for me it was because they 
thought I would represent them well in Parliament not because of any 
special promises of things I would get them' .  Their attitude might have 
been summed up by Regione' s  election slogan 'No Rhetoric. Just Hard 
Work. No Promises. Only the Promise to do my best'.  Rooney, the only 
one to lose a seat, contented herself with saying that she felt the people of 
Manus would regret their decision. Abaijah said that this was the end of her 
political career but she felt not only had she created an awareness of Papua 
but would continue to make Papuans aware of their identity and their rights. 
She regretted the absence of women from parliament, saying that an 
aggressive male parliament would not provide an alternative but set a bad 
example. 
Women as a Special Electoral Group 
The lack of any elected woman made some think of alternative 
strategies for representation. Consideration was given to appealing to 
section 102 of the constitution to obtain at least one woman member. This 
section states that 'The Parliament may from time to time, by a two thirds 
absolute majority vote, appoint a person (other than a member) to be a 
nominated member of the Parliament' .  This section had previously been 
invoked when it appeared in 1982 that there would be no woman MP, 
Rooney' s  appeal to the Court of Disputed Returns not yet having been 
heard. The National Party stated in July 1982 that it would press for such a 
nomination. By the time Stephen Tago, leader of National Party, put a bill 
to that effect to the House, Rooney was back in and indeed voted with the 
prime minister, Michael Somare, against the bill which was rejected by 
forty votes to twenty-seven. The opposition was led by the minister for 
Youth Recreation and Women, Tom Awasa, on the grounds that it would 
mean opening doors to all groups like churches, trade unions and the 
business community (Post-Courier, 6 May 1983:2).  
Other attempts had been made to have women treated as a special 
political category. - In May 1982 the Police minister, Warren Dutton, had 
proposed separate women's  election booths to stop women being pressured 
by their husbands or harrassed by unknown men, an idea said by the 
electoral commissioner to be a good one but proposed too late to be 
implemented and not raised again in 1987. A suggestion in 1985 that Enga 
province should have a separate women's  electorate got a mixed reception 
from both women and men. Rooney supported this on the grounds that it 
would enable women to get to power, but once there they would have to 
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represent everybody not just speak for women (Times of Papua New 
Guinea, 9 October 1985:23). 
Comparable demands were made in this election when first the 
Southern Highlands Provincial Council of Women and then the PPP 
regional secretary in the Mamose region demanded equal representation of 
women in running the election. Mr Yawasing of PPP claimed: 
I believe strongly that women voters who are very old and cannot 
read or write, including non-formal educated ones, feel more 
confident in themselves when approaching their own sex sitting 
behind the polling table than men' (Post-Courier, 4 June 1987 : 1 0) .  
WOMEN AND POLICY 
The use of such affirmative action to ensure women' s  fuller participation in 
politics is an issue which will have to be addressed by the Women in 
Politics group. There is no doubt of the lip service given by the major 
political parties to the importance of women. When the PDM was founded 
in 1985 by Wingti, Rooney and A wasa with thirteen other members, Wingti 
as the leader pronounced ' the movement is totally committed to respect 
women as dynamic partners in nation building' and Rooney added that this 
part of their platform was ' her baby' .  (Times of Papua New Guinea, 5 
September 1985:5) 
Equal lip service was paid to women' s  affairs in the PPP election 
literature which stated: 
Women 
THE PEOPLE ' S  PROGRESS PARTY WILL:-
. promote women's  legitimate right to contribute to national 
development. We will continue to consult women' s  groups to help 
combat law and order problems, improve education and health care 
policies, and foster economic development; 
. dismantle all barriers which prevent women from making a career in 
public life or participating in public affairs; 
. enact tougher laws to better protect the rights of women; 
. assist the National Council of Women to get viable projects off the 
ground, quickly and efficiently; 
. provide government-funded travel between provinces and regions, to 
enable women to learn from activities in other areas. 
Julius Chan, the leader of PPP and deputy prime minister, employed 
Nellie Lawrence, formerly Secretary of the National Council of Women as 
his political assistant. But his party was not helped by this nor indeed by 
any other of its policies. Somare, speaking to the National Council of 
Women in 1984 when he was prime minister, called for women to enter 
politics and take up active roles in leadership. He added, significantly, that 
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the position of women seemed to have gone backward since independence. 
(Post-Courier, 2 1 March 1984:23). 
In the current election, Pangu declared its policy: 
Women's  Equality 
PANGU continues to support the goal of equality for women in 
all activities. Pangu will make sure: 
girls have the same opportunity as boys to go to school 
women are treated fairly by the law 
women are treated equally in getting work. 
Of the other major parties, United Party made no printed statement on 
women while the Melanesian Alliance in its own eight point plan said in its 
seventh point that it would work for: 
. Women as Equal Partners in Development 
effective protection against domestic violence 
. re-direct agricultural extension to women 
more women in top jobs. 
There is nothing new in any of these statements and while vocal women 
might complain if they were absent they are hardly likely to be vote 
catchers. Nor can it be assumed that they will have influence on future 
policy in a parliament where a debate on domestic violence can produce a 
statement from the minister for Housing that 'I paid for my wife so she 
shouldn 't overrule my decision because I am the head of the family' and 
another member said 'Previous speakers . . . talk very strongly about 
husbands drinking and going home and bashing their wives . .. I am one of 
those people' .  (Hansard 1987) . Nor can anything be read into the fact that 
both of those members lost their seats since the same happened not only to 
the member who said that 'I speak on behalf of the women in my electorate 
and the people of the nation. . . .  In the Melanesian way of life, we men claim 
to be boss of everything .. . I think 99 per cent of the country's  development 
is by women but yet we do not realise this fact' but also to the Minister for 
Justice who proposed that legislation to penalize 'wife-bashing' should be 
brought in to the next Parliament. 
ALTERNATIVE AVENUES TO POUT/CAL POWER 
Somare' s words of 1984, that the position of women seemed to have gone 
backward since independence, were bleakly prophetic in the light of the 
1987 election results. That is, however, too pessimistic a view of women' s  
position i n  PNG; a few women in this male-oriented society have broken 
through barriers in public service or business. In the political field in 
provincial governments, almost at the same time as women were losing their 
place in the national government Enny Moaitz was appointed the first 
woman provincial premier in Morobe. She had been minister for Finance 
and when the premier resigned to contest the national election, she was 
elected unopposed to take over. 
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It may indeed be at provincial level where women can make the major 
inroads into the power structures; certainly in some of the provinces there 
are strong women' s  groups which are not afraid to intervene in politics. In 
East New Britain the Council of Women threw their support in the national 
election behind three candidates in the province, two of whom were elected; 
while in the East Sepik women provided political education in which they 
stressed women' s  issues and the importance of women's  contribution to 
economic development. However, the East New Britain action was 
equivocal since one of the candidates the women endorsed was standing 
against a woman candidate. In New Ireland where a woman candidate was 
defeated in the provincial government election, she was later appointed to 
the government. But this appointment created controversy among women's  
groups - a not unusual feature of political activity of  women who have 
frequently been accused of not pulling together to ensure women act as a 
united group serving the interests of all women. As one ENB woman 
activist stated: 'women should stay united at all times to pursue their 
Council 's  interest without being politically manipulated' (Times of Papua 
New Guinea, 21 -27 May 1987 :4). Some women as well as men felt that 
council was being used when it gave support to three male candidates. 
Experience of decision making at any level must be valuable for women 
who have only just obtained access to political structures and may be a 
pathway to national power. But the president of WIP has said: 'Women 
should work together to achieve one goal - to vote women into Parliament 
so that issues affecting women can be better catered for. ' (Post-Courier, 
1 7 July 1987 : 16) .  This is one of the many problems facing women - they 
have not as yet articulated what are the important issues on which they can 
and will unite and which will enable them to ' sell ' themselves not only to 
women voters but to men also. What has to be decided by women is 
whether they wish to enter politics as surrogate men or as women with their 
own culture and political agenda. 
WOMEN AND POUT/CS 
The position of women in PNG has recently generated a considerable 
literature often focussing on the extent to which colonization and the 
development of a capitalist economy has increased the subordinate position 
of women (Preston and W ormald 1987). It has been suggested that in 
traditional societies, women as well as men had clearly defined and 
complementary roles but that today women have to compete in a man's 
world in order to achieve status (Mandie 1985). 
This leads to a consideration of the idea of two cultures. It has often 
been suggested that for women to obtain position and power, they have to 
become surrogate men by taking on male characteristics. As an early 
theorist wrote: 'It is an old truth - but just for that reason important as the 
outcome of general experience that women are usually led by feelings men 
more by intellect. Men are more clever, [women] lack the necessary 
requirement of rational will ' (Tonnies 1955). Whilst the specifics of this 
statement are now likely to be treated with derision, the idea that women 
and men display different characteristics and that the former are more suited 
to the 'private, '  the latter to the 'public ' sphere, would not. 
Women themselves frequently state that their primary commitment is to 
their children and in both paid employment and politics the general 
tendency is for women to devote themselves to activities having a close 
relationship to their maternal role (Wormald 1982). In Papua New Guinea, 
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Bray ( 1985) writes: 'jobs such as typing and nursing have become known as 
women's work. ..  . At the same time they learn to think that to be a 
parliamentarian, doctor, airline pilot or (bus) driver is a man's  job' .  Yet 
however important their chosen role, it is undervalued in both status and 
material rewards: 'Women have a disproportionately onerous role in the 
maintenance of living standards in the Pacific and they receive only a 
relatively small share of the benefits ' (Hughes 1985). 
When women wish to break out of their traditional role by entering the 
public economy and political arena, they may find not only that they lack 
economic independence but also that they cannot succeed without adapting 
to the requirements of the dominant gender. Apan (1985) has shown that 
attempts by women to organize economic development in their own way in 
PNG met opposition from the cultural mediators, the male-dominated 
missions and government. 
In politics, they have to fulfil their traditional familial role as well as 
selling themselves as able to compete successfully in the power struggle. 
When an aspiring woman politician said: 'Unless women are represented at 
all levels of decision-making there will be no real developments that affect 
women in society',  she was careful to add: 'This is not to say that laborious 
household tasks are of lesser importance (Times of Papua New Guinea, 8-
15  August 1986:9). 
WOMEN IN POUT/CS GROUP 
The need to combine being wives and mothers with successful political 
action and a commitment to furthering the interests of women may seem a 
formidable task. It is, as we have seen, one which has been undertaken by 
the Women in Politics group which was founded in June 1986. During the 
foundation weekend, all the women present and some of the men recognized 
the need to encourage greater participation by women in politics but a few 
men articulated doubts about the advisability of action at the present stage 
of PNG's  development or indeed at anytime (Times of Papua New Guinea, 
8-15  August 1986:9). The women had no doubt that their knowledge and 
experience was needed by their country and that if women worked together, 
they could ensure that they were in a position to make decisions. The group 
did offer some support in the 1987 election by lending their name to fund­
raising activities by women candidates and by giving advice about the 
mechanics of standing as a candidate, but lack of money and 
accommodation made anything more impossible. Women in Politics, 
through its interim President, Maria Kopkop, maintained a fairly high 
profile in the media. It is concentrated on no specific policies or appeals to 
women to vote for women, but rather took a stand on the 'constitutional and 
moral obligation to be involved in the government of our country' (Post­
Courier, 29 April 1987:3). 
CONCLUSION 
Given the overt recognition by major political leaders and parties of the 
importance of women' s  equality and the impetus for electing women MPs 
provided by the formation of WIP, why did women not make progress in 
1987 instead of taking a backward step? There are a number of structural 
reasons of which the most important may have been lack of funds. Rooney 
probably spent about K7 ,OOO but others spent nothing approaching this sum 
and still ran into debt. Jogo had only KlOO from the Papua Party for her 
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nomination fee and found that funding was her major problem since lack of 
money prevented her from visiting all the districts of her provincial 
constituency. Pai, on the other hand, supported by PAP, spent K6,000 
although some of this amount was from wantoks and her own pocket. 
Tekwie estimates she used K7 ,OOO of which K2,000 in cash, together with 
electioneering materials, came from Pangu. Abaijah, who after Rooney 
came the nearest to winning, said she had no funds for her campaign 
although she carried it out over a long period by visiting even the most 
remote and isolated villages in Central Province. It was an impressive 
campaign and she polled well but was defeated by Diro who, it was 
subsequently revealed, had massive campaign funds for his newly-founded 
People 's Action Party. Lack of party endorsement was a factor related to 
lack of organizational support as well as to lack of funds; six women were 
'screened' by PPP but none was endorsed and it is not known how many 
others were similarly unsuccessful with other parties. Although party 
support in itself, as an indication of a policy direction or an ideological 
stance, was not an important factor in this election, the money and other 
assistance provided through their agency almost certainly was. 
It is unlikely however, that even without these constraints that women 
would have made great strides in this election although one or two might 
have been elected. Women have to overcome the twin difficulties of their 
position in Papua New Guinea culture and their own ambivalent attitude to 
their entry into political structures. Women aspiring to political activity in 
PNG face the pressures of traditional society on top of which has been laid 
an ideology of economic development which reinforces the subordinate role 
of the mass of women. However impressive their own emergence from this 
role, candidates, in order to win elections have to make other women and 
men vote for them. Pokawin ( 1987) sees this obstacle as almost insuperable 
because success in the power game by a woman is still not acceptable. 
Clearly an education and awareness campaign about the contribution which 
women can make, based on examples from other parts of the world in 
politics and from within PNG in business and the public service, must be 
started now in preparation for the 1992 election. In the meantime aspirant 
women politicians must clarify their own position; do they like Tekwie, 
wish to 'whip ' men out of politics or do they believe like Abaijah that the 
time for gender antagonism is not ripe. 'Just at the moment we shouldn' t  
isolate women's  problems from men's  and women's  shouldn 't take 
precedence when you are in government . . .  women and men still go hand in 
hand in development of our country' (Abaijah 1987) .  
But if women have been discriminated against in the process of 
economic development it seems unreasonable for them to expect that they 
will not suffer equally in the political field at the hands of well-entrenched 
men. Some men will support women's aspirations but in general women 
may find, as they have elsewhere, that they need to work as a group for their 
own advancement. Even working as a group will not resolve all women's  
difficulties. Within WIP there has been another divergence of opinion 
between those who think the main objective should be to work for the 
election of women at every level of government and those who feel its main 
purpose should be to form an electoral lobby which would monitor all 
parliamentary decisions which might affect women and make 
representations in their interests. To do the latter they need to decide on a 
platform of women' s  issues and in a heterogeneous religious and cultural 
group, this might not prove easy. The two aims are not necessarily 
incompatible but to achieve both, they need personnel and resources not yet 
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available to the WIP. There is also the possibility that acting as a women's  
lobby might conflict with the work of the National Council of Women or 
the Women's  Affairs Section of the ministry of Youth and Home Affairs, 
producing further disunity among women. (Niugini Nius, 1 September 
1987 :8). Moreover, some feel that setting a 'women's  agenda' is a mistake; 
'We focus our attention on the specific needs and problems of women rather 
than the needs and problems of the community and the nation' (Rooney 
1985). For individual women, access to power in itself may be the goal, 
with the implicit assumption that political decisions will be different if 
women are prominent among the decision makers. If women are to achieve 
such a position, however, concerted action is essential; a climate must be 
created in which not having equal representation of women in decision 
making is seen as reprehensible, in which women are seen as able to play 
the political game on equal terms with men while pursuing their own goals. 
Awareness, education and action are all necessary both at grassroots level, 
the start of which was seen in the East Sepik in 1987, and at the elite level 
of lobbying through parties to adopt equal numbers of women candidates, 
teaching women the skills of political campaigning, and ensuring that 
successful women help others to emulate them. 
Only then may we hope to see 'equal participation by women citizens in 
all political, economic and social activity' (Constitution 1975: National 
Goals 2, Directive Principle 5). 
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The Trader's Voice : PNG-Born 
Chinese Business and the 1987 
Elections 
MARGARET WILLSON 
THE PNG-BORN CHINESE COMMUNITY 
The elections of any country are determined by more factors than the 
political predilections of the voting public and this is certainly true for the 
1987 election of Papua New Guinea (PNG ). One influence worth 
considering in this election is the relationship between the PNG-bom 
Chinese business community and government officials. Government 
officials, for the purpose of this paper, are defined as public servants and 
established contenders for the 1987 political seats. The PNG-Chinese 
business community is slightly more difficult to define. This business 
community is enveloped in a kind of mythology created by its apparent 
ability to acquire money. This mythology, like all myth, has maintained its 
power through mystery; few outsiders have economic knowledge of either 
the income of PNG-Chinese business people or their business methods. 
Before we can discuss the true role of PNG-Chinese business in national 
politics, we must unravel a bit of the mystery. 
Business Management 
We shall begin with business management. The management of PNG­
Chinese businesses, from trade store to corporation, is a family concern. 
This is because of a prevailing attitude among PNG-born Chinese that, in 
business, the only people one can trust are family. Family members are not 
considered inherently superior to outsiders, but internal family influence is a 
driving force in the PNG-bom Chinese community and can be used to exert 
pressure on a family member who is making what the family considers to be 
unsound business decisions. This pressure also ensures a degree of honesty 
within the company. Such control is not possible over an outsider. The 
ideal PNG-Chinese business is one in which pressure and respect are in 
balance so as to create a strong and stable management team. Because of a 
belief in this ideal, PNG-Chinese businesses tend to use family members in 
top management positions when possible. Business knowledge is circulated 
among the members of such a management team, but seldom becomes 
general knowledge outside the family concern. It is unlike the knowledge in 
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the expatriate companies where hired managers move between corporations, 
turning specific business methods into a matter of general knowledge. 
PNG-Chinese businesses tend to remain discreet about internal business 
methods also in the hope that this will help them maintain, or gain, an 
advantage over their competitors. Concern for both discretion and stable 
management has made their business knowledge a private affair. 
The Image of Success 
Without specific knowledge, outsiders speculate on PNG-Chinese business 
methods, allowing rumour to become accepted as fact. One such accepted 
fact is that the PNG-Chinese have an inherent ability to make any business 
venture a financial success. Nationals and expatriate business people in the 
Port Moresby area express conflicting opinions about whether the cause is 
genetic or environmental, but the ability itself is above doubt and is 
perceived as giving the PNG-Chinese firms unfair advantages over other 
firms. This stereotype is based partly on observable reality: most PNG­
Chinese businesses are successful enough to allow their owners a 
comfortable middle-class life-style. Success is partly due to the intense 
concentration many PNG-Chinese families devote to their business. In 
many PNG-Chinese families, business concerns dominate conversation both 
during business hours and at home. This continual concentration is a 
dominant factor in the high degree of financial stability that is actually 
achieved. 
Their perceived financial stability is influenced by 'face ' .  The Chinese 
concept of 'face ' has no equivalent in standard English usage. It is a state of 
being. It is a condition that allows the individual to retain a position within 
the moral fabric of a community where respect is given a value above all 
else. In both traditional and modern China, high emphasis is placed on 
outward conformity to an ideal behaviour. Maintaining 'face' is the ability 
to live up to the standards of that code. A person who does not follow this 
code will be ostracised. 'Loss of face' is more than embarrassment or 
shame; it robs a person or family of a positive self-identity. It leads to 
extreme humiliation and in some cases suicide (Wilson 1979). For the 
PNG-Chinese business family, maintaining 'face ' ,  or the appearance of 
success, is vital and success  will be upheld at almost any cost. For this 
reason, if business failure does occur, few outsiders will hear of it. The 
combination of all these factors - privacy relating to business methods, a 
high incidence of actual success, and the emphasis on 'face' even in times 
of financial difficulty - have worked to give the PNG-Chinese businessmen 
their legendary reputation for clever business judgment and an almost 
invincible ability to succeed at any business they enter. Such a reputation 
about the use of this power promotes questions about their role in national 
politics. 
FUNDING REQUESTS 
A central issue relates to sources of funding for the candidates. The 
political parties of the 1987 elections presented individual platforms, but the 
policy differences between them were often subtle. The traditional dialectic 
of the Left and Right in party policy did not apply to the issues they 
addressed, nor was one party characterised as the specific party that catered 
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to business concerns. Because of this and other factors, a candidate's  
individual influence counted as  much as  party affiliation and encouraged the 
candidates to seek funds on personal merit. Candidates seeking such funds 
often come to PNG-born Chinese businessmen. The candidates realise, 
either from reputation or from individual dealings with a specific business, 
that these businessmen earn at least middle class incomes and in addition 
have a vested interest in the future of PNG. For these reasons, candidates 
look to PNG-born Chinese businessmen for sizeable contributions to their 
campaigns. It is implicitly suggested that any candidate who receives a 
contribution will, if he becomes a member of parliament, unravel bureautic 
tangles for a person who has helped him in the past, no matter whether he is 
Chinese, other expatriate, or National. This possibility of preferential status 
is also why the general attitude among the PNG-bom Chinese is either to 
give small contributions to all of the candidates or to give nothing. In 
general, PNG-Chinese prefer to donate money in support of community 
sports or charities, investments more in keeping with their particular 
interests and daily lives. 
Political Insecurity 
One reason for their attitude lies in political insecurity. During much of the 
colonial era, the PNG-Chinese had uncertain citizenship. The majority 
came in the early 1900s under German colonial rule and remained under the 
Australian Administration. During this period they remained nominally 
Chinese citizens, but as the years of continued separation from China 
passed, their alliances began to shift towards their adopted country. As non­
British subjects and 'non-aboriginal natives' of the Mandated Territory, the 
PNG-Chinese were classed as aliens in PNG (Cahill 1973). During the 
Japanese invasion of the Second World War, the Australians adopted a 
confused policy towards the PNG-Chinese, unable to decide whether to treat 
them as expatriates and evacuate them or to treat them as locals and leave 
them behind. The Australians made a halfhearted attempt at evacuation in 
Lae, but in the Rabaul area, they treated the Chinese as locals and ignored 
them. Because of such confusion, the PNG-Chinese began to push for 
citizenship after the war ended. As the Australians were then the ruling elite 
in PNG, they sought Australian citizenship. Most did not at that time 
contemplate making Australia their home. In 1956, the Australian 
government awarded them Australian citizenship (Cahill 1973, Inglis 1975, 
Wu 1982). In the early 1970s, the PNG independence movements, 
particularly the Mataungan movement in East New Britain, carried 
exclusionist and nationalist overtones. This nationalism often took the form 
of anti-Chinese action. Other recent independence movements in Indonesia 
had resulted in massacre and expulsion of the Chinese (Mackie 1976). 
Faced with these examples, many Chinese became nervous about the safety 
of their families and left. Those who remained encountered little actual 
danger, but they retained a sense of insecurity about the stability of their 
political status in PNG. 
When PNG became independent in 1975, the new government did not 
grant the PNG-born Chinese automatic citizenship, granting them only the 
options of becoming either naturalized or resident non-citizens. Under 
naturalized status they had restricted land rights and retained a status as 
outsiders. Since the proposal of dual citizenship had already been rejected 
by the new government as well as the Australians, the PNG-Chinese had to 
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make a choice between becoming naturalized PNG citizens and forfeiting 
their Australian citizenship, or keeping the Australian citizenship and living 
in PNG as resident non-citizens. The PNG-bom Chinese had fought hard 
for Australian citizenship under the Australian Administration and, despite 
their feeling of loyalty to PNG, most opted for the political stability of 
retaining that citizenship. The PNG government' s offer, they felt, accorded 
them only second class status. Either option - as naturalized PNG citizens 
or Australians living in PNG - placed them in a politically insecure position. 
Political Impartiality 
PNG is a democratic state and its members of Parliament are elected every 
five years. The National government in PNG is trying to unite a country of 
hundreds of different languages and cultures. Because of the tensions 
among these groups, the elections are notoriously unpredictable. If a 
businessman backs a candidate who then loses his seat, that businessmen 
cannot count on political or financial impartiality from the winning 
opponent. As non-citizens, PNG-bom Chinese living in PNG have little 
political recourse against a politician who might decide to tum against them. 
Most PNG-bom Chinese have invested much of their future in PNG and 
they do not want to endanger this vision for themselves or their families. 
For this reason, most choose the middle road of political impartiality rather 
than risk making political enemies. 
Another related reason for political impartiality is that most PNG-born 
Chinese prefer to remain unobtrusive both politically and socially. They 
tend to refrain from political involvement in an attempt to reduce the 
damaging side-effects of envy. They state that envious people will try to 
improve their own status by ' shooting at the head of the tallest poppy' .  
Envy i s  a danger both within and outside the Chinese community. All the 
PNG-born Chinese are related either by blood or marriage and this 
closeness gives the weapons of gossip and filial duty additional power. 
These binding kin ties, in a community where one household may contain 
members of two or more competing companies, create a political 
atmosphere where a delicate balance between public and private becomes 
vital even in the most intimate of relationships. In such an atmosphere, envy 
can create havoc inside a company as well as between companies. 
Likewise, if business people outside the PNG-Chinese community feel that 
certain PNG-Chinese are gaining too much advantage, they could try to 
damage that PNG-born Chinese person's  status or company standing. The 
way to avoid becoming the object of such destructive envy is to keep one 's  
own head low and blend in  with the other businesses. 
IDENTITY QUESTIONS 
The PNG-born Chinese have an uncertain identity. They are racially 
distinct from the native Papua New Guineans. They are ethnically Chinese 
but their culture is less easily categorized. For most, their first languages 
include Tok Pisin as well as Cantonese; they speak Cantonese that is dotted 
with nineteenth century terms no longer commonly used in modem Hong 
Kong or China and liberally interspersed with Cantonese swear words used 
in a way that reflects more a Melanesian and Australian life-style than 
Chinese. Most would not consider themselves fluent in Cantonese and if 
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their Cantonese vocabulary fails them, they quickly substitute a word in 
English or Tok Pisin. Few read or Write Chinese or know much of classical 
Chinese philosophy. While they have retained much of the traditional 
Chinese style of cooking, their dishes have also incorporated Melanesian 
foods and cooking techniques. Their traditional medicine, which like many 
other overseas Chinese in Western influenced countries they use as a 
supplement to Western medicine, has become a blend of Melanesian and 
Chinese. The result is a culture that is neither Australian, Melanesian nor 
Chinese, but a culture unique in itself. Most PNG-born Chinese feel they 
could not live in China. As one young PNG-born Chinese woman said: 'We 
had a lovely holiday. We visited my grandfather' s  village. It was 
interesting, but so dirty and poor . . . I 'd hate to live there. ' (personal 
communication, anonymous, February 1987). 
Most are Australian citizens, yet few of the PNG-bom Chinese who 
were raised in PNG like living in Australia. Many of the older PNG­
Chinese who left PNG at Independence regret the move and wish they could 
return. Those who travel south for business trips or to visit family, return 
refreshed from the change, but glad are to be 'home' .  As some PNG-born 
Chinese people have said about Australia: 
or : 
I enjoyed Brisbane, but it got boring. There's  nothing to do. Most 
of my friends are here in Moresby. (personal communication, 
anonymous, April 1987). 
People are different outside Rabaul. Rabaul people are friendly . . . In 
Australia, people just don't  have time for you. In Rabaul we always 
have time, (personal communication, anonymous, December 1986).  
I tried living in Australia for a few months, but I didn't  like it. This 
(Rabaul) is where I want to die (personal communication, 
anonymous, September 1986). 
Friendship 
This combination of background and emotion makes the PNG-Chinese 
racial and legal outsiders in the country they consider home. Despite such 
commitment to PNG, PNG-Chinese realise that they are legally guests and 
they do not want to endanger their position. Before Independence, the 
PNG-Chinese had some involvement in elections. In 1964, a PNG-Chinese 
businessman acted as campaign manager for the Spanner-Toliman team and 
in 1968, three PNG-Chinese stood as candidates in the New Guinea Islands. 
But even in 1964, the PNG-Chinese showed so little interest in politics that 
they were criticized both in the gossip column Rabaul Talktalk and at a pre­
election meeting. At this meeting several people asked why no Chinese 
candidates were standing. As one student said: 
It is very rare to hear Chinese talking about political matters. It would 
not matter if they were not naturalized yet. All their interest is based on the 
business sector of the economy (Bettison 1965 :257;Epstein 197 1 :73). 
In the years following Independence, the reluctance of the PNG­
Chinese to involve themselves in politics has only increased. Now the PNG-
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born Chinese do not want to become politically involved in PNG because 
they then run the risk of becoming a perceived threat to the nationalist aims 
of the PNG government. This they do not wish to do, so the choice of most 
PNG-born Chinese is to remain free of political involvement. This opinion 
seems consistent across the country. In Rabaul: 'We're traders, business is 
what we're good at . . .  Politics is too unsure' (personal communication, 
anonymous, October 1986); or from Port Moresby: ' I'm not very interested 
in politics, except when it affects business. I 'm just a businessman . . .  getting 
messed up in politics only gets you trouble' (personal communication, 
anonymous, June 1987). And according to one government official: 
The [PNG] Chinese are power brokers, but they stay out of the 
political scene. They are . . .  a commercial power. When they do 
back a person in an election, it is not so much for commercial gain 
but more from long connections and long-standing friendships. 
They aren't so much worried about what the candidate can do for 
them personally, but support them from long association (personal 
communication, Mr Wep Kanawi, May 1987). 
This same long association makes the relationship between the PNG­
Chinese and public servants somewhat different from their relationship with 
the elected politicians. The public servants are PNG's  elite, often highly 
educated, and they remain in government over several administrations. 
Because of their long-term involvement with government, high-ranking 
public servants become politically powerful both in normal government 
affairs and in matters relating to an election. Many PNG-born Chinese are 
friends of these officials. Friendship is an ambiguous term that implies 
varied meanings for different cultures. In general Western usage, it means a 
person who has access to the domestic life of another person. The word was 
earlier incorporated into New Guinea Pidgin with the Western meaning. In 
contrast, the eighteenth-century European meaning of 'friend' implied a 
unity of elites that supported each other; for example, the King' s  Friends 
were those who supported his rule. The friendship between PNG-Chinese 
and elite Nationals encompasses both meanings. They have emotional 
commitment, but both are members of a PNG elite who benefit by 
supporting each other. This friendship does indeed smooth PNG-Chinese 
negotiations with the government, but that is not the purpose of the 
friendship nor its intent. Both the friendship and the elite status are partly 
grounded on the PNG educational system. 
Schooling 
Before Independence, primary schools in PNG were segregated and the 
European children attended a separate school from the Chinese and 
Nationals. The two Chinese-funded primary schools established after the 
Second World War in Rabaul catered at first exclusively to Chinese students 
(largely because the classes were taught in Chinese). The Australian 
Administration also adopted a policy to provide separate Primary and Post­
Primary Schools for Asians and Natives (Cahill 1973:  192). Beginning in 
1948 the Australian administered education system allowed the resident 
Chinese to attend secondary schools in Australia (Cahill 1973: 193). In 
1952, twenty-two 'Asian' children enrolled in Australian schools (Cahill 
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1973 : 1 96) and that same year, a secondary department was established at 
the Administrative Chinese School in Rabaul where students could prepare 
for the Junior Public Examination of the University of Queensland (Cahill 
1973: 198). Those who remained in Rabaul could attend the Administrative 
Chinese Secondary School for Chinese and mixed race students (Cahill 
1973: 1 99, citing Thompson 195 1/1952:39). 
Beginning in 1948, the nationals from either elite families or those who 
showed exceptional promise had a similar chance to continue their 
secondary schooling in Australia. When the opportunity came, many elite 
Nationals and Chinese attended the same schools mainly because these 
schools were recommended from one family to the next. These schools 
included the Marist Brothers' College (Ashgrove, Qld.), Scots College 
(Warwick, Qld.), Eagle Heights School (Mt. Tamborine, Qld.) University of 
Queensland, Oakhill College (N.S .W.), Blackheath College (Qld.), Slade 
School (Warwick, Qld.), Rockhampton Grammar School (Qld.) St. 
Brendon' s  College (Qld.) ,  and others. 
In Australia, both the PNG-born Chinese and the PNG nationals felt like 
strangers in an alien land. PNG..:born Chinese recount their first experiences 
of riding a lift or an escalator or their nervousness at entering a large city. 
The nationals had many similar experiences. In an alien country, the PNG­
born Chinese and the Nationals found they had more in common with each 
other than with many native-born Australians. Their shared background of 
a childhood in PNG and a shared language of Tok Pisin created more 
empathy between them. Also, racial prejudice in Australia against people 
with anything but European-coloured skin further tied them together. The 
result was that many nationals and PNG-born Chinese developed deep and 
lasting friendships. As these school children reached adulthood and 
returned to PNG, many of the PNG-born Chinese became entrepreneurs 
while the nationals became public servants, professionals, politicians, and 
entrepreneurs. Both groups form an elite segment of PNG society and, as 
friends, they influence each other. The reciprocal nature of this relationship 
should be stressed here. PNG-Chinese do influence the views of friends 
who are in government, but the public servants also influence the views of 
their PNG-Chinese friends. PNG is a rapidly changing country. Such 
reciprocal relaions between people with a common ground in PNG culture 
and expertise learned overseas provide insights on how PNG can react to 
internal change and external pressures. 
PUBLIC SERVANTS IN PNG POUT/CS 
Of seventeen established politicians running in the 1987 election, selected 
on the basis of their national influence, fifteen had been employed in the 
public service before they ran for public office. Twelve of these public 
service-trained politicians atended schools in Australia. Of these, at least 
ten attended schools with PNG-Chinese. As one prominent public servant, 
who did not run for public office, said, 'I went to school with (PNG-born) 
Chinese . . .  They're friends' (personal communication, Mr Wep Kanawi, May 
1987). This special relationship, a Melanesian version of the 'old school 
tie, ' makes some politicians the exception to the PNG-Chinese rule of 
impartiality. These school connections should not be underestimated. They 
are an integral part of political unity in PNG. One has only to note the 
influence of the 'Bully Beef Club' ,  a discussion group from the 
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Administrative College in W aigani in the 1960s which formed the embryo 
for the Pangu Pati (Amarshi, Good, and Mortimer 1979: 1 54). 
In the rare cases during the 1987 elections when PNG-Chinese actively 
supported a friend who was running for office, or if they particularly 
favoured the politics of a certain party, they became involved mostly by 
making policy suggestions or giving political advice. Other PNG-Chinese 
muttered dire warnings against such involvement, but to no avail. In the 
1987 elections, at least three of the parties had advice and personal 
involvement of PNG-Chinese businessmen. 
Mutual Benefits 
Such relationships of long association provide a catalyst for the introduction 
of business connections between PNG-bom Chinese and elite Nationals. A 
person will often prefer to conduct business with a friend because he knows 
the strengths and weaknesses of a friend. This is why many PNG-bom 
Chinese who enter a business transaction, prefer to deal with someone they 
know. Sometimes this person will be a long-standing National friend. 
Some of these transactions are financially successful; some are not. 
However, over a longer period, both sides usually benefit. The PNG-bom 
Chinese benefits through continuing ties with a National who has become 
influential. In addition such interaction continues to add to the PNG-bom 
Chinese person' s  understanding of Melanesian culture. The National gains 
through the business knowledge and support he receives from the PNG-bom 
Chinese businessmen. As with nearly all business transactions, both sides 
hope for financial gain. These are the usual business connections between 
most PNG-born Chinese and National government officials and the PNG­
bom Chinese are quite open about them. 
The PNG-Chinese are traders; therefore most are not interested in large 
government contracts. Instead their business concerns are the sort of 
transactions where one person sells property to another or two persons start 
up a business together. Although this relationship can influence a 
politician's  financial standing and indirectly influence the amount of cash he 
can pour into an election, his PNG-bom Chinese business associate has little 
financial interest in the election' s  outcome; a person in political office can 
lose money as easily as a person in another vocation. The PNG-born 
Chinese are offering the elite Papua New Guineans the opportunity to learn 
about those same legendary business methods that have made them 
perceived as per capita the most successful entrepreneurs in PNG. In this 
way, the PNG-bom Chinese are assisting the development of business in 
PNG in a way that foreign aid cannot. Theirs is a grassroots involvement. 
They are not giving anything and therefore are not insulting the PNG sense 
of self-pride. The Nationals are neither granting a favour that will increase 
their influence over the PNG-bom Chinese, nor are they accepting a favour 
that would put them in debt. Rather they are working in a symbiotic 
relationship that is beneficial to both. 
Selection of PNG-born Chinese Advisors 
These friendships also open channels where the national politicians and 
government officials feel they can ask select PNG-born Chinese for advice. 
This is different from an informal exchange of views in that specific advice 
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is sought on a specific issue or for a specific transaction. The advisor acts in 
an official capacity and is paid for services rendered. At least four 
prominent PNG-born Chinese business people offer consulting services to 
government bodies while many others give advice when they are asked for 
it. The PNG-born Chinese have lived in PNG longer than any other 
expatriate group. The exodus at Independence left about a thousand people, 
or a third of the original population. These remaining residents have 
experience, through their own lives and through those of their parents and 
grandparents, of the changes and problems of PNG over two colonial 
administrations and over more than ten years of independence. At present, 
most expatriates come to PNG on a contract basis for a period of two or 
three years. Some remain longer, perhaps even as long as ten years, but few 
stay long enough to call the country their homeland. Fewer still pass from 
childhood to adulthood in PNG and then work as qualified professionals. 
As a people who spent their early years in PNG and who place an emphasis 
on education, the PNG-born Chinese have qualities that other expatriates do 
not. 
Their background gives the PNG-born Chinese the advantage of 
continuity when they give professional advice to the government. They 
have watched the ebb and flow of political trends; they have conducted 
business under various administrations and survived through them. Most of 
those who are in the position to advise the government are also connected to 
international trade networks and have extensive knowledge of international 
politics and finance. When National politicians and government officials 
want outside advice, they often turn to the PNG-born Chinese as the experts 
best able to serve them. In this sphere, PNG-Chinese have a positive 
influence on the policy of politicians. This in turn can affect a politician' s  
election platform. In  this way, PNG-Chinese can indirectly affect election 
results by directly affecting certain government policies that relate to 
business and finance. 
A traditional Chinese cultural trait the PNG-Chinese have retained is the 
higher value of the family over the individual. They are watching the social 
and economic changes in PNG and are hoping for a development that will 
allow their children to remain in the country with jobs suited to their 
educational level. PNG-Chinese want their children to feel secure in 
investing both their capital and their professional expertise in PNG. These 
parents can work to ensure economic support for their children, but this is 
only one aspect of a family 's  needs. To maintain the economic stability the 
PNG-born Chinese desire, PNG as a whole must retain political and cultural 
stability. Their idea of good government is one that is stable and secure. 
They do not want radical change nor revolution; their ideal government is a 
conservative one that will allow them to make long-term plans and 
investments. They are not interested in short-term goals. When PNG-born 
Chinese work with the PNG government, these are the ends they are trying 
to achieve. Because of this, their advice to the government is likely to be 
given with the development of the country in mind. 
Although a PNG-born Chinese would always work for the advancement 
of his family first, family stability depends upon a country-wide stability. 
This is not the case with contract workers. Contract workers, from 
Australia, Asia, Britain, or other countries, come to PNG generally for only 
a few reasons: .  they cannot find a job elsewhere; or they come for 
adventure; or they come for job advancement; or they come for money. 
Outside investors come for financial profit. Here lies a fundamental 
difference between the PNG-born Chinese and expatriate business people. 
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Outside investors can profit from a short term investment and pull out if 
they find the political, social, or economic climate unfavourable. Likewise, 
a contract worker will generally stay only as long as the contracting 
employer gives him the incentives he or she desires. In order to make a 
similar choice, PNG-Chinese must exile themselves from the country they 
consider a homeland. To avoid such an exile, PNG-Chinese walk a narrow 
path between involvement and detachment in PNG government affairs. 
Their direct effect on the 1987 elections was probably negligible, but as 
advisors and contributors to the economic development of an independent 
PNG, they are a rare asset to PNG political leaders. 
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Angoram Open : Twelve 
Candidates,  One Party, Little 
Enthusiasm 
R .  J .  MAY 
THE ELECTORA TE 
Angoram, one of the East Sepik's six open electorates, is geographically one 
of the largest electorates in the country, stretching some 1 35 km north to 
south from the coast to the border with Enga Province and 190 km east to 
west from the border with Madang Province to the Ambunti district boundary, 
an area of over 15 ,000 sq.km. Much of the electorate is thinly populated, 
however, the population being concentrated along the Sepik River and its 
major southern tributaries, the Keram, the Yuat and the Karawari. The 
electorate (whose boundaries coincide with Angoram District) contains a 
number of language groups divided between fourteen census divisions, but in 
terms of self-identification the bulk of the population can be roughly divided 
into three geographical zones: the middle Sepik, which includes a number of 
large river villages (mostly Iatmul speakers); the grass country south of the 
river, including the Keram and Yuat villages; and the lower Sepik, including 
the Murik Lakes and the scattered population between the river and the coast 
in the eastern corner of the province. Of a total district population of just 
under 39 ,OOO in 1980, about 38 per cent were in the Grass, Yuat and Banaro 
census divisions and 22 per cent in the Middle Sepik and Korosameri census 
divisions. Angoram town, a minor administrative and commercial centre, had 
a population in 1980 of 1 830, including a shifting population of people from 
up and down the river, and the Gavien Resettlement Scheme, a few 
kilometres outside Angoram, contained about the same number, drawn from 
various parts of the province. (Since 1980 there has been a significant 
increase in the number of people at Gavien.) 
The Angoram District is one of the poorer districts of Papua New 
Guinea, being ranked 59th out of 87 districts in a 1985 study of district level 
inequalities (de Albuquerque and D'Sa, 1985). Two traditional mainstays of 
the cash economy, crocodile skins and artifacts, provide a small and irregular 
source of income, artifact sales specifically having been adversely affected by 
a decline in tourism (itself a minor source of income) and official 
discouragement of private - mostly foreign - artifact dealers. With the 
development of the Gavien Resettlement Scheme, cocoa, Robusta coffee and 
rubber production have become the major sources of income, along with 
small quantities of copra and vegetables .  A Wewak-Angoram Land 
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Development Scheme, formulated by the provincial government, is 
undergoing a feasibility study. It is planned to cover some 90,000 ha in 
Angoram and Wewak districts and involves logging, plantation and 
smallholder production of coffee, cocoa and copra, and subsistence 
agriculture. In contrast to some other electorates in the country, there is little 
cash to lavish on election campaigns in Angoram and local business interests 
are not conspicuous, although the Pangu Pati president and former candidate, 
Joe Kenni, is a businessman of some standing and president of a small but 
influential group of local businessmen, Angoram Development Association, 
in Angoram town. 
Although the construction, by the Somare government, of a road 
between Wewak and Angoram has considerably improved land 
communication, transportation in the electorate is still mainly by motorized 
canoe and is difficult and expensive. 
Politically, Angoram, even more than the rest of East Sepik (excepting, 
perhaps, Peter Lus' Maprik) , has been a longstanding Pangu stronghold. 
The lower Sepik is the home area of former Pangu leader and prime minister 
Michael Somare, and the Angoram branch of Pangu has had a continuity of 
membership and support unusual in Papua New Guinea politics. 
Between 1972 and 1982 the Angoram seat was held for Pangu by Bill 
Eichorn, a mixed-race former teacher who has a crocodile farm and cattle 
smallholding on the Keram River. On the eve of the 1982 election, Eichorn 
looked vulnerable and though endorsed by Pangu he was opposed by seven 
candidates, including two strong pro-Pangu candidates, John Maiben and 
Philip Laki Yua. The last-minute candidacy of Laki, a local businessman 
(formerly a telephone operator) from Timbunke village in the middle Sepik 
who had been a member of the provincial assembly since 1979, was not 
universally popular: many middle Sepik villagers resented the fact that the 
man they had elected to represent them in the provincial assembly had 
resigned, without consulting them, to contest the national seat, and many 
Pangu Pati officials, who had seen Maiben as a likely successor to Eichorn, 
feared that a three-way split of the Pangu vote might let a rival candidate 
through. Laki was supported, however, by the Angoram Development 
Association, and in the event he won the contest by a clear margin over 
Maiben. Eichorn came third, the three Pangu candidates together collecting 
73 per cent of the vote. The endorsed National Party candidate, Teddy Sane, 
came fourth with 12 per cent of the vote and the endorsed Melanesian 
Alliance (MA) candidate received less than 200 votes (May 1989). 
PRELUDE TO THE CAMPAIGN 
In the lead-up to the 1987 election the customary preambles to nomination, 
preselection and campaigning, got under way slowly. In Port Moresby a 
Concerned Sepiks Group (whose membership seemed to contain a 
preponderance of MA supporters) held a meeting with a view to identifying 
'good provincial candidates' for East Sepik, across party lines. There were 
suggestions (as there had been in 1982) that Somare might stand for 
Angoram, leaving MA national chairman Bernard Narokobi to contest the 
provincial seat, thereby avoiding a confrontation between Narokobi and the 
sitting Pangu member for Wewak, Tony Bais. But nothing came of the 
Group's suggestions. 
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Nationally, an electoral pact was negotiated between Pangu and the MA with 
a view to avoiding contests between Pangu and MA candidates. This pact 
was always suspect, since in Morobe Province the MA had a similar pact with 
the Morobe Independent Group, whose principal electoral platform was 
opposition to Pangu; also it was known that Narokobi intended to stand in 
East Sepik, in either the provincial seat or in Wewak. In the event the MA 
endorsed candidates in every East Sepik electorate except Angoram; Narokobi 
stood (successfully) against Bais and a MA candidate stood (to little effect) 
against Somare. This was a source of some bitterness amongst Pangu 
supporters. 
Within East Sepik, as in some other provinces, there was discussion of 
whether the provincial government should give its endorsement to selected 
candidates. Since the provincial government was generally regarded as a 
Pangu government such a move might have been expected to favour Pangu 
candidates; however in 1985 there had been a falling out between the 
provincial government and the national MPs from the province which 
culminated in the national members calling for the suspension of the 
provincial government (May forthcoming). Although the rift had been largely 
closed, feelings between the provincial government and national Pangu 
members were still not overly cordial in 1987 and the provincial government 
(which itself appeared to be losing cohesion in 1987) played no role in the 
national election, though the deputy premier subsequently became a candidate 
in Angoram. 
At the 'grassroots', talks with a variety of people in villages and in 
Wewak and Angoram in 1986 suggested a fairly widespread disenchantment 
with national politics. People expressed the view that, once elected, 
politicians were only interested in looking after themselves and showed no 
concern for those who voted them into office. Many electors said they would 
not vote in 1987. (Long-time student of the East Sepik, Bryant Allen, made 
similar observations in 1 987 - personal communication). The government's 
voter education campaign may have done something to counteract this 
(although the returning officer at Angoram assessed its impact as 'limited') : 
for what the figures are worth, total votes cast in Angoram in 1987 
represented 89 per cent of enrolled voters. 
PARTIES 
In East Sepik generally, parties played a much less conspicuous role in 1987 
than they had in 1982. Pangu was, of course, well represented, with all 
seven sitting members re-endorsed and the individual campaigns coordinated 
from the party's provincial headquarters behind the provincial assembly 
chamber in Wewak. Despite its pre-election pact with Pangu, the MA also 
endorsed candidates in all but one electorate. It maintained a small office in a 
local motor vehicle workshop, though MA activity largely revolved around 
the campaign of Narokobi in Wewak. The list of endorsed candidates of the 
People's Progress Party (PPP) included four in East Sepik, not including 
Angoram, but although the national party secretary visited the province briefly 
there was little evidence of an organized campaign. With Sane standing as an 
independent, there was no National Party (NP) organization in the province, 
although former Yangoru-Saussia member John Jaminan contested that seat, 
unsuccessfully, as a NP candidate. The People's Democratic Movement 
(PDM) and League for National Advancement (LNA) were conspicuous by 
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their absence, though PDM leaders had talked with candidates in the 
province. The relatively low visibility of parties was reinforced by the fact 
that the campaign budgets of the two major parties in the province were small, 
and by the decision of Pangu, in view of criticism of its 1982 campaign, to 
run a 'no noise' campaign. 
In Angoram in 1982 there had been four party-endorsed candidates; 
moreover, in addition to the Pangu endorsed candidate there had been four 
pro-Pangu candidates, at least one of whom was alleged to have received 
some assistance from the party. The National Party, MA and PPP all 
endorsed candidates in 1982, though only the NP candidate (Sane) appears to 
have received much backing from his party, the MA national leadership even 
supporting Sane over the MA-endorsed candidate, who polled poorly. In 
1987 Pangu policy ruled out pro-Pangu candidates and none of the parties 
which had endorsed candidates in 1982 - the NP, MA and PPP - endorsed 
candidates in Angoram in 1987 (though one candidate claimed affiliation with 
the PPP and another with the MA - see below). 
The Angoram electorate was thus unusual - though not unique - in 1987 
in that it had only one party-endorsed candidate, in a field of twelve. Pangu 
officials rationalized this by saying that since the electorate was 'Pangu­
loyal', association with another party was an electoral liability, that it would 
be seen as 'disrespectful' to Michael Somare. There was almost certainly 
some truth in this, and it probably explains the reticence of candidates like 
Wimban, Unumba and Sane towards declaring party affiliations. But 
discussion with villagers over the twelve months or so before the election also 
suggested a pretty widespread cynicism, even hostility, towards parties in 
general ; parties, they said, were more interested in playing the coalition 
'numbers game' than in governing the country, and had done nothing for the 
people. In any case, since parties other than Pangu apparently had very little 
to offer candidates in Angoram, it made more sense to remain independent 
during the elections and keep options open if elected. 
THE CANDIDA TES 
Laki served as an able if somewhat unspectacular member of the national 
parliament and, as the sitting member, he was reendorsed by Pangu in 1987. 
Eleven other contestants sought election. 
Michael Kayus Nime, of Yaul village (Yuat CD), aged 42, educated to grade 
6, a former policeman and church worker in Wewak, self-described in 1987 
as a subsistence farmer, and president of the Biwat-Yaul Business Group. 
He had not stood previously and contested the election as an independent. 
Sari Wimban . born in Mindimbit (Middle Sepik CD) but living on the Gavien 
settlement, 43, a diplomate in Health Administration from the College of 
Allied Health Science, Madang, having served for ten years as provincial 
health extension officer and stood for the national parliament unsuccessfully 
in 1977 as the endorsed UP candidate. In 1987 Wimban stood with the 
support of the Public Employees Association (the only East Sepik candidate 
with PEA endorsement). He did not declare any party attachment but was 
widely believed to be a PDM supporter, and admitted having 'had talks' with 
Wingti. 
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Teddy Sane, born at Koragopa (Grass CD) but living at Magiendo No. 1 ,  38, 
educated to grade 10, a former naval cadet officer, merchant seaman and then 
stevedore instructor in Lae, had returned to the province in 1977 to contest the 
national election as a PPP candidate. Failing to get elected, Sane set himself 
up in Angoram, operating a trade store and dealing in crocodile skins. In 
198 1 he founded a local branch of the National Party and the following year 
stood as the endorsed NP candidate in Angoram, with support not only from 
Okuk but from the MA (see May, 1989). Following Okuk's death Sane lost 
interest in the NP, which he said was 'in a mess', and in 1987 he stood as 
'independen kendidet i sapotim grass rut pipol long pies', though he too 
appears to have had some contact with the PDM. 
Victor Terenfop, of Akuram (Yuat CD), 38, educated to grade 9 ,  employed 
for fourteen years as a community school teacher but self-described in 1 987 
as a subsistence farmer. Terenfop had not stood previously and had no party 
attachment. 
Leo Unumba, from Biwat (Yuat CD) but resident in Angoram, 34, 
matriculated from UPNG and trained in Australia as a pilot before returning to 
work with a local construction company, Sepik Brothers, in Angoram. In 
1977 Unumba contested the national elections, unsuccessfully, as an 
independent; two years later he was successful in the provincial elections, 
winning the Yuat seat and subsequently becoming deputy premier and 
treasurer. He was reelected to the provincial assembly in 1983 but resigned 
to contest the national election. Although standing as an independent, and 
having served in a predominantly Pangu provincial government, Unumba 
was said to have PPP links. 
Benny Simbi, of Imbuando (Lower Sepik CD), 46, educated to grade 7 ,  
trained as  a forestry officer at the Forestry College, Bulolo and served in  East 
and West Sepik before retiring in 1979. Simbi, ' self-employed' in 1987, 
served as a councillor for a number of years. In 1982 Simbi stood as the 
endorsed PPP candidate. In 1987 he again claimed PPP affiliation but did not 
appear on the PPP's list of endorsed candidates and was officially described 
as independent. 
Sarni Januarius. also of lmbuando, 3 1 ,  educated to grade 10, was employed 
by Wantok Nius and later as a provincial public servant before returning to 
his village. Described in 1987 as 'self-employed', Januarius had not 
previously contested an election, and stood as an independent. 
Matthew Tamoane, of Darapap (Murik Lakes CD), 42, a former teacher and 
public servant with a BEd from UPNG, had returned to his village in 1984 to 
become involved in community and youth work. Tamoane, an independent, 
had not stood previously. 
Jae Maika. of Moim village (Middle Sepik CD) but living in Angoram, 42, 
educated to grade 9, was employed as Angoram Council executive officer for 
eighteen years before leaving to become a coffee buyer for the Lus  
Corporation. Maika had unsuccessfully contested the 1977 and 1982 national 
elections and 1979 provincial election as a pro-Pangu candidate. In 1987 he 
stood as an independent 
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Elias Kainor, of Angoram (Middle Sepik CD), about 50, educated to grade 
10, a former member of the army and subsequently a clerk in private 
enterprise in Madang and Wewak, was self-described in 1 987 as a 
subsistence farmer. Elias, who had never stood before, claimed affiliation 
with the MA - and indeed his name had been written in to the list of MA 
candidates on the wall of the MA's small electoral office; the MA, however, 
denied having any association with him. 
Torovi Dambui, of Angoram, 49, no formal education, a self-employed 
artifact carver who had returned to the Sepik after eighteen years in Rabaul 
and Lae and had not stood previously. 
Of these twelve candidates, the general pre-election consensus seemed to be 
that only three or four had much chance. Most people with an opinion 
seemed to think that the likely winner was either Laki or Unumba. Both were 
well known and had firm bases in the populous - and therefore critical - grass 
country and middle Sepik areas. Reports from the Middle Sepik, however, 
suggested that a longstanding antipathy between the big Iatmul villages of 
Tambanum and Timbunke had resurfaced and that the Tambanum people 
were therefore likely to support Unumba against Laki (who is from 
Timbunke ), splitting the middle Sepik vote and thereby giving an advantage, 
especially, to Wimban, who, himself a middle Sepik, was believed to have 
strong support in the grass country as well as in Angoram town and Gavien. 
There was also some suggestion that people in Yuat were angry with U numba 
for abandoning his provincial seat to contest the election, but similar 
comments had been made about Laki in 1987, and it had done him no 
obvious harm. Opinions differed as to Sane's prospects. Sane himself was 
confident (as he had been in 1982), claiming strong support in the grass 
country and lower Sepik, but only a small number of the people with whom I 
spoke gave him much chance. Most of them counted against Sane the fact 
that he had stood for three different parties in three elections, and some 
complained that he was not a 'gras rut man'. 
THE CAMPAIGN 
In over a decade of election-watching in Papua New Guinea, I have never 
witnessed a campaign as quiet as that in Angoram in 1 987 . In contrast to 
1982, when most people with whom I spoke could name most of the 
candidates and attach party labels to them, and had views about who might 
win, in 1987 few people seemed to have much knowledge about who was 
standing and little apparent interest in the outcome. Most expressed cynical 
views about parties and politicians. 
Pangu, as usual, ran a well-organised but low-key campaign through its 
established komiti system. The Pangu team carried out fairly extensive 
patrols through the electorate - including the Keram, despite early threats by 
Eichorn that he would prevent Pangu teams entering his area. Laki was 
reported to have distributed NDF grants in several villages, including an 
amount of K5000 in Tambanum. Somare visited the electorate - making a 
special trip up the Keram - at a very early stage of the campaign but did not 
return until the final days before voting, and then only briefly. But there was 
little evidence of posters or party T-shirts and many komiti complained that 
they received scant support from party headquarters and had to provide 
canoes and pay for benzine personally. At village meetings party officials 
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emphasized Pangu's (and by implication, East Sepik's) early leadership of the 
nation and pointed to inefficiencies, disagreements and corruption in the 
Wingti government. They promised, if a Pangu government were returned, 
to promote economic development in the area (claiming as Pangu 
achievements the Wewak-Angoram road, the Gavien Scheme and the 
eradication of Salvinia from the river) and to tackle the growing raskol 
problem in the province. (The raskol issue was underlined by the closure of 
Angoram High School in June 1987 because of repeated attacks by raskols. )  
The Pangu teams were generally well received, though they ran into verbal 
abuse in a few villages where people felt that the sitting member had done 
nothing for them. A particular grievance in a few villages was the failure of 
the government (and indirectly of the local member) to assist in the sale of 
artifacts, and in Timbunke village people complained that, though he was a 
Timbunke man, Laki had done nothing to improve the road from Timbunke to 
the Sepik Highway. 
Unumba, Sane and Wimban, and their campaign organizers, carried out 
limited patrols, concentrating on areas of expected support (Unumba in the 
grass country and middle Sepik; Sane mostly in the grass country and lower 
Sepik, and Wimban in the grass country and at Gavien) and around Angoram 
town. Both Unumba and Sane appeared to have well-organized informal 
komiti networks. At campaign meetings these candidates discussed much the 
same issues:  the performance of the Wingti and Somare governments, 
economic development, and law and order. 
None of the other candidates appears to have moved much beyond his 
own group of villages. 
The returning officer in Angoram also reported a quiet and incident-free 
campaign and polling, though in the south of the electorate villagers from 
Enga came in to vote in East Sepik, in protest against the lack of regular 
government services in their own province (Post-Courier 3 1 July 1987). 
THE VOTE 
The outcome of the election was a victory for Laki, who obtained 32 per cent 
of the vote, over Sane (21 per cent) and Unumba ( 1 3  per cent). Wimban (6 
per cent) finished only fifth. 
An analysis of ballot box figures helps throw some light on the pattern 
of voting (see tables 1 ,  2). Laki achieved the best spread of votes, being 
placed first in 13 of the 37 ballot box* counts and second in another 9. 
Almost certainly he attracted votes as the sitting member and the endorsed 
Pangu candidate. Nevertheless Laid derived a quite high 3 1  per cent of his 
vote from only 4 of the 37 ballot boxes; moreover in 12 ballot boxes he 
scored less than 50 votes and in 5 boxes 10 votes or less. Surprisingly, Sane 
achieved a comparable spread: first in 1 1  ballot boxes, second in 7, with 32 
per cent of his vote in 4 boxes but scoring less than 50 votes in 15 boxes and 
10 or less in 8. Unumba recorded only 5 first placings and 1 1  seconds and 
his vote was more concentrated: 42 per cent from 4 boxes and 10 or fewer 
votes in 13 boxes. Other candidates' votes tended, as might be expected, to 
be more highly concentrated: Terenfop, who came fourth, received more than 
half his vote from two ballot boxes; Wimban received 40 per cent of his vote 
from two boxes, and the next rankedcandidate, Tamoane, a high 74 per cent 
* There were actually 38 ballot boxes but one contained only 14 votes (of which Sane and 
Lalci together got 12). 
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from 2 (apparently defeating Laki on the lower Sepik) but receiving no votes 
at all in 19 boxes. Only three candidates - Wimban, Januarius and Dambui -
failed to win a single ballot box (though Wimban scored 3 seconds). 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions from these figures. It is tempting 
to infer from the size and spread of his vote that Laki, as the endorsed Pangu 
candidate, received a Eart� vote. 
TABLE 1 
Analysis of Ballot Box Results 
Ballot Total First and second Candidate with Two candidates 
box votes ranked candidates most votes as with most votes 
in box percentage of as percentage of 
total votes cast total votes cast 
1 578 Sane, Laki 5 1 .7 94. 1 
2 660 Terenfop, Sane 53.8 85 . 1 
3 605 Maika, Sane 47 .3 70. 1 
4 490 Sane, Maika 59.2 84.5 
5 264 Kainor, Unumba 22.7 42.8  
6 292 Sane, Unumba 32.9 58 .9 
7 3 14 Unumba, Sane 52.2 72.0 
8 193 Sane, Unumba 50.3 66.8 
9 540 Unumba, Laki 78 .0 96.5 
10 556 Laki, Wimban 74. 1 95.0 
1 1  357 Laki, Wimban 5 1 .3 97.2 
12 349 Unumba, Laki 47 .9 77.4 
1 3  364 Laki, Kainor 40.4 55 .8  
14  874 Tamoane, Laki 48.2 77.3 
15 1019 Tamoane, Laki 39.7 62.6 
1 6  383 Laki, Sane 8 1 .2 9 1 .0 
17 38 1 Unumba, Terenfop 60.6 8 1 .4 
1 8  538 Sane, Laki 36.8 62.6  
19  198 Simbi, Unumba 50.5 69.7 
20 664 Terenfop, Unumba 54. 1 84.0 
2 1  584 Laki, Unumba 6 1 .5 82.4 
22 48 1 Nime, Terenfop 43.5 67 .6  
23 467 Sane, Laki 40.0 75 .6 
24 534 Unumba, Laki 3 1 .2 58 .8  
25 320 Sane, Unumba 93.8 97.2 
26 372 Sane, Unumba 46.5 69.9 
27 3 16 Laki, Terenfop 32.9 63.6 
28 596 Laki, Maika 2 1 .0 39. 1 
29 525 Sane, Laki 65 .0 87 .4 
30 723 Sane, Nime 3 1 .8 49.4 
3 1  504 Laki, Sane 38.5 69.7 
32 561 Laki, Sane 96.6 98.4 
33 642 Laki, Wimban 49. 1 95.8 
34 736 Laki, Sane 6 1 .3 8 1 .3 
35 379 Sane, Unumba 32.5 56.7 
36 574 Laki, Unumba 7 1 . 1  92.2 
37 43 1 Laki, Unumba 95.4 96.5 
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The uncomfortable facts are, however, that Laki received the same 
percentage of the vote in 1987, as Pangu-endorsed candidate and sitting 
member, as he did in 1982, as an unendorsed challenger, and that Sane, the 
endorsed NP candidate in 1 982 supported by Okuk and the MA, as an 
independent in 1987 improved his share of the vote (from 12 to 21 per cent), 
and achieved a geographical spread comparable to that of Laki (as, to a lesser 
extent, did Unumba). Moreover, the concentrated vote for Tamoane in what 
has to have been lower Sepik, suggests that in the Pangu heartland itself local 
loyalties prevailed over party. On the basis of these observations, the most 
that can be said with any certainty is that energetic campaigning and 'being 
known' (both of which parties facilitate) gain votes, but that local support 
factors are still of great importance, especially for minor candidates. 
POSTSCRIPT 
In provincial assembly elections in October 1987 Unumba was returned in his former 
seat (Yuat) and Sane also gained election. In the formation of the provincial 
government, Pangu lost out to a coalition of independents and MA supporters. 
Unumba and Sane are ministers. 
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TABLE 2 
Candidate Performance 
Ni me Wimban Sane Terenfop Unumba Simbi Januarius Tamoane Maika Laki Kainor Dambui 
Best 2 ballot box results 
as percentage of 
candidate's total vote 66.9 40. 1 1 6.7 50.2 26.8 80.0 32. 1 74.0 52.0 17 .0 36.2 35.4 
Best 4 ballot box results 
as percentage of 
candidate's total vote 87.8 56.0 32.0 65.5 4 1 . 8  84.0 44.3 90.2 75.8 3 1 .0 54.9 55. 1 
Total vote 502 1 1 57 3835 1423 2435 150 246 1 1 16 788 585 1 621 1 58 
Placing 9 5 2 4 3 12  10  6 7 1 8 1 1  
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Papuan Prince(ss) and Papuan 
Development: A Look at the 
Election in Central Provincial 
WARI IAMO 
In this paper, I look at the 1987 election in Central Provincial and focus on 
why the election slogans or rhetoric of 'Papuan Development' and 'Papuan 
Prince or Princess' have been the mainstay of Papuan leaders since post­
independence. The twin political affinity 'Papuan Development-Papuan 
Prince or Princess'  commences with the landmark political legacy from the 
one and only Josephine Abaijah, former MP for both Central Provincial and 
National Capital District, and the founder of the secessionist movement, 
Papua Besena. It continues with the brand of politics espoused today by 
Ted Dire, the incumbent for Central Provincial. I will argue that, in the 
electoral history of Papua New Guinea, Abaijah and Dire have provided an 
ideological framework that is a 'cementing metaphor' that unites the entire 
Papuan region as a people and holds together a political bloc in its quest for 
power and development. In doing so, I am building on Gramsci 's  metaphor 
of ideology as the 'cement' of society, and on proposition Poulantzas 
derives from it that 'ideology, which slides into every level of the social 
structure, has the particular function of cohesion' (Poulantzas 1975:207) .  
PAPUAN HEGEMONY 
Since the 1987 national elections, I have concluded that although Abaijah 
and Dire differ in some respects in their ideological framework, both have, 
through the use of the party system, created a concept I call 'Papuan 
hegemony' .  This concept is more salient now in national politics than ever 
before and is also more pronounced among the people of Central. As I 
perceive it, Papuan hegemony describes not just the independent nature of 
political ideas and beliefs that, in addition, influence and mould fragmented 
social entities into unity; it is the conscious act of a coterie of conscious 
political engineers whose aim is to infiltrate a whole range of social 
structures for a purpose. The repercussions of this act are not perceived by 
the devotees. 
As a military man and politician, Ted Diro, aided by a group of 
indigenous intellectuals, is consciously involved in creating a Papuan 
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hegemony. In using the word 'hegemony ' I extend Antonio Gramsci' s  
definition to fit my analysis of Papuan politics. 
By hegemony Gramsci meant permeation throughout civil society -
including a whole range of structures and activities like trade 
unions, schools, the church, and the family - of an entire system of 
values, attitudes, beliefs, morality, etc., that is in one way or another 
supportive of the established order and the class interests that 
dominate it. . . .  To the extent that this prevailing consciousness is 
internalized by the broad masses, it becomes part of "common 
sense".  In short, hegemony worked in many ways to induce the 
oppressed to accept or "consent" to their own exploitation and daily 
misery (Boggs 1976:39). 
ELECTORAL SETTING 
The Central Province (Map 1 )  is a narrow strip ranging from thirty to 100 
kilometers in width, and stretching about 407 kilometers, from the border of 
Gulf Province to Milne Bay Province. It shares a common sea boundary 
with Australia and on land it shares land boundaries with Morobe, Oro, Gulf 
and Milne Bay provinces. A useful way of grasping the electoral extent of 
the region is by talking about each of the four open electorates, in spite of 
the fact that, in my view, they are quite arbitrary in nature and do not really 
represent each of the cultural groups in the region. They are the following: 
Abau, Rigo, Kairuku (including Hiri) and Goilala. 
In 1964, the boundaries of what is now Central Province and the 
electorate of Moresby Open were coterminous. As a result voters from 
Goilala formed the largest block and, voting along ethnic lines, they elected 
Erico Rarupu, a Goilala man, who outdid the prominent Motuan favorite, 
Oala-Oala Rarua. Although Port Moresby and the Goilala sub-district were 
divided, Reverend Percy Chatterton, a strongly backed Motuan and coastal 
candidate, emerged the winner in the regional seat. From 1968 onwards 
Moresby Open Electorate remained a separate electorate, although minus a 
number of Motu-Koita villages which were included in Hiri Open. These 
villages were again included in Moresby when the District was created after 
independence. Today National Capital District and Central Province have 
separate electoral boundaries; the capital of both is within the confines of 
the District. 
Central Province is divided into administrative districts of Abau, Rigo, 
Hiri, Bereina (or Kairuku), and Goilala. The entire population is, from the 
1980 national census figures, 1 17 ,242. Of this total, 24, 164 are from Abau; 
24, 172 from Rigo; 22,386 from Hiri; 22,7 16  from Kairuku, and Goilala 
provides 23,804. The 1987 national elections indicate that the voting 
population for the entire region is 56,775. Of these 1 2,084 come from 
Abau, 1 3,03 1 are from Rigo, 10,086 from Goilala and 21 ,57 4 from Kairuku­
Hiri. 
LANGUAGE AND TRADE 
The people of Central Province speak ten Austronesian languages and about 
twenty non-Austronesian languages (Pat 1988). While the majority of the 
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former language groups can be located in the coastal regions, the latter 
inhabit mostly the inland areas with pockets in coastal areas. It might be 
thought that language and feuding relationships, as well as geographical 
cleaveages, were impediments to social interaction between ethnic groups. 
Yet authors as diverse as Seligman ( 19 10), Malinowski ( 19 15), Belshaw 
( 1952, 1957), and more recently Leach and Leach ( 1983), provide evidence 
that the inhabitants of Central Province were neither isolated social entities 
nor untouched by neighbouring groups . The so-called Kula ring extended 
into Mailu-Aroma trade, and the latter into Hiri, thus pointing to the fact of 
economic interdependence among the diverse cultural groups. Indeed the 
need for each other' s services and economic and cultural artifacts cross­
linked all cultural groups into confederations, loosely amalgamated for trade 
purposes. 
ECONOMIC FACTORS 
Economically, Central Province is one of the least developed regions. In 
this, it resembles the other Papuan provinces, and collectively the national 
politicians from the Papuan region, and most notable among them are such 
leaders as Abaijah and Diro, have successfully evoked resentment against 
this under-development to mobilize, appeal to, and influence the voters 
(Badu 1982; Daro 1974). The preponderant part of the population is rurally 
based and, according to the 1980 national census, of all the persons of all 
age groups involved in some kind of economic activity (80,741), the largest 
single group (26,363) is engaged in subsistence agriculture. About 13 ,068 
are engaged in farming and fishing, 7,980 work for salary or wage; 1 ,982 
own businesses; 1 1 ,690 are full-time students; 7,054 do housework; and the 
rest are too old to work or are looking for work. 
Although of the total land mass of 34,457 square kilometers one third is 
coastal plain and two-thirds is foothills with mountain ranges, it is evident 
from rural peoples' agricultural activities that there is enormous potential 
for cash crop development. As shown in the 1980 national census, 
households in all districts · of the region grow such cash crops as coffee, 
cocoa, rubber, spices, coconut, and food; or are involved in such economic 
ventures as raising pigs or cattle; selling artifacts, copra or fish; running a 
trade store or a PMV, and perhaps a canoe. 
The economic history of the region shows that a plantation economy has 
been long established, but the plantations were owned by foreign firms like 
Steamships and Burns Philps which have other foreign businesses. The 
plantation economy has been basically coconut, in the coastal areas of Rigo 
and Bereina; and rubber in Sogeri Plateau and Cape Rodney regions. These 
industries have been revitalized and still generate income for the region, 
together with timber and other cash crops. 
PAPUAN POLITICS: AN OVERVIEW 
It would take a thorough, major review of the literature on Papua New 
Guinea's  political history, and on both its traditional and modern societies, 
to come up with a complete picture of 'Papuan Politics ' .  However, as an 
indigenous Papua New Guinean, from the Papuan region, who as a child 
and as an adult was socialized into the Western education system, I vividly 
remember the electoral politics of Central Province, first in 1964 and 1968 
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as a child, and in the successive years 1972, 1977 and 1982, as a mature, 
educated person. These personal but living experiences of a person, 
watching from the village the making of a polity of which he is a subject, 
are sufficient when supplemented with the accounts written by scholars 
(Bettison, D.G. et al 1965, Epstein, A.L. et al 197 1 ,  Hegarty, D., 1983, 
Premdas and Steeves 1983) to permit him to see Papuan politics through a 
special lens. The theme, Papuan Politics, is an overview of the political 
ideologies and characteristics of prominent Papuan politicians, nurtured in 
national politics. All these politicians, according to my opinion, developed 
political ideologies. First, Abaijah and more recently, Ted Diro, together 
with Sir (Dr) John Guise, Oala Oala Rama, Sir Maori Kiki, Dr Reuben 
Taureka, Sir Ebia Olewale, have been the main originators of Papuan 
politics. 
Brief Overview of Electoral Politics 
Electoral politics among indigenous Papua New Guineans only began with 
the House of Assembly elections in 1964 and 1968, which laid out the 
fundamental aspects of politics that were to appear in the succeeding 
elections. Indigenous political infrastructure was much more localized and 
integrated, and alien from the implanted one. However, it was this localized 
form of indigenous political structure that became integrated with the 
Western political forms at the village level. As indigenous people 
confronted higher levels of Western political structures, it was reported by 
the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory that in 1965, 
there was: 
a deep feeling of inferiority arising from the lack of political 
education, ignorance of the outside world and . . .  in the case of 
certain more evolved elements of the population, who, on the 
contrary, are aware of the need for and advantages of political 
advancement, a certain timidity, physical or intellectual.. .(Visiting 
Mission 1965 : para. 3 12, cited in Epstein et al 197 1 :  1 8) .  
But, neither were young expatriates very experienced and 
knowledgable, although they were familiar with the political institutions. 
Yet they 'maintained a disproportionate influence over their less 
sophiscated members' (Epstein 197 1 :3). Like other introduced institutions, 
political education and infrastructure came much too late to Papua New 
Guinea, a subject of complaint in the United Nations and by Professor Ali 
Mazrui (Griffin 1975:247). Like their New Guinean counterparts, Papuans, 
in their pioneering ventures as politicians, experienced a considerable 
degree of ambivalence and timidity, all adding up to a sense of social 
inequality between the sophisticated and less-sophisticated and between the 
indigenes and the white Australians. These feelings of inferiority grew 
salient between the elected and official members, as expressed by Sir Tei 
Abal in the following words: 'We do not know much about what the official 
members think and feel. The Official members have so much of the power 
of discussion and debate that they seem to put the elected members down' .  
(Epstein 197 1  :26). 
Such feelings were even more explicitly expressed as a problem 
between the indigenes and the white Australians by Lepani Watson: ' .. .I see 
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the Papuan and New Guinean elected members being made into rubber 
stamps by some of the European elected members ' (Epstein 197 1  :26). 
Watson' s  claim that indigenous politicians were underestimated may be 
farfetched, since no statistics were used to verify this claim by Groves 
( 1 97 1 :276) in his 1968 election study of Central Province Region. But the 
same claim is restated by Oram in his 1 972 election study of Port Moresby 
electorate. The substance of his judgment is that 
. . .  By almost every relevant measure of modernization, the 
indigenous people of Port Moresby and its immediate hinterland are 
the most advanced in Papua New Guinea . . .  this population has 
higher levels of educational attainments, a stronger commitment to 
urban life, a more complex differentiation of status and role, 
including greater occupational specialization, a more extreme 
dependence on wage labour at the expense of traditional means of 
subsistence . . .  and a greater diversity of new institutions, ideas, and 
opportunities, than any other indigenous population in the Territory 
(Oram 1976:507) 
These factors were reflected in the kind of candidates who stood not 
only for Central but most of the Papuan seats, both open and regional, as 
compared to other regions of the country. Groves ( 1 97 1 :29 1 )  showed that 
'The Papuan candidates were almost all men with exceptional experience of 
the white man 's  world. None of them was either a hereditary leader of his 
lineage or a 'big man ' who had achieved status at village level through gift 
exchanges, feasts, etc. They had all achieved their status through their 
success in manipulating modem institutions' . The disadvantages brought 
about by lack of formal education and lack of familiarity with English and 
with foreign political behaviours and institutions were more pronounced 
among Papua New Guineans than their white counterparts, and more so 
among the thirty-odd New Guinea Highlanders and Islanders and Coastals 
than their seven Papuan counterparts . In summation these social statistics 
were highlighted by Epstein and others to depict the Papuans and New 
Guineans in the following manner: 'While five of the latter (Papuans) had 
spent some years in European-type white-collar occupations, the great bulk 
of the indigenous members were subsistence farmers or traders '  ( 1 97 1  :23) .  
Emerging Political Activism 
Political activism among Papuans or Papuan representatives, both 
indigenous and expatriates (some of whom were of mixed-race origin), was 
minimal both because self-confidence was low and because party politics 
was only beginning to emerge. This is confirmed in the words of the late 
Reverend Percy Chatterton : 'There were no parties and so promises could 
be no more than to do one ' s  best. Most policy statements were the same; 
the candidates were barking up the same tree'  (Bettison et al 1 965:363). 
Although candidates stood as individual persons, policies they espoused 
during campaign speeches or in their policy pamphlets highlighted issues of 
significance having to do with the political economy of the decade of the 
1960s. Most salient were two: the threat of Indonesian take over of the 
island and the question of independence, although welfare and development 
problems sometimes figured just as importantly. In 1 964 the question of 
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self-rule of some kind was on the one hand forced by the Indonesian' s  
attempt to take over West Papua (or Irian Jaya) and on  the other induced by 
the United Nations and the Afro-Asian bloc (see for example Grosart 
1965:328, Hughes 1965:359). 
Electoral politics were new to the Papuan candidates, yet their short­
lived association with the Legislative Council in 196 1 ,  at least for a few, 
and long sustained association with the whiteman' s  life style gave them 
enough exposure to participate effectively in the 1964 elections. A snap 
preview of some, but not all, important Papuan candidates who laid the 
framework for Papuan politics will reflect the kind of policies espoused 
from the onset. It may be doing injustice to individual politicians who 
contributed enormously to development of their regions, however, a holistic 
treatment of certain themes is important to judge everyone together. On the 
issue of independence, almost every candidate talked about the idea of 
'national unity ' ,  but it is not clear whether they meant national unity for 
Papua and New Guinea or for Papua as a Territory. There was a significant 
ambiguity among these candidates. Some were pro-nationalist (for United 
Papua and New Guinea) and others were regional nationalist, if we may 
assume this line of argument. For Oala Oala Rarua: 
.. .independence will come only when people are ready. All over the 
world people say: "Independence for Papua New Guinea" , but I 
don' t  see this now or next year . . .  We are not ready for this. 
Australia is being forced to give independence . . . .lf I am elected, I 
will try and see a proper independence, not a false one, is given by 
Australia to Papua New Guinea (Hughes 1965:355). 
Obviously Rarua was pro-nationalist as his pioneer campaign speech 
echoed a conservative independence move for Papua and New Guinea. 
John Guise 's  campaign slogan of unity and progress for Papua and New 
Guinea was similar to Rarua's. However, others struck a different note. 
Lepani Watson' s  national unity policy was based on Christian 
principles. He stated that since there are many inherent social and cultural 
diversities within and among Papuans and among New Guineans, and 
between these two peoples, the Christian God who recognises none of these 
boundaries and cleavages must be the basis for national unity (Fink 
1965:305). Yet these very Papuan politicians who sought national unity 
were alluding to their fellow men as Papuans on the one hand and New 
Guineans on the other, despite the similarity of their yearnings. In their 
advocacy of job opportunities, education and health, pay differentials, rural 
development, etc., all Papuan representatives, although benign in their 
attempt, were always speaking of two peoples: Papuans distinct from New 
Guineans. 
Gradually the electoral process entered its third and fourth phases in 
1968 and in 1972, and with higher levels of education and political 
participation, as well as work experiences, political activism increased 
among Papuans and New Guineans, and for the first time rising indigenous 
political parties played an active role in shaping policy issues for individual 
candidates. Nonetheless, many candidates were identified more by their 
personalities and charisma than by policies (Ogan 197 1 : 1 32- 1 6 1 ,  Gostin et 
al 197 1 :9 1 - 1 3 1 ,  Holzknecht 1976:21 6-237), by their personal loyalties and 
network (Oram 1976:504-528), and by their group and religious affiliation 
(Jawodimbari 1976:492-503, Allen 1976: 1 33- 159, Philsooph 
1976: 160: 167). 
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Among the Papuan candidates, there were already seasoned politicians 
like Oala Oala Rarua, John Guise, Percy Chatterton, Gavera Rea, Lepani 
Watson, Paulus Arek, Albert Maori Kiki and Dr Reuben Taureka. In their 
own capacities and in their careers, these men and others not mentioned 
here either affiliated themselves with or actively took part in the formation 
of political parties. They were members and presidents of such pressure 
groups as urban worker's and waterside worker's unions, and makers and 
executives of such political parties as National Progress Party, People' s  
Progress Party (PPP), Pangu Party, etc. While independence was an idea 
expressed by Pangu affiliates like Oala Oala Rarua, Gavera Rea and John 
Guise, most promises were of parochial interests. 
SELF-GOVERNMENT AND POST-INDEPENDENCE POLITICS 
Abaijah's Legacy 
The style of Papuan politics changed from mere parochial interests and the 
welfare of the united territories to the movement of secessionists, as Papua 
and New Guinea were being prepared for self-government and 
independence, and as young educated Papuans entered the field of electoral 
politics. It was within the colonial context that the new brand of Papuan 
politics began. The political personality who began it all is Josephine 
Abaijah, who first was elected into the then House of Assembly for the 
Central Regional Seat in 1972. 
Abaijah was a separatist, as some say, or secessionist; but Papua Besena 
(PB) expresses not only the name but also the philosophy (or ideology) of 
the movement. It was formed in 1973. Papua Besena is well documented 
and much of this discussion is drawn from Badu ( 1982), Daro ( 1975), 
Premdas ( 1977, 1983), Griffin ( 1975a, 1975b) and McKillop ( 1982), As 
Papua New Guinea (known as Papua 'and' New Guinea in 1972) prepared 
to enter the era of self-government, and eventually independence in 1 97 5,  
Abaijah'  s Papua Besena in 1973 joined the existing Bougainville 
secessionist movement in a move to secede from the rest of the country. 
Abaijah ' s  movement was premissed on the philosophy of colonialism of 
two types, external and internal, both emanating from economic deprivation 
and economic insecurity. Australia, according to Abaijah, underdeveloped 
Papua. Directed by the United Nations to hasten the pace of development 
toward independence, it had done so by focussing investment in regions 
where economic gains could be maximized, and Papua was not among 
them. Another important dimension of Papua Besena' s philosophy was 
derived from the region ' s  unresolved legal status. At the outset it sought to 
become another state of Australia, but this stance was overshadowed by the 
issue of 'white' (external) and 'black' (internal) colonialism. 
The course of action Papua Besena took in its formative stages changed 
when it won nearly all the Papuan seats in 1977 and controlled Port 
Moresby City Council. With the uprising of regional movements all over 
Papua and New Guinea, Papua Besena evolved into a regional pressure 
group rather than a secessionist movement. From 1973 onwards, the 
Somare-led coalition government had embarked on its decentralization 
policy which called for the setting up of provinces. Soon after, Bougainville 
and Central, the source of secessionist threats, came under provincial 
governments. 
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Abaijah and a new breed of Papuan politicians, well educated and more 
familiar with parliamentary democracy, like Galeva Kwarara, Gerega 
Pepena, Joseph Aoae, Goasa Damena, Sevese Morea and Roy Evara, still 
espoused rapid development for the underdeveloped Papua. The threat of 
Papua separating from New Guinea was the foundation of a political 
strategy developed by them to coerce decision-makers, a majority of whom 
they labelled 'New Guineans ', to treat them more cautiously and favourably 
in their quest for power and money (or development). In 1978 Somare was 
toppled with the vote-of-no confidence moved by Sir Julius Chan and his 
People 's Progress Party, aided largely by Papua Besena and the Papua 
Party,which had split off from PB, and the Melanesian Alliance (MA). 
Papuans, for the first time, held power in a big way. Members of Papua 
Besena like Joseph Aoae, Galeva, Damena and Pepena held ministerial 
portfolios. But its charismatic leader Abaijah, to her credit, refused any 
ministerial portfolios. In the 1982 elections only three of Papua Besen a' s 
adherents were returned by the voters and its leader, Abaijah, was among 
those who were not re-elected. 
With the electoral demise of Abaijah and majority of her colleagues in 
the 1982 elections, did the ideological imprints she had branded in the 
minds of Papuan politicians wither away? It is hard to tell; but it appears 
that though her secessionist claim died, her political ideologies survived and 
were maintained by a few ardent Papuan politicians. This impression has 
become more pronounced than ever before and one may, with little doubt, 
state that Abaijah'  s legacy, in a more refined version, is continued by Ted 
Diro. 
Ted Diro 
Ted Diro, the first Brigadier General of the PNGDF after independence, 
first entered parliamentary politics in the 1982 national elections. Like 
Abaijah, he was a well-known figure but as an army general, he enjoyed 
much more trust and respect among both Central people and Papuans. He 
portrayed himself with a regimental image and spread the idea that he would 
be the first Papuan to become the prime minister of the country. No doubt 
Diro, while in command of the army, had begun his campaign through civic 
activities in his electorate before he declared his intention to contest the 
seat. He was elected as an independent. 
Being highly disciplined, he promoted himself effectively. But Papuans 
were not united. Papua Party (PP) and Papua Besena with limited numbers 
were on their own. When Okuk' s  electoral status was declared null by the 
Court of Disputed Returns in 1984, Diro, upon Okuk' s  invitation, became 
the head of the National Party - a Highlands Party - and leader of the 
Opposition. However, a year after when Okuk had been elected again, Diro 
relinquished his position to Okuk. Through this manoeuvre, Diro lost much 
of the trust and confidence of his fellow Papuan politicians and followers. 
In mid- 1985, the political current in Papua New Guinea changed with 
the defection of the former ardent supporter of Pangu and deputy to Prime 
Minister Somare, Paias Wingti. In the Opposition he quickly rose to the 
position of leader, and became the prime minister after the second vote-of­
no-confidence, this time heading a party of his own, namely the People' s  
Democratic Movement (PDM). The Papua Party, led by  its staunch leader 
Galeva K warara, was with Wingti; so was Diro and a small group of 
followers. 
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Diro and K warara were strong believers in remaining in the corridors of 
power, where resources could be commanded and allocated to their 
electorate to reward loyalty and where Papuans could be assured of jobs in 
the echelons of power at all levels of the society. Getting into the 
government and occupying important portfolios were very significant. In 
1987, Papuan politicians were not well organised. A regional party (PP) led 
by Galeva K warara existed; Ted Diro had his own, the People' s  Action 
Party (PAP); Roy Evara belonged to another (Wantok); veteran politician 
Mahuru belonged to PDM, Tago to the National Party, Lemeki to the 
Peoples Progress Party. Yet the sentiment for and loyalty to the slogan 
'Papuan Development' and 'Papua for Papuans'  are writ large and salient in 
their politics. The 1987 elections highlighted these slogans in a more 
popular way than any other elections. 
1987 ELECTIONS 
Papua New Guineans understand elections as a Western mode of selecting 
leaders of a nation. Many Papua New Guineans who compete for these 
public offices are men who have had experience in the manipulation of the 
these Western institutions and thus have gained the support and following of 
their people. All persons who nominated to contest Central Provincial, 
without exception, confirm this theory. The eleven candidates - J.M. 
Abaijah, Moses Anai, Ted Diro, Allan Efi, Theo Efi, Arere Hitolo, Francis 
Irere, Perai Manai, Mairi Mehutu, Philip Orio, and Reuben Taureka - are 
contemporary leaders in their own village communities and in modem 
institutional settings. They have been former national and provincial 
politicians; leaders of political parties, groups, trade unions and community 
organisations; former public and private servants; professionals and 
businessmen; army generals, medical doctors, bulldozer operators, 
agricultural officers, broadcast officers, pressmen, bank officers, and 
salesmen. Their educational levels range from grade school to high school 
to university; and professional qualifications were obtained from national as 
well as international institutions of learning, in the South Pacific region and 
other foreign countries. 
Although one may philosophize that each candidate is of equal value 
and deserves mention in the literature of national electoral politics, for the 
purposes of this study I propose to concentrate on a few of the prominent 
candidates rather than all of them. I will only ref er to the others where 
apropriate. I confine myself to Abaijah, Diro and Taureka, to expound my 
thesis, and in passing mention such personalities as Perai Manai and Mairi 
Mehutu because of the ethnic groups they represent and their party 
affiliations. The order in which each person is discussed does not represent 
their status nor significance; rather it speaks for the order of their political 
participation in the electoral history of Papua New Guinea. Each of the 
candidates will be discussed in this order: Taureka, Abaijah, Diro, and 
Manai. 
Reuben Taureka 
Reuben Taureka' s  political history can be pieced together from studies done 
on electoral politics from 1964 (Bettison et al), 1972 (Stone, D.), 1977 
(Hegarty) and to the subsequent election in 1982. Taureka, 59, is a native of 
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Maopa village, in Aroma, Central Province. Because schools in his early 
childhood days in 1940s and 1950s were maintained under the auspices of 
missions (churches) and indigenous Papua New Guineans under the colonial 
educational conditions received minimal education, adequate only for 
reading and writing, many indigenous people who had the potential to attain 
the equivalent of an Australian education were denied that right. Taureka, 
although a graduate at grade school level, was sent to Medical School in 
Suva, Fiji, in the late 1950s to obtain a medical diploma that gave him the 
right to be recognized as a medical doctor. Since then, and before and after 
his appointment to the Fifth Legislative Council in 1961 ,  he served as a 
medical doctor and administrator in the Highlands, Mamose and Papua 
regions. He was the president of Port Moresby Worker's union in the 
1960s, and later in 1961 was succeeded by Oala Oala Rarua. During his 
term in the Fifth Legislative Council and in comparison with other 
indigenous members, Taureka is described by Hughes ( 1965:23) in the 
following manner: 'Admittedly there were many more indigenous 
Members, but only one, John Guise, became a major figure in Council 
business . . .  etc. From the first, Guise made extensive use of the power to ask 
questions, but of other indigenous Members, only Taureka made any real 
use of the opportunity. ' 
When the first House of Assembly was established in 1964 and also the 
first elected indigenous members sat in that House, Taureka was still a 
public servant. He served in his capacity as a medical doctor and 
administrator. However, in the 1972 elections, the year in which Papua 
New Guineans were still debating the question of political independence, 
Taureka nominated to contest the then Rigo-Abau seat held by Mr Euro, 
who was a businessmen and planter based in the hinterland of Aroma coast, 
the natal land of Taureka. Taureka easily won the seat because of his 
personal charisma, the vast experience gained from the Fifth Legislative 
Council, and his personal achievement and image as a medical doctor and 
administrator. Taureka entered parliamentary politics in the same year that 
Papua New Guinea was to gain self-government, and he and some 
prominent Papuan leaders like Maori Kiki, Gavera Rea, Oala Oala Rarua 
and Ebia Olewale were founding members of Pangu Pati. Under the then 
Chief Minister, Michael Somare, Taureka held such portfolios as Health, 
Education and Broadcasting and Information. At independence he was the 
Education minister. In the 1977 elections he lost to Gerega Pepena, a 
former Education superintendent for National Capital District, and an ardent 
Papua Besena candidate. 
Taureka's loss in 1977 was not a mark of defeat in politics. Soon after 
the national elections he contested the Aroma coast seat in the Central 
provincial elections in 1979 and won. He served as the leader of the 
Opposition in the assembly and later in 1984 toppled the incumbent Kone 
Vanuawaru government in a vote-of-no-confidence. Taureka served as 
premier and then in the Opposition until Central provincial government was 
suspended by the Wingti-Chan government in May of 1987 for gross 
financial mismanagement. Being a career politician he decided to contest 
the 1987 elections, but not the seat he usually contested; this time he 
nominated for Central Provincial. 
It is a mystery why Taureka decided to contest the Central Provincial 
seat, especially against such contemporary political personalities as Abaijah 
and Diro. But being a veteran politician, at both provincial and national 
level, Taureka is a big name in Papua and among his cohorts, both in and 
outside the national parliament. He decided against the idea of contesting 
1 34 W ARI IAMO 
the Abau seat, perhaps because he had lost twice since his term from 1972-
77. Since there were many candidates nominated from the Hiri-Kairuku and 
Goilala areas, he trusted that Abau voters might give him the edge to win 
Central Provincial. 
Taureka stood as a Pangu candidate, as he always had. Yet his election 
policies were more in tune with the Papuan brand of politics. As a Pangu 
candidate, under the leadership of Michael Somare, Taureka stressed that if 
he won, he was likely to hold an important portfolio. This means, as Pangu 
has shown when it is in government, that goods and services will be 
delivered to the maximum satisfaction of all citizens and residents. 
Taureka' s promise to the voters was to do the things he had done when a 
member from 1972 to 1977 , and also when he served as premier and 
member in the Central provincial government. To appeal to his voters he 
rejected the idea of a government-sponsored road linking New Guinea and 
Papua, or Highlands and Papua. He accused his arch-rival Ted Diro of 
supporting this project. 
Dr Reuben Taureka is regarded by Abau people as a member of the 
elite, who has personal ties and loyalties with old colleagues he met in his 
long-sustained political career. Being a Pangu founder (see Somare 
1975:5 1 )  and a personal friend of Somare and a host of politicians like of 
Sir John Guise, Ebia Olewale, Sir Maori Kiki, Gavera Rea, Thomas Kavali, 
Paul Torato, the late Sir Iambakey Okuk, etc . ,  Taureka' s  influence is far 
flung and he is perceived to have access to and the capacity to allocate 
resources and services. 
Taureka fulfilled the expectations villagers have of all the educated elite 
who nominate to run for elections, in that he maintained a bi-local residence 
between the village and city; he maintained subsistence farming; and he 
engaged in village collective activities like church donations, celebrations, 
sports and cultural festivities. But the suspension of the Central provincial 
government just before the national elections made him suspect in the eyes 
of ordinary villagers. There were rumours that he was party to the financial 
mismanagement of the province. Especially in his natal region, Aroma, 
Taureka was accused by some tractor owners of misappropriating funds 
which the provincial government had allocated to help plough garden land 
for subsistence farmers. 
Taureka's  campaign was mostly confined to Abau, the region he once 
represented and the region he thought might restore his pride and dignity. 
Because elections are an expensive exercise, loss of money is a personal 
concern to many candidates. Nontheless, Taureka's source of support came, 
first, from family members, second, from well-wishers, and lastly, from 
Pangu of course. On at least one occasion, Taureka and Diro used 
helicopters to visit parts of Abau. This, to voters in Aroma, was impressive. 
In Rigo and Abau and Hiri, Taureka made personal appearances; in Kairuku 
and Goilala regions, he did less travelling and counted more on his personal 
networks with his allies from the provincial government. 
Josephine Abaijah 
Josephine Abaijah was only the woman candidate among ten men. 
Biographical details about Abaijah were pieced together from published 
sources Membrey ( 1 974) , Daro ( 1976), Badu ( 1982), etc. At the time of the 
elections Abaijah was 37, and listed herself as a farmer. Her natal place is 
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Milne Bay, her parents are domiciled in Oro Province. Her tertiary 
education culminated in London University after studies with the Papuan 
Medical School where she earned a diploma in Public Health. Before she 
first entered national politics in 1972, she held the position of the Principal 
of Papua New Guinea's  Health Education Institute. 
As we have seen, Abaijah made history in the electoral politics of Papua 
New Guinea at the time of the coming of self-government. She was the first 
elected woman member and had a clear platform based on the notion of the 
separatior.. of Papua from New Guinea, because of internal political and 
economic colonialism brought about by Australians. She created an 
acephelous organisation, Papua Besena, to struggle for this ideology. Her 
separatist movement grew so powerful that at the dawn of self-government, 
Somare created the Village Task Force to bring development to 
underdeveloped areas such as Papua. 
In 1982 Abaijah lost her National Capital seat to pro-Pangu candidate 
Phillip Bouraga. Her loss indicated the multi-cultural nature of the city 
population, and if the defeat was really related to her Besena ideologies, 
many voters were certainly anti-Besena. In 1987 she chose to challenge the 
incumbent, a political role-model to many Papuans, and the self-styled 
'Papuan King' ,  Ted Diro. 
Although Abaijah revived the Papua Besena organization and fielded 
candidates in such electorates as Abau, Rigo, Kairuku-Hiri, Gulf, Kikori, 
Western, South Fly, Milne Bay, Samarai-Murua and Tari, she added another 
political dimension to her ideology. This time she became a member of a 
new political group, namely, Women In Politics (WIP) (see Wormald, 
Chapter 7). Other women candidates and supporters were Lady Okuk, Lady 
Olewale, Maria Kopkop (its president) , Tamo Diro, Fide Bale, and Au 
Doko. The main objective of the organisation is to recruit women at all 
levels of the government to participate in making important policy 
decisions, and to provide moral, financial and technical aid to women 
candidates contesting for public office. Yet, the Besena ideology that 
Abaijah nurtured and propagated still provided her main slogans although 
they were now blended with issues affecting women. This mix of politics 
based on economic underdevelopment and the oppressed women is a new 
turn in politics. It meant Abaijah was appealing desperately to her female 
voters to return her. 
Papua Besena as an organization has an independent source of funding 
from Abaijah ' s  business. Abaijah had to have funds to hand out to a 
number of candidates in the Papua region. She received aid from well­
wishers, friends, and family members. She travelled extensively throughout 
the Central Province, both to campaign for herself and also for the 
candidates she fielded in the four Open electorates: Abau, Rigo, Kairuku­
Hiri, and Goilala. In her campaign Abaijah invoked memories of Papua 
versus New Guinea and propounded a clear-cut policy of 'Papua for 
Papuans' and 'Development for Papua' .  Indeed, many Central people still 
uphold this legacy, because they see Port Moresby as the gateway to 
exploitation by outsiders, both New Guineans and expatriates. 
Ted Diro 
Ted Diro, 43, is from Boku Village in Rigo. By virtue of his mother's natal 
place, Diro is not a typical mountain man from Rigo. His father is from 
Boku and mother from Moapa, located on the Aroma coast. Another of 
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Diro' s political rivals, Taureka, comes from this coastal area. Diro spent 
part of his childhood in Aroma, and is fluent in Sinaugoro, Aroma, and 
Motu - all of which are mutually intelligible and are Austronesian 
languages. 
The colonial government provided few opportunities for secondary 
education in the 1940s and 1950s. However, at Sogeri in the 1 960s, Papua 
New Guineans were allowed to obtain secondary education. Some of the 
first Papua New Guineans to achieve this educational level became leaders 
of Papua New Guinea immediately thereafter. The class of 1962 at Sogeri, 
including Michael Somare, led the country to self-government and 
independence 
Ted Diro was a freshmen in 1962 and in the mid- 1960s completed the 
Queensland Senior, an equivalent of grade 1 1  and 1 2, at Slade School, 
Warwick, Queensland. While at Sogeri, Diro was the commander of the 
Sogeri School Cadets, a para-military organization for secondary schools 
established throughout the then Territory. His thorough indoctrination as a 
dedicated cadet influenced his career pattern. He joined the Defence Force 
and was one of the first nationals to attend the most prestigious military 
school in Australia, the Defence Academy at Portsea, Canberra. After his 
successful completion of a diploma, he rose quickly through the military 
ranks and, in 1975, at independence, became the country ' s  first commander. 
While in the Australian Defence Academy, Diro met the influential 
Indonesian Army commander, Colonel Murdani, who became a close friend 
and ally and from whom substantial 1987 election funds were received to 
aid Diro and his newly founded party, People ' s  Action Party. 
At independence in 1975, Diro inherited the colonial army legacy. In 
conformity with the traditional Western concept of a defence force, heavy 
emphasis was placed on the isolation of military and civilian roles. Papua 
New Guinea's educational programmes and civic activities were aimed at 
limiting any tendency for the armed forces to emerge in a political role. 
Civic activities, such as constructing roads and school buildings, aiding 
natural disaster victims in terms of shelter, food, and transport - these were 
once the responsiblity of the army, but are now shared by the government 
and the army. Nonetheless, these civic projects created an image of Diro as 
a man of action, and moreover, gained him the confidence of the village 
people as a true army commander. In the minds of simple villagers, 
everything representing the army by way of green trucks, zippers, choppers, 
planes, uniforms, arms, manufactured goods and products, became a symbol 
of Ted Diro. Diro's  biggest success in the Army was when he successfully 
put a rebellion down in 1 982 in then dominion of New Hebrides, now 
Vanuatu. 
The 1 982 national elections were Ted Diro ' s first after his career as 
army commander. And his overwhelming victory was due largely, I 
believe, to the image built for him through civic activities and projects. 
However, this was when Diro entered as a freshman in electoral politics. 
His success in 1987 cannot be wholly attributed to the army. A term in the 
national parliament was enough for Diro to be adept in PNG politics. At the 
end of 1986, he emerged with at least two prominent Papuans, Vincent Eri 
and John W aiko, to announce the formation of a national party which they 
named the People' s  Action Party (PAP). Diro is its parliamentary leader 
and Aruru Matiabe was then the deputy leader. The executive is made up of 
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Waiko, Eri and a few others. Its controlling philosophy, governing all its 
policies, is 'People First' .  The preamble to the party's  programme quotes 
the words of Jefferson: 'the care for human life and happiness is the first 
and the only legitimate object of government' .  Following on from this PAP 
recognizes the mood for national unity, and is committed to preserve the 
Westminster system of democratic government. All its campaign policies 
ranging from parliament, government and administration, education, 
economy, natural resources, localization, tourism, sport, law and order, 
foreign affairs, urban development, defence, police and CIS, youth, women 
and finance and investment are, in simple terms, 'honest' and 'trustworthy' .  
To illustrate this, under the heading 'Parliament, Government and 
Administration ' ,  the party stated categorically that it 'will fight.. .  the abuse 
of power and is against corruption ' .  
Among the many candidates that contested the Central Provincial seat, 
Ted Diro was by far the most advantageously placed in terms of finance. 
He went into the election campaign as a Foreign Affairs minister, using his 
own resources enhanced by substantial money (K124,000) donated by the 
Indonesian Army commander, Colonel Murdani. In all, Diro' s campaign, 
and those of the other PAP candidates who contested, cost him and his party 
well over K700,000. Diro's  gigantic financial support and the support of 
well-wishers augumented his chances of emerging the winner over other 
candidates. In an informal gathering, Diro claimed he was financially 
independent and the contributions he received were only a third of his total 
expenditure. 
As a freshman in electoral politics in 1982, Diro had formed a little 
independent group. During the election campaign he depended on his 
image as an army commander and on the civic projects he had created to 
portray himself as a 'man of action' .  Successfully, he presented himself to 
the voters as potentially the first Papuan to hold the highest political office, 
the prime ministership. With substantial experience behind him, Diro, in 
the 1987 elections, entered the field as a political heavyweight. Behind him 
he had a political machine and plentiful resources. As an incumbent with 
these attributes, Diro was well ahead of other contestants. Structurally, in 
each Open electorate, Diro' s PAP established the concept of komiti, a body 
composed of educated men, frequently retired army officers, to carry on an 
extensive campaign for Diro and others running under the banner of PAP. 
Some of these komiti men operated for money; others functioned on the 
assumption that a form of pecuniary reward would be forthcoming after 
voting was over. They also effectively served as scrutineers at polling and 
counting. 
In each Open electorate all the komiti men were given a crash course on 
electoral rules by PAP specialists to foster the mood of independence and 
instil confidence through knowledge of the rules. This became extremely 
successful. In regions where Diro was well entrenched through his 
organizational structure, he appeared remote. Then the Foreign Affairs 
minister in the Wingti-Chan government, Diro spent substantial campaign 
time travelling, while his komiti men on the home ground did it all for him. 
However, he personally appeared in big rallies either by a ministerial 'limo' ,  
first class four-wheel-drive, or a chopper. At these rallies villagers were 
bombarded with the campaign tactic, that Diro will be the 'first' Papuan to 
be the prime minister. This self-aggrandizing was adequate to convince the 
simple voters to consider him over others. 
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Perai Manai 
Perai Manai, 34, from Tapini, was the only native of Goilala who stood for 
the 1987 elections. It is worth saying something about Manai in order to see 
how he could have swept Goilala so convincingly as an independent. Was 
there anything in his background and experience that could have endeared 
him so much to Goilala people, or was being one of them enough? Or was 
there any plan agreed to in Goilala to run only one candidate so as not to 
split the vote? 
Manai completed grade 10 from Sogetj and after joining the public 
service in 197 1 ,  he completed the Public Service Higher Certificate at the 
Administrative College. At the University of Papua New Guinea, he was 
one of the first Papua New Guineans to enrol in the newly established 
journalism programme and graduated with a Diploma in Communication 
Studies. Manai served as a Press Secretary for the then Morobe premier, 
Utula Samana, for some time and in a similar capacity served Sir Julius 
Chan and the successive governments. 
Manai is one of the first and best educated sons of the Goilala people 
during the post-independence era. There is, according to Manai, no secret 
about why only one candidate from that region was fielded. It was a 
common consensus among the villagers, leaders, and educated people that 
only one person from that populous region should be tried, as the chance of 
winning was higher, given the number of candidates that nominated from 
the coastal areas. Manai was, among many, the best choice for the Goilala 
voters. Being the only one, party affiliation did not matter. It was assumed 
that the preponderant factor in determining Goilala voting would be 
ethnicity. The results of the final count indicated that Manai in his natal 
region polled convincing with an overwhelming majority of 5,260 votes. 
Voting 
Voting for the most part in the Central Province was quiet, although a few 
incidents were reported of between supporters of rival candidates, such as 
Taureka versus Diro in Abau and Kairuku, or Abaijah versus Diro and 
Manai in Goilala. Voting was supposed to be secret, done in a polling 
booth. This rule, however, was contravened in a number of ways: (a) where 
villagers agreed to 'block-vote ' ,  supporters would openly declare who they 
would vote for; (b) a small minority held up their ballot paper marking their 
'Xs ';  and (c) scrutineers of all candidates were within a seeing range and 
could figure out whom a voter chose. Secret voting then became open­
voting and that had certain ramifications, setting off family and kinship 
conflicts, clan rivalries , and inter-village conflicts. Whether or not the tallies 
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kept by the scrutineers of each candidate were accurate, in many cases the 
expectations of the candidate and supporters were raised and conflicts and 
frustrations ensued. 
COUNTING 
Table 1 :  Summary of Total Votes For Each Candidate From Open 
Electorates 
Electorate: 
Abau Goilala Kairuku-Hiri Rigo TOTAL 
Candidates 
J.M. Abaijah 1545 248 5467 2866 10126 
P.A. Otto 1570 409 972 336 3287 
M. Anna 1676 1 19 279 133 2207 
A.I. Efi 1 33 439 1200 66 1838 
T. Efi 294 993 1639 267 3 193 
T. Diro 2594 1760 4720 5896 14970 
F.X. Irere 168 56 1477 90 179 1  
A .  Hitolo 161 94 2826 107 3 1 88 
P. Manai 9 19 5260 515  100 5994 
M. Mehuiu 194 560 370 2191  3315  
R.  Taureka 3008 48 1221 45 1 4728 
Total allowed ballot 
papers 1 1462 9986 20686 12503 54637 
Informal ballot 
papers 622 200 1888 528 2 1 38 
Grand total 12084 10086 21574 1303 56775 
As shown in Table 1 ,  the total electoral population for the Central 
Province in this election was about 56,775. Of this total, 12,084 voted in 
Abau, 10,084 in Goilala, 21 ,574 in Kairuku-Hiri and 1 3,03 1 in Rigo. 
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Abau 
Table 2: Summary of Total Votes For Each Candidates in Abau 
Electorate 
Candidate Total votes 
J.M. Abaijah 1545 
P.A. otto 1570 
M. Anai 1676 
A.I. Efi 133 
T. Efi 294 
T. Diro 2594 
F.X. Irere 168 
A. Hitolo 161 
P. Manai 1 19 
M. Mehuiu 194 
R. Taureka 3008 
Total allowed ballot papers 54637 
Informal ballot papers 2138 
GRAND TOTAL 12084 
It appeared that since Taureka and another candidate, M. Anai came from 
Abau, ideally 12,084 would be split between the two on kinship and 
personal loyalty ties. Yet, their biggest opposition came from Diro, whose 
mother is from Aroma, and also an unknown quantity, P. Otio. Although 
Taureka won by about 400 votes ahead of his nearest rival Diro, the votes 
were distributed along both ethnic and personal lines. Table 2 shows that 
Taureka polled 3,008;  Diro 2,594; M. Anai polled 1676; and Otio polled 
1 ,570. Non-natives of Abau polled less strongly: Abaijah 1 ,545; A. Efi 
294; F. Irere 168; A. Hitolo 161 ;  P. Manai 1 19; and Mehutu 194. Except for 
Abaijah, who still had a substantial following in Abau and who perhaps 
benefitted from the fact that Abau shares ethnic boundaries with her native 
Milne Bay, the rest who had no kin and ethnic loyalty polled poorly. 
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Goilala 
Table 3 :  Summary of Total Votes For Each Candidates in 
Goilala 
Candidate Votes 
J .M. Abaijah 248 
P.A. Otto 409 
M. Anai 1 19 
A.I. Efi 993 
T. Efi 1760 
F.X. lrere 56 
A. Hitolo 94 
P. manai 5260 
M. Mehuiu 560 
R. Taureka 48 
Total allowed ballot papers 9986 
Informal ballot papers 100 
GRAND TOTAL 10086 
The tussle in the Goilala region is very interesting. Here one would have 
assumed that claims to personal loyalties made by candidates like Diro and 
Abaijah throughout the Central Provincial electorate would have had a lot of 
impact on voters, especially since there was only one native candidate from 
the area who contested. In the final analysis, kin and ethnic loyalties again 
outweighed all other factors. Perai Manai 's clear win of 5,260 as indicated 
in Table 3 proved this point. His nearest rival was Diro who polled a mere 
1 ,760, the only candidate besides Manai to poll four figures. Abaijah, who 
in 1972 elections had the largest following here, performed miserably and 
could only master 248. Candidates who one might think had connections 
through the Central provincial government also did not perform well. These 
include Taureka ( 48) and Mehutu (560). 
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Kairuku-Hiri 
Table 4: Summary of Total Votes For Each Candidates in 
Kairuku:.. Hiri 
Candidate Votes 
J.M. Abaijah 5467 
P.A. Otto 972 
M. Anai 279 
A.I. Efi 1200 
T. Efi 1639 
T. Diro 4720 
F.X. Irere 1477 
A. Hitolo 2826 
P. Manai 5 1 5  
M Mehuiu 370 
R. Taureka 1221  
Total allowed ballot papers 20686 
Informal ballot papers 1888 
GRAND TOTAL 21574 
A. Hitolo was the only Motuan candidate from Hiri; others like Allan Efi, 
Theo Efi, and Francis Irere came from Kairuku region. It turned out that, as 
shown in Table 4, Hitolo (2,826), A. Efi ( 1 ,200), T. Efi ( 1 ,639), and F. Irere 
(1 ,477) polled almost evenly along ethnic and kinship lines, and outsiders 
polled better than they. These outsiders were political heavyweights like 
Abaijah (5,467), Diro (4,720), and Taureka ( 1 ,221) , who performed 
extremely well because of their charismatic leadership, parochial handouts, 
and political loyalties through national and provincial politics. Both 
Abaijah and Diro still have a large following, especially Abaijah whose 
Papua Besena is still alive and well among these people. 
Rigo 
Table 5 shows that of the grand total of 1 3 ,03 1 voters, 12,503 were allowed 
and only 528 were invalid. Candidates who, by ethnic and cultural identity, 
would affiliate themselves to Rigo are Diro, Mehutu, and Taureka. It is 
quite evident that more than half of the voters polled their votes along ethnic 
lines: Diro polled 5,896, Mehutu 2, 191, and Taureka 45 1 .  Abaijah, with 
2,866 still has a very large following. 
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Table 5 :  Summary of Total Votes For Each Candidate in Rigo 
Candidate Votes 
J.M. Abaijah 2866 
P.A. Otto 336 
M. Anai 1 33 
A.I. Efi 66 
T. Efi 267 
T. Diro 5896 
F.X. Irere 90 
A. Hitolo 107 
P. Manai 100 
M/ Mehuiui 2191  
R. Taureka 45 1 
Total allowed ballot papers 12503 
Informal ballot papers 528 
GRAND TOTAL 1303 1 
The Central Provincial Electorate as a Whole 
In the final analysis, Ted Diro emerged the clear winner, polling 14,970 
ahead of Josephine Abaijah, who made 10,126. Trailing behind them were 
Manai (5 ,994) , Taureka (4,728) , and Mehutu (3,3 15) .  Although Diro won, 
his electoral performance compared to Abaijah, who was the first 
indigenous Papua New Guinean woman to represent the seat in 1972, was 
average. The results of the 1982 elections indicate that Diro won with an 
overwhelming majority (23,628), and his nearest rival could only master a 
third of his total votes. However, Diro 's dramatic win in 1982 was due 
largely to his own credit as a military man and to the symbol the army 
constitutes. After four years in national politics some of Diro's  weaknesses 
have become salient in his constituency. Some of these factors involved 
Diro's  family life; others had to do with relinquishing the opposition 
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leadership, and some were about his electoral duties as an MP and the 
obligation of delivering goods and services; and also just being with the 
people. 
PARTIES AND THEIR PERFORMANCE 
Party affiliations were interesting in Central Provincial electoral politics. Of 
the eleven candidates, five were endorsed by existing political parties. They 
are Abaijah by Papua Besena, Diro by People 's Action Party, T. Efi by 
People 's  Progress Party, Taureka by Pangu and Mehutu by Papua Party. 
Among them Abaijah and Diro are party leaders. The remaining six, M. 
Anai, A. Efi, P. Otio, F. Irere, A. Hitolo, and P. Manai, stood on their own 
accord as independent candidates. 
It is established, in the electoral history of Papua New Guinea, that kin 
and ethnic loyalty and parochial handouts are crucial variables that 
influence voters. The election results (1987 National Voting Statistics) 
indicated that, of the 106 MPs, a majority (84) were party affiliates and 
endorsees and the others (22) were independents. This, to me, suggests that 
political party consciousness on the part of voters in some electorates played 
a part in their choice of candidates. But party preference was combined 
with the candidates'  performance (or prospective performance) in the 
deliverance of goods and services. This clearly is the case in the Central 
Provincial election, where out of the total 56,775 voters an overwhelming 
majority (36 ,322) voted for party candidates and just over half this figure 
( 1 8,305) chose independent candidates. In the final analysis, a party 
candidate (PAP), Ted Diro, amassed a total of 14,970, about 4,846 votes 
ahead of his nearest rival, Abaijah, another party endorsee (PB), and 8,986 
votes ahead of the independent candidate, Manai. 
Party consciousness can be largely attributed to education, political 
participation and exposure of the Central people. Churches have enhanced 
this social process by neutralizing ethnic and kinship boundaries thus 
creating a cultural bond between ethnic groups under the name of a 
Christian God and concomitant ethical values and mores. And so the power 
of deciding on whom to select among the contestants becomes an individual 
choice free from kinship fetters. Trust is put in the guiding hands of the 
Christian God. From another point of view, the majority of Central people 
have had Western education longer than many parts of the country and adult 
voters write and read and can discourse on policy issues. Therefore there is 
a tendency for them to choose contestants on their party platforms and 
philosophies. But the party consciousness and political radicalism of many 
Central voters are largely attributable to Abaijah's  Papua Besena from 1973 
onwards. The increased party consciousness now means that party 
ideologies and policies are strengthening and the mechanics of 
operationalizing these philosophies are also becoming more sophisticated. 
Central voters, for instance, are told by the PAP supporters and canvassers 
that 'Party ' means 'Power' and this in turn means access to political 
resources. Delivery of material goods by an individual who is affiliated 
with a party is a real possibility; while an individual with no party 
membership will be a loner and dependent on the whims of party members. 
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DISCUSSION 
The concept 'the Papuan hegemony ' is the thesis of this paper. This is 
illustrated in the title 'Papuan Prince(ss) and Papuan Development' . It is 
the mainstay of both Josephine Abaijah and Ted Diro, during overt and 
covert election campaigns. It manifests itself through the use of party 
politics and through a much lesser use of kin and ethnic loyalty. Promoting 
the Papuan hegemony is the conscious and unconscious act of these two 
political personalities. 
We can see from the preceding analysis of the historical overview of 
Papuan politics, that electoral politics before Abaijah ' s  legacy, at the onset 
of 1964, were replete with kin loyalties and parochial interests. They were 
not party politics, owing largely to the alien nature of the institution. This 
trend was rapidly transformed with Abaijah ' s  Papuan consciousness that 
culminated in a separatist movement, vying vigorously for Papuan 
Development (see Premdas 1977, Badu 1982, Mckillop 1982) .  
The Papuan consciousness became so salient that fear of and dislike for 
internal colonialism received more attention than external (neo-) 
colonialism. Structurally this consciousness permeated family, village or 
community, church, school, council, city and town, development and 
welfare association, civil service, as well as private sector, and bureaucrat as 
well as politician. These groups were aroused and mobilized by this 
consciousness on occasions of mass street demonstrations to vent their 
anger against the outsiders ' mistreatment of their fellowmen, or in quest for 
equal allocation of resources and services. Great influence was brought to 
bear on the government of the day to take heed of the demands of the 
Papuans, predominantly residents in the capital city, Port Moresby, and 
outlying areas. A Village Task Force was specifically designed to 
counteract these social pressures (Somare 1975, Avei 1988). Nonetheless, 
the simple truth is that Papuan leaders, including their advisors and the 
bureaucrats, succumbed to the temptation of betraying Papua interests to 
enrich and enhance their social status at the expense of the ordinary, 
exploited villagers. The cultural activities and institutions that were built, 
the big corporations and food markets that cropped up, the fishing ventures 
as well as trucking businesses and many more that began, from the money 
collected from poverty-stricken villagers or through having access to 
resources, were all in the eyes of ordinary villagers smart ploys by their 
educated elite to enrich themselves more than aiding the common villagers 
to uplift their lives. The gulf between the villagers and the well-to-do 
Papuan grew. 
This inevitable legacy, the Papuan hegemony, indeed is carried over and 
maintained by Diro. Many Papuans, at elections in 1982 and 1987, still 
associated him with the symbols of army. In most basic terms he was and is 
perceived as a man of action. He and his coterie of intellectuals and 
followers successfully portrayed him as a 'Papuan Prince, '  and this usage 
was also seen as synonymous with 'Papuan Prime Minister' . He was 
strongly portrayed to his constituents as a potential Papua New Guinean 
prime minister, first to be from Papua. 
Diro' s People's  Action Party (PAP) calls for a united Papua New 
Guinea, an ideal which was anathema to Papua Besena as a separatist 
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movement, and upholds a loyal commitment to Papua New Guinea and its 
people to derive maximum benefits from the natural resources of its soil. 
Yet it is quite clear to many Papua New Guineans that Diro' s PAP is 
regionally based and biased towards Papuans and still upholds the legacies 
bequeathed by Papuan Besena. 
There is only a slight difference between the Papua Besena and PAP. 
Josephine Abaijah, on the one hand, juxtaposed Papuan underdevelopment 
with Australia' s  one-sided economic favouritism of New Guinea, and 
preached against the resulting internal, New Guinea-dominated colonialism. 
PAP, on the other hand, perceives that its Papuan soil, mainly the NCD, is 
the gate-way to nee-colonialism and exploitation by New Guineans, but 
more saliently by enterprising New Guinea Highlanders than any other 
ethnic group. Therefore, PAP is strongly committed to the prevention of 
such a tendency developing fully; on the other hand, it is dedicated to the 
promotion of Papuans to work their own soil, master their own affairs, and 
to facilitate their economic independence and prosperity. It wants Papuans 
to hold top posts in the military, in the public service, and in business. At 
the national level, PAP and its Papuan Bloc faction is dedicated to the 
maintenance and security of the Papuan bureaucratic elite, in various public 
service departments and financial institutions. At the provincial level too, it 
is committed to the maintenance of those who are loyal to its leaders and 
their ideals in strategic positions of authority and command, in the 
provincial public service and its private sector. It seeks to assure that 
friends are prominent in the Department of Central Province, 
provincial/local governments, its electoral offices, its police force, its 
business-arm, and a whole ,.range of government and non-governmental 
organisations . 
PAP, its leaders, and their coterie of advisers may be benign and 
genuine in their endeavour to help Papuans protect themselves from all 
forms of outside exploitation, and most notably from the threat of the 
Highlanders in the NCD. The aftermath of the elections still indicate that 
while party-politics is being profoundly entrenched through a variety of 
institutional structures, its political and bureaucratic leaders coalesce with 
the metropolitan bourgeoise to denude Papua of its natural resources, such 
as timber, much more to their own benefit than that of the ordinary villagers 
(see Barnet Reports, Times of PNG 1988). Nevertheless, this self-centred 
behaviour is prevalent in political as well as bureaucratic circles and not 
unique to PAP leaders. 
Indeed ' United Papua New Guinea' is a catch-phrase for all major 
parties in Papua New Guinea national politics. PAP is no exception. At the 
outset, PAP tried to be a national party even though it always made use of 
the 'Papuan hegemony' theme in Papuan settings, from where it draws its 
impetus. Still, PAP supported Uma More in the Highlands, Alan Sako in 
Morobe, John Banono in North Bougainville Open and one may argue that 
these candidates did not campaign on the Papuan hegemony theme. The 
hidden agenda for Diro and PAP became very salient after the election, 
when it was found that PAP had elected only Papuan MPs. PAP became a 
more explicitly Papuan party. Even then, Diro, to his credit, kept the door 
open for PAP to reassert a national identity by making the Papuan Bloc, 
rather than PAP, the focus of Papua pressure group activity. The Papuan 
Bloc appear strong, however; there are political infighting and leadership 
animosities between Diro and K warara and between the Papuan 
Highlanders and Coastals. 
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Regional and cultural identities are still salient in national politics, 
although an outsider unaccustomed to this political tradition may wonder 
whether or not there is a coup d'etat around the corner. Like all parties, 
PAP claims it is a nationally-oriented party, and its membership can be 
drawn from all over the country. But its base has to be geographically 
defined. Thus, it has no alternative but to identify itself with the Papuan 
region, its headquarters based in the National Capital District (NCD). 
While it claims that its policies are nationalistic, its actions are contrary to 
this. Its dislike for capitalistic Highlanders is a case in point. As a 
preventive measure, it has attempted, in the NCD, to place Papuan 
bureaucrats in strategic positions of authority, such as National Capital 
District Interim Commission (NCDIC) management, land board, transport 
board, etc. ,  to control and direct business interests towards maximum 
participation of Papuans. It appears that PAP's short-sightedness blinds it 
from a common enemy that all Papua New Guineans, regardless of 
ethnicity, have to compete with, the entrenched capitalists and the off-shore 
metropolitan bourgeoisie who coalesce with their counterparts, the national 
elites. Inevitably, economic development will create questions of 
belongingness and point to problems of regionalism, such as the one being 
faced by Papuans in the NCD now. On another note, however, Papua New 
Guineans in order to be one people, will have to tolerate each other and co­
exist in many realms of life, despite locality. Often the elites realize that 
they have alienated themselves from their own people and that they are the 
cause of their own people' s  misery and poverty. Few people also are aware 
that their leaders cause some of their daily problems; yet what a 'man of 
action' such as Ted Diro can do for the simple people often amounts to their 
own exploitation. 
CONCLUSION 
There is certainly a marked contrast between the electoral politics of people 
before and after the rise of Aba,ijah and Diro. Most salient perhaps were the 
changes in the variables that influenced voter behaviour. Only a few of the 
Papuans who stood in the early elections were highly educated and 
thoroughly assimilated in Western ways. They employed Western 
institutions and wealth to gain their bigman status and used it to gain 
leverage and become leaders in their communities and regions. Voting at 
that time was based much more along the lines of kin and ethnic loyalty and 
parochial handouts than along policy lines. 
Commencing with Abaijah and proceeding onto Diro, electoral politics 
in Central Province marked the beginning of a new political history in 
Papua New Guinea. Because Papuans in Central Province were sensitized 
to the concept of Papuan consciousness by Abaijah' s separatist movement, 
Papua Besena, voters tend to choose candidates along party and policy 
issues much more than on the basis of kin and ethnic loyalty. The 1987 race 
between Abaijah, the Papua Besena leader and candidate, and Diro, the 
PAP leader and candidate was not so much a choice between personalities 
as between representatives of parties and policy-goals. Despite the fact that 
Diro won the seat, the narrow victory margin indicates that both Papua 
Besena and PAP are popular in Central Province. Indeed, they stand for the 
same things. What makes both alike is their philosophy of Papuan 
consciousness, that acts as a 'cementing metaphor' for all Papuans against 
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New Guineans (now more pronounced against Highlanders). Papuan 
hegemony is the result of this social process. 
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Kerema Open C onstituency 
MICHAEL OLIVER* 
PREFACE 
A study of one constituency in an election must answer a fundamental 
question: why did the winner win? To have any hope of providing an 
answer, one must decide in advance what evidence is likely to be most useful, 
what is 'important'. After a first visit to the Province of Gulf and discussions 
with both local people and those closer to political life in Kerema, I arrived at 
a tentative set of hypotheses. 
First, I became convinced that local factors overwhelmed national or even 
provincial concerns in peoples' minds. 'Primordial sentiments' (Geertz 1963) 
* Three personal factors,  combined with an interest  in the h i s t o r y  
o f  the area and especially i ts attempts a t  co-operative organiz ation ,  
influenced m y  decision to  study Kerema Open constituency in the 
1 987 election. First, I knew Chris Haiveta, the G u l f  Provinc ial 
S ecetary ,  with whom I h ad spent a year at the Institute o f  
D e v e l op m en t  S tudies in  S ussex.  Secondly , one of the honours 
students in the Department of Political and A d m i n i stra t ive  S tu d i e s  
of the University of  Papua New Guinea with whom I had p r e v i o u s l y  
worked o n  a research task, Orovu Vitaharo , came from the v i l l a g e  
o f  Hamuhamu o n  the East Coast o f  Gulf. Thirdly, a former student, 
Daniel Itu , was going to be a candidate in  Kere m a  Open and 
genero u s l y  offered to he lp s teer m e  through some of the 
intricac ies  of 'appl ied' politics . I am enormously grateful to all of 
them . Chris  Haiveta provided access to political leaders , public 
servants and provincial data, as  well as h ospital ity i n  Kerem a. 
Orovu Vitaharo arranged for Mrs. Oliver and myself to be put up in 
her fami ly ' s  home in Hamuhamu,  introduced m e  to her f a t h e r , 
Vitaharo Avosa, an invaluable guide and informant for the Toaripi 
area, and acted as a constant companion and translator for us  in  
visits to  nearby v illages. Daniel Itu let  me accompany him during 
his campaigning through several vil lages in the Kaint iba  d i s tr i c t  
(Hawabango,  Kanabea ,  Kaintiba a n d  Kamina) and also served a s  
translator d uring individual a n d  group i n terv i e w s .  W h atever 
ins ights I have been able to acquire are the result  of their 
patience and helpfulness .  All of them have been kind enough to 
read the m anuscript for this  study , but for the  m i s i n terpretat ion s 
and errors that remain,  I am solely responsible. 
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were often not as strong as in other parts of Papua New Guinea, for clan 
organization had faded out along the Eastern Coast. A strong sense of village 
solidarity and language group consciousness seemed to have grown up in its 
place. Common social and economic concerns - the need for 'development' -
displaced or supplemented simpler kinship and 'wantok' loyalties. 
Secondly, I was impressed by how little political party affiliation seemed 
to be affecting people's thoughts on how they should vote. 
Thirdly, I heard a good deal about the interpenetration of provincial and 
national politics ,  and the hypothesis that provincial political connections 
would affect the 1 987 national election outcome in Kerema Open seemed 
worth testing. 
Equally important, this first visit convinced me that any attempt to 
interpret the voting in class terms would fail, but that the emergence of a 
political elite, from which the more successful candidates would be drawn, 
was probably going to be evident, continuing a national trend from the past 
elections. All of the members of this political elite would be better educated 
than most of their electors. They would also be better off economically and 
would sometimes be very wealthy. In these cases, wealth would often be a 
consequence of the interaction of political power, the power of public office, 
and business power. Perhaps their ability to lavish gifts and cash on their 
electorate would count heavily in their favour, but I had doubts that any such 
obvious connection between wealth and political power would emerge very 
clearly. 
It also seemed to me that religion would only be of minor significance and 
would be almost impossible to separate from local and clan affiliations. One 
very alert informant insisted that religion would have an effect on the election, 
but the fact that he came from Moveave, with its exceptional religious 
rivalries, led me to discount his views as a general explanatory factor. 
Gender was, it seemed, going to have no weight in voting or candidacy 
choices. No women looked about to nominate. The influence of women 
partisans of one candidate or other was likely to be very localized. 
Finally, I received no impression that the 'personality' of any prospective 
candidate was likely to-be-of crucial importance. No one who seemed likely to 
run was going to have great dramatic appeal. Each would have to be assessed 
in terms of the skills, personal qualities and connections he possessed; and 
there might be differences in campaign style and tactics which would 
influence the outcome. 
There remained the question of electoral 'issues' and their importance. It 
would be impossible to determine in advance whether clearcut questions of 
policy would arise. It was unlikely that they would be national questions, but 
perhaps local or even provincial questions would come up in the campaign 
which would divide the candidates on particular issues. 
The description which follows of the province, its regions, the electorate 
of Kerema Open, the candidates who nominated and, subsequently, of the 
campaign itself, will reflect the attention I decided to pay to these factors: (a) 
local and regional identity and interests; (b) political party affiliations; ( c) 
religious and non- traditional affiliations ;  (d) provincial government 
connections, ( e) personal characteristics, including wealth, of candidates; (f) 
campaign styles and tactics; and (g) issues. 
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Gulf Province is divided into six districts. From East to West, they are 
Malalaua, Kerema, Kaintiba, Ihu, Baimuru and Kikori. (Map 1 )  We will be 
concerned primarily with the first three, which are in turn divided into census 
divisions. Malalaua is made up of Moripi, Toaripi, Kaipi and Kovio. 
Kerema embraces Kerema census division, Kerema Bay and Kaberope. 
Kaintiba is composed of Hamdei and Uiabi on the East side of the Tauri 
River, and Hangoia and Ivore-Swanson on the West side (Map 2) . Census 
districts and divisions are not the only units which must be kept in mind in 
studying Gulf politics. The province has been divided into electorates for 
provincial elections which have borders that always differs and bear names 
that sometimes differ from those of the census divisions. Map 3 shows the 
names and borders of these provincial electorates in the area covered by the 
national electorate of Kerema Open. The main differences are in Kaintiba 
district where the census division names of Wen ta and Hamdei disappear and 
are replaced (roughly) by Middle Taure and Mienta respectively; in Malalaua 
where Mailovera is carved out of Toaripi; and in Kerema district where 
Kerema Bay is re-named Tairuma. 
For elections to the National Parliament, there are three electorates :  two 
Open electorates, Kerema and Kikori, and a Provincial electorate (Map 1) .  
Only three of the other nineteen provinces, West New Britain, New Ireland 
and Oro, have just three members of the National Parliament. Only one 
province has fewer members: Manus, with two electorates. 
Gulfs small population of 64, 120 is sparsely distributed over wide areas 
of mangrove swamp, seacoast and river shore that can only be reached by 
water, and tightly folded mountains and valleys accessible only by air or 
footpath. Kerema Open constituency is made up of only about one-third of 
the land mass of the province, but its population is larger than that of Kikori 
constituency because of the comparative density of population in and around 
the capital of the province, Kerema; in the mountain valleys of Kaintiba 
district; and along the coast of Malalaua district. In the 1 987 National 
Election, 14, 623 valid ballots were cast in Kerema as opposed to 10,5 17 for · 
Kikori. 
For the purpose of political analysis, a drastic simplification of Gulf 
Province groupings into three main regional* groupings is possible. 
Basically, there are Eastern Coastals, who live in Malalaua district; Western 
Coastals, who live in Ihu, Baimuru and Kikori districts; and the Kamea who 
live primarily in Kaintiba, but with spillovers into Kovio and, even more 
strongly, Kaberope census divisions. The people of Kerema Bay are best, 
but still unreliably, linked with the Eastern Coastals 
Since the focus of the study is Kerema Open electorate, detailed 
background information will only be supplied on Malalaua, Kerema and 
Kaintiba districts and the population groups that live in them, especially the 
Kamea and the Eastern Coastals. The boundaries of Kerema Open electorate 
reflect the basic artificiality of the boundaries of the province as a whole. A 
coastal population has been conjoined with a mountain population with which 
it has no affinity, and indeed a long tradition of enmity. 
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The Eastern Coastals 
La.nguage and communication 
Although there is no single language that is spoken by all the coastal people of 
the Kerema Open electorate, there is quite easy communication through the 
Toaripi language, which was used by missionaries in the churches of the 
Malalaua and Kerema Bay coastal districts. It has become a lingua franc a, 
but it would be misleading to suggest that linguistic distinctions are now 
unimportant. The labels given to Moripi, Toaripi and Kaipi census divisions 
are also the names of three of the main languages which are spoken along the 
coast. Language gives a sense of common identity to groups of villages and 
sets them off from villages where another language is spoken (Brown 
1 965, 1 972, 1 982; Franklin 1 973).  Nevertheless, historical connections 
among all areas along the coast are longstanding, and the entire region seems 
to have shared in the Hiri trade which for many generations covered the coast 
from the Purari River mouth down to the area that is now Port Moresby 
(Dutton 1982a and b; Rhoads 1982)). 
Economic factors and eastern coastal unity 
Economically, the villages that make up the coastal region present no sharp 
contrasts. Sago is the subsistence economy staple and it is supplemented by 
fish, shellfish and coconut and by storegoods like rice and tinned meat and 
fish when cash is available. The first major departure from subsistence 
agriculture was copra production. It was undertaken both by villagers who 
gathered the coconuts from the palms in their locality and on plantations. 
Most plantations were run by big companies like Steamships; but in a few 
important instances, such as Koaru and Moru, they were founded by the 
London Missionary Society (LMS ). 
The copra cooperative societies that grew up along the coast during the 
late 1940s and the 1 950s provide a vital key to understanding the political 
dynamics of the region. They have been described (Ryan 1 963, 1 969; 
Snowden 198 1 ;  Denoon 1982) in a fragmented way but their full story still 
remains to be written. Dawn Ryan's work, however, provides crucial 
insights into the reasons why the rise and fall of the copra cooperatives, and 
particularly of the Toaripi Association, had such a profound effect on eastern 
coastal villages. The bald facts about the Toaripi Association are simple to 
relate. Under the leadership of an ex-pastor named Posu, the seven villages of 
the Toaripi-speaking people established in 1946 a copra cooperative and by 
1 950 raised the sum of £6000 to buy a boat to transport copra to Port 
Moresby. The effort this demanded was enormous and could only be 
sustained by a constant high level of enthusiasm and commitment. Under 
colonial government pressure, the Toaripis were persuaded to extend their 
Association to include cooperative societies in the villages of other 
neighbouring language groups. For a while, the villages began to taste 
prosperity as the cooperative grew and flourished, but by the early sixties it 
collapsed. 
The causes of failure were many. They included over-regulation by 
government, competition from private traders, disagreement among villages 
and especially among villages of different language groups, administrative 
inexperience and waning enthusiasm as the rewards seemed more remote and 
sparser than had been hoped for. But for a decade the people of the Eastern 
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coast had worked together, had shared a common purpose and had achieved 
something tangible and valuable. This period is now seen as the Golden Age 
of the East Coast. The cooperative's ship called in at most villages, taking 
copra to Moresby and bringing back a flow of manufactured goods and it was 
simple to communicate between settlements. 
The Association was a symbol, however, as well as a practical 
achievement. Inevitably, it was perceived as an answer to the problem of 
how to tap the source of 'cargo' that had preoccupied the Gulf coast since the 
days of the 'V ailala Madness' (Williams 1 97 6) in the 1920s and the later 
Tommy Kabu movement (Allen 195 1 ;  Maher 1958). The very practical steps 
which were being taken by village leaders to found an economic enterprise 
could also be seen as the rites that were necessary to get the ship that would 
bring cargo to the coast. 'Cargo cult' activity had stripped the East coast 
peoples of clan and sub-clan organization, of their men's houses and magical 
rites, and indeed of the whole set of interwoven rituals and symbols that had 
given coherence to their early social forms. The 'cargo cult' and the 
wholehearted adoption of Christianity were expressions of a rejection of the 
ways of the past and of a willingness to find 'modern' ways of achieving the 
incredible prosperity that attended the Australian-European way of life. The 
cooperative was capable of generating the same mix of mystical and material 
hopes that Ryan found to be induced by Christianity, with its promise of 
expatriate life-styles as well as the Second Coming (Ryan 1963). 
The political significance of the cooperative movement's rise and fall 
remains strong. The cooperative proved that if coastal peoples could unite, 
they could prosper. It also showed how difficult the achievement of 
cooperation could be and how fragile it was once attained. Whatever the 
causes of the decline from the Golden Age, all efforts needed to be bent to its 
re-creation. Government help was desperately needed. Representatives who 
could both unify the East coast and bring the riches of the government to it 
were an urgent need. At the very least, the coast needed MPs who could see 
to restoring the ports, clearing the river and creek channels, and above all see 
to the completion of the Hiritano Highway which would provide access to 
Port Moresby. 
Churches and schools 
First Christianity and then colonial officialdom had made an impact on the 
East coast since the 19th Century. The London Missionary Society (later the 
United Church) presence was particularly strong and in many cases the 
missions along the coast were founded by Polynesian pastors sponsored by 
the Society. The Roman Catholic Church has a strong presence in the 
province as well, and intense rivalry persists in centres where both churches 
are in close proximity, such as in Heavala, which with its twin village, 
Heatore, makes up the important centre of Moveave. More recently there has 
been some penetration by evangelical groups like the Seventh Day Adventists 
(SDAs). Coastal people, especially in and around Kerema, have had access 
to schools for several generations and in the post-World War Two period, 
leading up to self-government, independence and beyond, they have provided 
more than their proportionate share of Papua New Guinea's leadership in 
politics and the public service. Names like Sir Tore Lokoloko, Vincent Eri, 
and Mekere Morauta are known and respected well beyond the Province. 
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The Kamea 
Just north of the town of Kerema, the mountains come nearly down to the 
coast. They are the home of the Kamea, a people closely united by language 
and a common sense of identity in spite of the isolation of one village from 
another in the incredibly rugged terrain of the highlands. The Kamea of 
Kerema Open are part of a language and cultural group, 72,000-strong in all, 
that extends into the Southern Highlands, Morobe, Chimbu and the Eastern 
Highlands. They are quite different from the coastal peoples on almost every 
count. They look different - short and stocky as compared to the coastal 
tendency to be tall and slim. They grow kaukau in gardens through which 
they migrate in shifting cultivation. They are hunters. Above all, in the past 
they were raiders, and especially raiders of the coastal settlements. Their 
reputation for ferocity was unrivalled. The image of inhuman cruelty and 
untameable wildness that the coastal people held of the Kameas was passed 
on to the Europeans who first came to the area, and books were written about 
the terrible deeds of the savage Kukukuku, the coastal name for the 
Kamea.(Simpson 1 953, Blackwood 1978).  Contact with churches did not 
come to the Kamea until mid-20th century. The Roman Catholics were the 
first to penetrate, but more recently the SDAs have established themselves. 
Schools were almost unknown until the 1970s. 
The government presence in Kaintiba was minimal. The ignorance and 
possibly the indifference of those who planned the new Province of Gulf is 
sharply revealed in the document prepared by J. Morola, with the help of a 
team of n ational and expatriate researchers, entitled: Gulf Province 
Development Study (Morola 1 976) . The final section of the study outlines 
eight key objectives : sea and river transport, road projects, hardware shops 
and service stations, postal services, commercial bank branches, agricultural 
development, commerce and trade, rural improvement and works. A Kamea 
reader would have difficulty finding a proposal that might affect Kaintiba. 
Perhaps she could discover the Murua-Kaintiba Road, squeezed in by some 
geographical distortion as a sub-heading under Murua-Kerema; perhaps she 
might consider that the bank branch recommendation could apply to some 
Kaintiba village; but she would hardly warm to the specifics of fish, crabs, 
prawns, crocodiles, a Kerema abbatoir, improved ports and a new large 
barge, sago sales and marketing of river-reed mats. Copra, rubber and fish 
get specific mention, but not coffee or cardamom or the other highland cash 
crops. Postal services are specified for every Gulf district except Kaintiba. In 
sum, the Kamea barely existed in government plans. 
Economic and social factors 
In comparison with the other provinces of Papua New Guinea, Gulf is neither 
rich nor well-endowed with the infrastructure and the amenities of 
modernization. Above all it lacks transportation facilities, and if there was a 
single theme that could be isolated in the 1987 election campaigning, it was 
the demand for roads, ports, channels and airstrips that would make the 
development and marketing of cash crops feasible and profitable. The Kamea 
are conscious of possibilities for future economic prosperity (Ilave 1 9 8 1 ) .  
Coffee small-holdings are multiplying, but unless the cost of shipping out the 
crop can be reduced, the extent of development is limited. In a similar way, 
the coastal people can go only so far in developing cattle raising and cocoa 
growing, expanding off-shore and deep-sea fisheries, and in rehabilitating 
the copra and rubber plantations unless roads and ports are built or improved. 
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Coast!Kamea contrasts 
There is a general feeling in Gulf that development needs are urgent; but the 
stark contrast between the coastal region (Kerema and Malalaua districts) and 
the Kamea-populated highlands of Kaintiba is politically more important in 
Kerema Open. Kaintiba ranks 8 1  st out of the 85 census districts of PNG 
according to a recent study of socio-economic indicators (Albuquerque and 
D'Sa 1986: 52) while Kerema ranks 9th and Malalaua 25th. 
Neither the coastal people nor the Kamea believe they have done as well 
as they should have in terms of 'development' in PNG; but the intensity of 
the Kamea feeling that they are not getting their share of the good things of 
PNG life is stronger by far, and their resentment covers not only remote 
Islanders, Highlanders or Mamose people who are deemed to be getting more 
than their due, but the coastal people of Kerema Open itself. 
National Politics and Provincial Politics 
National politics 
Men from Gulf Province were a constant feature of the national political scene 
and although a Prime Ministership (never held by a Papuan) might have been 
more impressive than the Governor-Generalship attained by Sir Tore 
Lokoloko, the accomplishments were not meagre. Very powerful ministers 
like Albert Maori Kiki had represented the province and in the period 
immediately before the election, from 1982 to 1987 two major portfolios went 
to members elected from Gulf. It must be stressed that both the recent national 
cabinet members, Roy Evara and Tony Farapo, were from the coast, as had 
been all their predecessors in national public posts, whether political or in the 
public service. The only Kamea to have been elected to the National 
Parliament, Aron Noaio, had been hopeful of a ministry after his first victory 
in the 1977 election and even more hopeful after his re-election in 1982. He 
had been passed over by each of the Prime Ministers of the period, Somare, 
Chan and Wingti. 
Provincial politics 
Gulf Provincial Government came into being in late 1977, but it was not until 
December 1979 that the first provincial election took place. The election 
provided new avenues to political power through 22 provincial seats and from 
the beginning they were hotly contested. The manouevring for control of, or 
even membership in, the Provincial Executive Council (PEC) was strenuous, 
and regional factors soon made themselves felt. It became clear that there 
would be fierce claims for PEC posts from each of the three geographic, 
cultural and linguistic groupings: West Coast, East Coast and Kamea. The 
Eastern coastals held the premiership in both the governments from 1980 to 
1987 :  Sepoe Karava first, then Francis Malaisa. Since the December 1987 
provincial general election, the pattern has not changed: Tom Koraea, another 
Eastern Coastal, came to power as premier with Francis Malaisa his deputy. 
Within the Provincial Executive Council, the balance of power among the 
regions has changed frequently, for though the premiership has been fairly 
stable, threatened votes of lack of confidence have produced frequent shifts 
in the personnel of the executive and in its regional composition. Since 1986 
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particularly, the Kamea group has been determined to increase its share of 
provincial portfolios and has set it sights on the premiership. By mid- 1988, 
it had accomplished little and indeed had been completely excluded from the 
PEC, but the Kamea feeling of regional identity was as strong as ever. 
Much of the political manoeuvring in the 1987 national election campaign 
reflected the power alignments of provincial government politics.  Provincial 
members and ministers sought to use the prominence they had achieved in 
provincial government affairs as a spring board to national office; and 
regional groups, especially the Kamea politicians, linked their provincial and 
national strategies for acquiring power. 
CANDIDA TES 
Thirteen candidates entered the lists for Kerema Open. This number was 
somewhat fewer than in 1 982, when sixteen nominated, but it still covered a 
wide range of aspirations and interests in the electorate. By the close of 
nominations on 27 April, it was apparent that neither the Eastern Coastals nor 
the Kamea had been able to consolidate their forces behind a major regional 
standard bearer. 
The coast: M alalaua 
For the eastern coastal people, the disunity that still dogged them in 1987 
must have been galling, since many of them were quite conscious of the risk 
that was being run. The victory of a Kamea over the influential Tore 
Lokoloko in 1977 had shocked the coast, and to make sure there was no 
repetition of the event, a strong move had been made in 1982 to unite Kaipis, 
Toaripis and Moripis in support of a legendary figure from Moveave. Torea 
Erekofa was a mystic as well as an organizer. He had run afoul of the 
Australian colonial administration which had a deep-rooted fear of cargo 
cults. This fear was acute in Gulf which had been the scene of the 'Vailala 
Madness' of the 1920s. The authorities had jailed Erekofa in the 1970s for 
promoting a 'five-story-house' project in Moveave. The building plan might 
have been regarded as an expression of village pride, but the alternative 
interpretation that this was to be a cargo landing place won out. From then 
on, the colonial government kept a watchful eye on him, assisted it was 
rumoured by the Catholics of Moveave whose rivalry with the United 
Church, of which Torea was a somewhat independent and unorthodox 
member, was longstanding. But to pin down Torea Erekofa as a cargo cultist 
is to miss the many-sided appeal of the man (Ryan 1963 : 12). He had built a 
United Church, rival to the official one; he had been the promoter of 
economic schemes; he was seen as a prophet by a large following. He gained 
wide support as a standard bearer for the Eastern Coastal people against the 
Kamea candidate, but, to his followers' great disappointment, it was not 
wide enough. The Moripis and the Kaipis and, indeed, other factions of the 
Toaripis could not resist putting up their own candidates. A split vote was 
inevitable. Still, Torea and his supporters were certain that they had 
consolidated enough votes to win. When the results were reported, and Aron 
Noaio, the leading Kamea candidate, was declared the victor again, there was 
angry disbelief throughout Malalaua. .In the riots that ensued, Torea was 
jailed with a goodly band of his irate supporters including the candidate for 
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the Gulf Provincial seat, Clement Morasuru, who came from Torea's own 
Moveave village. 
Given this well-remembered experience, Torea had redoubled his efforts 
in 1987 to achieve some measure of unity among the Eastern Coastals. He 
felt too old and unwell to run again himself, but he threw his support and 
prestige behind his son-in-law, Haro Meara Sarufa, and wrote to the Local 
Government Councillors of East Kerema and Mailovero enlisting their 
support. When the nominations were in, it was clear that his success in 
unifying the coast had once again been very limited. Local favourite sons 
abounded. Against Sarufa were lined up: a) Nelson Lari, a Moripi-speaking 
candidate from lokea; b) Semese Ivaraoa, a Kaipi- speaking small 
businessman from Lelefiru; c)  Hora Maera, another Kaipi- speaking 
businessman and former public servant: and d) Susuve Ila, a Toaripi­
speaking salesman from Mirivase. The Malalaua vote was thus to be split 
five ways, and while no one seemed to give much chance either to Ivararoa or 
Ila, Lari and Maera were much more formidable rivals. 
The Kamea 
The situation in the North was not much different. Aron Noaio had put his 
head together with Daniel Itu; they had looked at the 1977 and 1982 returns 
and were convinced that Aron could win the Gulf Provincial seat just as 
handily as he had won Kerema Open in the past, particularly because there 
were bound to be enough coastal candidates to fragment the non-Kamea vote. 
They agreed that Itu would be candidate for Kerema Open and that both 
would take on the Peoples Action Party label and cooperate as fully as 
possible. The success of this strategy in Kerema Open depended on the 
Kamea vote remaining unfragmented and being cast in the direction that the 
combined weight of Noaio and Itu indicated. When the nominations were 
closed, the situation was far from solid. Itu had three rivals, and one of them 
seemed formidable. They were: (a) Sinkau Fugundo Didiman who was, as 
his name implied, a representative of Department of Primary Industries in 
charge of rural extension work in the north of the province. The big hurdle 
he had to leap was that he was not a Kamea and came originally from the 
Eastern Highlands. (b) John Dio Maso, a former member of the Gulf 
Provincial Assembly, who was a driver at the Kaintiba Mission. (c) Samuel 
Kamiaeto, the Deputy Speaker of the Gulf Assembly and a former provincial 
cabinet minister. Many informants whom I interviewed gave Kamiaeto a 
better chance of capturing the lion's share of the Kamea vote than a student 
fresh out of University like Daniel Itu. 
Kerema district 
The resident population of Kerema district is small compared with either 
Malalaua or Kaintiba districts (Table 1 ). In and around the town of Kerema 
itself are squatter settlements often made up of Kamea-speaking men and 
women. The affinities of most Kerema Bay voters are closest with the 
Coastal language groups to the East, but loyalties and origins are mixed. 
Included in the census district is the census division of Kaberope. The 
population of the division is in large measure Kamea-speaking and, in the 
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reporting of voting results, Kaberope was grouped by the officers of the 
Electoral Commission with the Kaintiba votes. Four candidates came from 
Kerema district: Roseva Rovela, a former member of the provincial assembly 
and the owner of a popular Kerema bar; Mika Kerekere, a Kamea-speaking 
carpenter from Kaberope; Michael Sosori Oraka, a public servant; and Joe 
Karava, formerly with the Defence Force. None was seen as likely to affect 
the election outcome significantly. 
The intensity of inter-area political rivalry 
The motives of the Kamea politicians in pressing for power for their region 
are reasonably clear. Apart from their personal ambition, they were intent on 
using political power to help their economically and socially disadvantaged 
region to achieve 'development'. They sought to rally supporters on these 
economic-catch-up grounds. The fierce resentment of the coastal people at 
their lack of success in Kerema Open ever since 1977 needs more complex 
explanation. It was based on both demography and culture. 
Demography 
Table 1 Population by Census Districts within the Kerema 
Open Electorate 
District PoEulation Absentees % Residents % 
Kaintiba 14, 1 25 734 5 .2 1 3 ,39 1 94.8 
(Kamea) 
Malalaua 22,340 10,220 45.7 1 2, 120 54.3 
(Eastern Coastal) 
Kerema 6,535 1 ,538 24.3  4,949 75 .7 
(Mixed) 
Total 43,000 30,460 
Kaintiba: percentage of total population of Kerema Open 32.8% 
percentage of resident population 44.0% 
Malalaua: percentage of total population of Kerema Open 52.0% 
percentage of resident population 39.8% 
Source: National Statistics Office, Rural Community Register, Gulf Province, 
June 1982. 
Census District has been so heavy that, although its total population 
constitutes a clear majority (52 percent) of the Kerema Open population, its 
resident population is only 40 percent. Kaintiba has only a small out­
migration flow and its resident population is 94.8  percent of its total 
population. Kaintiba's resident population thus exceeds that of Malalaua, and 
constitutes 44 percent of the resident population of Kerema Open electorate. 
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The Eastern Coastal people thus believe that they are really the biggest 
group in the constituency and that only the accident of temporary population 
displacement (although it is now a displacement of two generations in many 
cases) puts them in a position of numerical and thus political subordination to 
the Kamea (Morauta and Ryan 1982; Morauta 1984). 
The second explanation for the Malalauans' resentment of the Kamea's 
political success can best be described as a perception that the coastal people 
have of themselves as much more knowledgeable and sophisticated than the 
Kamea. The leadership candidates from the Coast included former senior 
public servants, diplomats and wealthy businessmen. Seven of the Coastal 
candidates in all three of the electorates of Gulf were university graduates. 
Among the Kamea candidates, a Grade 10 education was exceptionally high 
and only one of them, Daniel Itu, had a university degree. To the people of 
Malalaua, there seemed to be something 'wrong' with Kameas beating out 
coastals for the coveted seats in the National Parliament. 
Sources of support for candidates 
Political party affiliations 
Six of the thirteen Kerema Open candidates (Table 3) declared themselves 
as party candidates and seven were independents. The parties were Pangu 
(Hora Meara), Papua Besena (Mika Kerekere) ,  Papua Party (Haro Meara 
Sarufa), People's Action Party (Daniel Itu), People's Progress Party (Sinkau 
Fugundo), United Party (Samuel Kamiaeto), and Wantok Party (Nelson 
Lari). I interviewed three of the party-endorsed candidates and in two of the 
three cases, they had applied for a party's support only at the time of the 
announcement of the election and had had no previous ties with the party. 
The reasons these two candidates gave for seeking party affiliation were 
simple and straightforward: they needed the funding and other indirect 
supports, such as T-shirts, posters and the loan (or sharing) of vehicles that 
the party might supply. In Samuel Kamiaeto's case, he expected the party to 
supply K3000 and 5000 posters. He had sought a bank loan to cover the 
remaining K3000 which he expected to spend on the campaign. The second 
candidate, Sinkau Fugundo, had been promised K7000 from his party and 
planned to add K8000 of his own funds. The third party candidate for 
Kerema Open that I interviewed was Daniel Itu. His reasons for party 
affiliation with the People's Action Party (PAP) were quite different. He was 
one of four recent graduates from the Department of Political and 
Administrative Studies of the University of Papua New Guinea (UPNG) who 
had seen their best chance for entry into the political scene in the new party 
and had become founding members. The PAP was led by Ted Diro, who 
came from Central Province and had gained prominence both as a military 
commander and as a national cabinet minister; Vincent Eri from Gulf; and 
John Waiko from Oro. The party also received a great deal of practical 
organizational help from Colonel Ian Glanville, who was born in Australia 
and shared the military background of his leader. 
Table 2 Gulf Provincial ........ 
1 987 National Election Candidates in Gulf Provincial Electorate in Order of Votes Polled °' N 
Rank Name Votes % Party h;J3 Educn Residence Occup'n GG Other I nformation � 
( y r s )  Cens Dist (j 
� 1 Aron Noaio 4 7 5 8  1 8 . 9 9  PAP 3 5  1 0 Kaintiba Teacher N MP-Kerema Open 
2 Dorobe Ridler Kimave 2 8 5 2  1 1  . 3 8  Wantok 3 2  9 K i ko r i (DPI)  N Self-employed 0 r4 -3 Sepoe Karava 2 6 9 5  1 o . 7 5 Pangu 3 6  1 5 Kerema Community Dev y ( P r e m i e r ) � 4 Thomas Kekeao Hareo 2 6 2 7  1 0  . 4 8  pp 4 2  1 5 ? (Foreign Affs) N ( D i pl o m at) � 
5 Api Namari 2 1 7 5 8 . 6 8  LNA 3 0  1 2 Bai m u r u  Farmer N (Teach er) 
6 Lemek Kum 2 1 6 6 8 . 6 4  PPP 3 3  1 0 Kaintiba MPA y (Teacher) 
7 Tony Haro Farapo 1 6 7 1  6 . 6 7  Ind 3 8  1 5 Malalaua (Pub Se r) N M P-G ulf Prov 
8 Tom Koraea 1 4 9 3  5 . 9 5 Ind "4 7 1 0 Kerema MPA y ( N at ' I  M i n ister) 
9 Leo Kavaua 1 0 1 0  4 . 0 3  PB 3 9  1 5 l h u M PA-Speaker y Soc. Worker 
1 0 Opeaea<a 8 3 4  3 . 3 2  Ind 4 6  6 l h u  MPA y ( I nterim Prem ier) 
1 1 Anton Mark 8 2 3  3 . 2 8  Lab 5 6  6 Malalaua Carpent. N Contractor 
1 2 Maravila Turiai 8 1 0 3 . 2 3 Ind 4 0  1 0  Kerema (Deputy Seer) N Publ ic Servant 
1 3 Francis Pao Maiu 6 9 4  2 .  7 7  Ind 5 2  9 Malalaua Farmer N (PTC employee) 
1 4 Morris Morehari 4 4 4  1 .  7 7  Ind 3 8  6 Malalaua ( F a r m e r ) N Lives in P. Moresby 
Total 1 0 5 1 7 9 9 . 9 4  
Average 4 0 . 3  1 0 . 6  
Legend: 
G PG Employed by or elected to Gulf Provincial Government: Y=Yes; N=No 
( . . .  ) Brackets indicate an occupation or a position formerly practiced or held 
M PA Member of the Provincial Assembly DPI Department of Primary Industry 
Party Abbreviations: Lab=Labour; LNA=League for National Advancement; PAP=People's Action Party; 
PB=Papua Besena; PP=Papua Party; PPP= People's Progress Party; lnd=l ndependent 
Table 3 Kerema Open 
1 987 National Election Candidates in Kerema Open Electorate in Order of Votes Polled 
Rank Name Votes % P a rty /JgJ Educ'n Residence Occup'n G>G Other I nformation 
( y r s )  Cens Dist 
1 Daniel ltu 2 6 0 8  1 7 . 8 3 PAP 2 5  1 5 Kaint i ba Farmer y (Gulf Public Serv .) 
2 Haro Meara Sarufa 2 4 7 7  1 6 . 9 3  pp 3 9  1 0 Malalaua School lnsp N Torea's son-in- law 
3 Hora Meara 1 8 5 9  1 2 . 7 1  Pangu 3 8  1 0 Kerema Business N (Public Serv.) 
4 Sinkau Fugundo 1 6 8 0  1 1  . 4 8  PPP 3 2  1 0 Kaintiba ( D P I )  N From E. Highlands 
5 Samuel Kamiaeto 1 6 2 8  1 1 . 1 3  United 3 0  1 0 Kaint iba MPA y Deputy Speaker 
6 Nelson Lari 1 5 0 0  1 0 . 2 5  Wantok 3 6  1 5 Malalaua Self- e m p  y (Prov . Planner) 
7 Roseva Rovela 5 8 8  4 . 0 2  I nd 4 1 8 Kerema Business y ( M PA )  
8 M ichael Sosori Oraka 5 6 0  3 . 8 2  I nd 5 3  9 Kerema Public Serv. N 
9 M ika Kerekere 5 2 2  3 . 6 1  PB 2 8  6 Kaintiba Carpenter N 
1 0 Joe Karava 4 0 9  2 .  7 9  I nd ? 1 0 Kerema Farmer N (Defence Force) 
1 1 Susuve I la 2 7 9  1 .  9 1  I nd 3 1  6 Malalaua Sale man N (Social Devel't) 
1 2 Semese lvaraoa 2 6 7  1 . 8 2  I nd 5 2  7 Malalaua Business N Tavern, Cattle 
1 3 John Dio Maso 2 4 1  1 .  6 4  I nd 3 0  6 Kaint iba D r i v e r  y ( M P A )  
Total 1 4 6 2 3  9 9 . 9 4 
Average 3 6 . 3  9 . 4 � 
L.egero 
� 
� 
GPG Employed by or elected to Gulf Provincial Government: Yes=Y; No=N � 
( . . .  ) Brackets indicate an occupation or a position formerly practiced or held � ;::s 
MPA Member of the Provincial Assembly 
Party Abbreviations: PAP=People's Action Party; PB=Papua Besena; PP=Papua Party; ,_. 
PPP=People's Progress Party; lnd=lndependent °' w 
Table 4 Kikori Open >--' °" 
1 987 National Election Candidates in Kikori Open Electorate in Order of Votes Polled +::-. 
Rank Names Votes % P a rty � Educ'n Residence Occupation GG Other Information � -
( y r s )  Cens Dist (') 
� 
1 Al len Ebu 2 5 2 2  2 3 . 9 8  NP 3 3  1 0 K i k o r i  Farmer N (Public Servant) r-
2 Roy Evara 2 0 0 1 1 9 . 0 2  Wantok 3 7  1 5 Bai m u ru M P  N Pol i t ic ian 0 r-
3 Jacob Kairi 1 0 6 0  1 0 . 0 7  PAP 3 6  1 5 Bai m u ru Publ Serv N Foreign Affairs 
-
� 4 Joye Soloi Hareavila 8 0 8  7 . 6 8  Ind 3 2  1 5 l h u  MPA Y Min ister of Finance � 
5 Mark lvi Maipakai 7 3 0  6 . 9 4 PPP 2 7  1 2 Bai m u ru Fish Plant Mgr N (Bank Manager) 
6 Vaii Kaipu 6 4 5  6 . 1 3  Pangu 3 4  1 0 Bai m u ru Farmer N (Public Servant) 
7 Peni Bori 6 2 8  5 . 9 7 Ind 4 5  3 K i k o r i  MPA Y (Local Gov. Council) 
8 Will iam Keare 5 7 4 5 . 4 5 Ind 4 5  9 l h u  Council Pres N Medical Asst 
9 Nao Kouoru 4 6 0  4 . 3 7  MA 3 3  1 2 ? Accts Clerk N Studying Economics 
1 0 Mark Mauvake 4 4 4  4 . 2 2 Ind 4 5  1 0 l h u  Business N (MP) (Publ Serv)  
1 1 Kuberi Epi 4 1 4  3 . 9 3 Ind 4 2  1 0 ? Liaison Off Y Aide to Somare 
1 2 Navu Gevina 7 6  0 .  7 2  Ind 3 3  1 0 ? Publ Serv N 
1 3 Laura lvia 7 0  0 . 6 6  Ind 6 1 4 Ba imuru Farmer y District Adv Council 
1 4  Nabira Ovi 5 2  0 . 4 9  Ind 5 0  5 Kerema Farmer N Medical Orderly 
1 5 Tau Kuma 3 3  0 . 3 1  Ind 3 4  9 Baim u ru MPA y 
Total 1 0 5 1 7 9 9 . 9 4 
Average 4 1 . 9 1 0 . 6  
Legend 
GPG Employed by or elected to Gulf Provincial Government: Y=Yes; N=No 
( . . . ) Brackets indicate an occupation or a position formerly practiced or held 
M PA Member of Provincial Assembly DPI Department of Primary Industry 
Party Abbreviations : MA=Melanesian Alliance; NP=National Party; PAP=People's Action Party; 
Ind= Independent 
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Itu's candidacy was one which from the outset showed promise. He had 
been active politically in Gulf affairs while still a student and a member of the 
Gulf Provincial Students Association at UPNG. For a year after his 
graduation he worked in the Provincial Secretariat first as as a research officer 
and then as an executive officer. He had been deeply involved with the 
Kamea provincial members in planning for increased influence in provincial 
government through the toppling of the Karava government. He counted on 
spending Kl0,000 on his campaign, most of which would be supplied by the 
PAP. 
Itu's deep party involvement was exceptional in that it was both recent 
and intense. Among four other party-endorsed candidates I interviewed (for 
the Gulf Provincial seat), this party commitment was matched only by Aron 
Noaio of the PAP. Sepoe Karava had been a Pangu Party member for fifteen 
years and remained loyal to it, but expected little support from it financially. 
The other two party candidates were recent converts. Lemek Kum, the 
Deputy Premier was frank in stating that he had been negotiating with two 
parties and intended to accept the endorsement of whichever provided the best 
material support for his campaign. This turned out to be the People's 
Progress Party (PPP). Ope Oeaka who had been a member of the PPP since 
1969 was abandoned by his party and left to run as an Independent. 
In not one of the interviews with party candidates was it claimed that the 
fact of party endorsement in itself increased the chances of winning the seat. 
Itu and Noaio both hoped that in the future the PAP could build an 
organization that stayed alive between elections and commanded people's 
loyalties. Sepoe Karava hoped that party affiliations, especially those of 
Pangu, would become stronger, but the there was no hint that these desiderata 
had been attained in time for the 1987 election. All discussions of possible 
outcomes turned on local and personal factors and their impact on the voters. 
No candidate interviewed suggested that the reason for his affiliation with 
a party was its programme. Daniel Itu came closest to giving this reason, but 
his comments are better interpreted as enthusiasm for a party that brought 
together new faces and dynamic personalities rather than agreement with 
specific policies. 
Provincial government connections 
Four of the candidates in Kerema Open in 1987 had existing or previous 
provincial government connections. We have already noted those of Daniel 
Itu. The person whom informants usually cited as his greatest rival was 
Samuel Kamiaeto, the current Deputy-Speaker of the Provincial Assembly 
and a former provincial cabinet minister. His connections with provincial 
politics were much more public and obvious than those of Itu, who was only 
briefly a public servant and a private rather than a public voice in Kamea 
political councils. Neither of the other two former provincial members who 
were running, John Dio Maso and Rosela Rovera, were mounting very 
considerable campaigns. .If the hypothesis that provincial clout could be 
transferred to national campaigning was valid, it would most show in the vote 
received by Kamiaeto. 
Village affiliations 
Every candidate counted on village, and sometimes clan, affiliations for a 
core vote which could give him victory. Even Sinkau Fugundo, the outsider 
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from the Eastern Highlands who was running in Kerema Open, felt sure that 
because his wife was a Roman Catholic from Moveave he would receive 
support from an area where he was not personally as well known as in the 
mountains. For the rest, he was certain that his recent hard work among 
Kamea voters as a didiman (agriculture extension officer) would outweigh his 
status as an outsider, and he believed that some support would come from 
Malalaua people where he had earlier been President of the Public Employees 
Association (PEA) for five years. 
Marriage connections were also regarded as significant by Daniel Itu. 
Itu's wife was from Miaru and she had relatives in Iokea, both Moripi­
speaking areas of Malalaua. News that Samuel Kamiaeto, whom he 
perceived as his chief rival, had had a hostile reception when he visited Miaru 
early in the election campaign convinced Daniel Itu that his wife's family links 
were going to stand him in good stead. 
Non-traditional Affiliations 
Church affiliations were those most often mentioned by informants as having 
some influence on voters' choice and candidates' acceptability. But, as noted 
in the preface, only one informant gave religion a prominent place among 
election determinants. Samuel Kamiaeto counted on the solid support from 
his Lutheran co-religionists; unfortunately they were too few to make a 
noticeable impact on election returns. Perhaps more important, he was 
convinced that no potential supporters would be turned against him because 
he was Lutheran. There was a precedent for this confidence. An SDA, Aron 
Noaio, had won Kerema Open in 1977 and 1982, yet his power base was the 
same as that of Kamiaeto, the predominantly Roman Catholic Kamea. United 
Church affiliation was important for the support that Haro Meara Sarufa 
hoped to gain along the East Coast, but it would be so intertwined with the 
appeal of his father-in-law, Torea Erekofa (whose United Church orthodoxy 
was often in question), that it would be impossible to separate the two. 
Among candidates for the Gulf Provincial seat, the religious affiliation factor 
was deemed of some importance by Sepoe Karava who felt he would be 
helped by his extensive connections within the United Church. He had been 
Vice-Chairman of his local United Church circuit. 
Non-traditional associations had grown up in Gulf as in the rest of PNG 
during the colonial years, but there was little evidence that they would play a 
significant role in the election. Many of Sinkau's PEA associates would, he 
hoped, support him. Samuel Kamiaeto had helped form the Wantoks, a 
sports club, and had been a patron of the New Gulf Club (another sports 
organization) ; he was also chairman of the Kamea Social Club that brought 
together Kamea public servants in Gulf. For the rest, membership or 
leadership in 'modernizing' associations seemed of little account and no 
candidate saw fit to mention such an affiliation in his brief biographic notes 
submitted to the Electoral Commission. Government experience was more 
significant, and no less than twelve of the thirteen candidates in Kerema Open 
had worked for a public body. It is a measure of Gulf province's lack of 
development that only four of the candidates had had private business 
experience or, at any rate, saw fit to mention it. 
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CAMPAIGN STYLE AND TACTICS 
Running a serious campaign in Kerema Open requires an immense  
expenditure of energy. Voters in  the mountains are only reached by 
aeroplane, or by a motor cycle track from Kerema to Kaintiba, and then by 
punishing back-packing over mountain trails. Along the coast, candidates 
must beat their way through the waves in a dinghy from river mouth to river 
mouth, then follow winding creeks through the mangroves from one 
settlement to another. There are roads around Kerema itself and there is the 
highway to Malalaua, but that is the end of land transport possibilities. Travel 
is also expensive. Air fares are high, dinghies cost a lot to rent and more to 
operate. Petrol rates are set by small scale entrepreneurs in villages who 
charge what the traffic will bear, and boat traffic at election time is supposed 
to be able to bear a good deal. One consequence of boat and to a lesser extent 
road transport difficulties is to force candidates to work together. The most 
common combination is that of Open and Provincial candidate from the same 
party. But other ad hoe and locally appropriate sharing is common enough. 
Area access and vote-splitting 
Cooperative campaigning may be motivated by other considerations than 
sharing travel costs. Two other reasons are area access and vote splitting. 
Candidates for the Kerema Open seat frequently combined with candidates for 
the Gulf Provincial electorate because each wished to be introduced by a 
native son into an area where he was not well-known. Daniel Itu came from 
the west side of the Tauri River, thus even though he was campaigning 
among his own Kamea people, he found it useful to have Aron Noaio with 
him when he visited such East side villages as Hawabanga and Kaintiba (all 
the more so because Samuel Kamiaeto came from the east side). Similarly, 
Aron made use of Daniel's support when he was campaigning for the Gulf 
Provincial seat against Lemek Kum who, like Daniel, came from West of the 
Tauri. The partnership between the two PAP candidates, Itu and Noaio, was 
much less useful in other parts of the electorate. Daniel Itu frankly admitted 
that there were more valuable combinations when he was visiting the coastal 
settlements and that he ran a risk if he spoke out for a mountain candidate on 
the coast where at least the tolerance of the coastal candidates for the 
Provincial seat was essential. Tony Farapo might be Aron's rival for the 
Provincial seat, but Itu considered him an ally well worth having in Farapo's 
own Moripi country. The question of whether Farapo, an Independent, was 
really supporting Daniel Itu or Samuel Kamiaeto in Kerema Open was 
disputed. (The probable answer was: it depends what part of the electorate 
you are talking about! ) There was similar ambiguity about Lemek Kum's 
support. Both Itu and Kamiaeto thought they had it; probably neither did. 
Sometimes it was alleged by an informant that 'access' combinations 
were deliberately created. It was claimed that John Dio Maso was only 
running in Kerema Open as an Independent because Sepoe Karava, a 
candidate for Gulf Provincial, needed someone to take him through the 
Kamea areas where he had no strong and reliable connections. Sepoe might 
normally have turned to his fellow Pangu Pati candidate in Kerema Open, but 
this would have done him no good, for in that electorate Pangu had endorsed 
an eastern coastal. For the same reason, Leo Kavaua, the Speaker of the 
Provincial House of Assembly who was contesting the Provincial seat, was 
rumored to have put up Mika Kerekere, who came from Didimaua in Kamea 
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country, for Kerema Open. But at least in this case they were members of the 
same party, Papua Besena. 
The line that divides putting up an 'access' candidate and putting up a 
vote splitter is a fine one. There was speculation on the part of one informant 
that Jacob Kairi had been put up by the PAP in Kikori Open as much to split 
the base vote of the incumbent Roy Evara who came from the same part of 
Baimuru as to win. But this kind of allegation is difficult to prove and Kairi 
in the end received far more votes from the electorate as a whole than a vote­
splitter would be likely to get. . Sepoe Karava, himself accused of putting up a 
candidate in Kerema Open to serve his personal needs, was suspicious that 
Maravila Turiai had nominated for Gulf Provincial j ust to reduce his 
(Sepoe's) vote in Kerema district. 
Organization and tactics 
If an impact is to be made on voters who are scattered in dozens of little 
villages, a candidate requires local help. Each of the candidates I interviewed 
had set up some sort of network of local campaign agents in the villages. 
Usually these were village notables, perhaps a traditional leader, a Local 
Government Councillor or a church leader. Sometimes a candidate would, by 
contrast, seek an agent and most of his supporters from among the rising, 
non-traditional leadership, made up of the best educated who were often,  
especially in the Kamea villages, quite young. In larger centres and in areas 
of strong personal support, the single agent would be aided by a committee. 
(In Pidgin, the word komiti applies either to an individual or a group, so it is 
sometimes unclear how many organizers are involved.) Young people were 
usually recruited to do the chores of tacking up posters, passing messages 
and handing around notices. Supporters who had prestige in a broad area 
were asked to write letters to influential people they knew in other villages. 
The candidates' tours were scheduled to permit local committees to organize 
an impressive reception and a meeting. Party affiliation helped in these 
preparations. Trucks or boats could be borrowed; T-shirts or buttons,  at least 
of the party leader, could be obtained. Sometimes the meeting was a feast, 
with beer and food for all. Sometimes it was simply a series of speeches,  
especially by the candidate himself with questions asked and answered. 
In Kerema Open, Daniel Itu's and Haro Meara S arufa's campaigns 
presented interesting contrasts . Neither had run before and they could not, 
therefore, run on their records or on the credit they might have picked up for 
the way they spent the K40,000 National Development Fund sums 
incumbents had at their disposal. But since Aron Noaio had moved to the 
Provincial electorate contest, none of their opponents had that advantage 
either. 
Daniel Itu's campaign was heavily based on an appeal to voters to support 
a new kind of leadership: young, educated and politically sophisticated. He 
described his campaign as an exercise in political education. There was little 
razzmatazz. Itu's posters were black and white and they were sparsely 
distributed. His speeches owed more to the models of National High School 
teachers and his university lecturers than to high power evangelists. But he 
was indefatigable and succeeded in surrounding himself with young, 
dedicated followers. The energy and drive of Itu and his key supporters was 
directed not only to overcoming the domination of the coastals, but also to 
taking over from the traditional leadership in Gulf, especially in the Kamea­
speaking region. Their aim was the substitution of a new generation for an 
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older one in the direction of provincial, and eventually national, affairs. Itu 
was confident that his understanding of politics and the ways of power was 
deeper than that of former leaders and would lead to greater effectiveness. In 
some parts of Papua New Guinea, like the Islands and much of Mamose, a 
young, educated leadership had taken over twenty years earlier and men like 
John Kaputin, Rabbi Namaliu and John Momis had enjoyed power for a 
generation. It had happened more recently in the Highlands, but Paias 
Wingti, Aruru Matiabe and John Nilkare were proof that it had occurred. 
Now it was time for the Kamea to field an effective, educated new team, and 
Daniel Itu was intent on giving it direction. Itu did not neglect the obeisances 
to traditional leaders in the mountains, but the men he relied on were young: 
leaders of youth groups, high school graduates, local teachers. 
B y  contrast, the campaign of Haro Meara Sarufa embodied the 
frustrations of the coastals, and particularly of people who had felt that they 
were on the way to 'development' and had found that both economic power 
and, since 1977, political power was evading them. The malaise which had 
set in along the Eastern Coast after the failure of the copra cooperative was 
expressed in a series of related resentments. Resentment against self-seeking 
entrepreneurs who had made themselves a beginning in the comparative 
prosperity of the 1950s and 1960s, often by skimming off the profits of the 
cooperative. Resentment against political representatives who went to Port 
Moresby and forgot their villages. Resentment at the neglect of Gulf Province 
by the National Government and especially by the failure to keeps ports open, 
clear the waterways and put the Hiritano Highway through from Port 
Moresby to Kerema. Resentment that a Papuan had never been chosen to be 
Prime Minister. And finally, resentment that the Eastern coast's problems, 
and Gulfs problems, and Papua's problems were a connected chain of 
discrimination and neglect. An initial solution to all these problems would be 
the election of a member for Kerema Open who represented the coast, and the 
traditional values of its villages and a had strong sense of Papuan identity. 
The right candidate had to be counted on to keep close touch with and be 
sensitive to the ideas and aims of the village councillors and the leaders of the 
United Church. The claim of the young and educated to provide leadership 
was greeted with suspicion by many coastal leaders who felt that they and 
their villages would be used as stepping stones to personal power and wealth. 
They looked for a local vision and powerful local connections .  Torea 
Erekofa's son-in-law, Haro Sarufa, set out to meet these desires and hopes. 
He concentrated almost exclusively on the coast and Kerema. He used 
Erekofa's extensive network of friends and followers. He ran under the 
banner of the Papua Party whose leader, Galeva Kwarara, was a United 
Church minister. He set himself the task of unifying the coastals and 
convincing them that he represented the best in their traditions. His agents 
were the local notables. At 39, he was still a fairly young man himself, but 
much of his organization was more mature. 
I did not follow Haro Sarufa's campaign in person, but I had visited the 
villages of Hamuhamu, Moveave, Uritai and Koaru in April 1987 when the 
election campaign was just beginning and before nominations had closed. 
My notes from that visit read: 
Vitaharo Avosa and the village leaders in their fifties to whom he 
introduced me felt strongly that their best choice would be an 
experienced village leader, one of their own. And they were 
supported in their view, both in their presence and in their absence, 
by younger men. There was skepticism about the importance of 
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education and of a fluent command of English. The educated young, 
once elected, got enmired in W aigani intrigues and Port Moresby 
business deals that did little for their home areas. They were ignorant 
and uncaring about village people's cares and needs. 
S arufa was not to have the coastal vote to himself, but was the candidate who 
seemed to articulate the concerns of many coastals most clearly, and his 
electoral campaign reflected it. 
THE ISSUES 
In personal interviews and in group discussions, held before the election in 
Kaipi and Toaripi villages and during the election in the mountains, I 
attempted to uncover the issues that electors felt were important in their 
decision on how to vote. What emerged was a set of concerns and of hopes. 
Whether they constituted 'issues' in the usual sense is another matter to which 
I will return. 
Three themes were recurrent, indeed almost invariable: neglect of Papua, 
neglect of their region and locality, and the need for development. 
Neglect of Papua 
Resentment because Papua was getting a raw deal from the national 
government and because the interests of New Guinea and the highlands 
received far more than their just share of attention was expressed without any 
prompting in coastal villages and mentioned with only slightly less frequency 
and vigour in the mountains. The fact that no Papuan had ever been Prime 
Minister was often cited as proof of Papua's low standing in the national 
scene. The contrast between the Okuk Highway that linked the highlands 
internally and connected them with Lae and the failure to build either the 
Hiritano Highway or a road to join Kaintiba with the coast was strongly 
resented. Everywhere one looked, I was told, the story was the same: New 
Guinea dominated; Papua did not count. 
Regional and local neglect 
As might be expected, the charge that their region was not getting its fair 
share of public resources was most frequently heard in the mountains among 
the Kamea. Tony Farapo, the Gulf Provincial incumbent, was said to have 
paid no attention to them and provided them with no development. He did 
not visit them; he looked after his own interests and those of his wantoks. 
Aron Noaio was doing his best, but he had not been made a minister as had 
the two coastal men, Farapo and the incumbent MP for Kikori Open, Roy 
Evara. Along the eastern coast, the charge that some other region of Gulf 
was getting preferential treatment was rarely heard, but in its place came a 
litany of complaints about the neglect of almost every separate locality. Noaio 
was rarely the target of these charges; much more frequently they were 
levelled against Farapo, who was preceived as looking after only Moripi 
interests. The same attack on Farapo that was made in the mountains was 
echoed among the Kaipis and Toaripis: Farapo stayed in Moresby and never 
came to see them after he had been elected. Noaio was not spoken of with 
any gratitude or admiration in the meetings I had with village people along the 
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coast, but in two personal interviews, both with non-Kamea members of the 
provincial legislature, Noaio was judged to have been a Gulf representative, 
often present in the province and always attentive to its needs, rather than just 
a mountains' advocate. It was pointed out that he had even spent part of his 
national development fund money on the east coast. These facts might not be 
sufficient to exempt him from blame in each small locality for neglecting its 
interests, but it did mean that he was not a primary target. 
Local development 
If neglect was an issue, so also was the other side of that coin, the demand 
for development. What development meant was almost invariably the 
satisfaction of very local needs. Even when illustrations were being given 
about the neglect of the whole of Papua, the examples cited were at most Gulf 
needs and usually regional or local needs. In village meetings, the list of 
what was needed for development was long, specific and very locally 
oriented. Transportation needs were the most prominent. In both the 
mountains and the coast, roads were crucial. In the mountains, new or 
improved airships for use by larger planes came next; on the coast it was 
navigable water channels, port facilities and regular visits by coastal ships. 
The Kamea complained that they were better connected by air with W au in 
Morobe than with Kerema, and that they were marketing their coffee in 
Morobe and paying Morobe sales tax for goods they brought in from that 
province. Help in establishing cash crops and then in marketing the produce 
might stress coffee and cardamom in the mountains, and rice or fish along the 
coast, but the link between development and cash-cropping was universally 
perceived. The list of development needs usually continued with a demand 
for better, less costly schools, more available health centres, electrification, a 
sawmill so that better homes could be built, community centres that the 
women could run, and markets for handicrafts and agricultural and fishery 
produce. 
What was not cited as a development need was investment in petroleum 
exploration or large-scale lumbering, or a national development plan, or even 
a full exploitation of the Lakekamu alluvial goldfields. Indeed, the Lakekamu 
gold fields seemed to raise a land compensation issue rather than a 
development issue. 
Demands or issues? 
The link between local development needs and the election seemed clear 
enough in peoples' minds. The person they elected had as his or her primary 
responsibility the bringing of 'development' and there was a check list of 
local needs against which the representative's performance could be assessed. 
But there was no sense in which candidates would be distinguished one from 
another in terms of their policies for satisfying these needs. Every candidate 
was expected to know that his or her job was to bring development. Any 
candidate elected would at least have national development money to spend. 
The questions were: who would be most likely to act on the needs of a given 
locality? who would be able to get access to the largest pool of resources? 
who would be least likely to go to Moresby to make a fortune and to forget 
about the people who sent him there? The candidates were not expected to 
'debate' the issues. No statement of priorities was expected from them. The 
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'issues' were a given for each locality and to some extent for each region. 
The problem of the election was to choose the person who would act on these 
local issues most effectively. Sometimes a candidate would attempt to show 
how he could remedy a neglect better than others, e.g., Daniel Itu's argument 
that only someone who belonged to a party with a Papuan party leader could 
hope to advance the cause of a Papuan Prime Minister. More usually, it was 
assumed that the personal qualities - the morals, the communication and 
negotiating skills, and above all the sense of loyalty - of the candidates were 
what would count in getting the issues acted on. 
THE POLLING 
I watched the polling at Hawabanga in Hamdei census division in Kaintiba 
district. It is in the north-east of Gulf Province, close to the border of 
Morobe. The village is the home of Aron Noaio, Itu's PAP partner, and it 
lies on the East side of the Tauri River, the area of strength of the provincial 
deputy-speaker, Samuel Kamiaeto, whom Itu perceived as his chief rival . 
The total population of the Census division was 4721  in 1978. Hawabanga 
itself numbered only about 500 people, of whom less than one half would be 
of voting age, but electors would be coming in from surrounding villages as 
well. 
About two hundred men, women and children were seated in tiers in a 
hillside bowl that formed a natural amphitheatre. Those from Hawabanga 
village itself tended to be dressed in jeans or shorts and tropical shirts or, in 
the case of the women, laplaps and meri blouses. But of those who had 
walked in from distant hill settlements, the men were dressed in asgras and 
woven aprons and the women in grass skirts and a cape of barkcloth. There 
were necklaces of kina shells and nose ivories of pig tusk. Men carried bows 
and a handful of arrows. The characteristic huge, often heavily loaded, 
Highland bilums were slung from the women's backs. I was allowed to sit 
and observe as the election officials called out names and, in ones, twos, 
threes or fours (depending on whether or not a man was married and if so, 
how many wives he had) peopled hurried from their places in the hollow to 
the cluster of buildings on the lip of the bowl where the poll was located. 
The polling team consisted of a returning officer assisted by a man who 
had the voters list and called out names; another man who bellowed the names 
across the bowl; another who entered voters' names on a voters list; a 
policeman and two candidates'  scrutineers. The men were called out by their 
own names, the women were simply 'meri bilong . . .  ' If a meri arrived first 
at the poll entry, she was held back by a 'gatekeeper' (whose status was 
unclear to me) until her husband caught up and could precede her. 
Only four of the thirty-odd persons I observed casting ballots marked 
their own ballot paper. The rest were escorted to a 'booth' (a tin, three-sided 
screen) by the returning officer, flanked by the scrutineers. The voter was 
then asked either to whisper a name or to point to a picture on the ballot. This 
process was repeated twice for each person, for each one could, of course, 
vote for both a Kerema Open and a Gulf Provincial candidate. Usually, 
voters opted for a whisper, sometimes after trying the other method and 
searching in vain through the big ballot, turning it frontwards then backwards 
looking for the face they wanted. An X was then inserted by the returning 
officer and checked by the scrutineers. The ballot was then folded by the 
returning officer and given to the voter to insert in the slot of the ballot box. 
Sometimes,  I could hear the name 'whispered' from my station about five 
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yards away, and in this tiny sample the 'Aron' and 'Daniel' votes seemed to 
be out-numbering the 'Samuel' whispers, even though this was supposed to 
be one of Kamiaeto's areas of strength. 
That evening I was introduced to the poll 'crier', who turned out to be the 
Local Government Councillor for the village, and his friend the self-appointed 
'gate-keeper'. Both were unabashed supporters of Aron and Daniel and part 
of the local organization for those candidates. 
On the way to the polling place, I had encountered on a narrow path an 
elderly lady quietly repeating the names Aron, Daniel, Aron, Daniel. I 
assumed that she had been reminded of them recently and wanted to make 
sure she remembered them. Perhaps because I had arrived with Daniel Itu 
and was staying with him in Aron's house I encountered no representatives of 
Kamiaeto or indeed any of the other candidates in Hawabanga. 
There was no shouting, no scuffling, and little confusion. If this poll was 
typical, and there is no particular reason to believe it was not, Kerema Open 
was going to have a reasonably quiet election. 
THE OUTCOME 
Daniel Itu won in Kerema Open and Aron Noaio won in Gulf Provincial. 
Allan Ebu who won Kikori Open was a National Party (NP) candidate but 
had also received the endorsation of the PAP. It looked like a clean sweep for 
the PAP, but whether that was a way of describing the result that would make 
much sense to most of Gulfs voters remains to be discussed. 
The province as a whole: 
Before homing in on Kerema Open results, a word should be said on patterns 
of voting for the Province as a whole. Tables 2, 3 and 4 provide a base for 
some generalizations. The information in them is drawn largely from 
National Electoral Commission, National Elections 1987 Report: Bio Data of 
Candidates, Part 1 ,  Port Moresby, 1987 and from the official election returns 
furnished by the Electoral Commission.  The data has been supplemented 
occasionally by information obtained from Gulf informants. 
Party affiliation 
It was suggested in the Preface that party affiliation would not be an 
influential factor in determining how people would vote. On the face of it, the 
results seemed to belie this hypothesis. First, clearly-endorsed PAP 
candidates won both Gulf Provincial and Kerema Open, and a PAP­
supported candidate won Kikori Open. Secondly, an inspection of Tables 2, 
3, and 4 shows that the party-affiliated candidates tended to poll more 
strongly than Independents. Indeed, success (measured by rank in the 
polling) correlates strongly and significantly with being a party candidate 
rather than an independent (r = 0. 7 1 ;  p<O.O 1 ) .  If these results do not 
indicate that electors in Gulf are voting along party lines, what do they mean? 
My reluctance to interpret the returns as an indication of party preferences 
among voters stems from three sources. First, not one of my informants 
believed that anyone they knew cast their ballots for a candidate because of 
his party label. Similarly, no one to whom I asked the question: 'Whom do 
you think will win in Kerema Open (or Kikori Open or Gulf Provincial)?' 
replied: 'The Pangu (or the PAP, or the PP, or the PPP) candidate . '  
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Normally, they gave a name (Daniel, or Sepoe, or Tony) . Occasionally, I 
was told: 'One of the Kamea candidates' or 'I think the coastal voters will be 
more united this time and will elect one of their people'. 
Secondly, no one at any of the group or individual interviews I conducted 
said they were going to vote for a candidate because he belonged to a certain 
party. What I heard in local meetings and in interviews with village people 
was different. In the Toaripi villages of Hamuhamu, Uritai and Moveave, the 
Papua Party was spoken of favourably. A man in Hamuhamu said he liked 
the Papua Party because it had a United Church pastor, Galeva Kwarara, as 
its leader. Yet the feeling that the party was being picked by the candidate and 
his supporters, rather than the party picking the candidate, was strong. 
Particularly in Moveave, it was the fact that Torea Erekofa had left Pangu to 
run with the Papua Party in 1982, and was now calling on people to support 
his son-in-law who was the Papuan Party candidate, that seemed to generate 
the support people expressed in the party. In the Kaipi village of Koaru, just 
as much a United Church stronghold as Uritai or Hamuhamu, there was no 
Papua Party support. Rather, the name of the local favourite son, Hora 
Meara, who was running as a Pangu candidate, was on everyone's lips. As a 
vehicle for the right man, the party might have significance; party support 
went little beyond that. 
At Kamina, a group of about eighteen local people who were from the 
village (or in the village because it was Sunday) met with me and Daniel Itu. 
The latter's influence was possibly the cause of a comment that went as 
follows: 'We need a Papuan Prime Minister. It is not fair that all the Prime 
Ministers so far have come from New Guinea. If we vote for someone who 
has a party leader who is not a Papuan, we may lose the chance to help make 
a Papuan the next Prime Minister. ' Such an intervention was exceptional and, 
especially in the Kamina case, can probably be explained as an echoing of the 
'political education' that Daniel Itu had told me he was stressing in his 
campaign. 
Thirdly, the attempt to carry over a sense of the importance of party into 
the provincial general election in Gulf in December 1 987 was a complete 
failure, even though both Itu and Sepoe Karava, who were active in helping 
to plan the provincial election campaigning, were strong advocates of a party 
approach to politics. I have spoken to no one who explains the outcome of 
the provincial election as a consequence of party voting. 
A more plausible explanation for party-endorsed candidates polling more 
strongly than independents is based on three points: a) parties only endorse 
candidates they think will have a reasonable chance of winning; b) strong 
candidates may seek some party's endorsation to be eligible for the party's  
financial support and support in kind (posters, buttons, transportation) but it 
often seems to matter little which party finally provides the wherewithal; c) 
sophisticated candidates know that the selection of the Prime Minister, the 
Deputy Prime Minister and the other members of the National Executive 
Council is made as a consequence of party manouevring and bargaining. A 
strong independent member is not without resources in this manouevring, but 
normally the chance for a cabinet post, or real influence on those who become 
ministers, improves as a consequence of party affiliation. This third factor is 
not one that is perceived by most voters. Hence Daniel Itu's feeling that 
'political education' was essential, especially in the importance of voting for 
candidates who belonged to parties with Papuan leaders if they wished to 
have a Papuan Prime Minister. 
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Provincial government connections 
Do the results suggest that provincial politics and national politics are 
becoming more closely inter-connected in Gulf? Certainly men who had 
made a name for themselves provincially or felt they had established their 
ability to 'deliver' development for their constitutents, were coming forward 
as candidates in some numbers. A rough classification of candidates 
according to their provincial government connections or lack of them appears 
in Tables 2, 3, and 4 under the column headed GPG (Gulf provincial 
government connection). A correlation of 'rank' obtained in the poll (first, 
second, third, etc.) and 'Gulf provincial government connection' for the three 
Gulf electorates taken together shows no relationship (r = 0.06). The picture 
does not change when each of the electorates is looked at separately. 
Table 2 shows that of the five candidates for Gulf Provincial who had 
provincial connections, only two polled among the top seven candidates while 
three are found among the bottom seven. Lemek Kum, who just makes the 
top half of the poll, had been favoured as a very strong candidate by many 
informants in part because he was the Deputy Premier of Gulf. His final 
place in the standings must therefore be seen as a disappointment. The 
Speaker of the Provincial Assembly, Leo Kavaua, and two provincial 
ministers, Tom Koraea and Ope Oeaka, managed only to garner between 3 
percent and 6 percent of the votes polled. 
In Kerema Open (Table 3), the picture changes somewhat. Three of the 
five candidates with provincial connections appear in the top six of the 
constituency results. Two former members of the Provincial Assembly 
(MPAs) trailed badly with 4.0 percent and 1 .6 percent. But one of those listed 
as provincially-connected is Daniel Itu whose employment by the provincial 
government was neither long (less than a year) nor well-known. He had 
occupied only an advisory and a research post and was hardly a public figure 
in the same sense as an MPA or a minister. It would be s tretching 
interpretation a good deal to claim that his provincial government connections 
were a determining asset. Samuel Kamiaeto, the Deputy Speaker of the Gulf 
Provincial Assembly, came fifth in the Kerema Open poll, but this was a very 
disappointing result for a candidate whom many informants had thought 
would win. He fell 980 votes behind his fellow Kamea, Daniel Itu, and was 
beaten out by another mountain candidate who was not even a native of the 
province, Sinkau Fugundo. 
In Kikori Open also (Table 4 ), provincial connections counted for little. 
A senior minister in the provincial government, Joye Soloi Hareavila, 
managed fourth place and an MP A, Peni Bori, came sixth. Three other 
provincially-connected candidates trailed. 
The only conclusion to which one can come is that there was little positive 
transfer from provincial to national politics in Gulf. Was there a negative 
transfer? A hint of it came during an interview in Hawabanga where villagers 
asked why a person who already had a high position like Samuel Kamiaeto 
should try for a second one. But the evidence is slim and, as we have seen, 
has no statistical basis. 
Age and Education 
Tables 2, 3 ,  and 4 show that age and education, themselves closely associated 
(r = -0.41 ;  p<0.01 ), are assets in Gulf electorates. The correlation between 
rank and age is 0.46 (p<0.01) and that between rank and years of education is 
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-0.57 (p<0.0 1 ). If we look at the electorates separately we find the 
following: 
Age 
Gulf Provincial 
(Table 2) 
Kerema Open 
(Table 3) 
Kikori Open 
(Table 4) 
Education: 
Gulf Provincial 
(Table 2) 
Kerema Open 
(Table 3) 
Kikori Open 
(Table 4) 
Wealth: 
6 of the top 7 candidates were under 40 
5 of the bottom 7 candidates were over 40 
All of the top six candidates were under 40 
3 of the bottom 6 candidates (about whom age is 
known) were over 40 
6 of the top 7 candidates were under 40 
5 of the bottom 8 candidates were over 40 
6 of the top 7 candidates have Grade 10 or more 
4 of the bottom 7 candidates have less than Grade 10 
All of the top 6 candidates have Grade 10 or more 
6 of the bottom 7 candidates have less than Grade 10 
6 of the top 7 candidates have Grade 10 or more 
4 of the bottom 8 candidates have less than Grade 10 
Does the wealth of a candidate affect his chances of winning a national 
election in Gulf? The evidence is scanty. One simple fact can be stated: none 
of the three winning candidates was wealthy under any commonly accepted 
definition of the term. Daniel Itu was just out of university and was scraping 
funds from every source he could think of. Aron N oaio is a man of modest 
means, although his income as an MP puts him in the high income brackets of 
PNG. No informant suggested to me that Allen Ebu was a strong candidate 
because of his personal wealth. In 1982, the picture had been different. Both 
Tony Farapo, who won Gulf Provincial, and Roy Evara, who won Kikori 
Open, were regarded as very well-off. Perhaps the fact that Evara ran a good 
second to Allen Ebu in 1987 and that his Wantok Party running-mate in Gulf 
Provincial, Dorobe Ridler Kimave, came second also has something to do 
with Evara's capacity to raise funds. But the overall impact of the Wantok 
Party in the 1987 election was slight: a few votes were garnered; no one was 
elected. Gulf wealth does not yet seem determinant in Gulf elections .  
Perhaps the fact that the wealthy men who came originally from Gulf have not 
made their money in Gulf-based operations explains the lesser influence of 
wealth on electoral politics in Gulf than in some of the coffee-baron­
dominated electorates of the Highlands. The importance of winning a seat in 
the National Parliament as a stepping stone to personal fortune may be as 
great in Gulf as elsewhere. But if one has already made one's money outside 
the province, protecting it through Gulf-based political power may seem less 
important than in the coffee-dominated provinces (MacWilliam 1984; Stewart 
1 984). If oil is discovered in Gulf, if the Highlands-to-Gulf highway is 
completed so as to give Kaintiba coffee a cheap outlet, or if timber 
development goes ahead at the pace it reached in 1988, the picture may 
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change. Already, Allan Ebu has been accused of incurring debts to hopeful 
logging firms who provided campaign transport by helicopter for him. 
The results in Kerema Open 
Before any attempt is made to analyse the results obtained by candidates on a 
poll-by-poll basis, some interesting patterns emerge from a simple, 
preliminary examination of the overall figures. 
There is a sharp break between the votes obtained by the first six 
candidates and those obtained by the rest. These were candidates who were 
seen as serious enough to be sponsored by political parties. Each one of them 
garnered 1500 votes or more and each received over 10  percent of the total 
votes cast. Together they account for 80 percent of the valid votes. The 
immediate impression is that the votes of the coastals in Malalaua and of the 
Kamea in Kaintiba were cast for regional candidates, but that no one of these 
candidates was identified as an especially valid regional spokesperson. 
Daniel Itu seems to stand out from the other two Kaintiba-based candidates 
more than Sarufa stands out from the other two Malalaua-based candidates 
and that slight difference may have meant the difference between victory and 
defeat. One other impression given by the figures for the first six candidates 
is that the coastal candidates gathered votes in proportion to the size of the 
language group they came from. Sarufa, the Toaripi-speaker (arguably a 
Moveave-speaker, but that distinction is a fine one) gained more votes than 
Hora Meara, a Kaipi-speaker. Hora Meara in turn out-polled Lari, a Moripi­
speaker. And the census figures show that Toaripis outnumber Kaipis and 
Kaipis outnumber Moripis. It may also be guessed that part of Daniel Itu's 
victory over Samuel Kamiaeto can be explained by the fact that the 1978 
population on the West side of the Tauri River (Itu's side) outnumbers that of 
the East side by 2400 persons. 
A more refined look at the election results (Table 5) bears out these quick 
impressions and provides other insights as well. The data is presented as it 
was made available by the Electoral Commission and can be interpreted only 
by comparison between Map No. 1 (Census divisions) and Map No. 2 
(Provincial constituencies). 
Daniel Itu's Vote 
Daniel Itu received votes from just those areas that one might have predicted 
he would. His primary strength was in Kaintiba, the home of the Kamea. 
Table 5 shows that he received a larger vote than any of the other candidates 
who resided in Kaintiba. It also clearly indicates that the only non-Kamea 
candidate to make any sort of a showing in the region was the Eastern 
Highlander, Sinkau. No coastal candidate was able to pick up even 100 votes 
in Kaintiba. Itu's strength came in large measure from the western side of the 
Tauri, where he had been born and brought up. He received 1 190 votes or 
45.6 per cent of his total count from this homeground. The lion's share of it 
came from Hangoia-Middle Tauri and from Kaberope to the south. The 
support he had hoped for from Lemek Kum in remote Ivore-Swanson may 
not have been given or, if it was given, was unimportant, for Itu ran third 
there. On the eastern side of the Tauri, the positive impact of his running 
mate, Aron Noaio, seemed to count heavily for he narrowly out-voted Samuel 
Kamiaeto in Mienta, where Noaio's village of Hawabanga is located. In the 
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other east side area of Uiabi, his vote (7) was very low indeed. In Malalaua, 
Itu's only significant strength came from his wife's area, Moripi. There he 
outpolled all candidates except Nelson Lari, the native son, and left the two 
leading coastal candidates, Sarufa and Hora Meara, far behind. In Kerema 
itself, he did poorly, but managed to find 146 votes from the Kerema 
Bay/Kaipi Count #2. They probably came from the Kamea in the settlements 
around the provincial capital. 
Itu was a well-informed politician able to assemble and assess political 
intelligence with some skill. I interviewed him on June 1, two weeks before 
the polling began. He believed that Kamiaeto and Sarufa would be his chief 
opponents, but he had spent more time evaluating his own strength than in 
attempting to quantify the opposing candidates' support. He did say that he 
expected to get half the votes in Mienta and that he expected Kamiaeto and 
Sinkau to get about a quarter each. He over-estimated Sinkau's strength, but 
as usual had a shrewd idea of what his own chances would be. Itu also made 
a guess as to how his support would be distributed. He began by estimating 
that he would get about 3000 votes. He then went through the major areas 
where he felt he knew how things were going for him, and gave a figure for 
each. This added up to nearly double the 3000 total he predicted, so he told 
me to reduce each of the figures proportionately to add up to three thousand. 
The result is shown in Table 6 The location names he used did not 
correspond exactly with the labels assigned to official counts, and both Itu's 
and the official count names are used when there is a discrepancy. His major 
weaknesses were in over-estimating Kaberope and Moripi, but for the most 
part the orders of magnitude are right. 
Table 5 
Kerema Open Results by candidate, district, count and polling station 
Kerema District 
Kerema 
Name of Candidate 
(in order of votes polled) 
Count No. 1 
Daniel ltu 58 
Haro Meara Sarufa 61  
Hora Meara 127 
Sinkau Fugundo 62 
Samuel Kamiaeto 93 
Nelson Lari 170 
Roseva Rovela 1 35 
Michael Sosori Araka 50 
Mika Kerekere 90 
Joe Karava 78 
Semese lvaraoa 3 1  
John Dio Maso 20 
Total 999 
Kerema Bay/ 
Kai pi 
No. 2 
146 
1 5 1  
557 
1 55 
95 
1 34 
384 
72 
91 
188  
23 
1 8  
2055 
Total 
204 
2 1 2  
684 
2 17  
1 88 
304 
5 19 
122 
1 8 1  
65 
54 
38 
3054 
Kovio 
Count No.3 
Daniel ltu 50 
Haro Meara Sarufa 85 
Hora Meara 30 
Sink:au Fugundo 46 
Samuel Kamiaeto 30 
Nelson Lari 7 
Roseva Rovela 8 
Michael S. Araka 1 8  
Mika Kerekere 7 
Joe Karava 4 
Susuve Ila 5 
Semese Ivaraoa 2 
John Dio Maso 2 
Total 294 
Count No.9 
Kerema Open 179 
Malalaua District 
Kovio/ Kaipi Toaripi Mailo- Moripi Total 
Uiabi 
No.4 
27 
70 
1 6  
8 
238 
1 8  
5 
7 
2 
12 
1 3  
7 
4 
427 
No. 1 0  
vera 
No.5 No.6 No.7 
37 1 8  41  
175 552 1 1 80 
775 1 90 29 
33 21 56 
44 1 3  25 
41  212 68 
3 7 4 
17 12 30 
4 8 7 
26 12 1 1  
26 80 10 
1 32 1 1  29 
1 3 4 
1 3 14 1 139 1494 
Kaintiba District 
No. 1 1  No. 1 2  
No.8 
365 538 
1 35 2 1 12 
63 1093 
38 297 
62 412 
804 1 150 
1 0  37 
286 370 
15 43 
27 92 
43 177 
20 201 
8 22 
1 876 6544 
No. 1 3  
Mienta Uiabi Hangoia/ Kabe- Ivore/ Total 
Mid. Tauri rope Swanson 
Daniel Itu 669 7 832 260 98 1 866 
Haro Meara Sarufa 21  2 6 0 34 63 
Hora Meara 19 1 44 6 1 3  8 2  
Sinkau Fugundo 30 85 553 109 848 1 625 
Samuel Kamiaeto 629 247 24 9 1 19 1028 
Nelson Lari 28 5 0 1 12  46 
Roseva Rovela 7 1 3 8 1 3  32 
Michael Sosori Araka 1 6  2 7 3 40 68 
Mika Kerekere 9 3 1 273 17  303 
Joe Karava 10 0 2 9 30 5 1  
Susuve Ila 1 8  4 5 4 6 37 
Semese Ivaraoa 2 1 3 1 5 12 
John Dio Maso 123 14 10 6 28 1 8 1  
Total 1 58 1  372 1490 689 1262 5394 
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Table 6 
Daniel Itu 's  estimates and the final result 
Itu's Estimate 
500 
500 
500 
200 
500 
100 
25 
24 
500 
50 
150 
3000 
Haro Meara Sarufa's vote 
Official result 
Hangoia } 
Middle Taure } 
Kaberope 
Ivore/Swanson 
Mienta 
Tairuma/Ker. Bay/Kaipi 
Kai pi 
Kerema/Kerema Town 
Mori pi 
Kovio 
Other 
Total 
832 
260 
98 
669 
146 
37 
58 
365 
50 
93 
2608 
Sarufa's only strength was in Malalaua and there he was clearly the candidate 
of the Toaripis and their close cousins the Moveaves from Mailovera. He 
garnered 32.3 percent of the Malalaua votes, yet of the 2 1 12  district votes that 
went his way, 1732 or 82 percent came from Toaripi and Mailovera. The 
candidates that were responsible for his defeat in Kerema Open were Hora 
Meara who took the Kaipi vote and Nelson Lari who won Moripi. 
Hora Meara's vote 
A case could be made that Hora Meara had a wider base of support in Kerema 
Open than Sarufa, the other major coastal contender. He seemed to be able to 
win in Kerema Bay as well as Kaipi, his home area. This impression may be 
misleading, however. The fact that the election officers put part of the Kaipi 
votes in with those of Kerema Bay in Count #2 makes it impossible to know 
whether Meara's vote in this count is simply a reflection of language group 
loyalty among the Kaipis or of an appreciable support in Kerema Bay. 
Sinkau Fugundo 's vote 
If any candidate could be deemed to be a 'modern' rather than a traditional 
candidate in Kerema Open it was Sinkau Fugundo. He had no 'primordial' 
support base, for he was an Eastern Highlander. Yet he was able to compete 
for Kamea support with native sons like Itu and Kamiaeto in every part of the 
Highlands accept Uiabi and Mienta, and show them his  heel s in 
Ivore/Swanson. He also to put together votes in Kerema in just about the 
same proportion as Itu, Sarufa and Kamiaeto. In Malalaua, his marriage links 
in Moveave (Mailovera) did little for him, but Sinkau probably polled as well 
among the coastals as did Kamiaeto. The figures are presented in a way that 
clouds this outcome, but we shall explain it when Kamiaeto's vote i s  
examined. As a consequence, S inkau came fourth overall ,  ahead of 
Kamiaeto. An interesting question is why Sinkau did so well i n  
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Ivore/Swanson and for the first time an answer which stresses party ties may 
be tenable. Lemek Kum, who ran in Gulf Provincial, had opted, even if 
belatedly, for the PPP. His home base, from which he had been elected to 
the provincial assembly, was Ivore/Swanson and it was there Kum was 
counting on laying a firm base for his campaign in the national election. It is 
at least plausible that rather than choosing to back either of his fellow Kameas 
running in Kerema Open, Kamiaeto or ltu, both of whom were rivals for 
influence in provincial politics, he should decide to follow the dictates of 
party affiliation and throw his weight behind Sinkau, the PPP candidate in 
Kerema Open. Sinkau's extensive travels as a didiman, however, may be a 
sufficient explanation for his ability to gain votes in an area where neither of 
the two leading Kamea candidates had penetrated very far and were not well 
known. 
Samuel Kamiaeto's vote 
The way in which the electoral returns are reported makes it very difficult to 
sort out what happened to Kamiaeto's campaign. His home sub-district of 
Uiabi is divided in an unknown proportion between Count #4 (Kovio/Uiabi) 
and Count #1 1 (Uiabi). To make matters more complicated, ballots from #4 
are lumped in with Malalaua and those from #1 1 are (properly) listed under 
Kaintiba. All one can say is that Kamiaeto's big polling in #4 probably 
represents a Kamea vote, and may represent in large measure a Uiabi vote. If 
one makes the not too heroic assumption that 200 of Kamiaeto's 23 8 
Kovio/Uiabi votes are in fact attributable to Uiabi, then Kamiaeto's Kaintiba 
vote goes up from 1028 to 1 228 (or 22.0 percent of the new total) and his 
Malalaua vote goes down to 212  (or 3.3 percent of the new total, just below 
the 297 (or recalulated 4.7 percent) gathered in by Sinkau. Intricate arithmetic 
aside, Kamiaeto's results showed little beyond local success and could 
provide no support for a hypothesis that provincial prestige could be 
transferred to a national election. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is time to tackle the question: why did Daniel Itu win in Kerema Open? 
Thus far I have largely looked at numbers and localities. Inter-regional 
rivalry was a dominant factor in the election, and Itu was able to gain the 
largest percentage of the votes in Kamea country, which is the most densely 
populated part of Kerema Open in terms of residents. He was also able to 
attract clusters of voters in other parts of the electorate, notably in Moripi, 
where his wife had been born. But the key question remains substantially 
unanswered: why Daniel Itu? Why not one of the other mountain candidates 
who put on an energetic campaign? Why not Samuel Kamiaeto, or Sinkau 
Fugundo? It has been shown that the election in Gulf as a whole gave no 
evidence that a provincial reputation in politics carried over positively to the 
national scene. But although that may tell us a little about why Kamiaeto was 
not more successful, it says nothing about what made Itu popular. Sinkau 
was not a native of Gulf, and that undoubtedly told against him. But why did 
he do so remarkably well, and again, why did Itu win? 
In Kerema Open, the incumbent, Aron Noaio, did not try to take the seat 
a second time. Perhaps it would have been easier to explain Itu 's win in 
terms of what the voters had found lacking in the person they had elected at 
the previous election, but that possibility did not exist. Nonetheless, the 
winner of the 1982 Kerema Open contest, Aron Noaio, contested and won 
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the Provincial Open seat in 1987 and defeated the incumbent, Tony Farapo, in 
the process. A closer look at what made Noaio the winner and Farapo the 
loser may shed some light on Kerema Open. 
As already mentioned, I received frequent complaints about Tony Farapo 
during the visits I made and the individual and group interviews I conducted. 
He had not brought development; people hardly ever saw him for he spent his 
time in Port Moresby and rarely came back to see people and to talk to them. 
I asked: 'But doesn't the fact that he was a minister excuse some of his 
absences and don't you think the fact he was a minister was of benefit to 
you?' The reply was usually a non-committal shrug. Aron Noaio came in for 
very little of this kind of criticism. He had come back to many parts of the 
constituency. More often to Kaintiba and to Kerema than to Malalaua, but 
Malalauans had not been ignored. Especially in the north, people agreed that 
he had worked to get nationally funded development projects for the province 
and especially for the constituency. 
N oaio satisfied two important tests: he remembered his electors once he 
was elected; he seemed to try hard to bring development to his electorate. 
If we return to Kerema Open, we can suggest that although the results in 
each location show that people voted usually for one of their own, they 
n�vertheless chose from among their local candidates the one whom they 
thought would best bring development and who would not work for himself 
alone. This conclusion is supported most vividly not by examining Itu's 
vote, but by looking carefully at Sinkau's support. Clearly, he was identified 
as a candidate of the Kaintiba district, even though he was not a Kamea. 
Within that district, his support was remarkably consistent and widespread. 
Except in Mienta, and in lvore-Swanson where he won overwhelmingly, he 
came second in every count. In Uiabi, Samuel Kamiaeto's home territory, he 
gathered eighty-five votes as opposed to Itu's seven. In the Hangoia-Middle 
Taure stronghold of ltu, he took 553 votes as opposed to Kamiaeto's twenty­
four. In Kaberope, he got less than half as many votes as Itu, but out-polled 
Kamiaeto by 109 to nine. In the two Kerema District counts, he got slightly 
more than either of the leading Kamea candidates; and in Malalaua, if we 
remember to discount the Kovio-Uiabi count for Kamiaeto, we find that his 
297 votes made him the only northerner except Itu to make a showing. 
What did Sinkau have going for him? In education, he ranks with 
Kamiaeto in the second highest category, and behind Itu. He is young at 
thirty-two, but quite comparable to Kamiaeto's thirty and Itu's twenty-five. 
Like the other two leading northerners, he has party support. None of these 
factors make him stand out. Yet, even though a non-Kamea, he polled 
extraordinarily well. What seems to distinguish him from the others is a 
record of hard work as an agricultural extension officer helping small-holders 
and subsistence gardeners. He was known and seen frequently at the village 
level; he was there to help development. Even outside Kaintiba, he had been 
connected with public service as an officer of the PEA and as a Department of 
Primary Industry's official in Malalaua. He had established his concern for 
grass-roots development and his willingness to work effectively for it. 
Sinkau lost out in Kaintiba to Daniel Itu, but it can be suggested Itu's 
success came from his ability to project the same leadership qualities 
possessed by Sinkau : concern with local development and the ability to 
deliver it, combined with the 'primordial sentiment' factor which Sinkau 
lacked. Daniel Itu stressed that he knew how politics worked; that he 
understood how the national government could be made to give more to the 
development of Gulf and especially the Kamea area of Kerema Open. He 
climbed the mountain trails indefatigably with a message about how 
Kerema Open 183 
government worked in PNG and, simultaneously, how well he understood 
the mysteries of government. This combination of knowledgeability, energy 
and dedication marked both Sinkau and Daniel Itu and stood them in good 
stead even outside the mountains. 
Kerema Open election results cannot begin to be understood except in 
terms of region and locality. Sinkau's results indicate that regional and local 
concerns are distinguishable from clan or even language group solidarity. To 
be perceived as dedicated to the region and its development seems to be 
indispensable and can, in part, be a substitute for primordial ties. In sum, I 
suggest that Itu won because he was from Kaintiba district, was a Kamea, 
promised leadership that would be attentive to regional and local needs and 
was perceived to have the knowledge and dedication to deliver development. 
REFERENCES 
Albuquerque, K. de and D'Sa, E., 1986. Spacial Inequalities in Papua New Guinea: a 
District Level Analysis, IASER Discussion Paper No. 49. 
Allen, L.W., 195 1 .  'The Purari Kampani'. South Pacific Commission Social Development 
Notes, VII. 
Blackwood, B .M., 1978. Kukukuku of the Upper Watut .. Oxford: Pitt Rivers Museum. 
Brown, H.A., 1965. The Toaripi Language of the Gulf of Papua: a socio-linguistic study. 
University of Sydney, unpublished MA thesis. 
___ , 1972. Elema Languages. University of London, unpublished Ph.D. thesis. 
___ , 1982. 'The Eleman Language Family' in Dutton, 1982a. 
Denoon, D. and Snowden, C., eds., 198 1 .  A History of Agriculture in Papua New Guinea. 
Port Moresby: Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies and the University of Papua 
New Guinea. 
Denoon, D., 1982. 'Marketing Co-operatives' in King and Ranck, 1982. 
Dutton, T., ed. ,1982a. The Hiri in History. Canberra: Australian National University. 
Dutton, T., 1982b. 'Towards a history of the hiri: some beginning linguistic observations' 
in Dutton, 1982a. 
Franklin, K., 1973. The Linguistic Situation in the Gulf District and Adjacent Areas, 
Papua New Guinea. Canberra: ANU Press. 
Geertz, C., 1963 . 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in 
the New States' in Geertz, C. (ed.), 1963 . Old Societies and New States: The Quest 
for Modernity in Aisa and Africa. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. 
Have, Hulamari, 198 1 .  Alternative Sources of Internal Revenue for the Gulf Province: a 
report of the provincial government. IASER, Special Publication No.3.  
King, D. and Ranck, S. ,  eds. ,1982. Papua New Guinea Atlas. Port Moresby: University of 
Papua New Guinea. 
MacWilliam, S. ,  1984. 'Electoral Politics and State Power'. Yagl-Ambu 1 1  (2). 
Maher, R.F., 1958. 'Tommy Kabu movement of the Purari Delta'. Oceania, vol. XXIX(2) 
1 84 MICHAEL OLIVER 
Morauta, L. ,1984. Left Behind in the Village. IASER Monograph No. 25. 
Morauta, L. and Ryan, D. ,1982. 'From temporary to permanent townsmen: migrants from 
the Malalaua District, Papua New Guinea' in Oceania, vol LIII (1). 
Morola, J. A., 1976. Gulf Provincial Development Study. First Draft. Central Planning 
Office: Area Planning Branch. 
Rhoads, J. ,  1982. 'Prehistoric Papuan exchange systems: the hiri and its antecedents' in 
Dutton, 1982a. 
Ryan, D.,  1963. 'The Toaripi Association: Some Problems of Economic Development in 
Papua', Mankind, vol. 6, no. 1 .  
___ , 1969 . 'Christianity, Cargo Cults, and Politics among the Toaripi of Papua', 
Oceania, vol XL. 
Simpson, Colin, 1953. Adam With Arrows. Sydney: Angus and Robertson. 
Snowden , C. ,  1981 .  'Copra Co-operatives'. Chapter XI in Denoon, D. and Snowden, C. ,  
198 1 .  
Stewart, R.G., 1984. 'Coffee, Candidates and Class Struggle'. Yagl-Ambu 1 1  (2). 
Williams, F.E., 1976. 'The Vailala Madness' and Other Essays. London: Hurst and 
Company. 
(/) 
w 
.... 
<t 
0::: 
La.I 0 u 
z .... 
> (.) 0 
0:: 
a.. w 
lL _J 
...J 
::::> w (!) 
z 
w 
a. 
0 
Kerema Open 185 
/"--, <r \  _ _  _ 
I 
/ 
( 
I � 
I W 
,_/ 0:: 
I w 
/ � = 
/-· ·-· ·-· ·- · · ; 
, 
� 0:: 
' 
\ 0 
' 
\ 
\ 
' 
\ � 
I / 
I �, l 
i /
/ 
L _ __.// 
I I 
: ' 
I I 
t 
tl 
,, 
c 
5 t 
.D tl 
. ,, - c 
tl :J ... 0 � .D 
u -
• .  !:? 
- u CD C 
c ·; 
• 0 Q. .... 
0 Q. 
1 86 MICHAEL OLIVER 
, .. , : . . .... , 
z 
0 
(f) 
z 
<l 
3: 
(f) 
I 
IJ.I 
a:: 
0 
> 
· · ···.· .. 
... , 
.. , K E RE M A  OP E N  E L E C T O RAT E 
'"':'-., 
.
· ' 
C E N S U S  D I V I S I O N S  
. · · .. , 
·= ... , ·
·.. 
. .
... 
, 
=-
· 
........ .. -._ W E N TA '-. 
. : • • · ·
: 
••• • ••
• 
H A M OEI \ 
i ' 
. \ . ·. : · · · · · · · · · · · · 
: .
.... ···... ' ............ . \ , _  
•• • ••• W E I A B I • • - - - - - -
. . . . ' 
: · ·� . .
. .-
·· ·
.
·
.: 
· . . . ..... 
- -
· - - - .. 
.. , 
K A B E R O P E  
H A N G O I A  
·. :
· . . · 
· · · · · ·
· · · · · .. 
..
. : . . .
. . . . . . .. 
.. 
·. · ··. 
K E  R E
0�0A0 0
0 "\ 
K A I P I  
.· . . . . . . . .
... . . · . 
.:::. 
K E  REMA 
Ql:::=!::::::=:::::llO km 
Elec rorare boundar y 
Census dlv. b ound ary  
Pr ovincial boundar y 
. . 
T OA R I P I  
. . . . 
K O V I O 
·· . . 
. · · . . 
. · . . . . . 
. · 
M O R I P I  
- ­.- -
1 
i 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
.. ........ .. 
,.,,. -
I 
j 
Kerema Open 187 
K E R E MA OPE N E L EC TORAT E 
P R O V I N C I A L C ON S T I T U E N C I E S  
i 
i j KABE ROPE 
I 
I
=- -- ------
K O V  1 0  
--;------i TA IRUMA I 
- --\ \ 
I \ ', 
1 
K A I P I  
1
l 
, 
I I ', 
I / ' I _ I  ' 
Q IO km 
Elec torate boundary 
Constituency boundar y 
Provincial boundar y 
,' TOARI PI ,,,."'' ', 
/ ' 
I ' 
I ' 1MAI LOVE R�, 
\ ,,, "' '
, 
\ I ' 
\ /'' ' 
\ / ' 
" ' 
- - - - - -� 
_ _  _,,.. _ ,,,,-
, 
I 
) 

M a n u s : 
O p e n 
1 2  
P r o v i n c ia l  a n d  
E l e ct o r a t e s  
ALEXANDER WANEK AND EILEEN WORMALD 
INTROD UCTION 
The results of the 1987 national elections in the two constituencies of Manus 
have an interest which goes beyond the normal concern about who will be 
selected to represent the people of the province in the National Parliament. 
They will be examined to try to see to what extent boycott threats from 
dissatisfied groups both regional and religious (whose dissatisfaction might 
be just as much with the provincial as with the national government) affected 
how many people voted and for whom, and to test the importance of political 
party allegiance in voting. 
The chapter will first provide some background information on Manus 
province. Sources of community support for candidates will next be 
examined; and the candidates themselves. The discussion will then move to 
the political parties, Makasol, and other sources of voting strength; to election 
costs and to the platforms of the candidates. A discussion of the significance 
that can tentatively be attached to the polling results will conclude the chapter. 
BACKGROUND 
Manus Province has the smallest land area of all the provinces of Papua New 
Guinea: 1 943 square kilometres. It is made up of a group of islands, the 
Admiralty Islands, occupying almost 300,000 square kilometres. The largest 
island gives its name to the province as a whole. Manus Island is 
mountainous and about ninety kilometres long and thirty kilometres wide. 
Situated far off the mainland coast, Manus is probably the least visited of the 
provinces of PNG. Until the Second World War, it was known most widely 
from the writings of the anthropologist, Margaret Mead, whose 1 930 book 
Growing Up in New Guinea , based on her time spent at Pere on the south of 
the island, had a world-wide impact. The population of Manus in 1 987 was 
26,03 8 (NSO 1987), of whom less than 200 were non-citizens. For the 
national election, 1 3,903 were enrolled, of whom 7, 108 were men and 6,795 
women (EC 1987 ( 1) ). 
Since the 19th Century, the people of Manus have been divided, perhaps 
artificially, into four principal groups. The name Usiai has been adopted for 
the peoples of the inland of the main island; those of the coast and of most of 
the smaller surrounding islands are called the Mantakor. The Titan people 
form the third group. Traditionally, they lived in houses on stilts over the 
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shallow waters of lagoons to the south of the main island and over the waters 
adjacent to some of the southern islands. Now, they either lease state-owned 
land or they dwell as guests on the traditional lands of other groups. Titan 
legend holds that they originated on a prosperous island called Arop on the 
Castor Reef. When it disastrously submerged, the Titans took to the sea and 
to the shores of neighbouring people. In the late 1940s, they began to build 
ashore on Mantakor lands. They were invited to do so by Paliau Maloat, the 
prophetic leader of what is now the Makasol movement. A fourth distinct 
group of Manus people live on the remote Southwestern Islands of Wuvulu 
and Aua. They are probably of Micronesian origin, but today are intermixed 
with Sepik labourers who were brought in as plantation workers during the 
colonial period. Thirty-odd dialects and languages are spoken in the 
province. 
The economy of Manus is still dominated by subsistence farming, 
supplemented by hunting, with fishing rivalling it in importance in the coastal 
villages and on the small islands. Cash income comes in part from the 
remittances of 4000 absent wage earners. The Usiai and Mantakor rely on 
cocoa as a cash crop, while those from the smaller islands, especially those in 
the west, depend heavily on copra, with supplemental income coming from 
shells and beche de mer. 
Recently there have been moves to improve the economic base of the 
islands. A detailed study between 1 980-83 produced a K7 .8 million 
development plan which has been aproved by the provincial government led 
by Stephen Pokawin, a former University of Papua New Guinea lecturer. 
The programme is designed to increase rural development and private 
production while maintaining existing standards of social services. Timber, 
tuna, cocoa, copra and tourism are to be promoted as economic resources 
backed by improved road and wharf facilities. 
What today is Manus Province was part of German New Guinea until the 
end of World War I when it came under Australian administration. During 
the Second World War, the area was first occupied by the Japanese and later 
re-conquered by allied, mainly American, forces. In the last two years of the 
war, a huge concentration of American naval and air forces brought a million 
US servicemen into the area who were juxtaposed with a contemporary local 
population of 13,000. This massive American presence had a profound effect 
on the physical environment and on the population. Its impact on one of the 
inhabitants , Paliau Moloat, was dramatic.  The Paliau movement, later 
Makasol, was modelled on American miltary formations and set 
modernization and self government as its immediate goals. Over the years it 
went through many transformations, taking on sometimes the colouration of a 
'cargo cult', sometimes of a political party, sometimes of religion. As 
Makasol, it entered into the matrix of political forces that influenced the 
election in complex ways, which we shall try to explain below. 
SOURCES OF SUPPORT 
Even in a country that fields as many candidates for national elections as does 
Papua New Guinea, we must assume that most of the contenders have some 
notion of how they are going to garner enough support to be in real 
contention. Depending on the sources of support which they believe they can 
identify, they will map out a strategy to mobilize voting strength. 
A number of writers have stated that political representation in Papua 
New Guinea tends to follow clan lines. Hegarty ( 1983 :6) for example, 
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writing about the national elections in 1977, states that 'candidates and party 
organizers, particularly in the Highlands, calculated clan voting strengths .. . '  
when planning for their election campaigns. Clans in Manus are relatively 
small patrilinear groups, including their children and, sometimes, their wives. 
Candidates and party organizers in the 1987 campaign in Manus tended to 
calculate voting strengths rather in terms of what some of them referred to as 
a candidate 's 'extended family'. Extended families, according to this 
definition, consisted not only of a single line of men, their wives and cildren, 
but included the different clans of all the wives as well. They were thus large 
units of many clans. 
Obviously, these 'extended families' were not clear-cut, indisputable 
units, mainly because of considerable overlapping. The actual size of an 
'extended family' thus depended on a candidate's own ability to get his 
concept of 'relationship' across to as many of his 'relatives' as possible. 
According to personal (Wanek) information from several candidates, it should 
have been possible for any candidate with good standing in Manus to gain 
about 2,000 votes from 'extended family' members. 
If 'extended family' support was crucial to victory, and if, as according to 
our information was actually the case, each candidate came from a different, 
even if slightly overlapping, extended family, then the nine men who 
contested Manus Provincial began with approximately equal chances to garner 
about 1500 votes each. Their problem was to garner more of the overlaps 
and those of ambiguous status than their competitors. The Manus Open seat 
does not lend itself easily to this kind of calculation, for some of the fourteen 
candidates came from almost exactly the same extended family as a rival. 
Indeed, it was rumored that vote-splitting candidates were nominated by 
competitors when it was feared that a candidate was having things too much 
his own way in an extended family. 
To have good relations with their 'extended family' did not necessarily 
mean that candidates had to have spent all their time in their village. Usually 
it meant that they had been helpful over a long period on day-to-day problems 
of the extended family, whether they were physically present or not. Most 
important, however, among Titans and most Mantakors a candidate had to 
have a 'happy aunt', and among the Usiais, a 'happy uncle'. 
Traditionally among Titans and most Mantakors, a child's paternal aunt 
shaped the life of a youngster by giving the spiritual power to achieve certain 
goals in life. A similar tradition existed among the Usiais, but there, usually, 
he father's brother held this power. If an aunt's or uncle's blessing meant 
that a youth had to leave home in order to make full use of the bestowed 
spiritual power, the youth was in no way expected to stay; but there was an 
obligation to show devotion and gratitude by satisfying every small wish of 
the paternal aunt/uncle. An 'unhappy aunt/uncle' even today in Manus is a 
very dangerous enemy, capable of execrating the remiss youth. 
To supplement the extended family as a source of votes, candidates were 
led to find (or to establish) alternative groups who would support them. 
Among these alternative groups might, in some cases, be the political party; 
but in others instances to be identified with a religious group, or an 
occupational group or a racial group ( Melanesian or European) might be 
more important. Such alternative groups shared the characteristic of being 
mcxlern and non-traditional and of having cross-cutting memberships. 
Before reviewing these alternative groups as pools of electoral support, it 
is necessary to introduce the candidates in the two constituencies of Manus 
Provincial and Manus Open. 
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CANDIDATES 
General Characteristics 
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The nine candidates for the Manus Provincial seat came from five districts of 
the province with Loregau dominating with five candidates. In Manus Open, 
the fourteen candidates came from nine districts with none from Lorengau. 
Taking the two constituencies together, only the provincial electoral districts 
of Tulu-Panam, Kurti, Bupi-Chupen, Ere-Kele and South West Islands had 
no candidate in the field (see Map). 
The Open and Provincial constitutencies are coterminous so candidates 
have to decide which seat to contest. In part, the decision seems to rest on 
avoiding certain other candidates who seem to close competitors for the same 
set of voters. Most candidates try to nominate as late as possible so as to get 
the most information possible about the array of competitors in each contest. 
It also seems likely that those choosing the Provincial contest did so because 
they did not have a strong local base and they could afford to cover the 
province to draw support from all districts rather than obtaining a majority of 
the votes from their home village as some of the Open candidates felt they 
were able to do. Campbell, Chauka, Kellie, Marsipal and Pokayon lived in 
Lorengau and did not mention in their biodata another place of birth. Mundri 
from Kali and Polume from Loniu must during their education and training, 
as Doctor and Surveyor respectively, had spent long years away from their 
village. Only Pokana who stated he lived on Lau Island and Polaman living 
in S aban 2 village seemed as likely to have been Open as Provincial 
candidates though again, each had spent many years away from his village 
and in Pokana's case, with five years in Bougainville, away from Manus. 
Manus Open 
The average age of the fourteen candidates who contested Manus Open 
constituency in 1987, was 42.7 ranging from Thompson to Maiah, a former 
provincial government premier, at 56. Pokasui was 36 and Rooney 42. Ten 
of the candidates gave their marital status, and the number of their children 
ranged from two (Pogat) to eleven (Maiah), with N'Drenaon reporting 'many 
children'. Rooney and Pokasui did not declare their marital status. Their 
eduction covered the whole spectrum form non-formal educ ation 
(N'Drenaon) to postgraduate training (Kolowan and Thompson). There were 
four graqduates plus two who had been to UPNG but not completred their 
degrees and two who had post-school training, Gai in teaching and Pogat in 
paramedical. Pokasui alsostated that he had had 'post-grade 9' training, 
presumably in the army. In addition, one candidate had reached Grade 7, one 
Grade 9 and one Grade 10. Reflecting their relatively high level of education, 
these candidates had generally had well -paid jobs which some, like Pokasui, 
abandoned to pursue their campaigns. An occupational pattern for aspirant 
politicians found in many other parts of the world (Wormald 1983) was 
followed by four former teachers, a lecturer and two lawyers. Others were 
pblic servants, former politicians in local (N'Drenaon, Molean) or provincial 
(Maiah, who had also served a prison sentence for fraud while premier, and 
Senau) govenment. Pokasui had been for many years an army officer. 
Although the trend was towards educated candidates, Manus was not without 
its more traditional-style hopefuls. N'Drenaon who had served as a local 
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councillor stood because he wished to show that the old still had a part to play 
in governing and it seemed sad that having with difficulty scraped together his 
KlOO deposit he did not poll sufficient votes to save himself from losing it. 
Among the candidates was the sitting member, Nahau Rooney. In the 
first national election after independence, as one of seventeen women 
candidates, she won her seat by 680 votes, a clear victory, over her nearest 
rival James Sisosor. Though Sisosor was the official Pangu Pati candidate 
and Rooney had run as an independent (Rooney 1983), she was recognized 
as a Pangu sympathizer and was given a Ministry by the Pangu leader and 
Prime Minister, Michael Somare. She had a chequered career in that 
Parliament and in the 1982 election she was defeated on the first count by 
James Pokasui by one vote. Her appeal to the Court of Disputed Returns was 
successful and after a recount she was declared the winner by eleven votes. 
In the1987 fight, Rooney had both advantages and disadvantages. She 
fought the election on her record with the slogan 'Mama mas go bek', 
presented evidence of the improvements she had brought to the islands, and 
had the support of the provincial premier, Stephen Pokawin. Pokawin's 
endorsation in her election folder stated that "N ahau Rooney until now has 
effectively done her part in getting the necessary support from the National 
government for the programmes of the Manus Provincial Government. I find 
this very helpful. . . (Rooney 1987) " Her duties as a cabinet minister, 
however, made some voters believe she neglected them and her particular 
position under the Wingti government as Minister of Civil Aviation, Culture 
and Tourism led to criticism. The Island of Manus is well known as an 
'exporter' of educated personnel to employment elsewhere so that air 
transport for them to leave, return to visit and be visited is of particular 
importance. Rooney's initiation of cheap fares just before the election was 
thought to be a vote-catcher (Times , 20 Feb - 4 Mar 1987) but this move 
could not compensate for the limited air service to Manus which had been 
curtailed in recent years. Rooney was also the victim of rather ruthless vote 
splitting tactics, as many of her thirteen opponents flatly admitted. 
Among her opponents was James Pokasui, the man she had edged out in 
1 982, who had been permanently resident in Manus for a year prior to the 
election. After his defeat in 1982 and again in a provincial by-elecion in 1983 
he had acted as an advisor to the Minister of Defence. He left this post in 
1 986 and returned to his village to cultivate his electorate as well as his 
garden. Being a former officer and having many personal friends among the 
oficers at the naval base of Lombrum contributed to his good chances of 
winning the seat. 
Martin Thompson was informally seen as the Makasol candidate. A 
lawyer with a private legal practice in Lorengau, Thompson had frequently 
represented Makasol in its numerous court cases against the provincial 
government and against other adversaries. An informal poll was taken by one 
of the authors (Wormald) in Lorengau a week before the election in which 
informants were asked to list candidates in the order in which they thought 
they would come in the election. In it, Martin Thompson was identified as 
the leading candidate. 
Few of the other candidates were seen as having much prospect of 
winning. Micah Senau had a record of garnering electoral support for he had 
been the provincial member for the Sopomu Malai Bay constituency and was 
a former deputy premier in the Manus provincial government. Caleb 
Kolowan, a university lecturer and former Baptist minister, was hampered in 
what otherwise might have seemed a promising campaign by being 
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considered too involved with a local dispute involving his district of Los 
Negros. 
Manus Provincial 
The average age of the candidates was almost identical to that in the Open 
electorate, 42.8, but the range (36-55) was smaller. Their education was also 
similar: two were university graduates (Mundri and Polume), one had been to 
university but not graduated, one had teacher training, three had reached 
Grade 10 or equivalent and two Grade 7. Only the winner, Marsipal, did not 
disclose his education. All proclaimed their marriage (and one divorce) and 
they all had children ranging from two to a claimed twenty (Chauka), 
Marsipal had been a carpenter and then a building contractor until his fist 
election to Parliament in 1983.  There was a former MP (Pondros) and a 
former provincial government member from 1983-85 (Kellie) .  A doctor, a 
surveyor, two businessmen, a teacher and a clerk made up he remainder of 
the candidates. 
Arnold Marsipal, the sitting member, was a candidate for re-election. He 
had won a by-election in 1983 with a majority of 1 1 97 votes after his 
predecessor, Michael Pondros, who had also been Minister of Public 
Utilities, had been dismised from office when found guilty of misconduct in 
office by the Leadership Tribunal .  Marsipal had the triple advantage of 
having a good record of ministerial performance from his short time in office 
as Minister for Correctional Services between August and November 1984 
(when Somare's government fell after a vote of no confidence), of being a 
likely candidate for a ministry if Pangu formed the government, and of having 
had ample time to nurse his constitutency while being in opposition. 
Brian Campbell, who had run second to Marsipal in the by-election, 
stood for election again, and in his well-planned and extensive campaign he 
emphasized that he would attempt to bring rapid and large-scale development 
to the province, e.g. an international airport that would bring tourist traffic 
from Guam and elsewhere, with roads, hotels shops and other tourist 
attractions as its major economic spin offs. Campbell was considered to be a 
strong candidate, and many people in Manus wanted this naturalized citizen to 
be their representative in Port Moresby because, firstly, he would not be 
involved in 'wantokism' and, secondly, he would, as a European, be able to 
handle efficiently a government system brought to PNG by Europeans, with 
maximal benefits io the province. 
Michael Pondros, in spite of his dismissal from office, presented himself 
for re-election and received some external support; Dr. Thomas Mundri, a 
physician at the Lorengau Hospital and medical officer of health for Manus 
until his resignation to stand as a candidate, was also perceived as a 
significant candidate. 
Paliau Lukas Chauka was a strange and ambiguous contender. For many 
years he had been the Crown Prince of the Makasol movement under the 
elderly Paliau Maloat. He had fallen out with Paliau, however, and had left 
the movement after he and eighty-six other Makasol members had served time 
in prison for unlawful activities in the province. In contesting the seat he 
hoped to draw support from both Makasol and anti-Makasol factions. In 
those rural areas where he had strong Makasol ties (most of his family being 
Makasol members) he hoped to get Makasol support. In non-Makasol areas, 
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he hoped that his anger with the movement for the time he spent in gaol for 
his Makasol activities and his rupture with Makasol would gain him support. 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
Five of the fourteen Open candidates and two of the nine Provincial 
candidates held party endorsement. But of these seven party candidates, only 
three or four made significant use of their party status in the campaigning. 
Sometimes, the party connection was deliberately played down for fear it 
would alienate rather than attract voters for whom the idea of party appeared 
to be a novelty. However, the financial support of parties was important 
particularly for hiring boats to take candidates round to the sixteen electoral 
districts including the Southwestern Islands, Wuvulu and Aua, which though 
they had always been in the Manus parliamentary constituency (Electoral 
District 1 6) were until 1986 under the administrative control of East Sepik 
The 346 electors of these two small islands had been promised benefits from 
being taken over by Manus and some of the candidates felt they must visit to 
reassure them on this point. Certainly all available boats were in use in the 
election run-up and the state of the sea was a particular electoral hazard. 
Manus Provincial 
For Manus Provincial, the party picture was comparatively simple. Arnold 
Marsipal was unequivocally Pangu, used the party posters and cooperated 
with the Pangu candidate in the Open electorate, Micah Senau. Perhaps it 
was true that Manus was, as Nahau Rooney had once claimed (P-C 21n/83), 
a strong Pangu area (although it did not prove to be for Senau, as we shall 
see). Still, Marsipal and Senau felt it necessary to explain the difference 
between party/feast and party/political organization to villagers throughout 
their campaigns. It is possible too that Pangu Pati had special significance to 
the numerous resident Sepik people who had been brought to Manus as 
labourers during the period of island plantations. They were told by Marsipal 
that because of the very concept of party, a vote for Marsipal actually meant a 
vote for Somare, their own wantok. Many Sepik people were visibly 
impressed by this agument, and the notion of party, operating on ethnic lines, 
was probably a good puller of Sepik votes for Pangu in Manus. 
The only other candidate who ran on a party ticket in the Provincial 
contest was the candidate who came last in the polling, Denis Pokana of the 
National Party. Michael Pondros falls into a borderline zone. He was 
supported by the Group of Independents, led and funded by Hugo Berghuser 
and Robert Suckling, two Port Moresby entrepreneurs of German and 
Australian origins respectively. Pondros did not advertise this connection 
which would have done him no good in Makasol circles especially. But the 
Group of Independents was at most a quasi-party designed to give leverage in 
the post-electoral process of government formation. 
Manus Open 
In the Manus Open campaign, the part played by party and party affiliation is 
more difficult to discern and impossible to describe in general terms. Micah 
Senau, who ran his Pangu-endorsed campaign in much the same way as 
seemed to contribute to the great success of Arnold Marsipal in the Provincial 
seat, fared poorly in the final Manus Open tally. The winner was an 
Independent, James Pokasui. But Pokasui's success cannot be dissociated 
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completely from 'party'. He was quietly endorsed and funded by the Group 
of Independents. Moreover, he was known to have been a member of the 
National Party (NP) when he had run in 1983 (and come fourth) and it was 
noticeable that, this time around, the National Party had made no endorsation 
for Manus Open. After the election it was suggested not only that he had 
Pangu support but that he had received financial support from the United 
Party (UP). 
Nahau Rooney's party connections are intriguing. We have seen that 
shortly after her first election she was embraced by Pangu and given a cabinet 
post. In 1983, she resigned from Pangu, declaring she had been a victim of 
the 'numbers game' when Tom Pais was made Civil Aviation Minister in July 
1 983. She was reported as saying: 'In politics we unfortunately allocate 
ministries to secure political numbers which means that the minority groups 
like women and the Manus people will never qualify. I am disappointed that 
Manus is not represented in the Cabinet - and so are women. (P-C 21n /83)" 
She became a founding member of the People's Democratic Movement 
(PDM) in November 1984 and when she was accused of switching parties to 
look for ministerial power she again stated: 'The issue is not that N ahau 
Rooney should become a minister but that Manus people must have a voice in 
the Cabinet . . .  there is a lot that a minister can do for her province'. 
As a PDM candidate, Rooney may have lost support. Her own 
statements about political parties were equivocal. In her election pamphlet she 
wrote: "On the floor of Parliament parties are necessary in order for the 
system we have chosen to work, however Nahau will only ever be part of a 
party which moves to serve people and N ahau and the people of Manus have 
always emphasized the quality of the leader rather than the party name. ' 
Her own campaign relied little on her party connection. Wingti's picture 
appeared on the ballot paper and on her election poster, but she did not use 
the official PDM poster. To do so would have been difficult anyway since 
one of its two messages was 'Makim Wingti Man' and there was only one 
woman in the six photos surrounding Prime Minister despite the fact that the 
poster was authorized by 'Ms Nahau Rooney, Secretary'. 
Martin Thompson began as an Independent then declared himself for the 
League for National Advancement (LNA) and, during the campaign, made 
selective use of his LNA endorsation. In non-Makasol areas, the LNA 
connection was useful to prove that he was not the Makasol candidate. In 
Makasol areas, LNA was not mentioned. 
Province-wide 
The only party that seemed to have a province-wide strategy was Pangu and if 
it had any success, it may have had the odd effect of encouraging voters who 
lived in the Lele-Masi provincial constituency to vote for Pangu candidates. 
Pangu stressed that it wished to 'balance the power of the provincial premier 
in Manus' by means of its two endorsed candidates for the Provincial seat and 
the Open seat. Polotical power would be balanced if the there was a premier 
from the Lele-Masi 'middle of the province'; Pangu's Arnold Marsipal as 
Provincial member from the Rapatona provincial constituency located in 'sun­
up, the East of the province; and Pangu's Micah Senau as Open member from 
the Sopomu-Malai Bay area in 'sun-down', the West of the province. 
Yet in spite of these strategic models, Pangu's position, especially in 
Manus Open, was far from clear. Rooney, despite her defection, was 
thought to retain some of her old Pangu supporters and there was some 
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questipn of Pokasui's alliance with that party. Despite its official endorsation 
of another candidate, Pangu in the aftermath of the election stated that 
the Pangu Party branch in Manus has called on its Open member, 
James Pokasui, to withdraw from the P.M.'s camp. Party branch 
secretary, Titus Posakei, said Mr. Pokasui's supporters in the 
province were not happy that he had moved from the Pangu-led camp 
to Mr.Wingti's group. But Mr. Pokasui said he had consulted 
leaders from Manus before making his decisions: Manus had two 
members and at least one must be in government for people to 
benefit; Provincial member Arnold Marsipal was with Pangu, so he 
decided to join the other side in case they got in (P-C 3/8/87). 
Independents 
Running as an Independent might simply mean that a candidate had failed in a 
bid for party endorsation. For example, Micah Senau, Roy Pogat, David 
N'drayew, Phillip Sapak, and, according to himself though not the local 
party, Martin Thompson had all applied for the Pangu endorsation in Manus 
Open which eventually was given to Senau. In other cases, the choice of 
Independent status seems to have been unconstrained. Independent 
candidates emphasized the importance of their individual qualities as leaders 
rather than their representing a paty name and a prefabricated concept, thus 
appealing to traditional values of leadership in Manus. They usually also 
stressed the greater chance of independent canddates bringing development to 
the province by 'selling' themselves expensively to the faction in Parliament 
which was likely to form the government, thus gaining a miistry or at least 
project money for Manus. Some of the independent candidates tried to make 
use of their status of being 'independent' by stating unequivocally that the 
'independent' country of Papua New Guinea was in need of 'independent' 
candidates, and 'independent' members in the National Parliament. 
The evidence about the influence of parties and of independent 
candidatures in Manus is inconclusive. In the Open constituency, candidates 
for the LNA, PDM, MA, PPP and Pangu took five of the first six places, 
while an Independent won and Independents also monopolized the last eight 
places. Yet in the Provincial contest, the Pangu man won and the only other 
party candidate lost his deposit. 
MAKASOL 
It has been contended thus far that the understanding of election results in 
Manus demands first of all a recognition of the existence of the 'extended 
family'.  Then it becomes important to study the impact of other forms of 
identification and social categorization which crosscut both each other and the 
traditional 'extended family' grouping. We have seen how ambiguous the 
impact of party affiliation and endorsation seems to have been in Manus. It is 
time now to examine the political role of Makasol. 
Makasol is a special case, a movement endemic to Manus. Although it 
may be best classified as a religion, and indeed has access to schools for the 
religious instructioon of the children, it is many other things as well. The 
origins of Makasol in the Paliau movement led by Paliau Moloat have already 
been mentioned briefly. With a vision of the future influenced heavily, both 
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positively and negatively, by the American armed forces' stay in Manus, 
Paliau called on his followers to reject the state and all its emanations and to 
place their confidence on local, properly constituted institutions of their own. 
He rapidly ran afoul of the colonial authorities and spent several years in gaol. 
His influence remained enormous, and his first substantial success was the 
establishment of the Baluan Council as only the fourth local government 
council to be created in the whole of Papua New Guinea, following similar 
action in such relatively developed parts of PNG as Vunamami, Hanuabada 
and Reimber. The Baluan Council was created in 1950 while Paliau was still 
in prison. He became its president when he was released. In spite of his 
diatribes against government, he stood for and was elected to the House of 
Assembly in 1964 and was re-elected in 1968. He was defeated by Michael 
Pondros in 1973 and his influence seemed to wane. In 1 979, however, he 
was elected to the new provincial government of Manus as member for 
Balopa and his movement gained momentum again. 
In its contemporary form, Makasol is essentially a movement of cultural 
and political resistance to worldly government. The name Makasol was 
adopted by Paliau and his followers to stress their commitment to the 
customary council form of local government in Manus. It is an abbreviation 
of the Tok Pisin designation Manus Kastom Kaunsol , the customary council 
of Manus. Paliau believed the Manus Local Goverment Council set up in 
1964, in which he had played a dominant role, was the only valid expression 
of the Manus community. This customary council was displaced by new 
government-sponsored local government organs. The Kaunsol meant 
'government with a soul' ,  in contrast to other forms of government. 
Currently, the Makasol movement is preparing for the arival of Jesus who is 
said to be coming back to the world in a few years. Sitting on the throne of 
David (identified with the coronation stone in Westminister Abbey), He wlll 
govern the world in a new 'Commonwealth of Nations' .  Those states which 
refuse to be governed by him will be destroyed. Specifically, the 
'communist' system of community governments introduced by the provincial 
government is opposed and the re-introduction of the abolished system of 
local government is requested. Paliau's positions are not, however, constant 
and consistent. He may denounce the state as 'Lucifer' but he also stood for 
office, and accepted office, within the PNG state framework and has boasted 
of his role in introducing the national parliament. 
Makasol organizes quite a significant number of people in Manus and 
different sources give different figures on the size of the movement. Makasol 
leaders sometimes state that their movement comprises up to 15 ,000 people, 
while adversaries of the movement which causes so much trubulance in 
Manus state that it has between 1000 and 1500 members. However low its 
membership may be (probably between 2000 and 3000), it is large enough to 
count in an election contest. To the extent that Paliau controls the Makasol 
vote, he becomes a force to be reckoned with. 
The Makasol factor in the 1987 election might have affected the chances 
of victory of an individual candidate in any of five ways: ( 1) gaining of votes 
from Makasol support; (2) loss of votes from the alienation of non-Makasol 
voters who perceived a candidate to be too strongly supported by Makasol; 
(3) loss of votes from Makasol opposition; (4) loss of votes from a Makasol 
boycott; (5) gaining of votes (relatively if not absolutely) from a Makasol 
boycott when the Makasol vote would normally have gone to an opponent. 
Sorting out which of these five effects was in fact the operative one is no 
simple task. 
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The boycott effects have to be given very serious consideration because 
of Paliau Maloat's speech in Lorengau, the capital of Manus, on 24 April 
1 987. He ordered his followers not to enrol on the voters lists, not to 
nominate as candidates, and note to vote in the 1987 elections and told them 
that if they disobeyed, lightning would strike them. If Paliau's control over 
his followers is absolute, then only the boycott effects need be examined. 
But Makasol had attracted different kinds of people to it. Some highly 
sophisticated people, including several former senior civil servants, saw it as 
vehicle for political power in the province, yet may not have been as 
responsive to Paliau's general charisma and specific injunctions as his earlier 
disciples. For this and other reasons, the impact of Makasol, in spite of 
Paliau's espousal of a boycott, remained a question mark until the very end. 
It is undoubtedly true that several candidates believed that Makasol 
support would be translated into votes. Michael Pondros lent his house in 
Lorengau to his uncle Paliau Moloat, who lived in it and also used it for 
Makasol's religious meetings. Pondros was aware of the fact that religious 
Makasol meetings also have tremendous political relevance for its members. 
Paliau Lukas Chauka, as we have seen, tried to benefit both from his former 
prominence in the movement and, with a different group of electors, for his 
having left the movement. It was said that he was offered and refuse funds 
from Pondros, who was seeking to maximize his Makasol support. 
The case of Martin Thompson is particularly difficult to assess. He came 
a close second to Pokasui. Did this mean that he was as strong as he was 
because of Makasol support or that he failed to win because the Makasol 
people who normally would have supported him were obedient to Paliau's 
boycott order? It seems that Thompson' s team believed the latter, for his 
campaign manager is reported to have bashed up the head teacher of Makasol 
because Makasol had not supported Thompson enough. Yet his Makasol 
connections may have lost him support in the non-Makasol areas of the 
province in spite of the fact that he stressed when in these areas that some 
Manus leader had to be able to handle the conflict between Makasol and the 
government. Thompson claimed that Marsipal, Rooney and Pokawin had all 
ignored this very pertinent regional question. 
Finally, it must be noted, if for no other reason than to underline the 
difficulty of pinning down the Makasol factor, that according to Makasol 
sources, Arnold Marsipal , N ahau Rooney, Francis Molean, Simaon 
Ndrenaon and Ngat Boruan Silip all had Makasol parents and varying 
personal relations with the movement. 
THE IMPACT OF TRADITION 
Individual candidates ran into traditional barriers or were helped along by 
traditional beliefs in a variety of ways. One of those most affected was 
Nahau Rooney. The fact that she was a woman was in itself a defiance of 
tradition, for a Lapan (leader) was always a man. It followed from this that 
she should not have been allowed to hold betel nuts when she spoke at the 
launching of her campaign, for this was a Lapan privilege. The betel nuts 
were also a source of Lapan power. If a Lapan held a bunch of betel nuts 
when talking, he had to be obeyed unquestioningly. However, if a Lapan 
dropped a betel nut during his speech, he would sit down quietly, for his 
power had temporarily at least been sapped. Nahau Rooney, it was claimed, 
had not only illicitly held the bunch of betel nuts, but had dropped one and 
still gone on with her speech. Moreover, her opponents accused, she had 
allowed garamuts (large drums) to be beaten at her own hotel, the Kohai 
Manus Province 20 1 
Lodge, at the outset of her campaign. This too was a grave impropriety for 
garamuts should only be beaten in triumph or in joy, and must never be 
beaten before a war. Rooney's beating of garamuts was called immodest and 
an outrage. Traditionalists also held against her the fact that she had a 
naturalized husband of Australian origin, a source of foreign ideas and values 
from which people in Manus should be trying to free themselves. The idea of 
a woman in power was itself a result of European influence. 
Perhaps the candidate who, next to Rooney, suffered most from a 
traditional attack was Paliau Lukas Chauka, who was said to have been 
execrated by his aunt. 
Part of the Manus tradition involves the use of metaphor, and the 
campaign speeches were enriched by several of them. Some of these 
metaphorsbuilt on traditional tales and some on passages from the Bible. 
Two examples may be cited. 
First, several candidates who campaigned against the sitting Open 
member, Nahau Rooney, used her own slogan 'Mama mas go bek' and 
turned it against her by referring to the story of 'the mother turtle and the 
mother hen' (mama torosel na mama kakaruk). The turtle lays her eggs and 
abandons them (a metaphor for Rooney forgetting her electors in Manus 
while a minister in Port Moresby) while the hen sits on her eggs and 
constantly cares for her chickens (a metaphor for a good representative who 
cares for his electors). 
Secondly, Pangu candidates employed a metaphor based on the biblical 
text about 'The Three Wise Men from the East'. The East of Manus is the 
provincial constituency of Rapatona. David Tasion, the Commissioner of 
Police for Papua New Guinea, who comes from Mokara on Pak Island, and 
Karol Kisakau, the Secretary of Environment and Conservation, who comes 
from Mouklen on Rambutso, were two Wise Men who already came from 
Rapatona, 'the East' . Arnold Marsipal, from N auna Island, had to become 
the third Wise Man from Rapatona in order to fulfill the biblical text. 
During their campaigns, most candidates were careful to meet for a 
private talk with the lapan of a clan or village. Lapans still are said to have the 
power to command the votes of villagers. Most nowadays claim only to 
make recommendation in favour of (or against) candidates, but candidates 
know that their views are not to be overlooked. 
CAMPAIGNING 
The campaign on the whole was low key, and much of the work of 
candidates consisted in arriving quietly at a village, going to the house of the 
'komiti' (the local comunity government representative) and asking him to 
gather villagers together. Public speeches tended to be short and informal, 
the most important part of the visit being the candidate's talk with the lapan. 
Still, name-calling did occur. 
Name-calling 
Nahau Rooney bore the brunt of personal attacks based on traditional factors. 
She also was criticized on non-traditional grounds. We will note the charges 
made against regarding funds and membership lists for her old party, Pangu, 
but she was also criticized for having joined the People's Democratic 
Movement which was perceived as the party of 'those Highlanders who help 
the coffee growers in the Highlands and forget about the copra growers on 
the islands' . Her opponents, however, did not escape accusations of 
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impropriety. A particularly complex charge was laid against Martin 
Thompson, which illustrated the bitterness between Makasol and non­
Makasol groups in Manus. 
In May 1 987, Makasol had won a National Court case against the 
Government of Manus concerning the lawfulness of the system of community 
government introduced by the provincial government. The status of the 
Community Government Act was called into question in a case which 
involved members of Makasol attempting to retain possession of a large piece 
of land in Lorengau, which had been the property of the former organ of local 
government and which, Makasol claimed, should now belong to them. On 
May 2 1 ,  the Premier of the province, Stephen Pokawin, had attempted to 
remedy this situation, over the fierce protests of three Makasol members, by 
passing an amendment to the Act 'for reasons of avoiding confusion and 
securing the stability of the province' (Lapan Assembly, 21 May 1987). 
Later that day, in a Radio Manus interview, a member of the Community 
Government of Sopumu-Malai Bay in South Manus accused Martin 
Thompson of consciously creating loopholes in the Community Government 
Act during 1982 when he had been Legal Officer for the provincial 
government. Now, as legal advisor to Makasol, Thompson was accused of 
helping the movement to use these loopholes against the provincial 
government. Thompson himself (personal communication, 22 May 1987) 
believed the local politician had been put up to planting this denunciation by 
someone from Rooney's team. 
Ethnicity 
Ethnicity did not loom large in the campaign, except in the Pangu attempts to 
lure Sepik voters noted already. As the only naturalized- citizen candidate in 
the field, however, Brian Campbell had campaigned extensively and very 
efficiently and had toured the whole province even before many of the other 
candidates had begun their own campaigns. He had promised to bring 
tourists to Manus and used Fiji frequently as an example of an island state that 
had known how to achieve good development through tourism. When the 
military coup in Fiji became known in PNG, Campbell's adversaries quickly 
attempted to capitalize on the situation. They maintained that the Fijians had 
done the right thing when they had toppled their Indian-dominated 
government because it meant foreign government for Fiji. Papua New 
Guinea should be governed by Papua New Guineans and should not risk 
becoming 'another Fiji'. 
Campaign costs 
Little is known about the costs of each candidates campaign. An estimate of 
K7000 for Rooney compares with a few hundred she spent in 1977 when she 
'campaigned very little during the actual election period' (Rooney 1 983).  
Pokasui 's expenditure was probably rather more, but an accusation by the 
defeated United Party leader, Paul Torate, that he had been assisted to the 
tune of K34,000 was hastily withdrawn. The amended United Party 
statement claimed that 'the party did assist Mr. Pokasui in some form, 
however not in the magnitude of the figures published'. 
The Group of Independents calculated a cost of about K 150,000 for their 
thirty-seven endorsed candidates throughout the country (personal 
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communication, Robert Suckling). This would mean that Pondros and 
Pokasui would have been supported with about K4000 each. 
The two Pangu candidates were said to be handicapped in their campaign 
by the act that Nahau Rooney, who had beem secretary of Pangu's Manus 
branch until 1 985, still held the Manus party's bank passbook and thus 
controlled an amount of about K2600 (membership fees and returns from a 
sold car) . Rooney was also accused of holding Pangu' s provincial 
membership register and of repeatedly refusing to hand it over (personal 
communication, Pangu Manus branch, 29 April 1 987). The only support 
from the national office, according to the same source, was a 25 hp outboard 
motor which was too weak to be used for campaigning in the watedrs of 
Manus. When it came to Lorengau, the regional party attempted, 
unsucessfully, to sell the motor for K lOOO. 
Brian Campbell's campaign, according to his campaign manager, cost 
about K5000. This sum, however, did not include the cost of a large boat 
with outboard motor which was bought for the campaign, on the ground that 
it could be used for a longer period. 
Platforms 
The two sitting members and the ultimate victor in the Open contest adopted 
different approaches in their electoral platforms. 
Rooney stood on her record both as a minister and as a member for 
Manus. She claimed improvement in road and sea transport including a new 
workboat, M. V. N ahau, delivered immediately prior to the election to be used 
in the Western Islands. She mentioned her work with women and she was 
active in the celebrations held in May 1 987 for the tenth anniversary of the 
Manus Council of Women, one of the more effective provincial women's 
councils, to which she contributed K5000 (P-C 1 3/5/87). Indeed on all 
counts her activities sounded credible. They were not, however, always 
greeted with acclaim by the electors. The proposal to move the wharf at 
Lombrum was featured in her election literature : 'The new overseas wharf at 
Lombrum will commence his year at a cost of K l .5 million which came after 
years of planning and struggling'. Nevertheless it was described by an 
elector as 'too big, too far' and it was wondered by another if it would mean 
moving the naval base from Lombrum, a source of 570 electors. 
Other industrial projects such as a cannery at Lombrum had not 
materialized nor did a Japanese proposed timber development. Development 
of this type continue to be under discussion. Manus in 1987 could still be 
decribed as one of PNG's least developed provinces. It is not suggested that 
these disappointments were Rooney's  fault, but they were set against her 
achiedvements by her electors. Unable to compete with Rooney on a record 
of input into the constituency, Pokasui took another line. As we have seen, 
he returned to his village early in 1987 after losing his position as a ministerial 
aide to Defence Minister Stephen Tago, then leader of the National Party. 
There he lived as a subsistence farmer and established himself firmly in 
Manus consciousness. In the light of his previous career, he made a special 
feature of work with ex-servicemen and war carriers. Marsipal, on the other 
hand, fought on a platform of 'Honesty, Humility, Hard Work' and the 
necessity to get Pangu into power. Since his ministerial experience had been 
brief, he was not able to claim he had secured as much from the national 
government for Manus as had Rooney, but he promised future benefits from 
his re-election. 
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POLLING 
Polling was conducted by means of eight polling teams touring eight different 
'sections' of the province over a period of two weeks, each section being 
composed of from one to three provincial constituencies (Tables 1 & 2). 
Each of the eight teams carried four to seven ballot boxes (Table 2) and these 
boxes were filled successively. This means that no data are available on the 
number of votes given by village, or island, or constituency, etc., for a given 
candidate. 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The results of the election were no great surprise. Marsipal had been a 
popular member during his short time in Parliament and though his nearest 
rival, Campbell, was a well known businessman, he had stood before 
without success. Rooney's slender margin in 1982 meant defeat by Pokasui 
was in the cards and it may be that the emergence of Thompson as the second 
in the race was the most notable feature of the results in terms of personal 
success or failure. It is nonetheless interesting to examine the returns to see 
whether they yield any insight into how Manus voters make up their minds in 
elections. 
Perhaps the most evident pattern is the atypical behaviour of the voters 
from Wuvulu and Aua. People from the Islands of Wuvulu and Aua had 
repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the services they received from the 
provincial government in Lorengau. In a survey made in 1 987 by Mr 
Bernard Narakobi (personal communication), a total of 628 from the two 
islands were asked whether they would prefer their islands to be administered 
by the Manus government or by the East Sepik government. The result was 
497 to 1 3 1  against Manus. The citizens of Wuvulu and Aua had threatened to 
abstain from voting in the national elections of 1987 in protest against their 
undesired attachment to Manus Province. Table 3 shows that 47 per cent of 
the total population of Manus voted in the national election of 1987. 
However, it  also shows that in Electoral Section 1 (Western Islands) only 
30. 1 per cent of the people voted for a Provincial, and 35. 1 per cent for an 
Open, candidate. If the time factor in pre-election developments is looked at 
carefully, this discrepancy can plausibly be related to local feeling in Wuvulu 
and Aua about attachment to Manus Province. 
The unpopular decision to keep Wuvulu and Aua within Manus was made 
in late April 1987. Enrollment for the election took place before that time, in 
1986. In Sector 1 ,  49 . 1  per cent enrolled as compared to about 49 per cent 
for the province as a whole. Yet for the actual election, held after the 
attachment decision, only 6 1 .3 per cent of those registered voted for the 
Provincial candidate and only 7 1 .5 per cent for an Open candidate. These 
participation percentages are significantly lower than those for Manus as a 
whole: Provincial, 88 .2 per cent and Open, 89.7 per cent. Something must 
have occurred between registering in 1986 and voting in 1987 to explain the 
fall off in participation in the Western Islands relative to the province as a 
whole. The probable cause is the decison that Lorengau, not Wewak, would 
administer the Islands and the call for a boycott of the election which this 
decision evoked. 
Much less certainty attaches to the impact of Makasol on the election. As 
we have seen, it is impossible to assess the importance of a Makasol 
connection in explaining either the good showing of Martin Thompson in the 
Open seat (was it due to Makasol support?) or his failure to win the Open seat 
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(was it due to the Makasol boycott?). An examination of participation figures, 
however, does permit some tentative conclusiopns to be drawn about the 
effectiveness of Paliau's injunction to boycott. 
Makasol is represented in Sectors 4-8, but since it forms a clear-cut 
majority in none of the rural Sectors (a fact which leads to tensions in many 
villages), it is impossible to assess the effectiveness of the boycott. In 
electoral section 5 (Los Negros and Lorengau town), however, where Paliau 
Moloat and many of his followers reside, participation in the election was 
very low: only 39.6 per cent in the Provincial vote and 39.5 in the Open. In 
Sector 5,  furthermore, not only was the actual voting low, but voter 
registration was low as well; with only 39.6 per cent, it was the lowest in the 
province. It may be suggested that these figures �an be explained at least in 
part by Paliau's call for a boycott of 'Lucifer'. 
Finally, the results make possible no assessment of the significance of 
party endorsement as opposed to Indendent status; nor do they suggest a 
Manus preference for a particular political party. An answer to the question 
of the importance party has in Manus elections is perhaps best sought in 
looking at contributions to campaign costs and the provision for candidates, at 
least in the case of Pangu, of a minimal organization. 
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TABLES 
Table 1 Manus Provincial Constituencies 
Section Total Population Enrolled 
EC NSO Population 
1 North Western Islands 669 669 352 
2 Kari Bipi 1209 1209 746 
3 Soparibeu 1390 1612  746 
4 Tulu-Ponam 1 146 926 5 19 
5 Kurti-Andra 193 1 1 9 1  1042 
6 Bupi-Chupeu 920 920 537 
7 Lele-Masi 2207 2207 1252 
8 Lorengau Town 3986 3986 1460 
Lombrum base 1432 1432 570 
9 Los Negros 1267 1267 617 
10 Nali 1048 995 641 
1 1  Pere-Mbunai 88 1 8 8 1  478 
12 Ere-Kele 1 3 10 1 363 798 
13 Sopumu-Malai Bay 2246 2246 1253 
14 Balopa 1616  1616  888  
15  Rapatona 2034 2034 1065 
1 6  South Western Islands 753 753 346 
Sources: National Statistical Office, 1987; Electoral Commission, 1987 
National Elections Voting Statistics, 1987. The column EC gives numbers 
from the Electoral Commission; the column NSO gives those of the National 
Statistical Office. For constituencies 3,4, 10 and 12, these figures differ. 
Table 2 Composition of the eight provincial 'sections' 
Section (Team #) Provincial Constituency Ballot Box # 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
RIO 
Western Islands 
Kali-BipUSoparibeu 
Tulu-Ponam/Kurti-Andra 
Bupi-Cupeu/Lele-Masi 
Los Negros/Lorengau Town 
Ere-Kele/Nali/Pere Mbunai 
Sopomu-Malai Bay 
Rapatona/Balopa 
Postal Ballot Box 
01 -01  
05-09 
10-14 
15-19 
20-26 
27-3 1 
32-36 
37-42 
43 
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Table 3 Participation in polling, related to population 
Sects Pop'n Voters Percentage 
Prov'l Open Prov'l Open 
EC (NSO) EC EC EC (NSO) EC (NSO) 
1 1422 428 499 30. 1 35 . 1  
2 2599 (282 1)  1466 1469 56.4 (52.0) 56.5 (52.0) 
3 3077 (2857) 1340 1 346 43.6  (46.9) 43.7 (47 . 1 )  
4 3 127 1793 1799 57. 3  57.5  
5 6676 2643 2638 39.6 39.5 
6 3239 1678 1 690 5 1 . 8  52.2 
7 2246 1 1 1 8 1 121  49. 8  49.9 
8 3650 1734 1734 47.5 7 .5  
RIO NIA 4 4 
Tot. 26036 (26038) 12204 12300 47 .0 (46.8) 47.0 (47 .6) 
----------------------------------------------------
Table 4 Participation in polling, related to enrollment 
Section Enrolled Voting Percentage 
No % Provincial Open Provincial Open 
1 698 49. 1  428 499 6 1 .3 7 1 .5 
2 1579 60.8  1466 1469 92. 8  93.0 
3 1561  50.7 1340 1 346 85 .8  86.2 
4 1789 57.2 1793 1799 100.2 1 00.6 
5 2647 39.6 2643 2638 99. 8  99.7 
6 1917  59.2 1 678  1 690 87.5  88 .2  
7 1253 55.8 1 1 1 8 1 121  89.2 89.5 
8 1 953 53.5 1734 1734 88 .8  88 .8  
RIO 4 4 
Total 1 3397 53.2 12204 12300 88.2 89.7 

13 
Faltering Progress: Namatanai 
Open, New Ireland 
NORMAN MACQUEEN 
TRENDS AND NUMBERS 
The fortunes of the People' s  Progress Party (PPP) took a sharp downturn in 
the 1987 national election.*  The party ' s  leader Sir Julius Chan did, it is 
true, retain his position as Deputy Prime Minister in the new Wingti 
coalition but this was due more to an acknowledgement of his abilities and 
the unsuitability of his potential rivals for the post than to the voting 
strength at his disposal in the new parliament. That strength in fact fell 
from thirteen at dissolution to six after the election. 
This decline in the PPP's popularity among voters was fairly evenly 
spread throughout the country but nowhere was it better illustrated than in 
Chan' s home province of New Ireland. Three members of the National 
Parliament are returned from New Ireland - one from the provincial seat and 
one each from two Open seats: Kavieng covering the north-western portion 
of the island and N amatanai representing the south-eastern half. The PPP 
had represented all three constituencies in the old parliament but lost two of 
them in the 1987 election. Noel Levi, a senior figure in the party and a 
former Foreign Minister, was convincingly defeated by Pangu Pati 's 
Michael Singan in the provincial seat. In Kavieng Open, Robert Cheong 
trailed fourth behind Gerard Sigulogo of Melanesian Alliance (MA) and 
* A study of this nature obviously depends greatly on the good nature and patience of 
individual informants. I have been particularly fortunate in this respect. With very few 
exceptions the people I have sought information and guidance from have been both 
generous with their time and anxious to be as helpful as possible. A full list of these 
informants would� be lengthy indeed but among the most prominent were: Ben 
Remessen, the District Manager of Konos and Returning Officer for the constituency; 
Tony Drett, the Namatanai District Manager and Assistant Returning Officer; John 
Koae of the Electoral Commission voter education team assigned to Namatanai; Father 
John of the Missionary Society of Jesus in Lihir; Esekia Tomon, the Pangu Pati 
candidate; Raphael Topik, campaign organizer for Sir Julius Chan; Ephraim Apelis of 
Susurunga and the Education Research Unit at the University of Papua New Guinea; 
Norlie Miskaram of the Geography Department at University of Papua New Guinea. 
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Table 1 :  New Ireland Province Election Results 1987 
Candidate Party Vote Per cent 
Namatanai Open 
Sir Julius Chan PPP 8246 48.28 
Ezekia Tomon Pangu 6277 36.74 
Herman Saet Independent 1922 1 1 .25 
Alfred Simele Independent 636 3.72 
Kavieng Open 
Gerard Sigulogo MA 3614 26. 17 
Wala Gukguk Independent 1620 1 1 .73 
Tokau Kamalo Pangu 1482 10.73 
Robert Cheong PPP 1461 10.58 
[Others 5628 40.79 
New Ireland Provincial 
Michael S ingan Pangu 16156 52.78 
Noel Levi PPP 1 1577 37.82 
Joe Tangos Independent 2872 9.38 
Source: Electoral Commissioner of PNG, Report on Papua New Guinea Election 1987. 
indeed polled below a Pangu candidate whose intervention, PPP officials 
hoped, might have successfully split the vote against them. 
In Sir Julius' s own N amatanai Open seat alone did the People's  
Progress Party maintain a hold in  New Ireland and then only with a 
considerably reduced margin. The threat to Chan's  electoral position was 
neither sudden nor unexpected. The party's strength in New Ireland had 
been declining for some time and at the beginning of 1987 clear 
psephological evidence of this was provided by the defeat of the PPP­
dominated provincial government of Robert Seeto by a Melanesian Alliance 
grouping led by Pedi Anis. This evident vulnerability of the PPP in New 
Ireland, combined with Chan's position as Deputy Prime Minister, made 
Namatanai a major target for the main opposition parties. The long-term 
arithmetic of Chan 's position in Namatanai assumed considerable interest to 
friend and foe alike, suggesting to the latter a good prospect for his defeat 
and causing the former some concern. 
In the first post-independence national election, Chan had taken 64.5 
per cent of the votes in Namatanai, representing 8,75 1 of 1 3,557 votes cast. 
In the 1982 election, however, this had declined to 55.4 per cent (8 ,333 
votes out of 15,029). If the trend was to continue in 1987, Chan would dip 
well below the 50 per cent mark. Moreover, if the established pattern of 
few candidates and limited support for independents in N amatanai elections 
persisted, Chan would be very vulnerable to a single, strong opposition 
party challenger. With this in mind, Pangu and Melanesian Alliance agreed 
to a joint campaign. Pangu would endorse the candidate who would then be 
212  NORMAN MACQUEEN 
Table 2: N amatanai Open: Electoral Divisions and Populations 
Division 
1 .  East Coast Central 
2. West Coast Central 
3. Tabar 
4. East Coast Namatanai 
5. West Coast Namatanai 
6. Susurunga 
7. Kandas 
8. Lak 
9. Lihir 
10. Tanga 
1 1 . Anir 
Population 
5524 
2946 
2194 
4701 
2595 
4002 
1785 
1609 
5505 
35 18  
1 302 
* Divisions 1 -3 are in Konos Administrative District while 4- 1 1  are in 
that of Namatanai. 
* Total includes 80 non-citizens. 
Source: Final Report of the 1980 National Census 
'officially supported' by MA. The risk of vote splitting of the type 
witnessed in the Kavieng campaign would thus be minimised. 
The hopes of Pangu and MA were bolstered by the results of the 
provincial assembly election. In this the PPP had taken only 33 per cent of 
the votes in the eleven provincial electoral districts which corresponded to 
the Namatanai Open constituency. Between them, Pangu and MA had won 
44 per cent with other non-PPP candidates taking a further 25 per cent 
(Post-Courier, 22 May 1987). To some in the PPP, the message of these 
two sets of figures was that Chan must now shift to the New Ireland 
Provincial seat (the easiest option open to him under the residency rules for 
candidates). Against this, however, was the fact that although PPP had lost 
the provincial assembly elections, it had not done so in N amatanai. 
Although it had taken only a third of the vote there, it had still won nine 
of the eleven electoral areas. East and West Coast Central were won, 
respectively, by Melanesian Alliance and Pangu. The impetus for change in 
provincial government had come from the Kavieng 'end' of the island and, 
while the projections of national election figures might make the provincial 
seat look a safer option, the provincial election had shown PPP to be still 
dominant when the seats were distributed in N amatanai. 
The result of the national election in Namatanai clearly vindicated the 
latter view. (Although of course the possibility remains that PPP might 
have held the provincial seat and lost N amatanai on the strength of Chan ' s 
personal appeal had he made the move.) The trend against Chan in 
N amatanai was neither deep nor rapid enough to unseat him in 1987. 
However his proportion of the vote did decline further and indeed did drop 
below 50 per cent (to 48.28 per cent). His majority too was drastically 
reduced. In 1982 he had won by 3,058 against his Pangu opponent Isikel 
Manring while in 1987 Ezekia Tomon had cut this to 1 ,969. The 1982 
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figures were: Sir Julius Chan (PPP) 8,333; Isikel Manring (Pangu) 5,275 
and Sam W atnambar (Ind.) 949. Despite Chan' s victory for PPP in 
N amatanai, by 1987 a move away from the party appeared to be a 
continuing process in New Ireland politics at both provincial and national 
levels. 
The Candidates and their Bases of Support 
Atypically, in an election where double figure candidacies seemed to be the 
norm, the Namatanai constituency had only four contenders (one more in 
fact than in 1982). While the highest numbers of candidates were to be 
found in the Highlands seats, the rest of the country too was showing a 
growing penchant for lengthy ballot papers. Indeed the other Open seat in 
New Ireland, Kavieng, had fourteen candidates. However, both the 
provincial seat (with three candidates) and N amatanai Open held out against 
the trend. 
The Namatanai contenders were firstly, of course, Sir Julius Chan. The 
main threat to his position came from the Pangu-endorsed and MA­
supported challenger Ezekia Tomon. There were in addition two 
independents: Herman Saet and Alfred Simele. 
Sir Julius Chan, sitting member, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister for 
Trade and Industry and leader of the People 's Progress Party at the time of 
the election, was born on Tanga island in 1939 where his father owned 
plantations. The Chan family had been well-known as business people in 
both New Ireland and East New Britain for the past fifty years. Sir Julius 's 
Chinese father and New Ireland mother lived in Huris village in the 
Susurunga district close to the geographic 'centre' of Namatanai 
constituency. Chan himself, however, built his large residence at Huris only 
in the late 1970s as local rumblings of discontent were beginning to be 
heard about his apparent preference for living across in Rabaul in East New 
Britain. 
Chan's political career began in 1968 when he was elected to the pre­
independence Legislative Assembly. From 1972 he was Minister of 
Finance, a post he retained after independence in 197 5 in Michael Somare' s 
government until 1977. Following his split with Somare after the election 
of that year, Chan proved himself an effective leader of the opposition. In 
1980, after a carefully engineered vote of no confidence in Somare, he 
became Prime Minister. After the return of Somare and Pangu in the 1982 
election, Chan returned to lead the opposition. His next taste of government 
came in 1985 when Somare was ousted by his own protege, Paias Wingti, 
who secured the support of the thirteen PPP MPs. A major part of the price 
of this support was Chan' s elevation to the deputy prime ministership and 
the ministry of Finance. At the time of dissolution in 1987, Chan remained 
Deputy Prime Minister but had moved the previous December to the 
ministry of Trade and Industry. 
Both before and after independence, Chan had been regarded at home 
and abroad as one of Papua New Guinea' s most able and accomplished 
politicians. He had also managed for most of his time in office to remain 
largely untouched by the increasingly frequent scandals surrounding the 
personal and financial affairs of many of the country's  political leaders. 
Such evident integrity was simply enough explained, many felt, by the fact 
of the Chan family's considerable 'legitimate' business wealth. This 
relatively upright image was, however, damaged in the last months of 1986 
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as a result of the Placer shares issue and Sir Julius entered the election with 
his reputation for financial probity somewhat tarnished. 
Placer Pacific, one of the major foreign companies involved in the 
country's  incipient 'mineral boom', was lobbied by Chan ' s Department of 
Finance for a fourfold increase in the number of shares it had planned to 
float within Papua New Guinea itself. The intention - to offer 'ordinary 
Papua New Guineans' an increased stake in the exploitation of their 
country's  wealth - was entirely laudable. It emerged, however, that through 
various manoeuvres the Chan family company and the People' s  Progress 
Party itself had bought up some 800,000 of the 1 1 .5 million shares floated -
which in the first few days of stock market trading had increased in value by 
about 150 per cent. Chan, with Prime Minister Wingti's  support, brazened 
the issue out, with references to the spirit of 'popular capitalism' . Indeed, as 
Minister of Finance, Chan had expedited his financial coup by securing an 
extension of the period in which the shares were on offer and by relaxing 
PNG' s foreign exchange regulations (See Saffu 1987 :269-70). 
Sir Julius 's areas of support within the constituency could be roughly 
delimited in terms of census divisions/electoral districts. As might be 
expected, he was confident of considerable support in Tanga, his birthplace. 
The other offshore islands of Tabar and Anir also had been areas of some 
strength for PPP and, although less certain in 1987, the party's  position on 
the 'gold' islands of the Lihir group (where the Chan family owned 
plantations) had been fairly strong in the past. On the mainland, his support 
was located in the relatively highly populated districts of East and West 
Coast Namatanai - the latter of which included Namatanai township itself 
and the home of PPP ex-provincial premier Robert Seeto. Rather more 
problematic in 1987 was the position of his residential district, Susurunga, 
which was the birthplace of his principal opponent, Ezekia Tomon. 
Ethnicity did not appear to play a major part in voter' s  choice in 
Namatanai other than in the sense of a natural loyalty to the 'local man' 
where present. Consequently, cultural divisions were not the determinant of 
political commitment that they are in many other Papua New Guinea 
constituencies; nor could even the most Procrustean efforts of the 
ideologically motivated have found a class basis to political behaviour in 
N amatanai. The predominant cleavage appears to be based on what might 
be described as an 'age/education ' nexus. Chan appeared to derive most 
support from the older age group which had been conscious of his ascending 
career since before independence. In those areas where the traditional 
village councils of elders were still influential in fashioning collective 
positions, support from more youthful voters could also be relied on. Even 
in villages where the council had become dominated by a younger age 
group, the political influence of the older men often remained greater than 
that of the organised representative body itself. This can be seen as at least 
a partial explanation of Chan' s past strength on the off shore islands where 
customary generational deferences and authority patterns might be expected 
to persist more strongly than on the mainland with its greater exposure to 
outside influences. Chan ' s extensive business interests in the constituency 
and the resulting patronage network he controlled were also a significant 
feature of his support. In many ways, of course, the two aspects were 
interlinked with traditional deferences being both generational and socio­
economic. 
Ezekia Tomon, the Pangu candidate, was born in Hilalon Village in the 
Susurunga district in 1948. Educated locally and at high school in Rabaul, 
Tomon went on to study at the Administrative College in Port Moresby and 
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later took a Diploma in Development Administration at Birmingham 
University in the United Kingdom. In all Tomon had spent eighteen years 
in the public service roughly half at national level and half in New Ireland 
province. Before he resigned to contest the election, Tomon was Assistant 
Secretary in the Department of New Ireland. Like Chan, Tomon was clearly 
a 'local boy made good' but one of a different generation and political 
outlook. Committed to the public rather than the private sector and 
influenced by the pervasive radicalism of student life in Port Moresby in the 
1970s, Tomon was an advocate of a 'bottom-up ' development strategy and 
dismissive of Chan's  bisnis network and the political clientelism that this 
involved (interview with Ezekia Tomon, Namatanai, 27 May 1987). 
Tomon's  area of support was in the relatively populous districts of East 
and West Coast Central. These were 'traditional ' non-PPP areas. West 
Coast Central in particular had a reputation as a Pangu stronghold. This was 
in part due to the concentration of non-native New Irelanders working on 
plantations there. Many of these were from the Highlands and East Sepik 
provinces, both (though particularly the latter) established areas of Pangu 
support since independence. Additionally, Tomon hoped to wrest control of 
Susurunga division from Chan. Both men were residents of this district, 
(Chan from Hurls village and Tomon from nearby Hilalon), but in Tomon' s 
view, Susurunga as a whole was becoming disenchanted with the fixed 
pattern of PPP domination. In support of this contention, Tomon pointed to 
the recent defection from the PPP of the widely respected provincial 
assembly member, Edward Togimar, who became Deputy Premier in the 
Anis administration. Although Tomon devoted some campaign resources to 
the islands, apart from the politically uncertain Lihir group, he seemed 
doubtful of his support off the mainland. 
As would be expected, in view both of the profile of likely PPP voters 
and of his own political tendencies, Tomon had targetted the younger, more 
educated section of the electorate which was less deferential to tradition. 
Convinced of the gradual disintegration of the authority of those village 
councils dominated by the older generation, Tomon saw the resulting 
vacuum in political influence being filled by the high school (and even 
tertiary level) educated 'returnees' .  In essence, Tomon's  hopes for the 
election were based on the assumption that this process (evidenced in his 
view by the previous national and provincial elections) had advanced to a 
critical point. 
Another related section of the electorate that Tomon hoped to win over 
consisted of the local public servants. Tomon' s own public service career 
and his consequent claims on both their professional solidarity and faith in 
his commitment to protect their interests would, he felt, guarantee their 
backing. Additionally, of course, they were members of that relatively 
highly educated and 'modernised' section of the electorate on which his 
more general hopes were pinned. (Tomon was in fact one of a group of 
candidates in the election officially endorsed by the Public Employees 
Association.) 
The more serious of the two outsiders (both independents) in the 
election was Herman Saet. Saet came from Mahur island in the Lihir group 
and was forty-one years old. He had served for many years as a community 
school teacher in the province and, although contesting a national seat for 
the first time, he had fought and lost in the earlier provincial election. Saet 
was sponsored by a group of Lihir businessmen based in Port Moresby 
known as Pangpang. Their main objective in supporting the candidacy 
appeared to be to lay down a marker of their interest in future negotiations 
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with the national government and the companies involved in the gold 
workings. 
Saet' s support, therefore, could be assumed to come mainly from Lihir 
and his campaign was seen as an end in itself rather than as a serious 
attempt to win power. Nevertheless, his influence on a generation of school 
students and their families in various parts of the constituency was not 
underestimated by his opponents. 
The final candidate was Albert Simele who at fifty-four was the oldest 
in the contest. Simele was from Konogogo Village in the West Coast 
Central district. A subsistence fanner, he was associated with the TFA 
cargo cult. It was from its adherents that his votes would come. TF A was 
a mainland offshoot of the TIA (Tutukuval lsukal Asosieison - United 
Farmer' s  Association) which began in the 1960s on the island of New 
Hanover and which is associated with President Lyndon Johnson. It first 
appeared on the mainland in the Kavieng area before spreading to 
Namatanai (Miskaram 1985). This restricted his appeal to only three 
villages in his home area with a possibility of more in Lihir where a 
connected cult, NIMAMAR, was active. NIMAMAR is an acronym of the 
names of the islands in the Lihir group - Niolam, Mali, Masahet and Mahur 
(Filer and Jackson 1986). Its support was, however, also being canvassed 
by Herman Saet on the basis of a local rather than theological appeal. 
So much then for pre-election perceptions. How did the geographic 
pattern of support for each candidate hold up in reality? At time of 
publishing, the voting figures for each candidate in each electoral district 
were not available. The relative balance of support indicated here is based 
on the recollections of those officiating at the count. Unsurprisingly Chan 
remained dominant in the East and West Coast N amatanai divisions. Less 
expectedly, however, he did rather better than he might have hoped in the 
traditionally 'anti-PPP' districts of East and West Coast Central. These 
divisions appeared fairly evenly split between himself and the Pangu 
candidate, Ezekia Tomon. Tomon however picked up considerable support 
for Pangu in the remote southern mainland divisions of Lak and Kandas, 
winning the former outright and finishing neck-and-neck with Chan in the 
latter. Demography, however, made this more of a moral victory than a 
numerically significant one as the sparse population of this region meant 
little in terms of overall voters. In the crucial district of Susurunga in which 
both Chan and Tomon were resident for electoral purposes, PPP remained 
on top. Within the district, however, voters in the Hilalon/Huris 'home' area 
of both candidates appeared to favour Tomon. 
The island districts showed a somewhat clearer (and less expected) 
trend away from Chan and the PPP. Only Tabar offered Sir Julius a large 
margin of victory. As might be expected, his birthplace Tanga provided 
him with a majority - but one considerably eroded since previous elections, 
Tomon collecting the disaffected votes. Anir too saw Chan winning but 
with Tomon reasonably closely behind. The one island division in which 
the Pangu candidate failed to mount a reasonable challenge to the sitting 
member was Lihir. Here, of course, the challenge to Sir Julius came from 
the independent Herman Saet who, despite early indications of a reasonably 
strong showing, eventually dropped behind the PPP total. Albert Simele did 
badly throughout the electoral districts, winning, as expected, only limited 
support in his home area of West Coast Central and failing to make the 
impact he had hoped for among his co-religionists in Lihir. 
The reality of the geographical distribution of support for candidates 
therefore differed somewhat from their own pre-poll perceptions. Tomon 
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failed to extend Pangu 's hold on East and West Coast Central and was 
finally unable to wrest control of Susurunga from Chan. Pangu did, 
however, achieve a greater success than it might have expected in the more 
remote mainland divisions and on the islands. In the event, the balance, 
although still slowly shifting, remained in the incumbent's  favour. Neither 
the campaign nor the issues upon which it was fought provided the added 
impetus needed to complete the process of erosion of the PPP position. 
The Campaign 
A visitor arriving in Namatanai from Port Moresby in the last weeks before 
the poll might well have wondered if an election campaign was actually in 
progress. In contrast to the National Capital District, the trees were 
unadorned with fly posters and one's ears unassailed by loud hailers. In 
part, of course, this was simply a consequence of the low candidate numbers 
and the dispersed geography of the constituency. But in part, too, it 
conforms to a distinctly relaxed 'Islands style' of campaigning. 
The basic vehicle of campaigning was the village meeting at which 
candidates, or their representatives, by prior arrangement, would spend 
usually between one and two hours addressing the villagers and answering 
their questions. The meetings were invariably conducted in a decorous 
manner with prayers preceding politics and appropriate courtesies being 
shown to the village elders. Often the arrangement would be facilitated by a 
local committee of supporters. In such a dispersed constituency where 
communications could be extremely difficult, not only between the islands 
but on the mainland itself, blanket campaigning was clearly unrealistic. 
Consequently candidates tended to concentrate their efforts on consolidating 
known areas of support and attempting to win marginal ones. Inevitably 
some electoral districts were barely touched by the candidates. The 
southern divisions of Kandas and Lak, by reason both of their inaccessibility 
and sparse population, were largely ignored until the final stages of the 
campaign and then only canvassed in a fairly cursory manner. The disparity 
in the resources of the various candidates also determined much of their 
respective campaigning styles. 
By virtue of his national responsibilities to both government and party, 
Chan himself was only occasionally in Namatanai. His campaign therefore 
was run by various local lieutenants. When the candidate himself did visit 
the constituency, his style - understandably - tended towards the regal with 
his presence enhanced by the attentions of numerous aides. The resources 
of Rabaul-based Pacific Helicopters in which the Chan family had an 
interest were obviously immensely useful in his campaign and gave him a 
mobility which compensated somewhat for the infrequency of his visits. 
The PPP effort in N amatanai was, in theory, based on twelve campaign 
committees - one for each of the eleven electoral districts and one 
responsible for non-native New Ireland voters (mainly the Highland and 
Sepik plantation workers). It proved impossible to verify how far this 
model held up in reality but clearly Chan's  personal and party wealth put his 
campaign organisation on a separate plane from that of his opponents. 
Despite the opposition's  targetting of Namatanai Open, the national 
effort in support of Ezekia Tomon, was far from lavish. Moreover, Tomon, 
although until his candidacy a senior public servant in a provincial 
administration hostile to Chan, did not have any obvious access to state 
resources in his campaign. His transport consisted of one elderly utility and 
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the limit of Pangu Pati support appeared to have been a certain quantity of 
petrol and the use of an outboard motor to aid access to the more remote 
parts of the constituency. Tomon had found it necessary to arrange personal 
loans against Pangu guarantees to finance his campaign. Although 
Melanesian Alliance was supporting his candidacy, there was no indication 
that this support would be financial in nature. His campaign did, however, 
benefit from visits by both his Pangu chief and Leader of the Opposition, 
Michael Somare, in the last phase of the campaign and somewhat earlier by 
Father John Momis the Melanesian Alliance leader. 
Given his relatively limited resources, Tomon's campaign was 
inevitably somewhat selective. The Susurunga division was subject to a 
particular effort. Within Susurunga the Pangu campaign appeared to be 
based on local committees of supporters who prepared for - and 
subsequently attempted to build on - visits by the candidate. Beyond 
Susurunga, Tomon was concerned to 'nurse' the established non-PPP 
divisions of East and West Coast Central. The islands were, as already 
noted, seen as a less promising prospect, but the populous and politically 
unquantifiable Lihir group justified something of a special effort. 
In terms of material resources, the campaign of the independent Herman 
Saet seemed only marginally less well-endowed than that of Pangu. With a 
small group of supporters, Saet's campaign (borne by a vehicle of the same 
marque and vintage as that of Pangu) appeared to concentrate on those areas 
adjacent to the township of Namatanai itself. The extra dimension to the 
Saet campaign was, of course, the effort being made in Lihir, the main 
source of his sponsorship. 
There was no visible sign of any campaign being conducted on behalf 
of the other independent candidate, Albert Simele. With few resources and, 
in all realism, fewer prospects of success, it appeared that Simele was 
content to reap whatever support was forthcoming from his immediate home 
village area and such as could be garnered by his co-religionists in Lihir. 
The Issues 
What were the issues in the N amatanai election? In terms of policy options 
capable of affecting voting behaviour, few 'issues ' were clearly delineated. 
National-level considerations were virtually absent. Pangu's Ezekia Tomon 
did push the Placer share issue to a certain extent in his village meetings but 
it was unclear how much impact this actually had on his listeners. It is 
probably fair to say that any loss of prestige Chan may have suffered as a 
result was insignificant when compared to that which he enjoyed ex officio 
as Deputy Prime Minister and a former Prime Minister. His positive 
'national ' image more than outweighed his 'national ' embarrassment over 
the shares issue . 
At the local level, the issue of rural development (and past lack of it) 
was clearly important in the campaign. Ezekia Tomon, as already observed, 
saw the main division between his and Chan ' s approach to development as 
one between 'bottom-up' and ' top-down ' strategies. Certainly, during 
Chan' s period in office, N amatanai' s economic base had remained 
predominantly in the larger-scale sectors. New projects tended to offer 
waged employment rather than village or community self-sufficiency. 
The coconut plantations first established by the Germans at the tum of 
the century were, of course, no longer the valuable resource they once were. 
The sharp fall in copra prices in the 1970s almost halved New Ireland' s  
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production between 1978 and 198 1 (from 2,2 10 to 1 ,270 tonnes) and many 
plantations had fallen into decline. The response to this in N amatanai was 
not the subdivision and diversification of the plantations into smaller units 
producing a wider range of crops. Instead a process of renovation had been 
undertaken in which the plantations had been maintained as going concerns 
and planted with new hybrid strains of coconut (and, more recently, cocoa). 
The Karu project in East Coast N amatanai was typical, with renovation 
being financed by the Asian Development Bank. 
Chan had a personal financial interest in this sector of the economy. 
His recently acquired Hilalon plantation in Susurunga became a source of 
conflict with the Melanesian Alliance-dominated provincial government 
which wished to see it pass into the hands of the local villagers to be either 
sub-divided or run cooperatively. This issue was emblematic of Chan ' s 
differences with Tomon and was given added significance, of course, by the 
fact that Hilalon was the latter's home village. Livestock development 
likewise had been based on relatively large-scale undertakings. The coastal 
grasslands of Huris, Chan ' s  residential area in Susurunga, were given over 
to a cattle project funded jointly by the PNG Agriculture Bank and the 
European Community. 
Interestingly, the Huris project was the only obvious example of 
ministerial patronage being dispensed in the home area. This evident failure 
on Chan's  part to use his position in government to 'bring development' to 
the area in conformity with now expected political practice in the country 
was a source of some dissatisfaction in Susurunga. According to some 
informants, this disappointment played a part in the close fight between 
Chan and Tomon in this district. 
The perceived shortcomings of Chan in sponsoring infrastructural 
development in the constituency might also offer an explanation for 
Tomon's relatively strong showing in the remote mainland districts of Lak 
and Kandas. This area had for long been neglected in the view of its 
inhabitants. Large parts of it were still accessible only by sea and 
considerable resentment had been felt at the failure of the government to 
extend the main arterial road in New Ireland (the German-built crushed 
coral Buliminski Highway dating from the early days of the century) 
southwards to the tip of the province. 
Local discontent over Chan 's track record did not, though, always mean 
a transfer of support to Tomon. The Pangu candidate too had a past record 
to defend in this respect - not as the incumbent candidate, of course, but as a 
leading provincial public servant. There was evidently some feeling that as 
Deputy Secretary of the province, he was not as effective as he might have 
been in encouraging the establishment of development projects and 
infrastructural improvements in the constituency. 
Beyond the cash cropping of copra and cocoa and livestock 
development, the other two main revenue producing props of the local 
economy - gold and timber - were, by their capital-intensive nature, large­
scale. They were, therefore, somewhat removed from the 'bottom up'/'top­
down' dispute. Both, however, had considerable political significance in 
the constituency. 
Lihir' s gold deposits were being exploited jointly by an American 
company, Kennecott Explorations, which had an 80 per cent share, and the 
Australian-based group, Niugini Mining Ltd, with 20 per cent. Initial 
prospecting had brought progressively more optimistic estimates of the 
eventual yield once the mine began production, probably in 1990 (Post-
Courier, 19 October 1987; Times of Papua New Guinea, 15-21 October 
220 NORMAN MACQUEEN 
1987). This gold was N amatanai ' s most significant source of medium-term 
income. Consequently, Lihir became a focus of considerable attention from 
the candidates. 
In anticipation of Lihir' s future wealth, Chan had himself been 
instrumental in setting up the Lihir Development Association. This was 
intended to coordinate the use of royalty payments to the islanders in 
general development schemes and, crucially, to represent the islanders in 
negotiations both with the national government and the mining companies. 
Such a group would clearly have considerable economic and political 
influence. The implications of this were not lost on local business people, 
many of whom were less than enthusiastic about surrendering such a key 
area of influence to an 'outsider' , for so Chan was represented by his 
opponents in Lihir. (Chan did have a long-standing association with the 
islands through family plantations and other business interests.) The 
election in Lihir therefore took on the character of what one informant 
described as a maus struggle (a conflict for who would be the voice - or 
'mouth' - of Lihir). Against the PPP and the Lihir Development 
Association was ranged the Port Moresby-based Lihir business group 
Pangpang. Pangpang backed the candidacy of Herman Saet because, it was 
felt, he could be expected to put up a strong local challenge to Chan. While 
he obviously had little chance of broader electoral success in the 
constituency, his support in the district would, in the view of his backers, 
provide a clear signal to Chan of the strength of at least a section of local 
opinion. 
The situation in Lihir was further complicated by the calculations of the 
other candidates. Tomon hoped that it would be he and not Saet who would 
be the ultimate beneficiary of the local suspicions of outside manipulation. 
The distrust of Chan was, in Tomon' s  estimation, more likely to express 
itself in support for a candidate capable of actually defeating him in the 
constituency rather than just giving him pause for thought in the Lihir 
district itself. 
Lihir provided one of the clearest examples of Melanesian Alliance 
support for Tomon's Pangu candidacy. The MA leader Father John Momis 
made a campaigning trip to the district a few weeks before voting began. 
The visit by Father Momis, a Catholic priest, to an island group with an 80 
per cent Catholic population was an astute move if not, ultimately, an 
especially successful one in terms of votes in the box. 
Albert Simele, the other independent candidate, also had hopes of 
winning support on Lihir. His calculation, as suggested earlier, was based 
on the association between the NIMAMAR grouping in Lihir and his own 
DFA cult on the mainland. Inter-cult loyalty would, he hoped, turn this 
'vote bank' over to him and deny it to Herman Saet. 
In the event Chan held Lihir - though the first boxes counted apparently 
showed a strong swell of support for Saet. The respective hopes of Tomon 
and Simele proved illusory. Although Saet ' s  share of the Lihir poll 
represented a movement of anti-Chan feeling, from the PPP point of view, 
he provided a very useful repository for such votes. If a significant part of 
the Lihir electorate was going to vote against Chan anyway, it was 
obviously preferable that it should do so in favour of a candidate incapable 
of using these votes to challenge the PPP at the level of the constituency as 
a whole. This circumstance raised a strong suspicion among Pangu 
supporters that PPP was in fact actively sponsoring Saet's  candidacy as an 
effective means of splitting the anti-Chan vote (or at least diverting it away 
from Tomon and his overall constituency total). Hard evidence of this is 
Namatanai Open 221 
impossible to come by but conspiracy theorists recalled what they claim was 
a similar situation in the 1982 election when the 'Pangu' vote was split to 
the benefit of PPP. In 1982 Sam Watnambar, a 'Pangu-supporting' inde­
pendent, took 949 votes thus reducing (according to Pangu activists) the 
vote of the official Pangu contender Isikel Manring. PPP was accused of 
engineering Watnambar's candidacy. In the event Chan's majority over 
Manring was more than three times the number of Watnambar's votes. The 
resentment of Tomon's  supporters appeared to derive from the success of 
the 1987 vote-splitting manoeuvre (if such it was) rather than its immorality. 
Pangu itself, some of its strategists suggested, should put up a prominent 
local 'PPP-supporting' independent in Tanga in the next election in order to 
syphon off 'official ' PPP votes in this marginal division. 
Clearly, Lihir and its gold were destined to be important features of 
New Ireland politics for the foreseeable future. How the potential wealth of 
the islands would influence electoral choice remains to be seen. But it is 
apparent that the islanders were increasingly conscious of their special 
position in the constituency and the province as a whole and were already 
beginning to give political expression to this. The nature of this expression 
in Lihir - one of the most populous as well as the richest of districts - would 
inevitably have a considerable influence on the politics of the constituency 
as a whole. 
As a campaign issue, the commercial exploitation of N amatanai ' s 
timber resources was, for the greater part of the contest, ' the dog which 
didn't bark in the night' .  Although a major social, economic and 
environmental question, none of the candidates appeared anxious to raise it 
as a major political issue. Throughout 1987 the activities of the various 
foreign logging companies active in Papua New Guinea had attracted 
increasing public attention as a series of press revelations of their financial 
and environmental misbehaviour emerged. At the local level, however, the 
issue was far from clear-cut. Many N amatanai landowners and 
communities were in fact quite happy with the short-term benefits they 
appeared to be deriving from a resource not previously regarded as 
particularly valuable. Political interference in this would not necessarily 
have been a vote winner. 
The timber industry in Namatanai had become closely associated with 
PPP. This was in part the natural consequence of the party's  traditional 
domination of the politics of the area both in terms of national 
representation and provincial government. In part too, it was due to the 
PPP's  image as a 'bisnis party' .  It was, however, only relatively late in the 
campaign that Tomon was willing to take a gamble on the timber question 
and raise it as an election issue. 
New Ireland is one of the most heavily exploited logging areas in Papua 
New Guinea. It is also one of the least regulated. There were two 
legislative mechanisms covering logging operations in the country: the 
Forestry Act ( 1973 and 1975) and the Forestry (Private Dealings) Act ( 1972 
and 1974) . Under the first, the state acts essentially as an agent for local 
landowners and manages the financial side of their agreements with the 
logging companies. The Forestry Act also incorporates environmental and 
reforestation safeguards. The Private Dealings Act, however, involves the 
state merely in the designation of Local Forest Areas (LFAs) which the 
companies can then exploit on the basis of 'private ' deals made directly 
with the local landowners (either individuals or communities) .  Most 
logging in Namatanai was carried out under this, increasingly controversial, 
legislation. 
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After some fifteen years of exploitation many LFAs had been clear­
felled and the longer-term environmental and economic consequences were 
beginning to reveal themselves to the landowners. The Commission of 
Enquiry into the forest industry in Papua New Guinea which was set up by 
the national government under Mr Justice Barnett in response to mounting 
public concern was, by the later stages of the election campaign, having 
some influence on opinion in those provinces most involved in logging. 
The community as a whole was beginning to take a more critical view of 
timber exploitation and it began to suggest itself as a viable election issue in 
timber areas. In Namatanai the position of the Nakmai LFA was becoming 
sadly typical. Nakmai was logged by the Japanese company Gaisho (one of 
the most active in Namatanai) through a local joint venture company. 
Reporting evidence to the Barnett Enquiry, the Times of Papua New Guinea 
( 15-21 October 1987) recorded: 
. . .  the N akmai forest has disappeared, the people are split and the 
profits from the operation are unaccounted for. On top of that soil 
erosion is now rampant coupled with mud-slides, destruction of the 
reef and fishing grounds, blockage of waterways and pollution of 
the people ' s  drinking water. 
The effect of the timber issue on the 1987 election in N amatanai is 
difficult to assess. Tomon appeared to have benefitted from raising it in the 
southern part of Susurunga district which had recently attracted the attention 
of the loggers. In future elections, however, it was likely to play a much 
more prominent part in the campaign. As the local consequences of clear­
fell logging become more and more evident and as national concern 
continues to be focussed on the timber industry and the misbehaviour of 
many of those involved in it, the voters in Namatanai are likely to respond. 
The particular form that response will take may well be determined by past 
perceptions of the positions of parties and individuals on the issue. In this 
event, the issue is likely to be fought out to the detriment of PPP. 
CONCLUSIONS, LESSONS AND PROSPECTS 
The re-election of Sir Julius Chan disguised the fact that a distinct trend 
continued to run against the PPP in New Ireland. In Namatanai itself the 
party's  percentage of the vote has progressively declined in the three 
elections since independence - from 64.5 in 1977 to 55.4 in 1982 and finally 
in 1987 to 48.3 If, as we have suggested, the motor of this trend is a 
changing age (and concomitant educational) profile on the part of the 
electorate, then the process looks set to continue. Certainly, no other social 
cleavages capable of cross-cutting this generational one seem likely to 
appear before the 1992 election. 
It is possible that Sir Julius may attempt to mitigate the effects of the 
trend against his party by a more diligent 'nursing' of his constituency. He 
had, of course, shown himself to be sensitive to the dangers of erosion in his 
local position in the past - when, for example, he took the precaution of 
building his new residence in Huris. He might now take account of the 
prevailing feeling that he has not done enough in terms of local 
development at a grassroots level. It is far from clear, however, whether 
this would succeed in altering the perceptions of the younger part of the 
electorate. To a great extent, the Chan wagon is already seen as hitched to 
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the star of isolated 'big ' project development. Opposition to such 
development has become, axiomatically, opposition to Sir Julius. 
In terms of larger, specific issues too, the situation appears not to favour 
a resurgence of PPP's fortunes in Namatanai. It is probable that the whole 
question of timber exploitation will play a much more dominant part in the 
next election. The growing national awareness of this issue is likely to 
combine with increased local concern with the immediate consequences of 
logging in the constituency itself. Already Chan' s Pangu and MA 
opponents are planning a much greater concentration on the issue in future. 
Unless PPP can distance itself from its past associations with the more 
negative aspects of the logging industry in Namatanai - no mean task given 
the longevity of local memories - it may well have a price to pay at the 
polls. 
Another result of the electoral post-mortem carried out by the anti-Chan 
camp was the conviction that the next campaign must pay much more 
attention to the island districts. Given the absence of any particularly active 
campaigning there by Tomon, Pangu's performance was unexpectedly 
good. The assumption that the islands are in some way a PPP reserve 
seems no longer justified. The population of the islands amounts to about 
35 per cent of that of the constituency as a whole, making them 
unquestionably a major electoral prize. 
Ultimately, of course, these speculations depend on a future contest 
which would, essentially, replicate that of 1987 in terms of candidates and 
their affiliations. Such an assumption cannot safely be made. While social 
and demographic changes - and even likely issue areas - can be reasonably 
predicted, the number and nature of the contestants cannot. The 1987 
contest involved what was basically a 'straight fight' between two sides 
distinguished by both local and national political features. There are many 
alternative scenarios, however. There is no certainty, for example, that the 
accommodation between Pangu and Melanesian Alliance will continue 
either at the national or the provincial level. A three-cornered election 
fought out among those two separately and the People's Progress Party 
would produce an entirely different type of contest. Similarly, the 
intervention of other established national parties would change the situation 
even further and would require an entirely new set of electoral calculations. 
There is, moreover, a danger in transposing to future elections the 
somewhat artificial importance given to party identification by the peculiar 
circumstances of the 1987 contest. Inevitably, Chan as national leader of 
the PPP had a particularly strong 'party' association. By extension, his main 
opponent clearly represented the 'national' hopes of the Pangu-MA 
grouping and in consequence had a higher party profile than most other 
candidates. In short, the nature of the candidates affected the terms of the 
contest and focussed an 'unusual' attention on party identity. One of the 
most important determinants of the character of the next election in 
N amatanai will, therefore, be the presence or absence of Sir Julius Chan as a 
candidate. If he decides to run again in N amatanai, the People 's Progress 
Party will obviously pull out all their campaigning stops against the trend of 
the past decade. Likewise, of course, Pangu and/or Melanesian Alliance 
will be making every effort to ensure that the trend continues. Both sides 
will attempt to capitalise on the 'lessons' of 1987 and this may very well 
involve, as we have suggested, a much more elaborate and ruthless set of 
tactics including perhaps the sponsorship of ' splitters' and ' syphons' by 
each side which would be capable of throwing even the most sophisticated 
psephological predictions into disarray. If, however, Chan decides that the 
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electoral trend in New Ireland is irreversible and chooses to run for another 
seat (perhaps in East New Britain), then Namatanai will have much less 
national significance and much less interest to the 1992 generation of 
electoral analysts. 
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The Ele c tions  • I D  Nor th 
S o l o m o n s  P r o v i n c e  
JAMES GRIFFIN WITH S AMUEL KAWONA* 
INTRODUCTION 
The North Solomons province (formerly Bougainville district) consists of a 
major island, Bougainville, 208 kilometres long by 32 to 64 kilometres wide, 
and a minor one, Buka, 56 kilometres by 14.5 kilometres. There are also five 
atolls: Nissan and Kilinailu are Melanesian-inhabited; Tauu, Nukumanu and 
Nuguria are regarded as Polynesian. Nukumanu, 400 kilometres east of 
Bougainville is the furthest of Papua New Guinea's outliers. The total area of 
the province is 8788 square kilometres; the atolls cover 1 92 square 
kilometres. Bougainville Island is mountainous and volcanic reaching to 
2600 metres. The coastal plains are extremely fertile, there are exploitable 
forests and marine resources and a scatter of mineral anomalies of which only 
the copper, gold and silver of the Panguna area (central Bougainville) have so 
far been exploited. Rainfall averages over 2800 millimetres for the province 
with 2100 millimetres on the northern Selau peninsula, 3260 millimetres in 
Kieta (central east coast) and over 5600 millimetres in south western Siwai. 
The southernmost area, Buin, is some eight kilometres from the S hortland 
Island in the Republic of the Solomon Islands and there are marriages, trade 
and 'traditional movement' between them. 
At the 1980 census the population was estimated to be 128,890. A 
growth rate of 3.2 per cent plus immigration may have brought this to 
* James Griffin is Visiting Professor of History at UPNG ; S a m 
Kawona from North Solomons is a graduate in Political S tudies at 
UPNG. They conducted interviews together in Kieta-Arawa in June 
1 987 after which Kawona proceeded to B uin and Griffin to Teop­
Tinputz . They are indebted to a range of informants, some of w h o m  
are recognizable from the text,  others of whom wish to rem ain 
anonymous .  Griffin i s  particu larly indebted to M r  G r a e m e  
Kemelfield ,  Coordinator o f  UPNG Centre, Arawa, and t o  Mr Gayne 
Cooke and Mr Carolus Ketsimur of Tinputz for hospitality a n d  
e n l i g h t e n m e n t .  
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1 60,000 or more in 1 987. In 1 980 more than 53 per cent of the rural 
population were under 18 . The impact of the Panguna mine can be seen in 
the urban growth. In 1966 there were less than 900 people at the 
administrative centre in Buka Passage and only 750 at Kieta. Little more than 
300 lived in Buin town. In 1980 a new town, Arawa erected on a resumed 
expatriate plantation, housed 12,623 people while at the minesite, Panguna, 
there were 3,487 and at the port, Loloho, 1,283. Kieta, some 10 kilometres 
from Arawa had 3,445. In this linked urban complex of 20,838 people, 35 
per cent were born in the North Solomons, 51 per cent in other parts of Papua 
New Guinea and 14 per cent were non-citizens. Buka Passage had 1 ,5 17 
with over 80 per cent North Solomonese and 49 non-citizens while Buin had 
877 with 86 per cent North Solomonese and nine non-citizens. Town 
population would have increased since 1980 with non-North Solomonese 
squatters aggravating inter-ethnic friction. The highest concentrations of rural 
population are on Buka Island, on the eastern coast of Bougainville down to 
Toimanapu, some 60 kilometres south of Kieta, and on the Siwai-Buin 
plains. The large enclave plantations occupying 3 per cent of the land are on 
the east Bougainville and west Buka coasts; there are none in the Siwai-Buin 
area. There is a sealed road for 30 kilometres from Panguna to Arawa and 
then to Aropa airstrip, 20 kilometres south of Kieta. Unsealed roads run 
from Panguna south to Buin via the west and from Toimanapu to Buin, and 
north to Buka Passage, but some rivers are not yet bridged - a sore point in 
the electorate. 
Fifty per cent of Papua New Guinea's cocoa is produced in the North 
Solomons, 60 per cent of it by smallholders while the province ranks second 
in copra production. Households on subsistence only comprise less than 15  
per cent of the total. Logging occurs in  the Buin area where, at Tonolei, there 
is a potential of 500 million square feet while lesser resources are being 
developed at Tinputz (north-east Bougainville), Wakunai (central) and Kieta. 
There are cattle and pig projects and a sizeable chicken hatchery. Small 
industries (bakeries, soft drink manufactures, laundry, workshops, garages) 
service the Panguna-Arawa-Kieta complex. 
From its opening in 1972 to the end of 1983 Bougainville Copper Ltd (a 
subsidiary of Conzinc Rio Tinto of Australia [CRA]) produced 2. 1 million 
tonnes of copper, 223,222 kilogrammes of gold and 523,692 kilogrammes of 
silver with a value of K3. 1  billion, of which gold revenue was roughly a third 
and silver some five per cent. This represented over 50 per cent of Papua 
New Guinea's export receipts during a period when overseas prices 
fluctuated markedly. Panguna ore grades are low and have declined with time 
but BCL has upgraded its technological efficiency and throughput to match 
deeper cuts, longer haulages and increasing costs. When, after self­
govemment (1972), the original mining agreement was renegotiated ( 1974) in 
Papua New Guinea's favour, a moratorium was placed on further 
prospecting. As the Panguna lode is scheduled for virtual exhaustion c.2005 
and a new mine requires some eight years from inception to production, the 
lifting of the moratorium is a pressing political issue. Without it provincial 
revenues, which have included mining royalties, and the general standard of 
living must drop. Popular opinion led by the paramount Melanesian Alliance 
(MA) party has been opposed to further mining (particularly by CRAJBCL) at 
least until problems of land resumption, direction of revenues and royalties 
and national-provincial equity can be resolved on terms more acceptable to 
North Solomonese. This became not only a major plank in the MA campaign 
of 1 987 but, at the time of writing (April 1989) ,  was part of the present 
resurgent movement for secession. 
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The province is divided into three districts which correspond to the three open 
electorates. Buka district (North Open) comprises not only the island itself 
but the southern side of the passage from the Selau peninsula south to include 
Tinputz and Teop speakers and west to Konua as well as the atolls (pop . 
4893). Kieta district (Central Open) includes the Rotokas, Eivo, Torau and 
Nasioi (the last named by far the largest group) .  Buin district (South Open) 
includes Banoni, Nagovisi, Siwai and Buin speakers. If the 'Polynesian' 
outliers are said to speak one language, there are probably some 20 languages 
extant in the province of which the Buka district languages are mainly 
Austronesian, while the Nasioi, Nagovisi , Siwai and Buin are non­
Austronesian. In 1964 the province comprised one electorate; in 1968 three 
(Regional, North, South); in 1972 the present four. (Sir) Paul Lapun, a 
Banoni speaker, won with especially strong support among the Nasioi in 
1964 and in the South in 1968 and, although the N asioi were excised to help 
form Central in 1972, again in 1972 (Ogan 1965, 1971 ;  Anis et al, 1976) , the 
last two times with an absolute majority. The North was won in 1968 and 
1972 by Donatus Mola who joined the People's Progress Party (PPP). The 
Provincial or Regional seat in 1968 was won by Joseph Lue a Siwai Catholic 
supported by the Church and Lapun. He also joined PPP and, losing his 
support and becoming too closely associated with the Australian 
Administration, he was overwhelmingly defeated by Fr John Momis ( 1 8  to 
82 per cent) in 1972. 
No psephological study of the North Solomons has been published since 
the chapter in the symposium on the 1972 elections (Anis et al, 1976) 
although it is  the nation's wealthiest province, has been dissident and 
centrifugal, and set a seemingly inexorable pace for the adoption of provincial 
government (Griffin et al 1979: 147-54, 209- 17; Ballard, 198 1 :  95- 1 32) . It 
would be difficult to make this resume of the 1987 election intelligible without 
trying, however sketchily, to cover this gap. In fact, the last sentence of the 
1 972 study entitled questioningly, 'Towards a new politics?', invites this 
sequel: 
If the new House of Assembly cannot deal successfully with 
emergent Bougainville aspirations toward social, cultural, economic 
and political autonomy, MHAs Bele (Cental Bougainvlle Open) , 
Lapun and Momis may well be swept away by the same forces 
which elected them. (Anis et al 1976: 465) . .  
Donatus Mola was omitted from this admonition. (Raphael Bele was 
elected to Central Bougainville Open.) This was not because Mola was a 
vanguardist of provincial autonomy but because, like Lue, he had been 
'closely associated with the Australian Administration as well with other 
elements . . .  (of the ) "Establishment"' (Anis et al 1976) . Obviously those 
'same forces' which had elected Bele, Lapun and Momis had not, according 
to Anis et al, elected Mola, and Eugene Ogan, the senior member of that team, 
had held in his study of the 1 968 elections that there was 'indeed . . .  a 
division of sociological significance' between the Buka district and the rest of 
the province (Ogan 197 1 :  159). In that Provincial election the North had 
voted heavily in favour of two European candidates, one from Buka Passage, 
the other from Teop-Tinputz, rather than for Melanesian Lue from the south. 
Anis et al implied that 'the traditional northern practice' of vesting 'long-term 
leadership . . .  in older men' may have been part of this sociological 
explanation although Mola's 'political acumen' and ebullient personality were 
undoubted factors in his success. As the North Bougainville electorate in 
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1 987 deviated from the pattern of Central and South, this notion of 'a 
sociological division' should at least be kept in mind. 
DEVEWPMENTS IN THE NORTH SOLOMONS 1972-7 
As, following the 1 972 elections, all four Members of the House of 
Assembly (MHAs) were incorporated into Michael Somare's National 
Coalition, it was assumed by many observers that seccessionism would 
wane. It had been openly articulated at the foundation of the Mungkas (Buin 
word = black) Society in September 1968 by 25 North Solomonese in Port 
Moresby with Lapun as leader. (Mungkas subsequently had corresponding 
branches in major towns and the home province.) The Mungkas declaration 
was occasioned by the Australian administration's intent to resume village 
land for mining facilities paying standard occupation fees of only 5 per cent 
per annum of unimproved capital value plus compensation for damage or 
inconvenience. It was accompanied by the formation of a Bougainville 
Landowners Association and in 1969 a secessionist association, Napidakoe 
Navitu (Griffin 1982). The subsequent defence of their land by the Rorovana 
(and, less dramatically, Arawa) villagers and the publicity given to it led to 
costly delays in the start-up of the mine as well as world-wide notoriety for 
both the multi-national company and the colonial government. By 1970 this 
issue appeared to have been settled amicably on much more favourable terms 
for villagers (Griffin, 1970). Napidakoe Navitu failed to spread province­
wide and a referendum on secession organised by its expatriate secretary 
proved a fiasco. At the Bougainville Combined Local Government Council 
meetings, the two LGCs of Buka and Teop-Tinputz continued to withhold 
support for separatist motions. Lapun himself, then truly the charismatic 
leader of the south and central areas (Ogan 1974), had remained deputy leader 
of Pangu Pati and wavered towards some sort of federal solution [Griffin 
1972: 27 6]),  although very aware of the sentiments of his people. His 
appointment, ironically, as Minister for Mines by Somare locked him into a 
nationalist position where his deficiencies in education rendered him incapable 
of resisting the persuasions of colleagues and their advisers, finding a creative 
devolutionary position or playing an effective role in government. The 
symbolism of his knighthood in 197 4 - the first conferred on a Papua New 
Guinean - was not lost on, or appreciated by, most North Solomonese. 
Lapun, contrary to expectations (Harries et al, 1973), rapidly lost home 
support. 
Tertiary student members of Mungkas who were close to Momis kept the 
discussion of future options for the North Solomons open during 1 972 
(Griffin 1973) while Momis became deputy chairman (de facto chairman ) of 
the Constitutional Planning Committee (CPC). Momis asserted that the North 
Solomons had 'an absolute right to self-determination' (Griffin 1973) and 
continued his severe criticisms of the intrusion of the copper mine and its 
impact on local welfare (Momis and Ogan 1972). He hoped that entrenching 
provincial government in the Constitution would satisfy North Solomonese 
aspirations. An interlude of seemingly conciliatory talk, however, was 
shattered by the killing of two North Solomonese civil servants Rovin and 
Moini) in the Eastern Highlands on Christmas Eve 1972. Immediately the 
whole province rallied behind the separatist banner as resentment of 
mainlanders, especially Highlanders, boiled over. Aside from working on 
the enclave plantations in the province and often not returning home, they had 
migrated to benefit from the mine and its 'multiplier effects'. 
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The Rovin-Moini tragedy also brought Leo Hannett, a university graduate 
and former seminarian (Anis et al 1976: 446-8), back to his province from 
overseas study to mobilise for some effective form of autonomy (Mamak et al 
1 974) . Hannett had been bitterly disappointed at failing to secure the 
endorsement of 'brokers' for the Provincial seat in 1972 in view of his record 
as a protagonist for his people since his seminary days. Intense rivalry 
developed with Momis from that time. To Hannett, Momis appeared to be 
exploiting his priestly network and influence to support a covert and 
inappropriate political ambition. Hannett's Bougainville Special Political 
Committee (Mamak et al 1976) demanded radical decentralisation, influencing 
the Combined Councils' Conference in November 1973 to threaten 'great 
trouble' if an interim provincial government were not immediately granted 
(Griffin 1977). Somare capitulated and the Bougainville Interim Provincial 
Government (BIPG) met in January 1974. (Sir) Alexis Holyweek Sarei, a 
former priest with a degree from a Roman university, who had married an 
American, became chairman. Sarei was from Buka, had been Somare's 
secretary, and was appointed by him District Commissioner of Bougainville 
in 1973 (Somare 1 975:  1 1 5-20). In the early eighties, he became High 
Commissioner to the United Kingdom. 
In spite of this, a series of contretemps ensued (Ballard 198 1 :  1 12-20) as 
Port Moresby failed to provide funding which satisfied the BIPG. It came to 
be agreed that the full mining royalties would be granted to the province as 
well as its negotiated allocation. This was the more practicable as the mining 
agreement was renegotiated in 1974 much in favour of Papua New Guinea. 
Exasperation climaxed for the BIPS executive in May 1975 when it was 
denied the funding for which it had effectively budgetted. Hannett who had 
just previously denounced the idea of secession in an interview with an 
Australian newspaper, now declared it was the only option and was 'non­
negotiable' .  Over 80 per cent of the North Solomonese appear to have 
agreed. Subsequently the national Constituent Assembly threw out the 
section of the Constitution entrenching provincial government. Momis flew 
to the United Nations to put a fruitless case for secession - or what he thought 
to be 'self-determination' . On 1 September 1975, with Hannett giving an 
inspiring oration, the flag of 'the Republic of the North Solomons' was 
unilaterally raised, the name being chosen to connote a prior kinship with the 
rest of the Solomons archipelago. The three significant religious groups 
(Catholic, United Church and Seventh Day Adventists) were represented as 
was the cultic Hahalis Welfare Society which had isolated itself from Church 
and State in the early sixties (Ryan 1969: 286-337). Particularly conspicuous 
was the Catholic bishop, Gregory Singkai, himself a Nasioi, whose pastorate 
contained 75 per cent of the local people (Griffin et al, 1979). He said simply 
that a bishop ought to support his flock. 
The stand-off was finally resolved (without loss of life) in August 1976 
when provincial government was granted. Meanwhile plans had gone ahead 
to dismantle the colonial local government council system and replace it with 
40 community governments. Sarei became premier without a contest; 
Hannett was provincial secretary. Writs had been issued for the Provincial 
and Central Open seats, but few bothered to vote. The new Provincial 
incumbent, Paulus Harepa, was to poll a mere 6.2 per cent against Momis in 
1977 and 4.2 per cent in North Bougainville in 1982. His candidacy was 
regarded as an impertinence. 
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THE PROVINCIAL EI.ECTORATE 1977-88 
Momis (b. 1942), Hannett (b. 1 94 1 )  and Sarei (b. 1934) remained the 
outstanding personalities in North Solomons politics and eventually 
interpersonal conflict enveloped all three. In 197 6 Hannett had progressed 
from provincial planner to provincial secretary but fell out with his colleagues 
and left the government prior to the 1977 elections. Although urged to stand 
for an Open seat to avoid what appeared to some as unseemly competition 
with his fellow hero of autonomy, Hannett contested the provincial seat and 
was defeated, 1 3 ,697 (51.4 per cent) to 8 ,046 (32.5), with two other 
candidates polling poorly. Momis won by over five to one in his home base, 
Buin district, but only narrowly in the North, for Hannett came from Nissan 
atoll. Hannett showed he could have won Central Open, where his activities 
had been most memorable, by leading Momis comfortably there. While 
Hannett campaigned widely and vigorously, Momis relied more on his church 
network and, in general, only replied to his opponent's vehement criticisms 
when they touched on the alleged incongruity of combining priesthood with 
politics. On this issue, which has continued to be hotly disputed, Bishop 
Singkai supported Momis although some members of the hierarchy in other 
parts of the nation doubted the propriety of Momis's position. Momis's 
apologia was entitled 'Priest in Politics for his Fellowmen in the World'. 
Citing documents from the Second Vatican Council he stated: 
As a priest, an ordained minister of God, sharing in the universal 
priesthood of Christ, it is both my responsibility and privilege to take 
a plunge unreservedly into the abyss of human affairs and in fact into 
human history in order to shape my own personal destiny in the 
context of our personal destiny . . .  Our strategy to promote such a 
development of man must be one of an intergral approach and must 
do away with the dualisms such as soul-body, heaven-earth, state­
church . . .  As co-creators we must not be slaves to traditional 
practices and structures for the sake of conformity but rather be 
prepared to update them to suit the modem man (mimeo, 1977) . 
Time would show that the North Solomonese welcomed their MP's 
sacerdotal status rather than the contrary. Whatever supernatural associations 
clung to his priesthood, Momis's reputation for integrity and his rhetoric 
against foreign influence ('neo-colonialism'), big business, multi-nationals 
and the corruption of leadership matched the self-image of a people with an 
ingrained sense of moral superiority and of having been neglected and 
exploited by Port Moresby (Hannett, 197 5). As a celibate he did not need to 
acquire wealth, as seemed imperative for politicians in many other parts of the 
nation. Voters seemed more satisfied with blessings than patronage. Momis 
was unreconciled to the intrusion of CRA/BCL and refused for years even to 
visit the mine. He was the father of a Constitution which had ultimately 
sanctioned provincial government. He was also critical of the paternalism of 
European clergy, while paying tribute to the proselytisation which had 
uprooted indigenous traditions more thoroughly than in most other parts of 
Papua New Guinea All this made him the ethnonational leader in spite of his 
being mixed-race (having a Buin 'big man' father and a part-Chinese/New 
Ireland mother) and lacking the appearance of a Mungkas tru. Momis's 
prestige also elected S .Tulo (North), R.Bele (Central) and A.Anugu (South) 
and ensured their loyalty in Parliament. 
Back at Waigani, Momis and his North Solomonese followers formed 
with John Kaputin (MP, Rabaul) an Alliance for Progress and Regional 
232 JAMES GRIFFIN WITH SAMUEL KA WONA 
Development, hoping to acquire some bargaining power in the formation of 
the new government. He was given the Decentralisation portfolio but 
eventually came to loggerheads with Somare over the latter's failure to bring 
down the Leadership Code. The last straw came when Somare reshuffled his 
Cabinet in late 1979 and took Decentralisation from Momis and Education 
from Kaputin. In March 1980 they helped to topple Somare and Momis 
regained his former portfolio, now called Provincial Affairs. His public 
altercations with the Deputy Prime Minister, (Sir) Iambakey Okuk, a fierce 
opponent of the Leadership Code and a scathing critic of Momis's principles, 
pointed up the Momis dilemma: was he a priest-in-politics or a politician who 
happened to be a priest? The rationale in 1972 for his entry into politics was 
that he would bring Catholic principles to bear on Constitution-making and 
ensure that the North Solomons gained substantial autonomy - both of which 
were achieved. However, his opponents were quick to note that where he 
had previously rejected Somare as 'corrupt', in 1980 he was a partner in a 
Chan-Okuk-led coalition that was even less tender to his principles. Indeed 
Okuk mocked them and on occasion publicly advised Momis to return to his 
presbytery. 
None of this, however, worried the bulk of his constituents. They were 
content that their MPs had access to government and, just as Lapun's 
charismatic sense of mission had been trusted before, so it was with Momis. 
The formation of the 'radical' and censorious Melanesian Alliance party (MA) 
with Kaputin, while giving Momis nation-wide scope did not, because of its 
North Solomonese core, divest it of its special ethnonational identity at home. 
Other parties as such, had not had, and were not to have, much attraction. 
Lapun's adherence to Pangu became significant (and fatal) only when he 
declined to support secession. Until then it was just a mysterious strategy 
the efficacy of which was best known to him. When, at a public meeting 
with Somare in late 1982, Hannett openly embraced Pangu (and national 
unity) , of which he had been a member at university, it cost him future votes 
especially because Somare had expressed exasperation with provincial 
government and wanted its powers curtailed. 
Hannett's success in defeating a lethargic Sarei ( 14,244 to 8,993 votes) 
for premier in 1980 spurred MA to more intensive organisation. Hannett had 
by then become a successful businessman in his own right and, as chairman 
of the directors of Bougainville Development Corporation (BDC) , had 
espoused pragmatism, productivity and profit. On his initiative BDC had 
been founded in 1974-5 with the following objectives: 
1. To enable Bougainvilleans to share in the profits being generated 
by the presence of Bougainville Copper on the Island (instead of their 
going to) . . .  foreign-owned companies and being exported . . .  
2. To enable people not living in the immediate vicinity of the mine, 
through a shareholding in BDC, to share in profits that were being 
generated in the vicinity of the mine and thus to spread the wealth and 
avoid the possibility of a wealthy elite developing in the immediate 
vicinity of the mine at the expense of the majority of the people on 
Bougainville. 
3. To undertake certain other viable economic projects which would 
be of assistance to the people, although not necessarily undertaken to 
make profits, for example, Bougainville Air Services (Hannett, 
1979). 
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Hannett went on to add that 'the long-term objective of the Corporation, once 
firmly established, was to move into the rural areas and undertake 
development and agricultural projects' for which 'positive plans were in 
hand' in 1979. However, the immediate aim was to acquire funds through 
penetrating service industries associated with BCL. By 1984, BDC was 
involved in airline operations, catering services, property rental, tavern and 
liquor sales operations, commercial laundries, welding and steel fabrication, 
hardware and timber supply, automotive repairs, polyurethane manufacture, 
paper products, limestone quarrying and investments in other companies. To 
fulfill its longer term objective, it moved into plantation acquisition in 1982. 
BDC was run on modern business lines; it had paid average dividends in 
excess of 20 per cent per annum; the total investment had been returned to 
shareholders; its senior management had been localised on performance not 
just on principle. In 1984 its net assets stood at K6 million and it was 
uniquely successful in Papua New Guinea (BDC, 1 984). In 1 987 BDC 
recorded a profit after taxation of K94 1 ,863 (Times, 1 1 .June 1987). BDC's 
management took the 'capitalist' approach that its first duty was to its 
shareholders, among whom conspicuously were the Provincial Government 
and the local Catholic Church, and that it was up to government to use the 
benefits for social development. This 'trickle down effect' philosophy was 
anathema to MA which believed that BDC should concentrate on promoting 
'grassroots' development and small-scale business activities. Almost from its 
inception clashes occurred between BDC and Provincial Government on the 
grounds of personalities as well as policies. (Hannett' s resignation as 
provincial secretary resulted from such a clash.) Although notionally 
opposed to political intetference in or even close government association with 
BDC, Hannett as premier in 1980-4 pressed the advantages of being chairman 
while Momis, Bele, Anugu and MA continued to oppose virtually any BDC 
initiative. While Hannett was regarded as an effective premier, he was widely 
depicted as 'a self-serving capitalist' hostile to the traditional egalitarian ethos 
and too supportive of a national integration which brought unwelcome 
immigrants to the province. 
Sarei's defeat in 1980, so unexpected by Momis supporters, brought 
about a major shake-up in organisation. This proved effective in the 1982 
national elections when some 75 per cent more voters turned out and all four 
incumbent MPs were triumphantly returned. Momis with 72 per cent of the 
votes defeated three opponents. Only the Pangu candidate, John Dumit, is of 
interest. Although he had been chairman of the Panguna Mungkas 
Association and a prominent supporter of secession in 197 5-6, he polled only 
14 per cent. Somare had visited Arawa in April 198 1 as Leader of the 
Opposition to form links with Hannett and returned in 1 982 during the 
campaign, to little avail. Following the elections he defeated Momis 66 to 40 
for the prime ministership. All North Solomonese MPs were now out of 
government. This was one result of having an MA bloc and little satisfaction 
was felt when in November Somare declared in Arawa in the company of 
Premier Hannett that he personally represented North Solomonese interests. 
The need to have diverse representation was an argument heard in 1987. 
An increase in the number of voters also occurred in the provincial 
elections of 1 984 (roughly 38,000 against 23,000 in 1980), when Sarei 
(23,538 against 8,993), with MA backing, turned the tables on Hannett 
( 1 3 ,345 against 1 4,244). In due course Somare appointed the latter 
Chairman of the Papua New Guinea Investment Corporation in Port 
Moresby. Fearing, among other reasons, that the MA-dominated Provincial 
Government, would take control, the BDC Board in February 1985 issued 
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700,000 new shares in a private placement at considerably lower than market 
valuation. When the Provincial Government did not immediately take up its 
option to purchase them, the Board, dominated by Hannett and its managing 
director, Paul Nerau, sold them precipitately with Hannett and Nerau 
purchasing substantial portions and, on paper, making a financial coup. The 
shareholding of the Provincial Government was reduced from 5 1  to 37 per 
cent; the Catholic Church and other shareholders had their assets at least 
temporarily diluted. The Board meeting was alleged to have been irregular 
and the whole issue at the time of writing is still subject to litigation. The 
electoral upshot was confirmation in the minds of MA supporters that Hannett 
and his associates were not only 'capitalist' but unscrupulous as well. 
In 1988 Hannett returned to contest the premiership with the support of a 
new body, the Bougainville United Group (BUG), which attracted local 
business leaders and the support of the North Solomons-born Archbishop of 
Port Moresby, Peter Korongku, who turned up during Hannett's campaign. 
Hannett's only hope lay in the split in the MA vote between Anthony Anugu 
from the south - believed to be preferred by Momis - and Joseph Kabui, a 
Nasioi from the mine vicinity. Anugu (who is described below) had foregone 
contesting a third term in the National Parliament in the hope of winning the 
premiership. He had for years been especially strident in denouncing Hannett 
(whose wit often excoriated his opponents) but Anugu's turbulent personality 
seemed unlikely to attract substantial support other than in the south from 
which even the police had been ejected for a time during Hannett ' s  
premiership . With approximately the same turnout as  in 1984 Kabui won 
with 40 per cent of the votes. Hannett gained ( with less votes than 
previously) 28 per cent, Anugu 27 per cent, and one minor opponent, 4-5 per 
cent. Kabui won 65 per cent of votes in Central, losing only Arawa town to 
Hannett; Anugu won 54 per cent in the South; Hannett 45 per cent in the 
North where Kabui gained 34 per cent. Hannett was especially strong in the 
atolls and in Teop-Tinputz where his former deputy and the incumbent MP 
lived; Kabui prospered in the most dissident Central areas. While Hannett 
had not been able to compete with Sarei in the latter's home district in the 
North in 1984, he was able to defeat less distinguished candidates from other 
districts in 1988.  
NORTH SOLOMONS PROVINCIAL ELECTION 1987 
Elections in the North Solomons have not been flamboyant and expensive 
affairs and relatively little money appears to be spent on publicity although 
posters and T-shirts were in evidence around Kieta-Arawa. Only MA had a 
pyramidal organisation and a provincial co-ordinator, electorate co-ordinators 
and community government committees with ward committees to provide 'a 
follow-up campaign blitz', said the purportedly confidential 'Election Strategy 
1987. ' The ward committees were to be managed by people 'who know, feel 
(sic) and understand the people of that area'. Each village was to have a 'leg 
soldier' who would canvass votes 'on a person to person basis. . . .  There can 
be more than one leg soldier in a village', said the Strategy, 'or a whole 
village population can be leg soldiers for that matter'. Advice was issued as 
to programming and punctuality, avoiding defamation, gaining endorsements 
from prominent leaders and opinion-makers, neutralising opposition and even 
setting up a 'spy network' to report on the opposition so that the campaign 
manager could prepare a 'counter-attack'. In the North Solomons, MA had 
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the Catholic Church network to supplement, or even pre-empt, party 
organisation. 
MA campaigners had little need to labour the party's general principles 
and platform when there were available the specific issues of the BDC shares 
and the rise of 'Hannett's capitalist class' together with the long-standing 
grievances and claims associated with the mine. Now that the exhaustion of 
the Panguna mine was in sight, moves were being made to lift the moratorium 
on further exploration. Economic consultants in 1982 had prepared a 
scenario for the provincial government on what might be expected if there 
was no further mining (North Solomons Provincial Government [NSPG] 
1982) However, while the prospect of reduced provincial revenues and 
lower living standards in an expanding population stimulated 'realism'.among 
the business-oriented, it aggravated the distemper among those who felt that 
mining had despoiled them. The environmental degradation was glaring 
enough to the Nasioi,as was the presence of unwelcome and often disruptive 
and unproductive immigrants. But to this were added beliefs that dust from 
the mine was responsible for any run-down in crops and that it was causing 
illnesses in children. Momis was clearly tuned into this as yet subdued rage 
and, in response to it and his own long-standing antipathy to BCL ('the alien 
monster in out midst') , he produced his 'Bougainville Initiative'. 
Under the heading 'THE WILD PIG CANNOT NOW HIDE FROM THE 
PEOPLE',  Momis accused BCL of having 'rooted up the crops in the 
villagers' gardens' and demanded 'a fresh start . . .  for self-reliance and 
dignity'. The 'Initiative' represented 'many years of careful thought' and 
offered Paul  Quodling, the Managing Director of BCL, 'the gift of 
understanding' and 'the opportunity to crown your long career with the 
achievement of gaining the friendship of the people'. It offered 'a win for 
everyone, and loss for no-one'. BCL was asked to give directly to the 
Provincial Government three per cent of its gross income or four per cent of 
net sales revenue. This could easily be saved, he said, by more efficient 
production practices. Momis accused BCL of transfer pricing, of 'salting 
away K60 million a year (to) . . .  return to the smelters who buy our copper'. 
The agreement between the national government and BCL was to be 'outside 
the scope of this agreement' but it too needed renegotiation .  Momis 
condemned BCL's 'philanthropic' arm, the Bougainville Copper Foundation, 
for deliberately fostering dependency, and placed 'moral blame' on BCL 'for 
the BDC scandal' .  The 'Initiative' was seeking 'seed capital, to generate 
communal funds which are self- sustaining, and which instil pride in 
community development'. The letter to Quodling ended wishing him 'a 
happy retirement to cap off a successful career' and with the salutation, 'May 
God bless you'. 
The reaction of most people unfamiliar with mining and government 
practice was obviously favourable and foreshadowed support for the direct 
action of the 'rebellion' of 1988-9. Those among the educated who saw the 
'Initiative' as demagogic were apt to ask why Momis had not raised such 
issues in 198 1 when the BCL agreement ( 197 4) came up for its seven year 
review as he was at that time a senior minister. Even where they concurred 
with the Prime Minister, however, that 'it was incredibly irresponsible and 
politically sinful' and damaged the nation's 'standing' (Times, 28 May 1987), 
there was agreement that the province should receive greater returns. It was 
Momis's timing and grasp of procedures that were wrong, they felt. 
Inevitably the issue of Momis's priesthood returned, with Sir Julius 
Chan, Deputy Prime Minister and also a Catholic, this time calling Momis a 
'hypocrite' who ignored the Pope's directive for priests to keep out of politics 
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(P-C:I. 8 May 1987).  Momis's critics even raised the question of why he had 
failed to take up the matter with the Pope or even greet him when the latter 
visited Papua New Guinea in 1984. Hannett wrote an 'Open Letter to the 
Bishops' asking why politics was not 'the laity's vocation per se' and 
accusing Momis of being 'partisan' and 'divisive' .within the church (Times, 
14 May 1987). The Bishops' Conference sidestepped the question by saying 
that Bishop Singkai had granted Momis 'an exemption .. .in exceptional 
circumstances' and the Conference would support that decision (Times 2 1  
May 1987). Momis saw this a s  'a vote of confidence' and denied there was 
any 'dichotomy' (Times 7 May 1987). He told the bishops his work was 
that of 'the visionary, for . . .  prophecy is needed today' .  He was known as 
'the conscience of Papua New Guinea', the opponent of 'individualism', he 
said. He cited the role of Cardinal Sin in the recent Philippines crisis (Momis 
1987). This led the chairman of PPP, Zibang Zurenuoc, to ask if the Catholic 
Church 'was behind Melanesian Alliance as a whole' and whether he should 
not recommend his Lutheran church to back PPP. Fr Momis's constitution 
'defines quite clearly the separation of church and state', he argued. (Times, 
7 May 1987) 
Momis in 1 987 faced two opponents, the more surprising being S arei 
who resigned the premiership in 1987 ostensibly because of ill-health. For 
publicly unspecified reasons he had become disillusioned with MA and 
Momis. 'Momis has never run anything not even a parish' , he said. It was 
clear to him that the province would need some new large-scale project in the 
future and Momis had not even taken an interest in repossessing the large 
plantations. Sarei was sacked from MA in April 1987 (Times 23 April 
1987). Sarei was extraordinarily confident of winning and did not seem to 
realize that the reasons for his resignation as premier were being derided. The 
third candidate, Alois Banono (54) , a former policeman officer from Buka, 
was endorsed by PPP. The result was a forgone conclusion with Momis 
gaining 70. 8 per cent, Sarei 17 .6 and Banono 1 1 .6. 
In spite of his continued success, one notable fact was the disrespect with 
which some of his critics now spoke of Fr Momis, where previously his 
integrity, if not his political judgement, was credited. Inexorably this led 
even to aspersions being levelled at his not being truly a 'Mungkas' .  There 
were reports of his having been heckled at a few meetings, something 
unprecedented in the writer's experience. 
NORTH BO UGAINVILLE OPEN 1977-87 
The elections here were won in 1977 and 1982 by Sam Tulo (b. 195 1 )  from 
Lemanmanu, a populous village in north Buka island. Tulo was listed as 'a 
trade store owner' but had been a superintendent of schools in the province. 
Having indicated his support for secession in 197 5 he was posted to the 
Highlands whereupon he resigned. Although a member of the United 
Church, support from Momis overcame some of that handicap. His 1977 
victory over Mola, however, was narrow: 3, 178 votes or 30.3 per cent to 
3,036 or 29.9 per cent. Mola was not granted a recount. Of the four other 
candidates, three were also Halia speakers: one was described as a 'wantok' 
of Mola's (423 votes); another, Michael Samo (854 votes), was actually a 
relative with whom Mola had had a land dispute. This was put forward as a 
reason for his standing. As the former commander of the riot squad in Arawa 
during the secession 'troubles' of late 1975, he stood little chance and might 
have known it. Mola could therefore be deemed unlucky. The Hahalis 
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Welfare Society did not put forward a candidate but probably gave a reduced 
vote to Joseph Hapisiria Nangoi ( 1 ,785 votes). Only one candidate came 
from the Teop-Tinputz area, Samson Purupuru of the United Church, who 
had had his life threatened when he opposed secession. Purupuru stood four 
times for Parliament with reducing support: 27 per cent in 1968, 12. 1 in 
1972, 1 1 . 1  in 1977 and 8. 1 in 1982. His 1 ,  160 votes in 1 977 fell well short 
of what another sole candidate from his area might have achieved. 
By 1982 Tulo, having been minister for Education under Chan, enjoyed 
increased prestige and an improved personal network as well as MA's 
improved organisation. He almost doubled his vote ( 42.4 per cent) while 
Mola was now regarded (with 20.4 per cent) as too old. Of the six other 
candidates only the two Teop-Tinputz candidates need further remarks: 
Purupuru (l,254) because he took votes from Carolus Ketsimur ( 1 ,635), a 
Catholic who had been educated in Australia and a programme director of the 
NBC seemingly groomed for chairmanship. Highly articulate, he 
nevertheless had a major strike against him being separated from his Catholic 
Australian wife. He has since lived with another Australian. Although it may 
be unimportant in places like the Highlands, 'divorce' disqualifies in the 
North Solomons. The two polled nearly 3,000 votes between them. 
In 1987 Tulo withdrew, allegedly somewhat disillusioned with MA and 
Momis. He was also alleged to have reduced his chances of re-election by 
giving too much patronage to United Church villages. However, he was not 
interviewed and Buka was not visited by the writers. Tulo was said, 
however, to have ostensibly supported the MA candidate, James Togel. 
Togel (4 1)  was born at Tahetahe, Buka Island, and educated there and at 
Catholic seminaries in Rabaul and Port Moresby. An Arts graduate of 
UPNG, he served as a teacher and then in provincial government, becoming 
Provincial Commissioner for Liquor and eventually Provincial Secretary. As 
such he enjoyed prestige but, living in Arawa, his campaign (it was said) was 
left in the hands of MA organizers, one of whom was said not to be in high 
repute. PPP again endorsed Mola while Thomas Anis ( 44, BA from 
UPNG), a former minister in Hannett's cabinet, was endorsed by Pangu. 
Surprisingly PAP had a local endorsee, John Banono (54), a former president 
of the Police Union who had been involved in the conflict with the rebellious 
Hahalis Welfare Society on Buka in 1962 (Ryan, 1969: 292) . He had been 
most unsuccessful as a candidate in Central Bouganville in 1982. All the 
other eleven candidates - there were 14 in all - were independents. Aside 
from the eventual winner, the most interesting of them was Pasini Frank 
Marena, originally from the Mortlock ('Polynesian') atoll, who held land on 
the Selau peninsula and was a prosperous farmer and logger. He was a 
patron of youth and women's groups and actively campaigned, using posters. 
He was expelled from MA with Sarei in April 1987 but must have taken some 
of its vote. 
With so many candidates, mostly from Buka, there was the obvious 
danger of splitting Togel's vote there too. Political brokers in the Teop­
Tinputz area were aware of this and, feeling that it was time the MP came 
from their area, dissuaded anyone from competing with Michael Ogio, 
Hannett's former deputy premier. They correctly calculated that, if the Teop­
Tinputz vote could be delivered together with that of Hannett's home base of 
Nissan atoll and of the Kunua-Hahon west coast of Bougainville Island, Ogio 
could win. Resources were concentrated accordingly. Among his advisers 
were former candidates, Gayne Cooke (Ogan 197 1 :  1 50-1), Carolus Ketsimur 
(above), Samson Purupuru (above) and prominent local politicians. Ogio (b. 
1942), who was a Catholic Church member, and was educated at Boin and 
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Keravat (Rabaul) high schools before attending Port Moresby Teachers' 
College. He passed through the primary and secondary teaching services, 
was recommended in 1970 for accelerated promotion, studied educational 
administration at ASPA, Sydney, and became a senior inspector in West New 
Britain before being appointed in 1974 to his home province. He was 
sympathetic to secession in 1975-6 and in 1980, after declining a transfer to 
the Southern Highlands, was elected to the provincial assembly. He accepted 
Hannett's view that the province should give priority to its economic base. 
From visits to both Catholic and United Church villagers it was evident he 
was acceptable to both. He was, however, cautious as to what his party 
affiliation might become. It appeared to be either pro-Pangu or pro-PPP for 
which there were already endorsees, perhaps fortunately for Ogio. He and 
his backers expressed concern that a solid MA bloc of MPs in the North 
Solomons meant exclusion for substantial periods from government , e.g. 
under Somare (August 1982 - March 1985) and under Wingti from 
November 1985. After supporting Somare for prime minister in 1987, Ogio 
was to accept a ministry from Wingti in 1988 not long before Namaliu, and 
Pangu, supported by MA, came to power. 
The results for the six candidates mentioned above were:-
Michael Ogio (Ind) 
James Togel (MA) 
Pasini Frank Marena (Ind) 
Donatus Mola (PPP) 
Thomas Anis (Pangu) 
John Banono (PAP) 
3,379 votes 
2,828 I I  
1 ,774 I I  
1 ,376 I I  
1 ,215  I I  
496 I I  
19 .5 % 
1 6.3 I I  
10.2 I I  
7.9 I I  
7.0 II 
2.9 I I  
The other eight candidates polled between 7 .5 and 1 .7 per cent. A Tolai 
resident, Norman Ereman, scored 1 .9 per cent. 
CENTRAL BOUGAINVILLE OPEN 1977-87 
Fewer voters (6,387 to 7,40 1 )  turned out in 1977 than in 1 972 in Central 
Bougainville Open in spite of the turmoil of the preceding years. It is  
significant that the Nasioi, the dominant language group, had voted in the 
three previous elections for non-Nasioi : Lapun (Banoni) and Bele (Torau) 
(Ogan, 1 965 and 197 1 ;  Anis et al, 1 976) .  Ogan believes they have a 
prejudice against voting for one another (personal communication). In 1977 
there were nine candidates, none at tertiary level and three at primary level 
only, in an electorate which had produced a number of North Solomonese 
graduates. Bele (then 29) had described himself in 1972 as a 'catechist' with 
five years schooling; in 1977 this appeared to have been upgraded to Form II. 
His claim on his electors rested with his leadership of the Rorovana people in 
the land resumption struggle in 1969, his treasurership in N apidakoe N avitu 
and his strong support for secession. He rarely spoke in Parliament and had 
resigned his seat in 1975. The main challenge to him in 1977 came from 
Raphael Niniku (49) who had replaced him in the 1976 by-election. Niniku 
came from Arawa village, was also involved in the land disputes, and had an 
ambivalent reputation in relation to the 'Establishment' . This and his 
membership of PPP explains his opportunism in taking Bele's seat. As a 
youth he had been a scout with the Australian forces against the Japanese, 
from 1946 an employee of the Health department, and during 1 966-72 
president of the less than popular Kieta LGC (Griffin, 1977). However, he 
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had also been among those protesting against the Australian administration to 
the United Nations in 1962 (Ogan 197 1 :  1 39) and had supported calls for a 
local referendum (Anis et al 1976: 458) Bele won with 26.2 per cent of the 
votes to Niniku 2 1 .8.  Their respective votes in 1972 had been 40.6 and 8.6. 
Lapun had then delivered the vote to Bele. 
In 1982 voters increased by nearly 200 per cent to 17 ,338,  no doubt 
owing to MA 's better organisation, better campaigning by Bele and better 
educated candidates of whom three were tertiary educated. Although there 
were now eleven candidates, Bele procured 32.8 per cent of the vote with an 
endorsed Pangu rival, Patrick Nianko (35), gaining 1 8. 1  compared to 8.7 per 
cent in 1977 . Educated to standard six, Nianko had been President of the 
North Nasioi community government and, formerly in 1972-5, a committee 
member of the Bougainville Mining Workers Union. Some observers felt 
that Nianko would have done much better but for competition from other 
Nasioi such as Theodore Miriung (9.7 per cent) who came third in the poll. 
Miriung (in 1988 a justice of the Supreme Court) was a law graduate and 
provincial secretary. Refusing to accept early nomination, he finally did so 
only the day before they closed and did not campaign on principle. His 
support came mainly from his home base in the North Nasioi and the 
contiguous Eivo area. A cogent debater he spoke at a forum during Somare's 
pre-poll visit - he was Independent Pangu in effect - and was scornful of 
MA's 'empty idealism'. Miriung saw Momis as a 'dreamer' who would have 
been better equipped for politics as a family man with some experience in 
business. Three Highlanders stood and incurred local resentment for doing 
so. Together they polled 19 .5 per cent - a surprisingly high total, suggesting 
that mainlanders had for once been carefully mobilised. 
Of eight candidates in 1987, four had some post-secondary education. 
Nevertheless Bele (36.7 per cent) and Nianko ( 16.9) again led the poll. Bele 
was now clearly one of the least educated MPs in Papua New Guinea. 
Informants agreed that his parliamentary and electoral performance had not 
changed but that, with MA endorsement and his rapport with N apidokoe 
Navitu and cultic areas, he could not lose. Momis's 'Bougainville Initiative' 
spoke most directly to Central electors. Nianko was interviewed in the 
newsagency of Barry Middlemiss (Anis et al, 1976: 457-9; Griffin, 1982), an 
Australian who had been the first secretary of Napidakoe Navitu and polled 
second to Bele in 1972. Nianko had since become a contributor to Pangu 
funds. He praised Hannett's performance as premier; approved of BDC as 'a 
business arm not a political institution' which through its profits benefitted the 
people; preferred Momis to Sarei ; thought 'redskins' created problems but 
that they could be overcome with 'proper settlement'; wanted a second mine if 
it 'operated in line with the people's aspirations'; saw the national government 
as doing little for the North Solomons and wanted a national high school in 
the province as well as additional primary and secondary schools. To Nianko 
BCL was 'a mixture of good and bad' which 'helps the whole country rather 
than local people'. Pangu's budget, he said, was only Kl ,300 with 2,000 
posters and two dozen T-shirts only being despatched to each electorate in the 
province. Supplementary donations came from prominent people but he did 
not know the amount. 
Two other parties were represented. PDM endorsed Joseph Monsen 
originally from the Sepik who became a farmer in Wakunai where he married 
a local woman. He had graduated in Education at UPNG and been a training 
officer with BCL. He was prominent in social welfare. He polled 16.4 per 
cent, apparently doing well in his home area, and finished third. Superficially 
more promising was the PPP endorsee, James Koibo (b. Kieta 1944), who 
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had been in administration for 1 8  years, and had been deputy provincial 
commissioner in Madang in the mid-seventies as well as president of Madang 
Mungkas, before becoming Administrative Secretary of the North Solomons 
1 978-85 .  He had not supported secession in 1975 .  He was currently 
personnel manager for Buin Earth Moving company. He saw PPP as a 
coherent well-led party which wanted to foster rural industries, thought the 
resolution of the Placer share issue should be left to the law not to politicians, 
approved of both Sir Julius Chan and the Leadership Code (but it was 
unfortunate, Koibo felt, that it was not implemented) , saw the thrust of the 
'Bougainville Initiative' as being proper but felt the timing and method were 
wrong. Koibo had helped to prepared a paper on revision of the Mining 
Agreement in 1 98 1  but Momis had not pushed it, he said. His campaign 
manager, Aaron Marena, a prominent businessman in the timber industry, 
who had come fourth in 1982, praised Hannett against Sarei as premier and 
complained that the province's national MPs were poor at pushing for 
advantages for the North Solomons. He accepted the BDC explanation on the 
share issue and felt that the controversy surrounding BDC was 'more 
personal than ideological'. Koibo appeared to have a rational program, an 
electoral strategy and prestige. He polled only 9 per cent of the votes. He 
was unable to match even the United Church independent, Patrick Itta ( 14.4 
per cent), from Guava minesite area, who as ' training services 
superintendent' with BCL may have drawn votes from the towns as well as 
his fellow churchgoers. 
The three 'also-rans' were the former priest, Edmund Tsivara (50), from 
the dissident Kuka village near Kieta, who was currently secretary of 
Napidakoe Navitu. A lacklustre candidate who, to a large extent, would have 
been in competition with Bele; he polled only 3 .7 per cent. Two 
independents from the Highlands, Elisa Tade (2.0 per cent) and Amgoi Dern 
(0.9), were ridiculed, the latter having no formal education and being listed as 
'unemployed' and living in the 'Kieta settlement' . A general concern of all 
other candidates was migrant 'squatting' in the province. 
SOUTH BOUGAINVILLE OPEN 1977-87 
Any lingering doubts about the overwhelming strength of secessionism in the 
parochial south were erased when Sir Paul Lapun could poll only 27 .9 per 
cent in 1977 (cf. 1964-72 in Ogan, 1965 and 197 1 , and Anis et al, 1976). 
The victor, Anthony Anugu (3 1 ), from Siwai, had been a strident advocate of 
secessionism pre- 1970. Educated to Form III at the Marist Brothers, Rigu, 
he had been secretary of the once promising but ultimately bankrupt 
cooperative, BUSIBA (Buin-Siwai-Banoni) ,  and president of the Siwai 
Elcom. A reputation for turbulence did not deter Momis from endorsing him 
and with 47 .2 per cent of the votes he defeated four opponents. Matthew 
Sipisong, a United Church village gospel preacher, was again (Anis et al 
1976) a forlorn candidate (8.9 per cent) . More interesting was the graduate, 
Ignatius Namake, from Siwai, who resigned as Assistant General Manager of 
the Papua New Guinea Electricity Commission but polled only 8.6. 
In 1982 Anugu's percentage rose to 64 against four opponents with 
La pun, by then a reluctant campaigner (rather than, as in the past, inactive), 
gaining 23.3 . Sipisong and another United Church candidate, Obed Konki, 
polled 8.4 between them and an independent Pangu candidate from Buin, 
Thomas Lugabai, an associate of Hannett's, gained less than 5 per cent. 
Hannett's attempt as premier to restrain disorder in the south made him more 
unpopular. Anugu was reported to have published a broadsheet with the 
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heading: ENOUGH OF HANNETT'S COMMUNIST GOVERNMENT 
SLA VISHING FOLLOWING SIR JULIUS CHAN. Although in an 
agriculturally fertile area, Buin in 1 982 was an underdeveloped, unkempt, 
unruly town - not an advertisement for self-reliance. 
Anugu did not recontest in 1 987 apparently because he aspired, with 
Momis's support, to become premier. His place was taken by his former 
campaign manager, Peter Kungka (39), from Buin. Billed as 'a subsistence 
farmer', he had a BA in missiology and diploma in broadcasting and had 
studied at a Rome university in 1 982-4. From 197 4-6 he had been manager 
of Buin Producers Cooperative and in 1979, and 1984-7, Communications 
Officer with the North Solomons Catholic diocese. Obviously he was a 
lynchpin in MA's upgraded strategy. Although the result seemed to be 
predictable, a few informants suggested that Michael Laimo, also from Buin, 
might split the Kungka's vote. Laimo, a provincial politician since 1980, had 
been a forceful political antagonist of Hannett and a prominent supporter of 
MA until expelled with Sarei in April. His personal life, however, was 
against him: he was a non-churchgoer and a 'divorcee' who had taken, while 
on a 'study course' in Japan, a wife from whom he was also separated. He 
gained 12.3 per cent against Kungka's 53.5. Ignatius Namake (Independent) 
improved his vote to 1 1 .9 probably getting some of Anugu's Siwai vote. 
Three other parties endorsed candidates. Thomas Lugabai did marginally 
better for Pangu with 6.5; Dominic Koroka 4.2 for PPP; Joseph Noro, an 
accountant and formerly a taxation officer for the provincial government, 
finished last of nine candidates for PDM with 2.3 per cent. Of the three other 
independents, Lembias Magasu Mangug from Siwai, who was a B .Sc and 
one of the first nationals to be employed on a university staff, polled 4.3 per 
cent. He had previously contested the 1 984 premiership with no hope of 
success. Sipisong's support dwindled further to 3.2 and a former teacher 
from Siwai, Peter Mikuasi, gained 2.3 per cent. Four candidates had degrees 
and all others except Sipisong had completed grade 10 or its equivalent. 
CONCLUSION 
With first-past-the-post voting, feeble party organisation and superfluous 
contestants, it is notorious in Papua New Guinea that the quality of a victor 
does not necessarily indicate the consensus of the constituents or, where 
he/she gains a low minority of votes, anything more than the roughest 
preference. A retrospect of the elections since 1964 in the North Solomons, 
however, points to several morals. While before independence party labels 
probably offered no advantage at all to Lapun, Mola and Lue, after 1975 all 
labels except MA appear a hindrance. The central issue in politics has not 
been just spoils for a particular electorate but the grievances, rights and 
identity of the province as a whole. These have been encapsulated within the 
'philosophy' of MA which has been wrought from 'anti-colonial' rhetoric and 
Catholic distributist principles. It is arguable that this 'philosophy' has not, 
for the North Solomonese, implied fraternity with the rest of the nation so 
much as reinforced separatism. North Solomonese, but not Fr Momis, have 
seen MA as their ethnonational party. Fr Momis's nationalism is something 
'offshore' and of the same significance as Lapun's membership of Pangu 
Pati. The ascendancy of Fr Momis and his ability to deliver votes even to 
undistinguished and non-performing or ill-prepared candidates may appear to 
have been dented by the victory of Michael Ogio in the North with its 
implication that some reduction of ethnonationalism occurs at the south 
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Tinputz boundary. A look at Donatus Mola's victories in 1968 and 1972 may 
reinforce that idea. However, while the immediacy of the grievances 
associated with BCL decreases in the agriculturally prosperous north, it 
would be wise, before making that inference, to inquire more carefully as to 
the adequacy of the MA candidates and their campaigns in the North and the 
absence of effective strategy in MA's opponents in Central and South. 
By late 1 988  a grave resurgence of secessionism became evident. 
Optimism that integrative forces must prevail appeared misplaced. For one 
occasional observer at least, the seeds of optimism began to sprout during the 
eighties because no 'outbidder' (i.e. someone seeking mobilisation of more 
radical forces) had appeared to challenge the leadership of Momis, Bannett 
and Sarei. Whatever the differences among them, and in spite of their 
gestures in 1 975 , they were by preference nationalists with , however, an 
imperative commitment to local autonomy. Instead of competing with Momis 
for the support of dissidents, Bannett pursued economic policies and interests 
which were integrative. This has created space for a younger ethnonationalist 
leadership to emerge and it may require considerable flexibility for an MA 
with a nationalist programme to combat it. However accommodating the 
national government and BCL may be to current demands,  population 
pressure in the North Solomons - numbers should double in less than fifteen 
years! - will continue to creat dissatisfaction and scapegoats will come readily 
to hand. Anis et al in their 1972 study properly gave readers warning of 
what came to pass in 1975-7; it may be appropriate for this chapter to suggest 
that 'outbidding' will recur, though not necessarily through the formalities of 
national elections. 
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The Simbu Election 
PAULA BROWN 
My contribution will be limited to those aspects of the 1987 Simbu 
Provincial and Open elections that I could observe during the period I spent 
in Kundiawa, March to June 1987, and my knowledge of Simbu politics 
before, during and after this field period. Written in New York, the absence 
of direct experience of the last phases of the 1987 campaigns, voting and the 
post-election period in Simbu will be evident. The paper is, in large part, 
written before I received notice of the results, and these have been appended 
in revision. 
Analytic and descriptive discussions of several previous elections 
observed by Bill Standish provide most valuable background information 
and orientation. My knowledge of candidates and events owes a good deal 
to his studies and the observations and comments of others (Criper 1965, 
Dage 1986, 1987 . Griffin 1987). My own research in the area, which covers 
many facets of social, political and economic life, began in 1958. 
Fieldwork has been intermittent, and never concentrated upon the study of 
an election from early campaigning through voting and the establishment of 
government at local, provincial or national level. 
While Simbu Province must conform to the requirements and 
procedures of the Papua New Guinea parliament and its elections, the 
Highlands, and Simbu, have certain special features and ways that the 
system has been adapted to local values and political process. It is indeed 
fascinating to see how highlanders manipulate the well-known wantok 
system to their political ends; how local rivalries become candidate 
nominations and electioneering; how party affiliation and endorsement 
provide some financial or practical assistance to candidates while party 
policy is ignored; how the gift and exchange system is adapted to election 
campaign food, beer and money distributions. 
Simbu Province must represent an extreme case of dependency. Within 
the Highlands, it has as long a history of contact as the Eastern and Western 
Highlands provinces, more than Enga or Southern Highlands. Yet its high 
population density and lack of land available and suitable for agricultural 
development in coffee or other market products has resulted in less foreign 
investment and economic growth. It remains a land of smallholders, 
relatively unstratified. Since the first colonial period, finance and 
development have always depended upon government, and Simbu people 
have come to regard government as the major, or only, source of 
opportunity and finance. Having a friend in national government is seen as 
necessary for economic success. Election to office in the provincial 
assembly and parliament is keenly contested (Brown 1987). 
Simbu, with nearly 1 80,000 people, is a populous and densely settled 
province. No large tracts of land have been alienated or are owned by the 
Simbu, and there are few non-Simbu residents or voters. People of the 
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Simbu (Chimbu) language and culture in North Simbu, and an increasing 
proportion of South Simbu, make up the population of the province. Many 
people can understand two or three Chimbu dialects. The other language 
groups are small and do not form separate electoral districts for 
parliamentary seats. However, Tok Pisin is the preferred language of 
political discussions and meetings among speakers of more than one dialect, 
and is commonly used by candidates for the provincial seat. In my 
observations of campaigning for the Open seats of Kundiawa-Gembogl and 
Kerowagi, I noted mainly use of the Kuman dialect. Local forms of 
Chimbu language are probably often used in the Open seat campaigns of 
other sub-provinces except, perhaps, in the Siane-speaking area of the 
eastern part of the province and at Karimui. This, I believe, intensifies the 
localization of interests. In recent elections, there have been no non-Simbu 
candidates, as are often found in other rural or urban constituencies. Every 
candidate looks to his own local support group. 
April-June 1987 , when the election preparations were most active in 
Papua new Guinea, was also the time that Australian and British national 
election campaigns were active. The contrast was striking, for party 
differences and national figures dominated these campaigns, while national 
political and economic issues were rarely discussed by voters or candidates 
in Papua New Guinea. As Hegarty observed of an earlier period, Papua 
New Guinea parties have not developed distinctive policies (Hegarty 
1979:88). Only individual local candidates received attention in Simbu. 
The Papua New Guinea parliamentary election, with its emphasis upon 
individual candidates, in this respect resembles campaigns in the United 
States ' primary elections without party considerations. 
In the Open and the Provincial constituencies of Simbu, a total of 168 
( 167 men and one woman) nominated. The Provincial seat had the fewest 
candidates: seventeen, including nationally known figure Ignatius Kilage 
and two members of the 1982 parliament, John Nilkare and Peter Kuman, 
former allies in Pangu. Some of the candidates for the Provincial seat could 
not have expected success against these opponents, but I imagine that they 
chose to stand for the attention and exposure it offered. Perhaps the four 
men from the Chuave area regarded Brown Sinamoi, the parliamentary 
speaker and a National Party member, such a powerful opponent in the 
Chuave Open that they chose another contest. The Chuave Open electorate 
had twenty-one candidates. Forty-five candidates, the most in Papua New 
Guinea, were nominated for the Kerowagi Open. Kundiawa-Gembogl Open 
electorate nominated thirty-five. There were elder experienced politicians 
who had been member and ministers in earlier legislatures, young educated 
professionals, businessmen, government employees at all levels including 
teachers, policemen and ex-servicemen, and mission workers. Most of 
today's  candidates are literate. 
An Open electorate has a population of about 30,000-35,000. Over 
17 ,OOO voted in each of the several Simbu Open electorates. A tribe of 
3,000 or more people is the largest recognized and named unit, divided into 
clans which may number 1 ,000 people and sub-clans of a few hundred. In 
many cases there were several members of the same clan, and sometimes 
subclan, competing for the votes of their fellow-clansmen. In the Kerowagi 
and Kundiawa-Gembogl areas, few of the Open candidates were well­
known outside their tribe, and many did not attempt to win many votes 
beyond their tribe. Candidates frequently calculated the number of votes 
needed to win, on an optimistic expectation of votes from every man and 
woman in their local group, subclan and clan, and many in the tribe, with a 
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few friends in other parts for the electorate. Clearly, if votes are divided 
fairly equally among the candidates, in a field of forty candidates, the 
winner can be the one who receives just 3 per cent of the votes. Some 
candidates believed that they could win with votes of their clan and friends. 
What accounts for the extraordinary hopefulness, rush of nominees, and 
rivalry for national elective office in Simbu? What level of qualifications is 
considered appropriate? How are candidates supported, votes decided and 
delivered? 
It works something like this. By their own ambitions and the 
encouragement of members of their local men 's  house and subclan group, 
and some other friends, would-be candidates are identified months, even 
years, before the parliamentary election nominations. Some men seem to be 
perpetual candidates, nominated in every parliamentary and/or provincial 
election for a decade or more whether or not they have ever succeeded. 
This persistence is sometimes rewarded. 
Since the first elections for local government council and house of 
assembly in the 1960s, Simbu have believed that a candidate should be 
educated and experienced in government service. In the 1960s, the most 
qualified was a man who could speak Tok Pisin and had some experience in 
working for Australians; now education beyond high school, fluency in 
English, experience in government employment, previous elective office or 
business achievement, are usual among candidates. For the most part, each 
candidate is independent: decision to nominate and supporters do not 
require party membership or a large support base. Since work experience is 
a qualification, many candidates who have been employed outside the 
province resign and return home to conduct a campaign. Some are rarely 
seen in the province until a few weeks before the voting begins. There are 
some tireless and some reluctant campaigners. 
Nomination parades, demonstrations of supporters and some 
confrontations between them marked the period 27 March - 27 April in 
Simbu. Before this, the names of most of the candidates were widely 
known in their constituencies and among the politically interested men of 
the province. The perpetual candidates and many hopefuls announced 
themselves years before the nomination period, and only a few of the 
expected candidates failed to nominate. Thus it must have been known to 
all, well in advance, that competition among local hopefuls would be great, 
and indeed there were more candidates in 1987 than ever before. 
Simbu believe that knowledge of the person, kinship, friendship and 
group membership are the basis of votes. The mode of campaigning, area 
covered, and expectation of results reflect this belief. A few seem to regard 
their local support base as secure, do not expect to win more votes, and do 
not make public addresses. A few moralists said that people know them and 
what they stand for, and vote accordingly. While the Open seat campaigns, 
where in 1987 there were many candidates, are often restricted to the tribe 
and neighbouring areas, campaigning for the provincial seat must be wider. 
Nevertheless, some of these candidates rarely ventured out of their 
subprovince and language area; I do not believe that they expected to 
receive many votes from other areas. Enmities between tribes and 
supporters of the many candidates make campaign visits hazardous. Some 
candidates reported hostility in their visits to other clans and tribes, and 
there were several fights among supporters of candidates during 
campaigning and canvassing visits. 
During April and May the campaigns got under way with posters, signs 
along the highway, cars emblazoned with 'vote . . .  ' and slogans, loud hailers, 
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and roadside visits and speeches by candidates and supporters. I had little 
opportunity to observe the private visits by candidates to small localities, 
men's  houses in their locality and other friendly areas, which several 
candidates said would be their method. 
The action of campaigning is enjoyable, exciting, and prestige-building 
for candidates and their supporters. The male camaraderie of driving about 
in cars, using loud-hailers, playing tapes on loudspeakers, drinking parties, 
food distributions enliven Simbu life in the pre-election period. While 
women at roadsides, markets and localities see and hear some of this action, 
they do not share it. It is generally believed that women vote as their 
husbands direct them. Since most voting seems to be in local block, except 
where a woman has a close relative as candidate in the constituency, there 
would be little involvement for them. 
Voters expect candidates to repay votes with cash and other 
distributions. If their candidate wins, a remote possibility in a field of forty, 
voters expect material benefits from their member of parliament. There is, 
indeed, some precedent for this, as Peter Kuman, the Kundiawa-Gembogl 
Open electorate MP and minister for Works, distributed a reputed K500,000 
in the province for road construction and easily won the Provincial seat in 
1987. Political sophisticates talk of vote-buying, vote-splitting, and other 
manipulations of the democratic process. It was claimed that local leaders 
publicly advertised that they had a block of votes for sale. Direct payment 
to local leaders and voters is said to be common. 
I was also told that, to prevent a strong candidate from winning, a 
political party might put up a rival within his local group to 'destroy' his 
chances. It is general knowledge, then, that the candidate most likely to win 
is the one who has few rivals within his clan, tribe, or district. However, the 
pleasure of candidacy and of close ties with a candidate seem to prevail over 
a rational assessment of the probability of success. 
There is also a concept, sometimes expressed, of ' leading candidate' ;  
that is, a person who is expected to get votes beyond his local group, who 
has a reputation as a leader, vote-getter, and is thought to be well-qualified 
for office. Certainly all candidates are not considered equal: some are 
supported as a device for stopping a rival, and some are strongly supported 
by a party or are popular locally. Sitting members are formidable opponents 
too. 
Candidates, their supporters, party officials and pundits all calculate the 
chances of candidates; their predictions are based upon informal polling, 
assessment of the local situation, and guesswork. Some claimed that a 
former leader had awarded his leadership to them upon retirement. The 
numbers calculation is based upon an estimate of the number of voters, and 
I think political magic: the belief that by saying a candidate has the numbers 
will make it so. Elections and the manouevres that accompany them are a 
most exciting Simbu sport. 
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The mysteries and intricacies of party endorsements and vote-splitting 
are embedded in old and new rivalries, enmities and allegiances. Old tribal 
wars, alliances, and conflicts, new school, work and rugby football team 
friendships and convivialilty, kinship and affinity, may all be invoked to 
gain votes and disparage rivals. Two candidates, each of whom had wives 
from other provinces, expected all of the resident voters in Kundiawa town 
who were from their wives' home province to vote for them. 
Every candidate questioned stated that his political programme, even if 
little enunciated in his public addresses, was to improve the life conditions 
of Simbu Province: roads, business, investment, educational and health 
facilities for the people. The 1987 catchword was ' grassroots '. Few 
mentioned national or international issues, and these rarely arose in public 
discussion. Problems of corruption, bribery, law and order in Simbu, curing 
the ills of former governments, were also raised. Some candidates manifest 
little knowledge of the powers and capacities of parliament to deal with 
local or national problems. Very few candidates stated any party allegiance 
in terms of political issues. However, party support in the form of funds and 
materials was received by some and expected by others. Many take the 
position that: 
/' m independent and stand on my personal popularity and 
character. The voters will choose me because I am well known, 
well liked, honest, trustworthy, and have a strong group of 
supporters in my clan and tribe. If I win I may join the winning 
party, hold a ministry and bring great benefits to my community, 
tribe, district and province. 
One Provincial candidate believed that if he won, he could control the six 
Simbu Open constituency members as a block to offer a party in exchange 
for a ministry. 
National political parties did endorse candidates in Simbu, interestingly, 
in different ways. At the Provincial candidacy level, party affiliation and 
endorsement of a candidate likely to win are a significant commitment to his 
role in parliament. Thus Peter Kuman had People 's Democratic Movement 
support, which also carried support of Open candidates in the province, and 
John Nilkare is a founder and leader of the League for National 
Advancement which endorsed only a few others. The National Party's  
interests in  Simbu are more complex: they endorsed Ignatius Kilage, Y err 
Komndi and others for the Provincial seat, and many candidates in the six 
Open constituencies. This might serve to split votes among Open 
candidates, it certainly must increase divisiveness while ensuring party 
loyalty if any of its endorsees should succeed. One or more candidates were 
endorsed by other parties, including Pangu which financed a helicopter tour 
with Somare, Peter Kumgi and Open candidates throughout the province. 
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Table 1 :  Results of election to the Provincial seat 
Chimbu Provincial Votes 
Buckley Wan Iarume 6163 
Peter Kumgi Kankuie 6339 
Bongi Jeff Kobla 4 121 
Peter Kuman (Kakep) 22299 
Kimin Poga 3 181  
Ignatius Kilage 14085 
Yerr Komndi 2339 
John Nulai 912 
Sam Tokam Kundie 7732 
Kiri Po Mala 23 19  
Roger Kaupa Ipaku 2723 
John Mua Nilkare 13 155 
Peter Mondo 5 1 15 
John Komba B'nabe 1061 
Wera Mori (Mori Wera) 1 1002 
Nime Felix Table 5770 
John Kultu 4882 
TOTAL 1 13 198 
The combination of party connections and funds for distribution had 
interesting facets most visible among Simbu Provincial candidates in 1987 . 
Simbu' s leading political figure, a man who at one time controlled large 
funds for beer distribution, Iambakey Okuk, died in November 1986. His 
National Party organization had no local successor. Two members of 
parliament, John Nilkare of Gumine and Peter Kuman, were known for the 
money and gifts they had brought to Simbu. John Nilkare made gifts of 
cars, school supplies and equipment to the people of Simbu from his own 
resources, and Peter Kuman as Minister of Works had distributed large 
payments for roadwork in his home district of Kundiawa and North Simbu. 
Other well-known candidates, Ignatius Kilage for example, had no such 
resources and could not compete with such electoral methods. The support 
of the National Party evidently did not extend to large payments. Each of 
these, and some lesser known candidates, such as Wera Mori of Chuave, 
who is a United Party candidate, and Peter Kumgi of Kerowagi, had their 
greatest support in their home districts. 
There is a discrepancy, then, between a Simbu ideal of independence 
and personal popularity and the national political party organization. Some 
candidates seem truly unaware of national issues and party politics; if so, 
they can have no genuine expectation of success. 
There were strong and popular sitting members in four Simbu Open 
electorates, with party support. Brown Sinamoi (National Party) won the 
Chuave Open by receiving the largest number of votes in any Simbu Open 
constituency, 3,452; John Numi (National Party) polled 2,2 1 4  in SinaSina-
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Yonggamugl, Bill Ginbogl Ninkama (PDM), 2,096 in Gumine, Paul Pawa 
Sisioka (PDM), 2,239 in Karimui-Nomane. In none of these cases did the 
winner poll more than 10 per cent of the votes cast. 
The member for Kundiawa-Gembogl in 1982 was Peter Kuman, who 
succeeded in getting about 20 per cent of the votes for the Provincial 
electorate seat in 1987 against a strong field including John Nilkare, who 
won the seat from Iambakey Okuk in 1982. The Kundiawa-Gembogl seat, 
then, had no sitting member to contest. The death of a candidate delayed 
the voting here, and the final list of candidates differs slightly from the 
original nominees. 
I examined the detailed results in Kundiawa-Gembogl, the area I know 
best, attempting to identify local support as indicated in ballot box figures. I 
find that favourite local sons seem to poll most of their votes in a small area, 
as represented by two or three ballot boxes which they often dominate. 
They may obtain a scatter of other votes in the electorate. However, the 
most successful candidates live up to the 'leading candidate' label : they 
receive most of the votes in their home area, usually a tribe, and some votes 
in nearly every area of the constituency. Votes for the winner of Kundiawa­
Gembogl Open election, Wagi Meremba, were numerous in seventeen 
ballot boxes and scattered in may others, for a total of 2,952 out of 20,362 
votes cast. When several men are nominated within a clan or local group, 
the votes are so divided that each may receive a hundred or fewer votes. 
In Kerowagi, where candidates included four former members of 
parliament or the house of assembly, the sitting member David Tul polled 
second. He lost to Jim Yer, a teacher now engaged in building construction, 
who polled 1 ,889, about 8 per cent of the vote. Siwi Kurondo, a popular 
elder statesman, former member of the house of assembly, former minister 
and provincial premier, received only thirty-six votes in the field of forty­
five candidates, one of whom received only a single vote! Kerowagi has 
been an area of recent warfare and tribal conflicts. Rival candidates abound 
to divide votes within the clan and tribe. No elected member has kept a 
following and been re-elected. 
I believe this is the explanation of the large field of candidates and 
apparent hopelessness of the contest. The campaign is really two political 
competitions at the same time. For most of the candidates, candidacy itself 
is the goal. It demonstrates local popularity, makes a big man, shows how 
the candidate measures up against local rivals for clan and tribe leadership. 
In this competition, candidacy itself, having one's  name on the ballot, 
posters, cars, supporters is an indication of being a local big man. Secondly, 
success is measured by obtaining votes of the subclan, clan and tribe. 
Electoral success, that is, achieving office, against thirty or forty rivals 
cannot be expected In the local contest the one who receives the largest 
number of votes demonstrates that he has at least a local following. 
Looking back to the 1 960s, the first members elected to the legislative 
council and the house of assembly were less prepared than the present 
candidates, who have the first generation of national representatives as their 
models. Simbu voters, and many candidates, are guided by traditional 
values of local leadership and competition, and have adapted national 
political elections to their local rivalry. Yet Simbu has had some real 
national leaders: the first Highlands member of the house of assembly, 
Kondam Agaundo; Siwi Kurondo, an early minister, and Iambakey Okuk. 
In the 1980s there have been several prominent Simbu politicians. Simbu 
expect to lead their fellows and the nation; oratory and aggressive 
competition are highly developed in Simbu. Politics is their life. 
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Tribal Structure and Rural Ballot 
Box Counts in Hagen Open 
JOHN BURTON 
Hagen Open electorate was won by the National Party candidate, Paul Pora, 
with 37 per cent of the popular vote and 2,697 votes more than his nearest 
rival, an Independent. The People' s  Democratic Movement candidate came 
close behind in third place. The election was unusual for its small field of 
seven candidates, for being one of only three in 1987 where three candidates 
each polled over 20 per cent, and for the national/provincial dimensions of 
the struggle between the National Party and PDM candidates. It was also a 
Supplementary Election and highlighted an unintended consequence of the 
rule that after a candidate 's  death an election must be halted and new writs 
issued. 
In this chapter I present a fine-scale analysis of voting in the rural parts 
of Hagen, based on ballot box counts and my knowledge of Hagen tribal 
structure. 
VOTER CATCHMENTS 
In their analysis of Moresby North-East in 1977, Premdas and Steeves 
declared: 
In analysing the results of practically all the electorates in PNG, 
clear patterns of voter preference reflecting a close association 
between the ethnicity of a candidate and the sources of his support 
is evident. It is relatively easy to cross-check this observation since 
the population is dispersed in rural areas and villages to which 
candidates can be easily traced. By examining the results in ballot 
boxes from different clusters of villages, one can show a pattern of 
voting that underlines the role of ethnic and regional factors in 
determining voter preference (Premdas and Steeves 1983 :32; my 
emphasis) . 
In reality, it has proved exceedingly difficult to do this kind of analysis. 
Population figures have been wayward and hard to fit to the wards within 
electorates and ballot boxes have been taken 'on patrol' and have collected 
together votes from several villages. Worst of all ,  'ethnic and regional' 
factors are not often known in close enough detail to make sense of the 
results. Thus, in previous election studies, only a few observers have tried 
to map ballot box counts to voter catchments. In 1968 , Marie Reay 
(Colebatch et al. 197 1 )  presented summary figures by tribe for three 
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candidates in W ahgi Open. In 1972, Bryant Allen ( 197 6) managed to get 
voter turnout figures for each village in Dreikikir Open, but was unable to 
pin ballot box counts to particular polling stations because election patrols 
carried boxes from village to village, filling them as they went. In 1977, 
Wes Rooney tried to match ballot counts to political and geographic 
divisions in Manus but had the same problem as Allen; some ballot boxes 
mixed votes from several areas. It 'proved difficult ' ( 1 983:277) to correlate 
these divisions with the ballot box counts. In the same year, B. Goode 
(1 983) fitted the Obura-Wonenara Open returns to Wurm's  language atlas, 
but he was only able to work at Census Division level (there were nine in 
the electorate). 
THE ELECTIONS IN HAGEN OPEN, 1987 
The election was held over three days: Monday 10 August to Wednesday 12 
August. The election was a 'Supplementary' ,  that is, it was held some six 
weeks after the close of polling in the main election period ( 1 3  June-4 July) . 
Paias Wingti, the sitting member, narrowly escaped a premature end to his 
career as Prime Minister when he abruptly - but predictably - switched seats 
to contest Western Highlands Provincial just before the close of 
nominations on 27 April 1987 (see Angwi Hriehwazi, 'Will Mr Wingti 's  
gamble pay off? ' ,  Post-Courier, 30 April 1987) .  The Pangu candidate, 
Brass W ak, died on 22 May and the Electoral Commissioner was obliged, 
under the existing rules, to issue fresh writs. A side issue became the 
possibility of 'poison ' as a cause of death (see Joe Koroma, 'The death of an 
heir' , Times of Papua New Guinea, 1 1 - 17 June 1987). Wak apparently 
drowned when he fell into shallow water at his coffee garden during an 
epileptic fit and the coroner went to the unusual length of speaking at the 
funeral to explain the physical signs of epilepsy on Wak's  body, such as bite 
marks around the tongue and mouth ( 'No poison, mourners told' ,  Post­
Courier, 29 May 1988).  This was fully accepted, in my observation, during 
the election period. 
The circumstances of the Supplementary Election altered the way in 
which the election was conducted in some important ways. These will be 
examined later in relation to the common roll. 
The boundaries of Hagen Open are identical to those of both Hagen 
Census Division and Hagen Local Government Council. In 1987 there were 
thirty-three rural polling stations, two areas classified as 'urban' - Hagen 
town and Kagamuga (Hagen airport) and six other 'non-village ' areas. Paias 
Wingti had allegedly received strong support from Engans living in Hagen 
in 1982 but, because of trouble between Engans and Wingti-supporting 
Hageners, was not expected to benefit from this 'external ' support in 1987 . 
In the event, and as will be seen in the analysis, the urban votes were not 
decisive to the result even though they amounted to 1 6  per cent of the total 
(3 ,702 out of 23, 109). Table 1 shows the results. 
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Table 1 :  Results from Returning Officer' s report (Masi 1 987 :Table 7) 
Ordinary Section 
votes 141  Total 
Paul Pora 7018 1576 8594 
Michael Kunjil 4700 1 197 5897 
Terema Rumints 3664 968 4632 
Michael Pundia 1689 58 1 2270 
Peter Wap 921 173 1094 
Rotep Wak 338 62 400 
Tom Nidop 123 16 139 
Informal 83 
Total 23 109 
Tribes in Hagen Open 
TRIBES IN HAGEN OPEN 
Hagen social organisation is based on tribes, defined as politico-military 
alliances of territory-holding clans (cf. Brown 1960; Strathem 
1 97 1 :Chap.2). Tribes have a segmentary structure and may, depending on 
size, be subdivided into several levels of sections, clans and subclans (cf. 
Strathem 1 972); I have published a breakdown elsewhere (Burton 1 988). 
The area is notable for the dominance of two very large tribes, the Jika and 
Mokei, with estimated populations in mid- 1 987 of around 10,500 and 9, 1 50. 
With the exception of these two, each tribe in Hagen is paired off with 
another (this corresponds to the way the natural world is structured, with 
almost all plant and animal species being named in pairs). The the third 
most powerful grouping is the tribe-pair Kinjka-Yamka, with an estimated 
joint population of 4,300. Each of these three powerful groups put up 
strong candidates and, in each case, these men won their own tribes. 
However, the overall winner, Pora, was from the smallest of them, Kinjka­
y amka. Large tribes are prone to be factionally divided and they can be 
electorally overwhelmed because of this. The remaining tribe-pairs are as 
listed in Table 2, along with estimates of voter turnout, based on the most 
recent census figures and population growth set at 2.0 per cent a year, the 
rate adopted by the Electoral Commissioner in his first report (Lucas 
1 987 :7) .  The total enrolment was 3 1 ,084, comprising 29,2 1 8  in the 
Principal and Supplementary Rolls (Lucas 1 987 :30) and 1 866 in a Second 
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Supplementary Roll, so that whereas I put the turnout at well over 1 00 per 
cent, with the most politicized tribes having still higher figures, the official 
turnout was 7 4. 1 per cent. * The factors contributing to the excessive turnout 
figures will be discussed later. 
Table 2: Tribes in Hagen: population data 
1980 1987 est votes in- turnout 
residents est. voters3 cast formal 
counts I pops.2 
Jilca 8943 10508 5674 6257 7 l l0.4% 
Mokei 7809 9241 4990 5910 23 1 18.9% 
Y amka-Kinjka 3653 4642 2507 2635 3 105.2% 
Elti-Penambi 2699 3562 1924 1437 10 75.2% 
Kemi-Kukilka 2085 2015 1088 15 15  5 139.7% 
Kungunka-Palka 1621 1743 94 1 756 3 80.7% 
Ruruka-Mimka 7 13 859 464 395 85 . 1 %  
Kopi 55 1 633 342 4 12 120.5% 
Total 28074 33203 17930 19317 5 1  108.0% 
Non-village votes 3702 
Informal 32 
Grand total 23 1024 
Data from Rural Community Register (NSO 1982a) and 1980 census (NSO 1982b). 
These figures are for people deemed to be 'residents, . 
2 On basis of population growth at 2.0 per cent a year (cf. Lucas 1987:7). 
3 Based on the RCR, where 54 per cent of the residents were aged 18 years or over. 
4 There is a discrepancy of seven votes between my tabulation and the Returning 
Officer, s, given in Table 1. Later the Electoral Commission in Mount Hagen checked 
the EC601 forms and found one more vote to make an official final total of 23 , 1 10 votes 
cast. 
* Setting population growth since 1980 at a higher rate than did Lucas does not alter this 
conclusion. At 2.3% a year - a nationally cited figure - the turnout falls from 108% to 
106% in Hagen. 
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THE CANDIDATES 
Information on the seven candidates in Hagen Open comes from the 
Electoral Commission 's Bio data of candidates (Lucas 1988a), 
supplemented by my own observations. I was busy interviewing local 
government councillors during the election period and only interviewed one 
candidate, Rotep W ak, about his intentions. The candidates were, in the 
order on the ballot paper, as follows: 
• Michael Pundia, aged mid-30s. Pangu. A brother of the late Brass 
Wak, Pundia is a small businessman. Formerly an Ela Motors 
employee, he has recently started a branch of Paradise Motors in 
Mount Hagen, a company specialising in selling reconditioned 
Japanese cars (Post-Courier 26 August 1988).  Village: Koklamb. 
Customary group: Jika Milakamb (Code J l  l) .  
Michael Kunjil, aged 29. Independent. As a public servant, Kunjil 
was Principal research officer to the Lands minister in 198 1  and was 
cabinet secretary for Department of Western Highlands in 1985-86. 
Education: MA in Political Science, University of Hawaii. Village: 
Keltika. Customary group: Mokei Kelingamb (Code M2) . 
Paul Pora, aged 40. National Party. One of the most successful 
businessmen in Hagen, with interests in the haulage and coffee 
marketing industries, was seen as having the greatest personal 
campaign resources, as well as having the full weight of the NP party 
machinery behind him. He had been closely involved with the 
formation of the National Party in the early 1970s and lists a number 
of high national appointments in his bio data. Education: BEc, 
UPNG. Village: Teka. Customary group: Yamka Pepka (Code KY4) . 
Terema Rumints, aged 39. People ' s  Democratic Movement. A strong 
candidate who hoped to inherit sentimental support for Paias Wingti, 
the sitting member and Hagen' s  'favourite son ' .  A complicating 
factor was that as a Kinjka (the pair tribe to Yamka) he could be 
expected to split the Yamka vote and weaken Paul Pora' s chances. 
On the other hand, the PDM ticket could help him to win some 
sections of the numerous Jika, the prime minister's tribe. He had 
worked for 17 years as an airport fire officer with the Department of 
Civil Aviation. Education: Grade 9. Village: Teka. Customary group: 
Kinjka, Yamka resident (Codes J4 and KY2). 
Peter W ap, aged 27. People' s  Progress Party. The PPP ticket was 
unlikely to offer Wap more than token support in Western Highlands 
and Wap could be considered to be an Independent. He was a 
salesman at Ela Motors from 1974 to 1 985. Education: Grade 10. 
Village: Kokmul. Customary group: Jika Opromb (Code 18). 
• Tom Nidop, aged 36. Independent. A Sepik migrant, Nidop ran a taxi 
service for five years and was general manager of Kiluwa Trading for 
two years. He could have expected to find support among plantation 
workers and some urban wantoks as an alternative candidate. 
Education: Form 2. Residence: Hagen Town (Code U 1 ) .  
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Rotep Wak, aged about 45 . Independent (pro-People's  Democratic 
Movement). A pastor who has been more active in church activities 
than business and the councillor of the smallest and arguably most 
non-aligned tribe in Hagen, Wak could not expect much support 
beyond his own group and church- going friends. However, he stood 
as an alternative to the official PDM candidate. Customary group: 
Ruruka. Village assembly point: Kukl (Code RM). 
DETAILED BREAKDOWN OF VOTES 
Figure 1 is a key to the locations of the polling station catchments, with 
coded identifications matching my collations of the ballot box counts, which 
are given in Figures 2- 10. The data were obtained from the EC 60 1 tally 
sheets and the totals shown in Figures 2- 10  were obtained by adding up 
each day 's  votes at the polling stations. Thirty-three polling teams were 
employed in Hagen Open during the three days of polling using a total of 90 
ballot boxes (some teams were not needed on the third day). All ballot 
boxes were sealed at the end of a day and new boxes were always started 
the next morning. Some boxes contained less than 100 ballot papers and 
should have been amalgamated with other boxes to protect the secrecy of 
the poll, but the practice in 1987 was for the counts for all boxes to be listed 
separately. It was also the case in other electorates; Box 1 3 1  for the East 
Sepik Provincial seat seems to be the record holder with only one vote, 
while several boxes in North Solomons Provincial had no ballot papers in 
them at all (Lucas 1988b ). 
Also shown in Figures 2- 10 is the segmentation of the Hagen tribes, 
identifying thirty-three units - typically clans - that I was able to identify 
exclusively with each booth. There were five places where I had difficulty 
with this. 
Kumunga, north of Hagen on the Baiyer road, is the polling station used 
by some clans of the Mokei Kuipi section, but some Penambi live in the 
area and also, I believe, vote there. I do not think that their votes have 
resulted in a mixed ballot at Kumunga as the results for Kelua No. 1 ,  where 
Penambi ' s pair tribe, Elti, votes, are quite similar. The differences lie in a 
surprising 7 1  votes for the Sepik candidate, Tom Nidop, at Kelua No. 1 (the 
largest block of votes he received in the electorate) and fairly strong support 
for the Mokei candidate, Michael Kunjil, at Kumunga (Codes M7 and EP l) . 
Southeast of Hagen, Mokei Depi Komunka and the remainder of Mokei 
Kuipi share a territory, but had separate polling stations at Tiling and Kilika. 
This means that the results cannot be mapped separately. In the event, both 
groups evidently voted in a very similar way (Codes M5 and M8). 
The Kungunka-Palka tribe-pair comprises some nine subclans whose 
land is scattered about the southern part of the electorate. Three live among 
the Jika Milakamb at Koklamb. Their votes cannot be mapped separately 
from the Milakamb, but again their preferences followed those of the 
Milakamb (Codes J l  1 and KP2). 
The second Kungunka-Palka polling station was Kukl. This was the 
only booth at which the ballot box counts differed drastically on the 
different days that voting took place. Michael Kunjil won by a comfortable 
margin on the first day - and 120 of his 1 29 Kungunka-Palka supporters 
turned out on this day - whereas Terema Rumints won with 67 per cent of 
the vote on the second day. I did not ask a representative of these groups to 
identify the Kunjil (Independent) and Rumints (PDM) supporters among the 
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Kungunka-Palka subclans so I am forced to label the two factions 
separately: they appear as Kukl A and Kukl B. Additionally, a substantial 
number of Kukl A voters supported Rotep Wak from the neighbouring 
Ruruka tribe - his only identifiable supporters away from his home booth. I 
did interview Wak and he said he was pro-PDM and was standing in order 
to oppose the endorsed PDM candidate, Rumints (Codes KPl and RM). 
Lastly, at W ak' s own booth at the place called Ulka Angemb Pona, 
which is administratively called Togoba No. 2, the two tiny tribes Ruruka 
and Mimka put their votes into one box. Obviously there is no way to pick 
Ruruka intentions as distinct from Mimka' s  (Code RM). 
With these qualifications, there is a very good correspondence between 
the sixty-nine rural ballot boxes and discrete local groups. Figure 10 gives 
the data for the two 'urban' catchments and the six 'rural non-village' 
catchments - Hagen Technical College, Highland Agricultural College, 
Baisu CIS , Kuk Agricultural Research Station, Ogelbeng Mission and Tibi 
Plantation - representing a further twenty-one boxes. 
PERFORMANCE AT HOME BOOTHS 
According to the simplest expression of the idea that in predominantly rural 
areas 'primordial ' factors - voting for fellow tribesmen - dominate election 
results, each candidate should start out by winning his 'home' polling booth 
by a huge margin. There is substance in this, as seen in Table 3.  
Table 3:  Percentage of votes won at home booth 
Candidate Home group Place Per cent Runners-up (%) 
Michael Kunjil Mokei Kelingamb Keltika 98.5% 
Paul Pora Yamka Pepka Teka 86. 1% Rumints (1 1 %) 
Michael Pundia Jika Milakamb Kondila 72.0% Pora (22%) 
Terema Rumints Jika Mukaka* Ketika 59.0% Pora (18%) 
Peter Wap Jika Opromb Kokmul 37.5% Pora (34%) 
Rotep Wak Ruruka Togoba 2 44.6% Kunjil (46%) 
Tom Nidop 
* The PDM-supported Rumints is treated as a Jika Mukaka, Paias Wingti's clan, when 
really he is a Kinjka based at Teka. Pora won both Teka and Kinjka (62.1  per cent) by 
wide margins. 
Of all candidates, Pundia could have been expected to make a clean 
sweep of his own booth, Kondila, on a sympathy vote, following the earlier 
death of Brass Wak. But in fact Kunjil was the only candidate with no 
serious rival at home; he scored an amazing 98.5 per cent of the valid votes. 
(In 1968, Kaibelt Diria took 1 00 per cent, less one vote, of his home booth 
in North Wahgi [Colebatch et al. 197 1 :253].) Pundia lost votes to Pora, 
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probably because of the latter's business activities in the booming industrial 
zone along the Highlands Highway partly in Pundia' s territory. Pora lost 
votes to Rumints at Teka (KY 4); Rumints (a) being based in the same place 
and (b) having the backing of a strong rival party. Rumints lost votes to 
Pora at Paias Wingti 's  home, Ketika (J4), probably due to straight rivalry 
between PDM and the National Party. Wap, the PPP candidate, lost votes to 
Pora at Kokmul (J8) because of the apparent hopelessness of campaigning 
without the support of a big party. We cannot fully understand Rotep 
Wak's  narrow defeat by Kunjil at Togoba No. 2, because both Ruruka and 
Mimka cast their votes in the same ballot box (RM). It could be the case that 
W ak won Ruruka, his own tribe, but not Mimka. Nidop, the town 
candidate, received a surprising seventy-one votes ( 15  per cent) of the valid 
votes at Kelua No. 1 (EPI ), but had virtually no support elsewhere. 
PERFORMANCE IN HOME TRIBE 
The winner in the 'primordial ' model of voting should be the candidate 
from the biggest tribe, but this did not happen in Hagen Open (Figs. 1 1 - 1 6) .  
The three leading candidates - Pora, Kunjil and Rumints - won the tribes 
that endorsed them, they did so without unanimous support. I also have 
represented the relevant information in Figure 17 where isolines of voting 
percentages are mapped onto structural outlines of the Jika, Mokei and 
Yamka. What I have also tried to do here is to preserve the geographic 
relationships between the clans: Jika on the west, Mokei on the east and 
Y amka on the north east of the electorate ( cf. Figure 1 ). In Figures 1 1 - 1 6, 
the percentage support in each voter catchment area is displayed for each 
candidate. 
The ]ika 
Among the Jika, Rumints (Figure 1 3) won quite easily from the other two 
Jika candidates, Pundia (Figure 14) and Wap (Figure 15), support for these 
two men being confined to one half of Maipngel section only. Rumints ' Jika 
supporters came from a south-southwest/north-northeast axis along the 
western border of the electorate. As can be seen from Figure 17,  Rumints 
was unchallenged in the western axis comprising the Andapunts and 
Mukaka sections, but the votes were split four ways in the Maipngel section. 
Here, Wap 's Support came from Opromb clan alone, while Pundia 
mobilised Milakamb, Muklmana, a very close ally to Milakamb, and 
Komapi. The Jika clan-pair Komb-Akelemb, in the same section as Wap 
and Pundia' s clans, gave only three votes to Wap, and none to Pundia at all. 
An explanation may be found in that in 1 986 and early 1987 Komb, 
supported by Akelemb, fought a vicious war (using guns) with Komapi, 
supported by Opromb, Muklmana and Milakamb. The end result was that 
Komb and Akelemb were routed and fled their territory to settle with the 
Mokei clan Kiminingka, with whom they had a boundary. Kiminingka live 
in the heartland of Kunjil country, so it is not surprising that the Komb­
Akelemb, bitter at their defeat, put 8 1  per cent of their votes behind the 
Mokei candidate. 
A remaining pair of clans that are structurally part of Maipngel section 
are Parklemb and Roklamb. They too gave few votes to the Maipngel 
candidates. The explanation is that they physically live in between the 
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Mukaka clans at Togoba - and speak their language (see below) - while the 
other Maipngel clans are located in the Ogelbeng-Hagen Tech. area in the 
centre of the electorate, some 10 km away. While there is firm evidence that 
these clans acquired the eastern Jika lands through conquest some decades 
before contact in the 1930s (Vicedom and Tischner 1983),  I do not have 
ethnohistorical evidence for past schisms within Maipngel which would 
lend political meaning to the present-day geographical division. At any 
rate, the Roklamb-Parklemb are now more interested in the political scene 
around Togoba, with its national dimensions, than in the more distant and 
more parochial struggle going on near Hagen. 
The real winner of the intra-tribal struggles of the Jika was Paul Pora. 
He averaged over 20 per cent of the Jika vote, a very useful addition to his 
tally because of the size of the tribe. 
The Mokei 
Mokei has two structural sections: Depi, 'forest dwellers ' ,  whose clans 
occupy territories around and to the south of Hagen town, and Kuipi, 
'grassland dwellers' ,  whose original lands were north of the town on the 
Hagen plain. The smaller Kuipi section was troubled by warfare at around 
the time of contact in the 1930s and almost half its population resettled with 
the Komunka clan of the Depi Aling, or 'eastern' ,  subsection between the 
Kum and Kukla Rivers east of the town. Further small pockets of Kuipi live 
in other places around Hagen: 20 km away on the fringes of the North 
Wahgi Swamp in the extreme northeast comer of electorate, at Kumndi 
High School in the Baiyer-Mul electorate, and at Kokma near Newtown. 
Kunjil (Figure 12), the Mokei candidate, had a similar experience to 
Rumints in that he took only three of the eight Mokei polling booths. In 
structural terms, the split came in the middle of the N ambka subsection, half 
the Nambka going with him and half with Pora, and he only just scraped in 
to win Mokei overall from Pora by thirty-three votes. Pora' s  support among 
the Aling ( 'eastern') clans reached 70 per cent, and this was explained to me 
in terms of Pora' s  strong kin ties there through maternal relatives. While I 
understand this type of explanation, I am not fully satisfied by it, because 
candidates are evidently selective in choosing to exploit ties outside their 
own tribe. In fact, most of my analysis shows that candidates choose not to 
do so or are unsuccessful in doing so. Without going to a minute scale of 
analysis, I will generalise to say that 'propinquity ' can be a factor strong 
enough to override some intra-tribal loyalties. 
The situation of the Kuipi section may be compared with Jika Roklamb­
Parklemb. The geographic separation of the two Kuipi polling stations could 
be thought responsible for a divergence of interests, but in fact all the Kuipi 
showed strong support for Pora. The stronger support was at Kilika (M7), 
close to Teka (KY 4 ) .  The other group was, as discussed above, associated 
with pockets of Elti and Penambi, also Pora supporters, and their land is 
close to Pora's second area of activity in the Kelua area. 
Kinjka-Y amka 
Pora (Figure 1 1 ) won this tribe-pair by a large margin because only a small 
part of Yamka Kimbka section supported his rival, Rumints. No other 
candidates were in serious contention. Kinjka were involved in tribal 
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fighting with their neighbours a few years ago and there is still a good deal 
of enmity in their area. Their territory borders on that of Jika Mukaka and 
their strong vote for Pora may be read as an anti-PDM statement, reinforced 
by Kinjka' s traditional links with Yamka. But it was Pora' s  only good 
showing in the western part of the electorate. 
Elti-Penambi 
Their were two factions in this tribe-pair. The Elti and the Penambi Kuipi 
and Depi sections live in the northern and western parts of the electorate 
(EP16  and EP2), adjacent to Pora' s  heartland. They lent their support to 
Pora, with a small group apparently of Elti at Kelua supporting (for 
unknown reasons) Tom Nidop, the Sepik candidate (Figure 1 6).  The 
remaining section, Penambi Wia, live in the Kunguma-Korgua area (EP3) 
and their territory extends southwards into the Tambul-Nebilyer electorate. 
Fighting between Wia and the other Penambi had caused a severe split and 
Wia allied themselves with their Kunjil-supporting Mokei 
Kelingamb/Koipka neighbours. There was no support for Rumints or Pora 
here. 
Ruruka-Mimka 
I discussed Rotep Wak's (Figure 1 6) small voter base in this tribe-pair 
above but, as is evident from the maps, their land abuts Kunjil ' s  home 
territory and it was Kunjil who won the Ruruka-Mimka polling station, by 
four votes. 
Kungunka-Palka 
I have also discussed the problems met with in plotting Kungunka-Palka 
allegiances. These people are strongly associated with various sections of 
the Jika, and Strathern ( 197 1 :230) describes them as a 'refugee group' .  In 
several places, the land they occupy is enclosed by Jika land: at N unga 
among the Jika Nungapi (KP16), at Togoba between the Roklamb and 
Parklemb (KP1 6), and at Koklamb (KP2) among the Milakamb. The main 
Jika-supported candidate, Rumints, won Kungunka-Palka and Michael 
Pundia was second. All the same, there was a split, as already discussed, 
and the first day of polling at Kukl (KPla) saw a strong turnout for both 
Kunjil and Rotep W ak. 
Kemi-Kukilka 
There was good support for all three major candidates from this tribe-pair; 
the only minor candidate to pick up a significant number of votes was 
Pundia, among Kukilka Ruklka section (KK3a) whose territory is 
surrounded by Pundia-supporting groups (Figure 1 4).  
Kemi, who live at Kagamuga (KKl)  polled strongly for Pora, but 
almost as well for Kunjil. There is a perceptible split among the Kukilka. 
The Kluika section live at Anga (KK2) along the western boundary of the 
electorate in the PDM heartland; they polled strongly for Rumints. Voting 
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among the Ruklka, some of whom live next to the Kemi near Kagamuga 
(KK36) , followed the Kemi pattern. 
Ko pi 
The Kopi are paired with the small Nokpa tribe of Angalimp-South Wahgi 
electorate and are both part of the Pipilka phratry which controls the giant 
Gumanch Plantation in Dei electorate. The Angalimp-South Wahgi MP is 
Michael Mel, a Nokpa. Fifty-six per cent of Kopi votes went to Mel 's 
National Party colleague, Pora. There was secondary support, in line with 
Kopi's  geographic position adjacent to the western Mokei clans, for Kunjil. 
Hagen Town and the Non-Village Areas 
Urban voters would have good reasons to support each of the two strongest 
candidates. The New Town area actually lies on land originally owned by 
the clans supporting Kunjil and some Mokei still live there. Kunjil ' s  
academic qualifications and public service background would make him 
attractive to other urban voters. Pora' s  high business profile in Hagen would 
be expected pull in many other voters. In the event Kunjil won the town 
from Pora, by one vote (Figure 10). 
Elsewhere, Rumints had a special following at Kagamuga, having 
worked there for years, but he still lost out to Pora whose supporters 
swamped this area. Ogelbeng Lutheran Mission (NVS) is almost enclosed 
by the territory of Jika Opromb, Peter Wap' s clan; Wap ' s local presence 
helped him to win easily at this minor polling booth (Figure 15).  
Overall, the performances of each candidate in the non-village areas 
closely mirrored their showings at the rural polling booths, Pora winning by 
an adequate margin overall. 
FACTORS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF CANDIDATES 
There are obviously serious weaknesses in the idea that 'the biggest tribe 
always wins ' ;  if anything, the biggest tribes predictably lose because they 
are the least able to unite in support of one strong candidate. In reality the 
performance of candidates is affected by many factors. 
Party 
Two of the three best-showing candidates were supported by the parties that 
have fought out provincial politics in Western Highlands in recent years: 
PDM and the National Party. The strong independent candidate, Michael 
Kunjil, was sometimes described as pro-United Party, but also as a 'Wingti 
man ' .  (The United Party was wiped out at the elections but was 'revived' 
by two Independents who joined the Wingti-led coalition on 5 August 1987 
[Hegarty and Turner 1987 :25]) .  The background to National-PDM rivalry 
in Hagen is as follows. 
The National Party, led by Philip Kapal, came into power in the 
Western Highlands Provincial Government through a no-confidence motion 
in April 1985. Kapal 's  government was suspended by the PDM-dominated 
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national government in early 1987 and not reinstated until after the 1987 
elections. As was widely tipped at the time, this cost PDM a great deal of 
support in Hagen and Wingti was wise to nominate for the Western 
Highlands Provincial seat. 
As early as January 1987, Wahgi leaders were hoping to be able to vote 
for him in the provincial seat on the grounds that this would give them a 
chance to elect a prime minister, rather than 'wasting ' their votes on a 
backbencher. Wingti polled strongly in most areas judging by preliminary 
data (official figures for this seat have not been published). His only rival 
was Andrew Tai, a Mokei Kuipi, who took 20 per cent. No other candidate 
got into double figures, not even the former member, Raphael Doa, who had 
National Party endorsement. Doa was in the national parliament until 1982 
and once also led the United Party. He is a Mokei Nambka and his 
supporters may be identified with Kunjil ' s supporters in Hagen Open. There 
were two other Hagen candidates, Robert Enga, a Jika, and Daniel Rumint, 
a Yamka. 
Party, then, is important in Hagen in the sense that sets of party-aligned 
interest groups are at work. It is a debatable point as to whether this 
constitutes 'party' as a psephological factor in some pure sense, but a glance 
overseas reveals that 'party' means different things in different electoral 
systems. More often than not, the strength of parties in stable two- and 
three-party systems has come to mean their degree of entrenchment in the 
electoral numbers game, rather than their close and faithful identification 
with recognised positions in the political spectrum. Perhaps the best 
resolution of this is to say that, in Hagen, 'parties' = ' interest groups' = 'a 
set of semi-permanently opposed political alliance groups ' .  I have given 
this definition in the plural to stress the vital ingredient of opposition 
between a set of groups and I use the term 'political ' in its anthropological 
sense (as in 'political organisation') .  
Kunjil and Pora have constituencies encompassing Hagen town and the 
whole of the eastern half of the electorate. Principally this means the Mokei 
and Yamka tribes, but it also includes Kinjka, Ruruka-Mimka and Kopi. 
The Wingti/PDM-supporting block is made up of most of the Jika and 
Kungunka-Palka, and is located in the western half of the electorate. 
The remaining tribes - Elti-Penambi and Kemi-Kukilka - put up no 
candidates and split their votes between the major candidates. 
Language 
Hageners are slow to mention language as a factor dividing one area from 
another and many play down the existence of a well-defined boundary 
running across the electorate, roughly following the course of the River 
Walta. Melpa is the language of Hagen town and points east while 
Temboka is spoken at Togoba and southwards in the Nebilyer Valley. The 
languages are mutually intelligible and form the western end of the Central 
Family dialect chain which starts in Chimbu. Coincidentally the boundary 
marks the transition from mounded sweet potato, common in Southern 
Highlands and Enga (maunten kaukau in Tok Pisin) to the gridded beds 
common in the Wahgi Valley (baret kaukau in Tok Pisin). 
As it happens, the Temboka area correlates very well with the PDM 
voting block and the Melpa area with Kunjil and Pora's supporters. This 
may be qualified by saying that the Jika Opromb, Komapi, Milakamb and 
Komb-Akelemb clans are Melpa speaking. But it is precisely these clans 
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who broke from the PDM-part of Jika, with two candidates for the Open 
seat and one - Robert Enga - for the Provincial seat. Elsewhere, Kinjka and 
most of Ruruka-Mimka speak Temboka, but neither strongly supported 
PDM; Kukilka is linguistically split, with the PDM-supporting Kluika 
speaking Temboka and the NP-supporting Ruklka speaking Melpa. 
Language, then, highlights the line between the one western and two 
eastern voting blocks and correlates with at a rather odd agricultural 
difference. 
Number of Candidates 
The big question of the 1987 elections as a whole was 'why were there so 
many candidates? '  As is well known, Kerowagi Open was the recorder 
holder, with forty-five, and some of the other Chimbu seats were not far 
behind. The question in Hagen is 'why were there so few candidates? ' .  
The answer certainly lies with the size of the major Hagen tribes and 
their partial alignment with the two big parties in the area. In this context it 
is important to underline the social forces that deter candidacy. The key 
part of campaigning is never seen in public, but takes the form of 
canvassing of support for candidacy long before the nomination period. In 
one area of Angalimp-South Wahgi, for example, I was told in January 1987 
that all the men' s  house groups had pasim vot pinis. They had already 
decided which way they were going to vote - even though it would be 
months before nominations opened. How this works is that influential men 
pass from men's  house to men's  house listening to the talk and sounding out 
their allies. Possible nominees may be found in every village of Angalimp­
South Wahgi or Hagen Open (in all probability a university graduate could 
be found in each one), so the important factors are those that discourage 
nomination. As time goes by, the strength of support for a particular 
nomination will become evident. Hagen clans, as constituents of large, well 
defined tribes, are clearly not all interested in putting up a candidate if they 
can decide on a strong candidate with party endorsement. A factor present 
in Hagen - but not in Kerowagi - is the cross-linkage between kinship 
networks created by traditional moka ties and the endorsement of candidates 
by big-men of regional influence; a Wahgi commentator, Ben Kugam, was 
quite sure this was sufficient to account for the difference. At all events, the 
case of Hagen Open contradicts the common conception that all highlands 
elections involve twenty or more candidates. 
TOWARDS A MODEL OF CANDIDATE SUPPORT 
My analysis has taken the form of detailed discussions of voting in relation 
to tribal segmentation. As I have shown, voting intention is well-correlated 
to ethnicity when voters can trace some structural relationship to a 
candidate; however, this is not always possible. In the case of Southern 
Highlands Provincial in 1977, Sillitoe ( 1983 :205) found that in other cases a 
'vote-for-the-nearest-man ' principle applied when voters had no candidates 
of their own and did not know the candidates from other districts. This 
hardly applies in the case of the geographically close-knit Hagen Open, but 
a principle of social propinquity, taking into account affinal and exchange 
system ties, clearly does operate when lain fails to guide voters in their 
choice, or has been disabled by hostilities with the structurally nearest 
Hagen Open 273 
candidate ' s  clan. Thus, the two Kukilka sections voted differently and with 
their neighbours, and the eastern Mokei voted with the Yamka, their 
neighbours. 
When voters have several choices within the tribe, their choice is guided 
by that tribe 's segmentation, coupled with the degree of warmth in the 
relations between individual clans. In Hagen Open, there is a very good 
case for saying that multiple same-tribe candidacies arise in those sections 
where the political atmosphere is most charged, so that the fact of there 
being a choice means that relations between nominating clans are, at the 
least, competitive. This was evidently so in 1987 within the fractious Jika 
Maipngel section. 
Coupled with inter-clan competition is the virtual certainty that 
members of a clan will not all vote the same way, even if they have a home 
candidate to support. We do see a close correlation between the strength of 
support for each candidate and his relatedness (qualified by the above) to 
the voters at a particular polling booth, but the support is rarely exclusive. 
The exception in Hagen was Keltika, where 839 out of 852 valid votes were 
for one candidate. As Table 3 shows, candidates could more realistically 
expect between 40 per cent and 85 per cent of the vote in their own 
strongholds. I suggest that this scotches the occasionally aired notion that 
there are alternatives to the secret ballot that are more appropriate to PNG 
conditions, such as public declarations; Hageners, at least, do want the 
freedom of choice that the secret ballot offers. 
In the final analysis, candidates owe their success (or lack of it) to the 
occurrence of rifts within their opponents' tribes and their ability to keep 
their own tribes united. The structural divisions of tribes do not determine 
when rifts will occur or how severe they will be, but - like geological 
faultlines - they do determine where the breaks will come. 
The ultimate reasons for competition between tribes and for splits 
between the sections of tribes are often found in a history of warfare and 
alliance. Fighting is recorded between the sections of both Jika and Mokei 
(Strathern 197 1 :2 1 )  and even within them, as seen in 1987 in Jika Maipngel 
section. An example of warfare between tribes is the record of enmity 
between the Jika and Yamka; observers in Hagen in the early 1970s 
describe pitched battles between thousands of warriors from these tribes 
while the German missionary Georg Vicedom, who lived at Ogelbeng in the 
1930s, recorded fighting between Yamka and both Jika and Kukilka in the 
early part of the century (Vicedom and Tischner 1983). After Pora's  win, 
the Y amka took the opportunity to rub in their victory at the Hagen show 
with an impressive dance performance. Alas, with bitter irony, the caption 
to a photograph in the following issue of Traveller's Times was 'Jika 
clansmen strut their stuff' . 
If candidates stand from the same tribe, or from the same section of a 
tribe, that tribe or section will predictably split down the middle along 
structural lines. In the present election, the three Jika- supported candidates 
drew votes in ever widening circles originating at their home polling booths, 
as can be seen in Figure 17.  However, the candidates differed in their 
' strength ' ,  as judged on independent grounds, and their circles of support 
varied greatly in size. A good way to judge this is to count the number of 
booths where a candidate scored 35 per cent of the vote. Obviously 
Rumints, with PDM backing, was much the ' strongest' contender; his 
circles swelled out to the extent that he took over 35 per cent of the vote at 
six Jika booths. Pundia' s  35 per cent circle extended only to three booths, 
while Wap could only manage one booth. 
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The concept of 'strength ' is the key here. Surveys indicate that strength 
is a composite quality, made up of such things as personal leadership 
qualities, educational background, campaign resources and party backing 
(cf. Saffo, Chapter 2). I see few functional differences in the way Hageners, 
Australians, Americans or Britons assess a candidate's  suitability for office. 
In each case the first phase is a form of preselection to screen out the 
candidates who are perceived to have a poor chance of winning. This can 
take place in the men's  house, at party headquarters or more publicly as in 
the U.S.  But in all the systems much weight is placed on a nominee ' s  
acceptability to as  many as  possible of the interest groups within the 
community. A comparison between the American system and PNG practice 
bears analysis. In the U.S. ,  Democrat and Republican presidential 
candidates attempt to win vote guarantees through the system of primaries; 
in PNG electorates like Hagen, preselection is a matter of a candidate and 
his campaign team securing agreements with the other sections and clans of 
the tribe that they will back him and not nominate their own people. As in 
America, this is undoubtedly where personal leadership qualities must 
shine. In Hagen, Paul Pora had long held a high political profile, 
unsuccessfully standing for the 'Niugini National Party ' in the 1972 
elections (Pora 1973) and continuing a strong association with the National 
Party into the 1980s. His subsequent success in business and his experience 
in various local and national offices set him well ahead of less eminent and 
younger rivals, Rumints and Kunjil. This kind of ' strength ' will also enable 
candidates to obtain similar assurances of support from at least sections of 
other tribes, as in Pora' s  case with the eastern Mokei. 
Finally, at election time, this judgment is tested when the various 
combinations of block votes are distributed among the candidates, capped 
by often fewer than 10 per cent of non-aligned, swinging votes. In Hagen, 
there were three tribal blocks not obviously, or not necessarily, associated 
with a particular candidate - Elti-Penambi, Kemi-Kukilka and Kopi - and 
these may be considered to take the place of the 'swinging ' voters in 
systems with well-defined parties. Their votes amounted to 15 per cent of 
the total and Pora won 37 .6 per cent of their votes - an almost identical 
performance to his showing in the electorate as a whole. 
All these considerations can lead to a general model of the expression of 
primordial factors in candidate support. The concept that 'biggest tribe 
wins ' was easy to discredit here though, hypothetically, it might apply in 
electorates with weakly developed political groupings at a level higher than 
that of the clan (cf. Ryan 1959) and, again hypothetically, large numbers of 
nominations. In · Figure 1 8a, we see three neighbouring tribes of different 
sizes, comprising say 1200, 1 600 and 2000 voters, they are undifferentiated 
with respect to clans and subclans; each puts up one candidate, a, b and y, 
and all voters in a tribe vote for their own candidate. Candidate 'Y wins 
because his tribe, C, is the biggest. 
A little more sophisticated is the model of pure ' segmentary 
enclavement' shown in Figure 1 8b. For the purposes of illustration there are 
seven intending candidates - a, pi ,  P2, "(1 , "(2, "(3, and 'Y4 - coming from the 
subsections indicated. Each receives the support of all the voters in that part 
of his tribe not claimed by another candidate. In this configuration, and if 
the lower level units in each tribe are of equal size, a will win with his 1 200 
votes, to P1 and P2' s  800 each and yi , "f2, "(3 ,  and y4' s  5 00  each. The 
message here is that the smallest tribe can win if its larger rivals are riven 
with internal dissent. As I have discussed, however, (a) candidates are not 
all equal with respect to leadership qualities and general credibility before 
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the electorate; (b) disputes arise between sections and nullify the ties of 
structural closeness; (c) not all electors vote for the home candidate; and (d) 
there are typically non-aligned tribes and non-village areas to consider. 
Figure 1 8c shows a 'modified segmentary enclavement ' model where 
the candidates are ranked in strength. For example, P1 is stronger than P2 
and can win the B2a subsection from him within Tribe B, overriding P2' s 
'natural ' claim to all of the B2 section. More than this, P1 can win 
subsection A2b in Tribe A, if, perhaps, its land abuts the land of candidate 
P1 's subsection in Tribe B and the two groups of people are on friendly 
terms; he is relying on the propinquity of the A2a voters to his base 
overriding the natural claim that candidate a has over them. 
In Figure 1 8c a dispute has arisen within Tribe C; in fact subsection C 1 a 
has had a fight with C l b  and has gone to reside with its neighbour, B2a. 
Cla  had thought of nominating its own candidate, yi , but has now given up 
the idea and has decided to vote for P2. After the election, uneven ballot 
counts for the remaining Tribe C candidates show that there was even a split 
within subsection C2b and one subsubsection has defected from 'Y3 to 'Y2· 
At this point, the candidates'  scrutineers are looking to capture the 
following numbers of votes: p i ,  1500 votes; y3, 750 votes; a and Jh, 900 
votes each; y2, 500 votes; and y4, 250 votes. But the last factor has not been 
considered - that not all electors vote for their kinsmen - and it is likely that 
the strongest candidates will be able to 'poach' further votes from the 
weakest. Candidate P1 , therefore, seems likely to win by a larger margin 
than indicated. 
In summary, this last model of voter behaviour best approximates to 
what is seen in Hagen; segmentary enclavement of support is evident, but it 
is modified by (a) a weighting attributable to 'leadership qualities ' ;  (b) the 
effect of a factor I have called 'social propinquity ' overriding structural 
closeness; (c) true floating voters; and (d) the shifting allegiances of non,.. 
aligned voter blocks. 
CONCLUSION 
With the benefit of hindsight, this exercise in mapping electoral results onto 
the political geography of the electorate was more successful than I 
imagined it would be. I emphasize that I did not start the investigation by 
interviewing the candidates or their campaign supporters. I suspect I would 
have become bogged down in an investigation of whose campaign funds 
were the largest, or which candidate's  promises were the most credible, if I 
had done so. Instead I paid attention only to what informants told me about 
the allegiances of groups in Hagen. Invariably men would have an elaborate 
historical reason why a certain group could or could not be relied upon to 
vote a certain way. My analysis here tries to replicate that information in an 
objective a way as possible and, by doing so, to arrive at a position where 
'primordial ' factors can be subtracted from the final equations. I believe 
this works to the extent that we are left with three equally well endorsed 
candidates, any of whom could have won from their voting bases. The 
winner triumphed because he consistently picked up more votes than his 
rivals at 'neutral ' polling stations and poached more votes from their 'home' 
booths than they did at his. In other words, he won because of an 
electorate-wide perception that he was the best man for the job. The size of 
the primordial voter base was not a factor in his win. 
280 JOHN BURTON 
r-1 Tribe C I 
(a) 'biggest tribe wins'  model 
A B c 
,/�- - -\, __l� 
I r--1 I _,, -r=-=�--=-�=i- ,  i 
�
A1 �A2 I (�81 \: (�82 \\ 
� 
I I I I I I I I I I ,� -, ,-6, 
I C1 a I I C1 b \ I C2a \ I C2b \ I f I I f 1 1  t I I f I I A1a A1 b A2a A2b I 81 a 81 b I I B2a B2b I I \ I I t  I I J I  
\ a / \ \.p1 / ' P2 / I I I  I I I I Y1 I I Y2 I I Y3 I I Y4 I ' / \ / \. / 
...... _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ ,.., , _ _ _  ,,,, ' / \. / \. / \ / \ / ...._ _, _ _,, ...... ..,..,,. ....._ _, 
(b) 'segmentary enclavement' model 
A B C 
_ _  c1-J _ _ _  h � 
,'/
�A1 --- -�\tl2/�- - - �81 - -�, 812 ,-- -- --�C1 C2 
: \ I t 
I I II , I I + \ / ' \ I A1 a A1 b A2aj 1A2b* 81 a B1 b B2a/ 1 B2b - C1 a I t C1 b  I C2b 
\��--- -�0'-- - -��----j \��--�1�/ \l/ / -- - -,\ ' ,+\ 
� ( C2a C2b1 /C2b2 1 4i! \ f / I f I 
(c) 'modified segmentary enclavement' model 
* P1  wins A2b - propinquity of the two subsections 
+ Y1 withdraws, takes voters to P2 (tribal fight within C) 
11 P1 wins votes from all weaker candidates 
Figure 1 8  
'- Y3 I \ Y4 I 
....... _ _  -/ , _ ./  
JOHN BURTON 28 1 
Sadly, even with seven candidates and a relatively well-ordered social 
organisation in Hagen, the results are combinatoric and they do not easily 
lend themselves to an economy of presentation that would enable me to 
produce a magical 'answer' .  If there is an answer, however, it is this: my 
representation of Hagen is a sketch compared to the volume of information 
collected in the heads of Hagen' s  traditional leaders as a matter of routine 
and which, through the interplay of many such heads, order daily political 
life in the electorate. 
Finally, Hagen had a special place in the 1987 elections because of the 
dimensions of the National Party-PDM struggle on the national stage, and of 
the PDM split away from PANGU which also occurred here. As I have 
portrayed it, the party-aligned factions have their historical roots in a 
century or more· of remembered warfare - not in the nationalist movements 
of the 1960s or 1970s. That the end result has the principal actors facing 
each other on the front benches in the National Parliament (Pora as Finance 
minister and Wingti as leader of the Opposition at the time of writing) is 
well worthy of attention in understanding the political dynamics of the 
modern state. 
ADDENDUM: SECTION 141 VOTING AND VOTER TURNOUT FIGURES 
The inflated turnout figures given in Table 2 are considerable cause for 
concern. Are they correct? How can voters cheat? Is double voting possible? 
The official position on this, stated publicly by the electoral commissioner 
in July 1988 at the Electoral Reform Seminar, is that the common roll is 
indeed in disarray but that double voting is impossible because the indelible 
ink used to mark the fingers of voters cannot be removed in time to cast a 
second vote. However, this is insufficient for the present analysis because 
(a) the statement does not get to grips with under-age voting, and (b) the 
Hagen Open election was not held during the main election period, meaning 
that more legal electors might well be available that ' should' have been. 
For example, many Hageners have multiple places of residence; if these 
happen to lie in difference electorates - say, Tambul-Nebilyer and Hagen - a 
prospective voter could well be able to satisfy an electoral official that they 
are residentially qualified to vote in either electorate. In practice, voters 
make a choice at general elections of where to cast their single Open 
electorate vote. However, at by-elections and supplementaries this may not 
be the case and all those (dubiously) qualified to vote may do so. 
Turning to Table 2, the acceptable turnout figures, ranging from 7 5 to 
85 per cent, relate to tribes that did not nominate strong candidates. Three 
out of four of the unacceptable ones relate to the politicised tribes that did. 
These figures can be challenged because the precise number of eligible 
electors is unknown and has to be estimated. It is possible to reduce the 
apparent turnout by assuming a higher rate of growth in the electorate than 
2.0 per cent a year since the last census. But calculations show that for the 
turnout to 'break even' at 1 00% an unprecedented rate of growth of around 
3.5 per cent a year would have to have occurred. We know this is 
impossible because the youngest cohort of legal voters in 1987 were born in 
the period 1962- 1969 when the birth rate was not high enough; even in 1980 
Western Highlands had the fourth lowest crude birth rate in PNG (30 per 
1000). 
It is an obvious hypothesis that Section 141 voting was abused to 
produce high turnout figures at some booths. However, this is frankly 
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untestable. There was an official reduction in Section 1 4 1  votes from 32 
two per cent of all votes in July (for the Provincial electorate seat) to 20 per 
cent in August (this election; Masi 1987 :5). And even in July there was a 
poor correlation (r=0.22) between the proportion of Section 1 4 1  votes at 
polling stations and the apparent turnout. The main reason was the use of 
the July Section 1 4 1  declarations to compile a Second Supplementary Roll 
for August. To say that this was a practice of dubious validity is an 
understatement and to carry the analysis further would be pointless. Suffice 
it to say that the initial 32 per cent rate of S 1 4 1  voting (30 per cent at rural 
polling stations) is absurd in an electorate where the population is 
essentially static. 
Examination of all three rolls used shows that they are very badly 
organised and that there are serious flaws in the manner of compilation: 
People appear more than once under different names. 
People appear more than once under the same name. 
• People appear in both the principal and supplementary rolls. 
• Husband and wife are given the same name. 
• Mis-spellings have created non-existent people. 
No second name is given (e.g. a 'John' is listed under Hagen town). 
Expatriates are included at Kuk DPI station. 
At non-village rest houses the roll is alphabetised by Christian name, 
splitting husbands and wives; at rural rest houses it is arranged by 
family groups, but not in a special order. 
• Common Christian names are mis-spelt (Geroge, Magret, Magaret, 
Mageret, Margart, Jerrery, Jenet, Jennet, Joccylin, Josphine, Thresia, 
Tresia, Thimothy, Vicent) placing them in the wrong places and casting 
doubt on the accuracy of customary names. 
An unlikely number of dependents follow the names of men; ages 
(estimated or otherwise) are not given so that wives cannot be 
distinguished from unmarried daughters nor unmarried adult sons from 
under-age sons. One man 's  name is followed by eighteen dependents, 
and only three marked 'F' appear to be wives. 
• A column marked 'occupation' is useless, almost all rural men being 
labelled 'SF' , subsistence farmer, and women 'HD',  household duties, 
regardless of whether they are parents or children. (Many urban men 
are also listed as 'SF'.) 
Some 36 people labelled as 'STDT' ,  i .e.  students, are enrolled at Hagen 
High School. These people are likely to be under-age. I located one, 
the son of a councillor, at a rural rest house as well. 
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Elsewhere I have urged the establishment of a unified system of field 
operations to carry out census book revisions on behalf of both the National 
Statistical Office and the Electoral Commission (Burton n.d.). I repeat this 
call here and predict with confidence that if this does not come about, 
sectional voting will remain a serious problem in 1992. A consultant' s 
report to the Electoral Commission comes to identical conclusions (Touche 
Ross 1987 : 17), but a proposal along these lines has yet to emerge from the 
Electoral Commission. Poor common rolls, it hardly needs stating, stand in 
the way of altering the constitution to allow snap elections. 
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Provincial Electorate 
Bougainville 
Central 
Chimbu 
East New Britain 
East Sepik 
Eastern Highlands 
Enga 
Gulf 
Madang 
Manus 
Milne Bay 
Moro be 
APPENDIX 1 
LIST OF ELECTORATES 
Open Electorates 
Central Bougainville 
South Bougainville 
Abau 
Kairuku-Hiri 
Chuave 
Karimui-Nomane 
Kundiawa 
Gazelle 
Pomio 
Ambunti-Dreikikir 
Maprik 
Wosera-Gaui 
Daulo 
Henganofi 
Lufa 
Oka pa 
Kandep 
Lagaip-Porgera 
Wapenamanda 
Ke re ma 
Bogia 
Middle Ramu 
Sumkar 
Manus 
Alotau 
Kiriwina-Goodenough 
Bulolo 
Huon Gulf 
Lae 
Menyamya 
Tewae-Siassi 
North Bougainville 
Goilala 
Rigo 
Gumine 
Kerowagi 
Sinasina-Yongamugl 
Kokopo 
Rabaul 
Angoram 
Wewak 
Y angoru-Saussia 
Goroka 
Kainantu 
Obura-Wonenara 
Unggai-Bena 
Kompiam-Ambum 
Wabag 
Kikori 
Madang 
Rai Coast 
U sino-Bundi 
Esaala 
Samarai-Murua 
Finschhaf en 
Kabwum 
Markham 
Nawae 
National Capital Moresby North East Moresby North West 
District Moresby South 
New Ireland Kavieng Namatanai 
Northern Ijivitari So he 
Southern Highlands Ialibu-Pangia Imbonggu 
Kagua-Erave Komo-Margarima 
Koroba-Kopiago Mendi 
Nipa-Kutubu Tari 
West New Britain Kandrian-Gloucester Talasea 
West Sepik Aitape-Lumi Nuku 
Telefomin V animo-Green River 
Western Middle Fly North Fly 
South Fly 
Western Highlands Angalimp-South Wahgi Baiyer-Mul 
Dei Hagen 
Jimi North Wahgi 
Tambul-Nebilyer 
APPENDIX 2 
POPULATION CENSUSES 197 1- 1980 
Province Citizen Population Increase 
197 1  1980 % 
North Solomons 90,382 1 25,506 39 
Central 1 00,264* 1 1 6,361 16  
Chimbu 1 59,729 1 78,0 1 3  1 1  
East New Britain 108,238 1 30,730 2 1  
East Sepik 1 80, 149 220,827 23 
Eastern Highlands 236,752 274,608 1 6  
Eng a 1 3 1 ,8 16 1 64,270 24 
Gulf 58 ,273 63,843 10  
Madang 1 68,2 1 2  209,656 24 
Manus 24,356 25,859 6 
Milne Bay 1 08,528 1 27 ,725 17 
Moro be 240,930 305,356 27 
National Capital 82,492* 1 12,429 41  
District 
New Ireland 58 ,507 65,657 1 2  
Northern 65,9 1 8  77,097 17 
Southern Highlands 1 92,047 235,390 22 
West New Britain 60,783 88,4 1 5  45 
West Sepik 93 ,479 1 1 3 ,849 22 
Western 70,339 78 ,337 1 1  
Western Highlands 2 1 1 ,456 264, 1 29 25 
* Estimates because Central Province and National Capital District were enumerated 
together in 197 1 .  
Source: 1980 National Population Census Pre-Release, National Satistical Office. 
APPENDIX 3 
Papua New Guinea national election 1987, party-endorsed 
candidates 
Party South Coast Islands North Coast Highlands Total 
Country Party 4 1 0  14  
Melanesian Alliance 7 1 3  20 5 45 
Morobe lndependent 10  10  
Group 
National Party 12  9 10  25 56 
Pangu Party 25 1 6  29 34 1 04 
Papua Besena 10 10  
Papua Party 17 17 
People's Action Party 23 2 3 28 
People's Democratic 7 1 3  1 7  39 76 
Movement 
People's Progress Party 22 14 23 30 89 
The League for 8 2 17 26 53 
National Advancement 
United Party 8 5 6 7 26 
W antok Party 14  1 1 1  26 
Leiba Party 1 1 2 
TOTAL 1 54 73 1 39 190 556 
Source: Turner and Hegarty 1988: 9 
APPENDIX 4 
Papua New Guinea national election 1987, returned and new 
members by region and province 
Region/Province 
SOUTH COAST 
Central 
Gulf 
Western 
:Milne Bay 
Northern 
NCD 
ISLANDS 
Bougainville 
East New Britain 
West New Britain 
l\1anus 
New Ireland 
NORTH COAST 
l\1orobe 
l\1adang 
East Sepik 
West Sepik 
HIGHLANDS 
Chimbu 
E. Highlands 
Enga 
S. Highlands 
W. Highlands 
l\1embers returned 
number 
4 
1 
2 
3 
1 
1 
12  
2 
4 
2 
1 
1 
10 
4 
1 
5 
4 
14 
5 
4 
1 
5 
5 
20 
New l\1embers 
number 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
12  
2 
1 
1 
1 
2 
7 
6 
6 
2 
1 
15  
2 
5 
5 
4 
3 
19  
Note: Gulf and Western Highlands each include one member returned to a different 
seat than the one previously held. 
Source: Turner and Hegarty 1988:  17 
APPENDIX 5 
Papua New Guinea national elections 1 977-87 ,  number and 
percentage of votes cast 
Election Estimated no. No. of votes Percentage of 
1 977 
1982 
1987 
of eligible voters a 
1 ,380,000 
1 ,600,000 
1 ,800,000 
cast eligible voters votingc 
970, 172 70 
1 , 194, 1 1 4  74 
1 ,355,477b 75 
Notes: (a) These estimates were kindly provided by Dr Bryant Allen of the Department of 
Human Geography, Australian National University. 
(b) The 1987 figure for 'number of votes cast' excludes three supplementary 
elections. The final figure will be slightly higher. 
(c) The figures cited by the Electoral Commissioner differ slightly from these: 
1 977 : 68.9 per cent, 1982: 66.3 per cent and 1987 : 72.9 per cent (PNG, 
Electoral Commissioner 1987: 5 
Source: Turner and Hegarty 1988:  23 
INDEX 
Abaijah, Josephine 53, 54, 56, 82, 84, 86, 9 1 ,  123, 1 30- 1 3 1 ,  1 34- 1 35, 1 46 
Bougainville Copper 55, 226, 232, 233, 235 (see also North Solomons) 
Boundaries Commission 38, 39 
Bureaucracy 72, 73, 78, 104, 105, 147 
Campaigns (see also Electoral issues) 
Angoram 1 12- 1 14, 1 17- 1 1 8 
Komiti system 1 17- 1 1 8, 
Kerema Open 1 67- 170 
Namatanai Open 217-218  
Manus 202-204 
platform and policy issues 7 5-7 6, 203-204 
strategy and tactics 7 4-77, 79, 1 68- 172, 196- 198 
role of money 23,  1 17,  202-203 
women 84-85 
Candidates (see also Electoral support, Tables) 
age 60, 89 
attributes 59-63, 1 8 1 - 1 83, 193- 196, 279 (see also Voters' perception) 
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